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This dissertation explores the news making process at CCTV-9, the Beijing-based 
global English language service of China Central Television (CCTV). My interest in this 
topic was triggered by the strange manner in which so much debate about media reform 
in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) elides any real discussion of the contribution of 
journalists themselves to reform, which is almost invariably treated as something that 
happens to media from outside of, or regardless of, what journalists do. My aim in this 
research was to address this lapsus and foreground the work of journalists to show how it 
contributes to the changing institutional framework in which their work is embedded and 
therefore contributes to media reform. Drawing on ground-breaking work on bounded 
innovation and resistance by Pan Zhongdang and Lu Ye in this emerging field, I utilize 
concepts derived from their use of Michel de Certeau and discuss these concepts in light 
of the works of Antonio Gramsci, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault to show how 
journalists at CCTV-9 exercised control over their work, despite their function as 
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mouthpieces of the news and publicity system operated by the Communist Party of China 
and PRC government. I am not suggesting that PRC journalists are dissidents. However, 
my research did suggest that the mundane practice of journalism, even in so constrained a 
media environment as that of the PRC news system, can alter the manner in which news 
is made and thereby contribute to media reform. Utilizing participant observation of the 
CCTV-9 newsroom in 2004-2005, interviews with a range of news makers, in-house 
documents and a survey of content, I construct a picture of news making at CCTV-9 that 
foregrounds what to more macro-oriented analyses of media reform in the PRC has 
remained inaccessible, the minutiae of everyday life in the newsroom, and the tiny, but 
not inconsequential changes brought about by the ordinary work of journalists. 
 viii
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................ xii 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... xiii 
List of Illustrations.................................................................................................xv 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................1 
Outline of the problem....................................................................................1 
Context of the problem ...................................................................................3 
Scope of the problem ......................................................................................5 
Contextualized and concretized research........................................................6 
Instrumental power and journalistic agency ...................................................8 
Rationale for doing this dissertation .............................................................12 
Theorizing journalistic agency......................................................................18 
Globalization & hybridization ......................................................................28 
Outline of research questions........................................................................30 
Outline of chapters........................................................................................31 
Chapter 2: China, globalization & hybridization...................................................35 
Introduction...................................................................................................35 
Globalization theory......................................................................................36 
The PRC’s problematization of globalization...............................................40 
Hybridization in China’s globalization.........................................................47 
Media, the nation & cultural policy ..............................................................49 
Rethinking globalization from a Chinese perspective ..................................55 
Discussion and summary ..............................................................................58 
Chapter 3: The Development of television in the PRC..........................................62 
Introduction...................................................................................................62 
Politics in command......................................................................................63 
Enter the market............................................................................................71 
The launch of CCTV International ...............................................................82 
 ix
Discussion and summary ..............................................................................89 
Chapter 4: The journalist & journalism in the PRC...............................................92 
Introduction...................................................................................................92 
Media and power...........................................................................................94 
Confucianism and the role of the journalist..................................................97 
Speaking truth to power ..............................................................................101 
The social theory of modern journalism in the PRC...................................105 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................114 
Chapter 5: Theorizing journalism in the PRC......................................................117 
Introduction.................................................................................................117 
Hegemony and its relevance for PRC media studies ..................................118 
Institutional analysis and journalistic agency .............................................123 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................135 
Chapter 6: Methodology ......................................................................................139 
Introduction.................................................................................................139 
Constructivism and methodology ...............................................................144 
Data collection methods..............................................................................146 
Data collection, analysis, and write-up .......................................................158 
Access .........................................................................................................191 
IRB & the issue of human subjects.............................................................192 
Problems with the research .........................................................................194 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................196 
Chapter 7: The relaunch.......................................................................................198 
Introduction.................................................................................................198 
The programming pre- and post-relaunch...................................................201 
Planning and executing the relaunch ..........................................................213 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................244 
Chapter 8: Editorial..............................................................................................250 
Introduction.................................................................................................250 
 x
General news & the editorial system at CCTV-9 .......................................251 
Editorial responsibility and resistance ........................................................290 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................295 
Chapter 9: Production ..........................................................................................298 
Introduction.................................................................................................298 
The role of continuity in news production..................................................300 
Continuity in PRC news production ...........................................................303 
The production system at CCTV-9 .............................................................305 
The production process ...............................................................................324 
The failure to handle breaking news...........................................................334 
My role in production .................................................................................342 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................346 
Chapter 10: Reporters ..........................................................................................353 
Introduction.................................................................................................353 
The CCTV-9 reporters’ group ....................................................................356 
Negotiating censorship................................................................................372 
Reporting HIV/AIDS..................................................................................378 
CCTV-9’s HIV/AIDS series .......................................................................380 
The tactics of getting AIDS Report to air ...................................................386 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................396 
Chapter 11: Content .............................................................................................403 
Introduction.................................................................................................403 
The news bulletin........................................................................................405 
The scripts...................................................................................................419 
Discussion and summary ............................................................................435 
Chapter 12: Conclusion........................................................................................440 
Summary of findings...................................................................................440 
Significance of findings for the literature ...................................................445 
Towards a theory of news in the PRC & the future of CCTV-9.................449 
 xi
Concluding comments ................................................................................459 
Suggestions for further research .................................................................460 
Appendix 1: Sample interview questions ............................................................464 
Appendix 2: Content coding sheets .....................................................................478 
Appendix 3: Samples of rundown and script coded ............................................487 
Appendix 4: Inter-coder reliability sample ..........................................................490 
Appendix 5: Test for inter-coder reliability .........................................................548 
Appendix 6: IRB Consent Forms.........................................................................549 
Appendix 7: CCTV-9 programs...........................................................................556 
Appendix 8: List of instructions and directives ...................................................569 
Appendix 9: News desk .......................................................................................579 
Appendix 10: Examples of story types ................................................................592 
Appendix 11: Copy editor productivity ...............................................................594 
Appendix 12: Illustration of the copy editing process .........................................597 
Appendix 13: Tsunami emails .............................................................................601 
Appendix 14: World Insight team & 2005 award................................................607 
Appendix 15: AIDS Report .................................................................................609 




List of Tables 
Table 1: Stories collected and used for comparison......................................178 
Table 2: Definitions of story types and bulletin elements.............................180 
Table 3: 1200 Bulletin comparison of news elements & filler .....................181 
Table 4: Units of analysis, variables, measurement & depth........................182 
Table 5: Old & new categories for coding Topic..........................................185 
Table 6: Number of stories of each type used in random stratified sample..190 
Table 7: Schedule of CCTV-9 before May 2004 relaunch ...........................204 
Table 8: Schedule of CCTV International after May 2004 relaunch ............205 
Table 9: Section responsible for programs....................................................206 
Table 10: Planned changes to programming pre- & post-relaunch.................217 
Table 11: Originally envisaged lineup for CCTV International .....................218 
Table 12: Comparison of programming..........................................................304 
Table 13: Distribution of categories into hard & soft news ............................425 
Table 14: Weighting of stories used for copy editor comparison ...................595 
 xiii
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Hours of weekly programming by section......................................207 
Figure 2: Hours per week of programming by news section..........................208 
Figure 3: The position of CCTV-9 within the ‘wai xuan’ 
editorial hierarchy ...........................................................................254 
Figure 4: CCTV-9 hierarchy of editorial control by reporting line................258 
Figure 5: Relative productivity of the copy editors at CCTV-9.....................328 
Figure 6: Script element for ‘AIDS fighter Gao Yaojie’................................389 
Figure 7: Proportion of new to repeat programming......................................407 
Figure 8: Proportion of news to filler .............................................................409 
Figure 9: Percentage of news & filler pre- and post-relaunch........................410 
Figure 10: Same as Figure 9 (News & Filler), 
but with repeat stories factored in...................................................410 
Figure 11: News & filler with repeat stories and anchor onscreen 
during new stories factored in.........................................................412 
Figure 12: Comparison of story types ..............................................................414 
Figure 13: Proportion of news by source .........................................................415 
Figure 14: Percentage duration of PRC and agency sources............................416 
Figure 15: Distribution of stories by orientation ..............................................421 
Figure 16: Distribution of stories by orientation with proportion of sources...423 
Figure 17: Distribution of topics, pre- & post-relaunch ...................................424 
Figure 18: Proportion of hardness to softness, pre- & post relaunch ...............425 
Figure 19: Proportion of hardness to softness by orientation...........................426 
Figure 20: Regions in the news ........................................................................429 
 xiv
Figure 21: Regions in the news, with sub-regions combined 
into full regions ...............................................................................430 
Figure 22: PRC major administrative units in the news...................................433 
Figure 23: Persons & institutions referred to in the news ................................434 
Figure 24: Who speaks in the news..................................................................435 
 xv
List of Illustrations 
Illustration 1: Webgrab of BSkyB basic news package ....................................86 
Illustration 2: Script for ‘Flu Controllable,’ aired February 1, 2004...............187 
Illustration 3: PRC reacts to death of Pope John Paul II .................................278 
Illustration 4:  Copy story CCTV-9, aired 1500 September 1, 2004...............281 
Illustration 5: CRI (online) Tribute to Deng....................................................294 
Illustration 6: People’s Daily (online) Tribute to Deng ..................................295 
Illustration 7: BBC Newsroom and desk.........................................................314 
Illustration 8: Spatial representation of the CCTV-9 editorial system ............316 
Illustration 9: Example of political editor correcting 
copy editor’s mistake ................................................................330 
Illustration 10: April 2004 publicity picture of the 
CCTV-9 Reporters’ Group .......................................................356 
Illustration 11:  Author’s annotated working list of stories for 
China’s Challenges (source: CCTV-9) .....................................361 
Illustration 12: Foreign Ministry fax criticizing CCTV-9 reporter ...................370 
Illustration 13: Sample interview questions for staff.........................................464 
Illustration 14: Sample interview questions for senior management ................471 
Illustration 15: Screenshot of Excel spreadsheet used to analyze coding .........486 
Illustration 16: Sample bulletin rundown coded................................................488 
Illustration 17:  Sample script coded ..................................................................489 
Illustration 18:  World Insight on the web..........................................................607 
Illustration 19:  2005 CCTV Outstanding Team Award for World Insight .......608 
 
 1
Chapter 1: Introduction 
OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM 
This dissertation grew out of my desire to find out how domestic journalists in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)2 go about their work on a daily basis. My curiosity 
grew out of experience in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, when I 
had been intrigued at how good at their jobs were many of the Soviet journalists I knew, 
despite the often hostile regulatory and censorial environment they faced, 
notwithstanding glasnost. I noticed the same phenomenon at China Central Television 
(CCTV) where I worked as a copy editor in 1999-2000 while I was conducting field work 
for my Masters Thesis. Many of the Chinese journalists with whom I worked were 
extremely good at their jobs, dedicated to making the best news possible, and unfazed by 
the regulatory and censorial regimes that enabled and constrained their work. 
Given the chance in 2003 to return to CCTV for an extended stay, I decided to try 
and answer questions that still lingered with me from my earlier visit and earlier work 
(see Jirik, 2004). In particular I had no answer for the manner in which journalists 
negotiated the pressures of the censorial and regulatory regimes and how, despite their 
formal subordination to powerful institutions of surveillance and control, they not only 
managed to do good work, but more importantly obviously had a great deal of agency in 
shaping their working environment and the kinds of stories they could do. Clearly, 
Chinese journalists were not puppets or marionettes dancing to the tune of the Central 
Publicity Department (CPD), which oversees censorship of media in the PRC, or the 
                                                 
2 I use PRC to avoid confusion with China, which I understand as an imagined entity that draws on myths 
of Imperial and Republican China, the PRC (including Hong Kong and Macao) and Taiwan. Chinese is 
used throughout as a cultural term. 
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State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), which is the regulatory 
body responsible for CCTV, in effect CCTV’s parent. 
After I had arrived back in Beijing to begin my dissertation research, the top level 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and SARFT ordered a relaunch of CCTV’s 
global English-language service, CCTV-9. The aim was to transform the channel from 
being a comprehensive channel – which featured news, current affairs, entertainment, art 
and educational programming – to being a news-only channel. In addition, the authorities 
called for the channel, as a news channel, to provide not only insight into China, but also 
to provide Chinese perspective on global affairs, expanding the scope of the PRC’s 
external publicity system, within which CCTV-9 plays a central role. In effect, the 
authorities wanted a PRC-based competitor to channels like CNN International (CNN-I) 
and the BBC World Service (BBC-WS). Management at CCTV-9 asked me to join the 
committee that was responsible for designing the new channel. I agreed. As a result, I 
was able to take part in the design and execution of the relaunch and to see up close the 
process of transformation at work. The relaunch was an unexpected bonus to my field 
research, and because of its importance for the development of the channel I made the 
relaunch a core focus of my dissertation. 
The over-arching question I sought to answer in my work was how can one 
reconcile journalistic agency with the equally obvious problematic that dominates the 
literature about journalism in the PRC, its role as a mouthpiece for the Party3  and 
government, and the propaganda function associated with that role? This over-arching 
problematic led to three broad research questions which framed my analysis: 
                                                 
3 Whenever I use Party with a capital ‘P’, I mean CPC. 
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• How do media institutions such as CCTV negotiate their overall relationship with 
the Party and government? 
• How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? 
• With the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International in May 2004, over time 
what evidence of change emerged? 
I return to these questions at the conclusion of this introductory chapter and 
provide intermediate questions that link the data chapters back to the research questions. 
But first, I want to outline the complex context that framed development of the research 
questions. 
CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM 
According to much of the English-language literature,4 despite ongoing reform 
and changes in the structure of media management, funding and regulation that have 
fundamentally changed the PRC mediascape in recent decades, journalists remain subject 
to a range of regulatory, institutional and editorial checks on their work that increase the 
more closely any particular medium or story is associated with the centers of political-
economic power, whether at the local, provincial or national level. 
At the apex of the media system is the newspaper People’s Daily, the Xinhua 
news agency and China Central Television (CCTV). People’s Daily (‘renmin ribao’) is 
the CPC daily. The Xinhua (lit. ‘New China’) news agency is an institution directly under 
the State Council, the PRC’s cabinet. CCTV produces the national nightly news Xinwen 
Lianbo (‘news network’), which is the premier news program in the PRC. By any 
                                                 
4 I discuss the problem of language and access to materials in Chapter 6: Methodology. 
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measure, these media are all mouthpieces (‘houshe’ 喉舌)5 of ‘power’, understood as the 
conjuncture of policy formulation, regulation and administration that characterizes the 
nexus between the Party and State in the PRC. 
However, it is my contention that because of the assumed role of journalists as 
mouthpieces for the power structure, research on PRC media has tended to neglect the 
role of journalists in producing news. For decades the prevalent wisdom was that 
journalists did this or that because they were first and foremost Party and/or State 
mouthpieces. The issue of control is still central to the literature, although nuanced 
accounts that questioned the relationship between institutions of power and journalistic 
agency began to appear in the early 1990s, and have continued to appear in the interim in 
work by scholars such as Hugo de Burgh (2000), Huang Chengju (2000), Lee Chin-chuan 
(2000a) Pan Zhongdang (2000), Zhao Yuezhi (2000), Li Xiaoping (2001b), Sun Xupei 
(2001), Hu Zhengrong (2003), Pan Zhongdang & Lu Ye (2003), Pan Zhongdang (2005), 
Brecken Chinn Swartz (2006), Sun Wusan (2006) et al.6 
In line with this literature, and recognizing a trend that seeks to analyze the 
workings of journalism as a situated and embedded practice in the PRC, I shall argue that 
journalistic work cannot be satisfactorily explained by analyzing only the political 
economy of media and/or the position and role of journalism within the power structure. 
Rather, the agency of journalists and their ability to exercise a great deal of control within 
their working environment, and shape to a degree the discourse on media reform must 
also be taken into account. 
                                                 
5 Analysts variously translate ‘houshe’ as ‘throat and tongue’ or as ‘mouthpiece’. Given that ‘hou’ also 
means larynx, I prefer ‘mouthpiece’ since it better captures the sense of the term, even if ‘throat and 
tongue’ may be more literal. 
6 For the sake of consistency, I have rendered all Chinese names according to the convention of family 
name first and given name second, even when they appear in the literature reversed to fit the Western 
pattern of family name second. 
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SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Part of the problem of researching journalistic agency in the PRC is that the 
mediascape is changing so fast that to determine what a ‘journalist’ is, let alone what they 
do, at any given time is difficult. As a plethora of sources point out (book-length studies 
include Donald, Keane, & Hong, 2002; Jia, Lu, & Heisey, 2002; Lee, 1994b, 2000f, 
2003b; Sun, 2001; Zhao, 1998), the media industry, including news, is continuing to 
expand and evolve rapidly, sometimes led by what the literature calls the Party/State (for 
a discussion of this concept, see suggestions for further research, p. 462), given the deep 
imbrication of the former into the latter, and sometimes forcing the censorial and 
regulatory regimes to make constant adjustments in a bid to keep up with institutional 
change. In early 2005, the government noted that the PRC had some 700,000 media 
workers, of whom 150,000 were registered as journalists (Wang, 2006b). However, 
Benjamin Liebman (2005), whose work on law and media is unparalleled in the English-
language material addressing that field, suggests official figures omit unlicensed 
journalists, while some proportion of licensed journalists do not do reporting work. In 
2005, Liebman (2005) put the number of functional journalists in the PRC at “more than 
500,000” (p. 8). They served television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and now 
increasingly the internet. Of the registered journalists, 60,000 worked in radio and 
television in 2005 (Xinhuanet, 2005). The television journalists worked at some 2,0007 
stations that serve a potential audience of at least 1.2 billion of the country’s 1.3 billion 
people (CCTV, 2006; Esarey, 2006, p. 2; Xie, 2003). 
Looking only at broadcast television, the PRC operates a four-tiered system 
(central, provincial, municipal and county) (Anon., 2008; Guo, 2003b). The national, 
provincial and municipal levels compete head-to-head in local markets. The top tier is 
                                                 
7 This number is contingent on the method of counting (see p. 74). 
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CCTV, the nation-level monopoly broadcaster, which in 2005 had sixteen analog 
channels available on the mainland that reached 95.9% of the population (CCTV, 2006). 
The second tier is made up of at least thirty-six (2002 figures) provincial and top-tier 
municipal broadcasters (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Qongqing), which have a high 
degree of editorial autonomy, including in news (Esarey, 2005, p. 49; Lee, 2000b; Lynch, 
1999; Zhao, 1998, the latter three authors cited in Esarey, 2005 p.42 note 16). Given this 
cursory description of the scope of the field journalism research attempts to address, 
clearly much space exists for clarification. 
CONTEXTUALIZED AND CONCRETIZED RESEARCH 
Given the size and complexity of the PRC’s mediascape and the pace of change in 
recent decades, by the mid-1990s scholars working outside the PRC had begun to jettison 
earlier theories, particularly the work on mass persuasion and propaganda that 
characterized early attempts to analyze media in socialist and communist countries. 
Critics (Chen, 2002; Lee, 2000f; Ma, 2000; Zhao, 1998) of the mass persuasion and 
propaganda model noted its ideological baggage, rooted as it was in an idealized vision of 
what the so-called ‘Western’ news model allegedly was not, and the subsequent failure of 
the theory to account for the rise of market-driven media within an authoritarian socialist 
system. A seminal moment in the re-thinking of PRC media occurred in 1994, when Lee 
Chin-chuan (1994a) called for a “contextualized and concretized” understanding of the 
PRC’s changing mediascape, arguing pointedly that the existing models bore little 
relationship to the reality of the PRC’s changing media, and that researchers should begin 
with specific examples and build theories on the basis of evidence, rather than ideology. 
Although Lee’s call resonated with much of the research community, the task of 
providing detailed and nuanced accounts of news-making inside the PRC has proven 
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difficult. Problems of access, language (for some), the size of the topic, etc., have all 
combined to limit the kind of research he called for, although a veritable industry in 
Chinese media studies operates in the PRC and Hong Kong and to a lesser degree 
elsewhere, including in the United States. The best of these studies have made 
penetrating insights into the general condition of the expansion of commercialization 
under which all media develop in the PRC. However, until the late 1990s, scholars’ over-
estimation of the power of the market to bring about democratic political change had led 
many analysts to underestimate the Party’s growing accommodation of the market, and 
instrumentalization of the market as a legitimating factor in the Party’s continued rule 
and dominance. 
The researcher credited with overturning this assumption in the literature was 
Zhao Yuezhi (1998), whose Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party 
Line and the Bottom Line was a sobering rejoinder to much of the field’s infatuation with 
the market. Zhao consciously applied Lee’s call for “contextualized and concretized” 
research, while introducing a paradigm derived from critical political economy and 
British cultural studies. Her work has since become indispensable for understanding the 
continued hegemony of the Party and the increasingly corporate relationship between 
Party and State, media and market in the PRC. 
In 2003, Lee acknowledged the influence of Zhao’s work, although he remains 
reluctant to admit the broader contribution of the PRC’s New Left, with whom she shares 
a loose affiliation, to an understanding of the corporatization of power in the PRC as the 
Party increasingly embraces the market (Lee, 2003b, p. 23; for an introduction to the 
PRC’s New Left, see Liu, 2004). 
If Zhao’s approach was to examine the structural relationship of the Party/State, 
media and market, a second approach to concretized and contextualized research has 
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been to focus on the newsroom and work of journalists. The sociology of journalism in 
the PRC is exemplified in the works of Pan Zhongdang (2000; 2005), He Zhou (2000c; 
2003), Li Xiaoping (2001b) et al. A third approach has been historical. Judith 
Polumbaum (1990), Hugo De Burgh (2000; 2003a; 2003b) and Lee (2004) typify a 
nuanced attention to history that added depth to the sociological and political economic 
approaches. Within the trajectory of these works, the conception of the journalist shifts 
over time from the passive dupe of the authorities associated with mass persuasion and 
propaganda theory to a sense that control in the newsroom is contested and negotiated. In 
particular, the recent work of Pan & Lu Ye (2003) and Pan (2005) analyzes the 
negotiation of innovation and provides an important insight into the agency of journalists 
in shaping their working environment and the institutional development of their field. 
INSTRUMENTAL POWER AND JOURNALISTIC AGENCY 
Following Lee (1994a), Zhao (1998), Pan & Lu (2003) and Pan (2005), in this 
work I attempt to provide a contextualized and concretized account of the work of 
journalists at a single media site by developing a case study of a single newsroom, that of 
CCTV International (CCTV-9 or CCTV-I).8 CCTV-9 is CCTV’s 24-hour global English-
language service. Although an expanding literature (Guo & Sang, 2003; Jirik, 2000, 
2004; Liu, 2006) has taken CCTV-9 as its object of analysis, the changing character of 
the channel justified further research. In particular, I focus on the relaunch on May 3, 
2004 of CCTV-9 as CCTV International. 
The rationale for a sustained focus on the relaunch derives from CCTV’s own 
attitude to the exercise. According to CCTV-9’s Controller (Managing Director) at the 
time, the relaunch was a significant change of direction for the channel, the introduction 
                                                 
8 I use CCTV-9 to label the channel pre- and post-relaunch, unless I am making a comparison between the 
channel pre- and post-relaunch. In that case, I use CCTV-I to refer to the channel post-relaunch. 
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of a rolling news service, and a shift in orientation away from being a window on China 
to also being a window on the world, a channel that would provide Chinese perspective 
on international events as well (Jiang & Liu, 2004). 
The relaunch followed the intervention of CPC Central Committee Political 
Bureau Standing Committee Member Li Changchun, one of the PRC’s eight top leaders 
at the time, into the development of what the Party calls external publicity or ‘wai xuan’.9 
Li, who at the time of writing was the Politburo member in overall charge of publicity, 
was on a trip to Latin America in July 2003 when he remarked that the people of the 
region should have better access to information about the PRC and that the PRC could 
use its own CNN. On his return to Beijing, that comment apparently put in motion the 
process that resulted in the CCTV-9 relaunch, as well as the launch on October 1, 2004 of 
a combined Spanish and French channel with global distribution.10 
According to my interlocuters at CCTV, the idea that CCTV-9 could compete 
globally with CNN, or more specifically CNN International, was originally met with 
derision and consternation at CCTV, which considered itself ill-prepared for the 
challenge. However, given that Li’s directive could not be ignored and moreover gave 
senior management11 leverage with which to strengthen CCTV-9’s position within the 
CCTV stable of channels, the challenge was accepted. 
                                                 
9 ‘Wai xuan’ can be translated as ‘external publicity’ or ‘external propaganda.’ Chinese does not 
distinguish between the two terms. 
10 I have put together this version of the genesis of CCTV International from the combined input of a 
number of CCTV personnel. None of their accounts fully tallied with one another, so I have made do with 
what appeared common in the different versions of the story. Following is typical: “I heard that Li 
Changchun was in South America watching television in a hotel and he didn’t see any news from China, 
and he said ‘why don’t we have a Chinese CNN?’” 
11 I use the term ‘management’ throughout to refer to staff at the level of the Editorial Board (see Figure 4, 
p. 258). By ‘senior management’, I mean staff at the level of Deputy Controller and above. Management 
can also refer to senior management, and senior management can refer to managers above the level of 
CCTV-9 within CCTV. 
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What Li meant by CNN must also be understood. Given that the Party operates 
from a Leninist perspective on media, which sees media as an instrument of the power 
structure, by “China’s CNN” Li was not arguing that CCTV-9 should be developed as a 
global news channel with editorial independence from political oversight, subject only to 
the demands of the market. On the contrary, from what is known about how the PRC 
leadership views media like CNN, apparently it views them as little different from PRC 
media, i.e. as instruments of political power. For example when Deng Xiaoping was 
criticizing foreign coverage of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, one source cites him as 
saying: 
The causes of this incident have to do with the global context. The Western world, 
especially the United States, has thrown its entire propaganda machine into 
agitation work and has given a lot of encouragement and assistance to the so-
called democrats or opposition in China – people who in fact are the scum of the 
Chinese nation. This is the root of the chaotic situation we face today. When the 
West stirs up turmoil in other countries, in fact it is playing power politics – 
hegemonism – and is only trying to control those countries, to pull into its power 
sphere countries that were previously beyond its control (Nathan, Link, & Zhang 
(compiler), 2002, p. 472). 
Moreover, in the Tiananmen Papers (Nathan, Link, & Zhang (compiler), 2002), 
source of the above quote, the government’s media monitors appear to make no attempt 
to distinguish between foreign media such as CNN and Voice of America. They lump 
them all together in the reports compiled for the leadership from the foreign press, which, 
according to the book’s editors, were the “most instructive items in the leaders’ 
intelligence flow” (Nathan, Link, & Zhang (compiler), 2002, p. xli). Whether this latter 
claim was the case is debatable. What is not is the non-contradiction for the PRC 
leadership of news media that are factual and accurate in what they report, if unbalanced 
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and partial in choosing what to report and what not to report, serving both as a source of 
information and a political instrument.12 
In the case of CCTV-9, whether the term “China’s CNN” or e.g. “Voice of 
China” therefore better characterizes the channel is a moot point, since the leadership 
does not distinguish between the two. From discussions with CCTV management and 
conversations with journalists, Li clearly wanted CCTV-9 developed as an instrument of 
global influence, or ‘soft power’ in the sense that Joseph Nye (2004) uses the term. This 
suggests the government sees CCTV-9 primarily as an ideological instrument even if that 
vision was at odds with the multiple visions many of CCTV’s and CCTV-9’s 
management and personnel had about how the channel should develop. 
I am not suggesting here that CCTV-9 was bristling with radicals or was a hotbed 
of dissidence, nor that it could compete with the premier news programs on CCTV’s 
Mandarin-language channels,13 or the dedicated news channel, CCTV News, launched on 
July 1, 2003. On the contrary, the overall tenor of CCTV-9’s work was unremarkable, 
even conservative compared to the programming of many other channels not only within 
CCTV, but within the PRC. However, even unremarkable and conservative work can 
have an effect, and through their quiet insistence on developing journalism that was more 
than a mouthpiece for the Party and government, the journalists at CCTV-9 were playing 
their own small role in a much bigger reform of media that has been ongoing since at 
least the mid-1980s, although, as I shall argue, its roots go back to the reform movements 
                                                 
12 Of course, an entire literature is devoted to making the same point about media such as CNN, that 
mainstream Western news media ARE instruments of power. In general, I am sympathetic to that literature, 
and would consider it a misuse of my work to contrast my findings with an idealized version of the Western 
news model, represented by e.g. CNN or the BBC World Service. 
13 Of these programs, the highest rating is Focus (‘jiaodian fangtan’), which airs nightly on CCTV-1 after 
Xinwen Lianbo and the national weather forecast. Other examples of respected CCTV news programs are 
Economic News Half-Hour (‘jingji bange xiaoshi’) on the economics channel, CCTV-2, and Tell It Like It 
Is (‘shi shuo shi hua’) on the 24-hour news channel. For an excellent discussion of the development of 
CCTV’s news channel, see Dong (2007). 
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that swept the last Emperor out of power in 1911. In short, in their vision for the channel, 
journalists at CCTV-9 were drawing on a long and venerable history of the development 
of journalism in Imperial and Republican China and the PRC, before the Party possibly 
derailed this process in calling for the creation of “China’s CNN.” 
Much of the outcome of the change in direction effected at CCTV-9 in May 2004 
remained unclear at the time of writing. Much depends on decisions taken at the level of 
the central authorities. However, much also depends on how CCTV-9 implements these 
decisions, since what was clear to me in doing this research was that many personnel at 
CCTV and at CCTV-9 were unwilling partners in harnessing CCTV-9 to any vision for 
the channel’s development that would further undermine the already limited autonomy of 
journalists in a system where journalists have long been chafing against the leash of the 
central authorities. 
RATIONALE FOR DOING THIS DISSERTATION 
A case study of CCTV-9 with an emphasis on the work of the news department is 
an appropriate topic for a PhD dissertation, as little is known about the minutiae of news 
production in the PRC, although the bigger picture from the perspective of the political 
economy of media reform is fairly clear. A lot has been written about PRC media and 
about news in particular. But the actual process of production, the manner in which news 
makers assemble stories and under what conditions, remains something of a mystery 
except to those working in news production sites. 
Because of the formal subordination of news media to the Party and State, 
analysis of the institutional position of news-making within the PRC power system is 
usually assumed to account for content. As a result, much of the literature tends to treat 
everything in between the political, economic and cultural contexts of news production 
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and the output as something of a black box. Very rarely are journalists asked why they 
are doing what they are doing. As a result, the inputs and institutional and organizational 
issues associated with news-making in the PRC tend to be taken for granted. Within the 
news-making system, journalists are denied more than token agency. 
What comes out of the black box is well-known. Analysis of the content of PRC 
news is well-established in the literature (see Jia, Lu, & Heisey, 2002; Lee, 1994b, 2000f; 
Zhao, 1998, et al. as a starting point). Research paradigms range from the propaganda and 
mass persuasion model that dominated the field in its early days to increasing recognition 
of diversity in media, including in news (Lee, 2000a, 2001; Wu, 2000; Zhao, 1999 et al.; 
Zhao, 1996). Against the dominant early trend of treating news media as mouthpieces of 
the Party and government, today analysts such as Zhao (2008) point to “ideological 
pluralism” and Zhao Bin14  (1999) to “unintended ideological pluralism” (p. 293) to 
account for the contradictory messages proliferating in PRC news. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the greater understanding of PRC media these 
more nuanced approaches bring, researchers still tend to analyze diversity within PRC 
media primarily, if not purely, in terms of the changing news-making environment, 
especially the tension between political oversight and commercialization. In particular, 
analysts focus on the contradiction between continued Party/State control of media and 
the shift from state subsidies to advertising as the primary revenue base for media. The 
resultant studies (Chan, 1994, 1995, 2000; Chang & Chen, 2000; He, 2000b; Jia, Lu, & 
Heisey, 2002; Lee, 1994a, 2000b, 2000d, 2001, 1994b; Zhao, 1998 et al.) have provided 
many insights into the changing political and economic contexts of news-making, and 
                                                 
14 Professor Zhao served for a period of time as a member of my PhD dissertation committee while I was 
doing fieldwork for the dissertation. During my time at CCTV-9, she joined the channel as a presenter of 
‘Documentary’. While I am very grateful for her insights and assistance, none of my analysis or 
conclusions should necessarily be attributed to her. My analysis and whatever errors are entirely my own. 
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their correlation in the changing character of content. But in news studies, the day-to-day 
affairs of the newsroom remain the missing link. 
This is not to suggest that visits to newsrooms and interviews with or surveys of 
news makers and media managers are uncommon in the literature. A range of studies 
(Lee, 2000e; Li, 1993; Li, 2001b; Pan, 2000; Sun, 2006; Swartz, 2006; Wu, 2000; Zhao, 
1998 et al.) provides a rich complement to the more macro-oriented analyzes of the 
contexts of news-making. They provide solid evidence of the increasing contradictions of 
the news-making environment and the effect these contradictions have on news makers’ 
work. In addition, several texts provide excellent interview-based insights into newsroom 
work (Huang, 2000; Li, 2001b; Sun, 2006; Swartz, 2006; Tong, 2007; Zhao, 1996 et al.). 
But systematic, long-term observation of the newsroom is rare. 
Several reasons either separately or in different combinations could account for 
this lack. Firstly, as I noted above, emphasis on news as a Party and government 
mouthpiece has oriented research to assuming that the presumed source of the message 
accounts for the content. The news-making process largely is taken for granted, given the 
assumption that news makers remain, in the final analysis, transmission instruments for 
the “Party line.” 
Secondly, to the degree that the mouthpiece metaphor is apt, the problem of 
access to newsrooms in the PRC might be presumed to be complex, although my own 
experience suggested the opposite. CCTV management was not averse to having 
somebody look closely at the newsroom, I imagine in the hope that I would produce a 
more nuanced account than the ‘China bashing’ that characterizes much anecdotal 
evidence about working at CCTV.15 
                                                 
15 The best known example of this kind of ‘China bashing’ is a look back at her experience at CCTV-9 by 
former copy editor Joan Maltese (2003). However, a number of other former or current of CCTV-9’s 
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Thirdly, news makers in the PRC may have a special reluctance to speak openly 
about what they do, given the political sensitivity of their work, and the danger of 
crossing an ever-shifting line about what is permissible. However, I found this latter 
barrier not to be the case at CCTV-9. I found my Chinese interlocutors eager to 
participate. They seemed to see my work as a chance for them to put on record an 
account of their work. If anything, the foreigners I dealt with in the news-making process 
at CCTV-9 were more suspicious and felt they had more to lose by speaking to me than 
did my Chinese colleagues. 
Finally, case studies take time, making a dissertation a time commitment that few 
researchers can afford. I solved this problem by taking a job at the channel. I spent two-
and-a-half years working at CCTV-9 between mid-2003 and late 2005. I was hired as a 
‘foreign expert,’ a categorization the State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs 
(SAFEA) uses for bringing in non-PRC nationals to work in certain state-owned 
enterprises and institutions such as universities or within the administration. I worked as a 
copy editor, consultant to management and adviser to several of the production teams, 
including the reporting team, and as a trainer of some of the journalists and writers. 
Working and doing research at CCTV was my second stay at the organization. In 
1999-2000 I also worked as a copy editor in the English department at CCTV, when it 
was part of a joint Mandarin & English language channel, CCTV-4 (Jirik, 2000, 2004). In 
2000, CCTV-4 was split. CCTV-4 became a global 24-hour Mandarin language channel. 
On September 25 that year, CCTV-9 was launched. Although this dissertation focuses on 
CCTV-9, my earlier visit provided a valuable starting point. Therefore my results here 
                                                                                                                                                 
foreign staff either maintain blogs or contribute to the lively blogosphere in the PRC with a strange mixture 
of pride and self-loathing about their work at the channel. 
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contribute to an emerging longitudinal picture of the development of English-language 
programming at CCTV that could be of value for future research. 
A second and perhaps more urgent reason for returning to CCTV was a nagging 
sense of incompletion associated with my MA thesis. When I published my earlier study 
of the CCTV English News, I wrote: 
Keeping in mind that most successful Chinese journalists are Party members or 
members of the Communist Youth League, direct supervision of their work by 
state or Party officials, other than media managers, is rare. Difficult coverage 
decisions are usually left to management. During my time at CCTV, I saw only a 
couple of instances of interference. (Jirik, 2004, pp. 134, italics added) 
I was being very careful in writing this paragraph, well aware that what one sees 
and what is the case might be different, even extremely different. I knew at the time I was 
opening myself to the charge of naivety. However, I was concerned and remain 
concerned that too much analysis of Chinese media remains ideological, steeped in the 
assumptions of the research traditions it represents, and concerned to mount a political 
argument for institutional change in the guise of academic debate.16 Nevertheless, I have 
had doubts ever since my first visit to CCTV whether I had not fallen into the very trap I 
was seeking to avoid. I.e. how ‘ideological’ was my own research? Had a desire to show 
the similarities between PRC and Western newsrooms blinded me to the day-to-day 
exercise of control over the newsroom by external agencies such as SARFT and the 
CPD?  
                                                 
16 One sees a similar trend currently gathering pace with respect to the PRC with a flood of ‘institutional’ 
interest, in particular from the United States, in ‘helping’ bring ‘rule of law’ to the country. While the 
Chinese have recognized rule by law as a much-needed palliative to the arbitrary exercise of power, I doubt 
whether US-style rule of law is what the Party has in mind or what the country needs. PRC media research 
and media reform have been blighted by decades of political struggle to undermine ‘communism’, masked 
as academic debate. The PRC’s fledgling legal establishment would do well to study the history of PRC 
media research to avoid similar pitfalls. 
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Criticism by Anne Marie Brady (2006) that “[p]ropaganda and thought work in 
China since the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 has been much underestimated and 
downplayed” ( p. 59) by twenty-two researchers she lists, including myself, suggests that 
the question of control was one worth returning to. Brady’s (2002; 2005a; 2005b; 2006) 
research provides much-needed insight into the structure and workings of China’s 
foremost agencies of censorship and media control. However, I am not convinced that 
accounting for the structural relationship of the Party and government to media more than 
partially accounts for the dynamics of power in PRC media development. 
Nor am I convinced in the implied contrast in this kind of research that the 
supposed independence of Western media is borne out when the concept of power in both 
systems is broadened to account for the cosy relationship between governments and 
mainstream media, regardless of the formal separation of media and state, whether 
through public service-type charters or commercialization of media. Bracketing that 
debate, which I have touched on elsewhere (Jirik, 2004) and accepting Brady’s (2006) 
findings that the work of the likes of Harold Lasswell et al. on propaganda have become 
key texts for guiding the work of media monitors and regulators in the PRC today, I ask 
whether deployment of Lasswell translates into control in the newsroom, or alternately 
does the use of Lasswell suggest that the CPD and other institutions of propaganda and 
media control are falling out of touch with the situation inside the PRC’s media 
institutions, including inside the country’s newsrooms? 
Given the complexity and uncertainty of the PRC’s ‘reform and opening up’ 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, analyzing control at CCTV-9 would give me the 
opportunity to investigate how Brady’s (2006) analysis plays out, whether power is 
contested and if so, how media managers and journalists negotiate control in the 
workplace, a topic that has produced some excellent literature in recent years (He, 2004; 
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He, 2000c, 2003; Hu, 2003; Pan, 2005; Pan & Lu, 2003; Sun, 2006). In particular, I 
would draw attention to Sun Wusan’s (2006) account of the manner in which a small 
television station in the PRC defied central plans for reform that would undermine local 
autonomy. Sun’s (2006 p. 43) account is all the more striking for reference to a general 
boycott by county-level television stations across the country of a 1999 policy designed 
to recentralize control of the broadcast system, forcing the center to retract the policy 
after three years. As Sun (2006) concludes: 
the Chinese broadcasting system does not work as an administrative pyramid or as 
a unified whole. Dispute and conflict take place at every corner. To refer … to 
Foucault, there is an unstable centre, uncounted points of collision, and conflicts 
and struggle arise at every point. (p. 54) 
Although Sun’s (2006) work was published after I had done my research, I sensed 
a similar uncertainty during my time in Beijing. In spending two plus years at CCTV-9, I 
was aiming in my research for what Clifford Geertz (1973) calls “thick description,” in 
this case an attempt to provide as full and contextualized a picture of the news-making 
process as possible. In particular, drawing on my observations and interviews and on the 
work of a range of theorists, as my research progressed, I became concerned to 
problematize any easy understanding of the newsroom as a passive instrument of the 
Party’s and government’s will. 
THEORIZING JOURNALISTIC AGENCY 
Lasswell is famously associated with the description of mass communications 
research as the task of analyzing “who says what in which channel to whom with what 
effect.” As a founder of the transmission theory of communication, he assumed strong 
media effects and a passive audience. According to Brady (2005b), Lasswell: 
is extremely influential in present day China, ‘unseen engineers’ were needed to 
manipulate public opinion. These were ‘a corps of experts, people who specialise 
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in the analysis and management of public opinion’ who were dealing with a 
‘fundamentally illogical public and therefore must learn to identify and master 
those techniques of communication that would have the most compelling effect 
on public attitudes and thinking.’ 
This description of the public might accord with how the CPD and SARFT see 
PRC audiences. It might even accord with how professional communicators such as 
journalists see their audiences. But is this kind of understanding of the communication 
process any less discredited because one is investigating the PRC? I doubt it. A cultural 
approach to communication and active audience research might suggest a high degree of 
agency for media users, even if, as the case may sometimes be in the PRC, the only 
choice is to turn off the television. Although this would not invalidate Brady’s (2005b; 
2006) findings, perhaps deploying Lasswell is not having the effect intended by the CPD. 
By way of illustration, the national nightly news and the broadcast most carefully 
regulated by the CPD, Xinwen Lianbo, goes to air each evening on CCTV at 7pm and is 
relayed by most provincial, municipal and county level channels. Between 2001 and 
2003, the audience for Xinwen Lianbo fell from about 360 million nightly to just over 270 
million, a loss of some 90 million viewers or twenty-five percent of its audience (Jirik, 
2003). By early 2007, the audience had shrunk to 135 million, a loss of a further 50 
percent of the remaining audience (Associated Press, 2007). The disappearing audience 
for Xinwen Lianbo triggered something of a crisis and some soul-searching at CCTV. Not 
least it opened up ways for news makers at CCTV to experiment with new formats and 
styles of presentation (Straits Times, 2006). Moreover it strengthened management’s 
hand against the CPD in the struggle to define what news should be in the PRC (Dong & 
Shi, 2007). 
Bracketing the audience, which is not a focus of this dissertation, I was concerned 
to investigate the complex relationship that links news makers, news institutions, and 
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external organs of the Party/State and their agencies of regulation and control. In 
particular I wanted to investigate issues of control, both as an empowering and 
disempowering process, and what kinds of resistance, if any, news makers deployed and 
to what ends, in their day to day work. Taking as my starting point the extant literature, I 
want to suggest that in order to better understand what journalists do, we need to rethink 
our understanding of the power structure and the position and role of media within this 
structure. 
I am not suggesting that journalists are somehow in opposition to the central or 
even lesser Party and government authorities. PRC media are state-controlled. Media are 
part of the power system. Rather, I want to investigate whether journalists can be shown 
to exercise even limited relative autonomy in the workplace. If so, then the workplace as 
a site of social agency is not simply an instrument of the authorities. Moreover, might this 
not suggest that negotiation and contestation of power are the norm in the workplace, 
rather than the exception? I draw on the works of (in alphabetical order) Pierre Bourdieu, 
Michel de Certeau, Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci to make my case. The theme 
relevant to my work that links these four theorists is a concern with power, and the 
relationship between structure and agency. 
Bourdieu (1999; 2005a) is particularly useful for institutional analysis, 
foregrounding in the concepts of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ a way of analyzing the range of 
possible actions of agents in any given institutional arrangement and political, economic, 
technological and cultural order in which institutions are embedded. Bourdieu (2005a, pp. 
32-33) developed the concept of field to discuss the role of producers in their work, and 
by so doing address the question Spinoza asked of hermeneutics, how could the sacred 
texts be understood without reference to their authors understood as historically and 
culturally embedded social agents. 
 21
Bourdieu (2005a, pp. 32-33) was concerned with contextual rather than textual 
analysis, which could not escape the double avoidance of the agent, whether in an 
immanent reading of the text or the crude reduction of the agent to the objective 
conditions of her production. Bourdieu (2005a) states that “a field is a field of forces 
within which the agents occupy positions that statistically determine the positions they 
take with respect to the field, these position-takings being aimed either at conserving or 
transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive of the field” (p. 30). A 
field is a “research tool, the main function of which is to enable the scientific construction 
of social objects” (Bourdieu, 2005a, p. 30). The journalistic field is the space of play of 
the institutions that represent the political, economic, cultural and technological 
disposition of forces that enable and constrain news making.  
Moreover, in his discussion of the journalistic field, Bourdieu (2005a) argues that 
it is important to focus not on journalists, but on “the structure of the journalistic field 
and the mechanisms that operate within it” (pp. 41-42). Thus, Bourdieu’s solution to the 
structure agency relationship was to avoid the dualism implied and seek instead the 
propensity for actions to be taken in the context of the conditions of their possibility. This 
relationship is expressed in habitus, a “socialized subjectivity” (Benson & Neveu, 2005, 
p. 3) that is a “structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perceptions of 
practices, but also a structured structure … systematic configurations of properties 
expressing differences objectively inscribed in conditions of existence” (Bourdieu, 1984, 
p. 170). 
In the PRC, the structuring forces that operated in the journalistic field at CCTV-9 
included the higher authorities within CCTV, the routines of news making, socialization 
into the rhythms of the work place, the social agency of news makers as workers playing 
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a particular role in the production process, and the imagined audience and real viewer 
feedback on management priorities. 
‘Field’ and ‘habitus’ provide powerful tools for addressing the particular 
conditions under which news making proceeds in the PRC. However, as Certeau (1984) 
notes, certain regularities escape Bourdieu’s sociology despite his fully relational 
explanation of practice. Certeau’s (1984) concern rests on the sociological character of 
Bourdieu’s work. He argues that statistical investigation finds only the homogenous, and 
misses the trajectories, which “trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that are 
neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop” (p. xviii). Certeau 
(1984) is suggesting what amounts to habitus in the multiple, a disposition to act not only 
in a particular way but also in ways quite contrary to those prescribed by the structuring 
structure and structured structure of their possibility, but a product and condition of those 
relationships nevertheless. 
In particular, Certeau (1984) is concerned to develop a “science of singularity” 
that would investigate “the relationship that links everyday pursuits to particular 
circumstances” (p. ix). In short, I understand Certeau (1984) as being concerned to re-
introduce the contingency of practice into habitus over and against its regularity in 
Bourdieu’s formulation. Moreover, a science of singularity is concerned not with 
contingency as an accident but with contingency as the “subtle logic” of ordinary 
activities “within a grid of socio-economic constraints,” which “comes to light only in the 
details,” but always expresses a struggle for life (tactics), an aesthetic (creativity) and an 
ethics (autonomous initiative) (Certeau, 1984, p. ix). Certeau’s (1984) account of the 
practice of everyday life is a response both to Bourdieu and to Michel Foucault’s (1977) 
account of disciplinary society. 
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Certeau (1984, pp. 45-49) accepts Foucault’s account of the disciplinary 
procedures that were perfected in the army and schools and generalized as procedures 
applicable to any institution through the elevation of visibility to a technology of control 
in the form of the panopticon. In the case of the PRC, the concept of the panopticon is an 
appropriate metaphor for the institutional relationship between the media and the power 
structure, especially media’s relationship with the Central Publicity Department, given its 
role in surveillance, discipline and where necessary punishment of journalists, and 
SARFT, given its regulatory role in journalistic work. But Certeau (1984) asks what of 
other procedures that “have not given rise to a discursive configuration or to a 
technological systematization? They could be considered as an immense reserve 
constituting either the beginnings or traces of different developments” (pp. 47-48). He 
continues: “It is in any case impossible to reduce the functioning of a society to a 
dominant type of procedures… Beneath what one might call the “monotheistic” privilege 
that panoptic apparatuses have won for themselves, a “polytheism” of scattered practices 
survives, dominated but not erased by the triumphal success of one of their number” 
(Certeau, 1984, p. 48). These scattered practices constitute the tactics of resistance that 
Certeau is concerned to show operate in conjunction with the strategies of power. 
The first scholars to deploy Certeau in the analysis of PRC media were Pan & Lu 
(2003). They deploy Certeau’s (1984) account of the ‘tactics’ of the weak (journalists) 
over and against the ‘strategies’ of the institutions that frame their work. In this way, Pan 
& Lu (2003) seek to account for the manner in which “power operates in everyday life” 
(p. 217) in news work and the manner in which journalists resist, appropriate and evade 
the established order. Rather than a monolithic apparatus of control before which 
journalists tremble in fear, to paraphrase Certeau, Pan & Lu (2003) show how journalists 
use the disciplinary and regulatory procedures imposed by the panopticon for ends other 
 24
than those intended. They subvert them from within, “not by rejecting them or 
transforming them… but by many different ways of using them in the service of rules, 
customs or convictions” functional to a discourse different to that for which they were 
intended. Pan & Lu’s (2003) use of Certeau aids an understanding of the manner in which 
journalists both reproduce yet contest the dominant hegemony in the PRC, even as they 
consent to that domination. In the banality of their workaday lives, they exert an 
inexorable if barely felt force on the dominant hegemony, shaping and changing it even 
as they reproduce it. 
The concept of hegemony is associated with Gramsci (1971), who argues that the 
ruling classes maintain their control over society through gaining, over time and not 
without cost, the consent of the ruled classes to domination. Zhao (1998) has used 
theories associated with Gramsci and their later development within critical cultural 
studies to show how the Party has maintained its grip on power in the PRC, despite 
commercialization, through engaging with the market and linking its legitimacy to 
success in developing the economy. For Gramsci, writing primarily about Italy in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries, the core institutions functional to the ability of the ruling classes 
to maintain their hegemony were the church, trade unions and the schools (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 56). However, a range of post-Gramscian theorists have extended that set where 
warranted to include other institutions, including media. 
The core of Gramsci’s theory is Marxian, pointing to the embedded character of 
the journalistic field in the broader political and cultural economy. Drawing on the extant 
literature, I shall argue that journalists in late Imperial China, Republican China and the 
PRC were and remain members of the intellectual strata, and hence deeply imbricated in 
the Chinese system of governance. Gramsci argues that intellectuals “are the dominant 
group’s “deputies” exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political 
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government” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Journalists in the PRC have inherited the traditional 
role of the intellectual in China, which I shall argue was to function as both an instrument 
and critic of the power structure. Moreover, as Zhao has shown in the case of the PRC, 
journalists today are also part of the burgeoning middle class. As such, journalists have a 
vested interest in championing the market. Therefore, they are inclined to consent to the 
Party’s hegemony in so far as it serves their own nascent class interest, but only in so far 
as their consciences, the product of what I tentatively call a ‘Confucian habitus’, permit. 
According to Gramsci, in the hegemonic process, the negotiation of consent is 
ongoing, hence the potential exists for an outcome that is not decided a priori by the 
political, economic and institutional structures where power is exercised and legitimized. 
In short, hegemony presupposes agency and the possibility of unintended outcomes. Such 
an understanding of hegemony comes very close to the dimension of contingency in 
everyday practice that Certeau (1984) introduces as a corollary to the concept of habitus 
in Bourdieu. 
So, what I am seeking to achieve in this dissertation is an understanding – at a 
specific media site (CCTV-9) within a specific ‘field’ understood in the sense Bourdieu 
(2005a) uses the term – of the practice of negotiating what Gramsci (1971) calls 
hegemony through the application of what Certeau (1984) calls tactics against the 
institutional strategies of the CPD and SARFT in a bid to recover for journalism some 
sense of how it is that the everyday practices of media-making, which piecemeal amount 
to little in and of themselves, can be thought of as contributing to the generalized 
discourse of power in the Foucauldean sense. Such an analysis should improve 
understanding of how change happens, even in systems characterized by a preponderance 
of top-down control. 
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Without such an understanding, systemic reconfiguration, whether radical or 
gradual, will constantly surprise, suggesting external pressure, unforeseen processes 
and/or the intended or unintended consequences of acts originating only in the power 
structure. Against this understanding, I see systemic reconfiguration as the result of a 
drawn out and barely visible process of the constant negotiation and contestation of 
power, played out at myriad sites in mundane practices that amount to little when 
considered in isolation, but which can snowball with bewildering momentum into the 
kind of confrontation witnessed between 1989 and 1991 across Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union and the PRC (symbolized by Tiananmen) when historical conditions 
permit. In Gramscian terms this kind of qualitative reconfiguration of the dominant 
hegemony can occur when the balance of forces shifts away from strategy and the ‘war of 
position’ favored by the power structure, to tactics and the ‘war of maneuver’ favored by 
historically weaker parties, leading to rupture. 
In attempting to understand the contestation and negotiation of control in the 
PRC, analogy with the work of media in the waning days of the former Soviet Union is 
suggestive. Any honest account of the collapse of the Soviet Union wastes little effort 
seeking prophets of doom, but rather asks in anguish why, except in hindsight, so few, 
including many of the best minds in the fields of political science, diplomacy and media, 
saw it coming. Even today nuanced accounts of perestroika and glasnost disagree as to 
the appropriate weight to accord the different agents of change, whether for example in 
the case of public discourse mainstream media or samizdat played the more important 
role.17 Suffice to say that in the Soviet Union, the government newspaper Izvestiya (‘the 
news’) and Russian republican television played quite different roles in the final days of 
                                                 
17 See Horvath (2005) for an excellent introduction to this ongoing argument. 
 27
the regime than did the Communist Party mouthpieces, the newspaper Pravda (‘truth’) 
and the national nightly television news, Vremya (‘time’) on the monopoly national 
broadcaster, Ostankino. 
I am making the analogy with the role of media in the Soviet Union, because an 
understanding of the role mainstream media played there in stimulating change, even if 
the result unintentionally was collapse, can improve understanding of how mainstream 
journalists in the PRC are affecting change from below. In short, by studying what 
journalists do, one can begin to see how power in the localization of its manifestations in 
hegemonic discourses plays out in a situated context and embedded practices. 
This is not, however, to suggest that the PRC is about to collapse,18 or that the 
Party/State through its agents the CPD and SARFT, and the market through its agent, 
ratings, do not determine the limits of media reform. Rather, I am concerned to argue that 
capillary power, small power, seemingly inconsequential power, what Foucault calls the 
“microphysics of power” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 174) always has an effect. And I shall 
further suggest that if the true measure of this almost invisible power is given by its 
accumulation at the myriad workplaces in the PRC where it plays out, then we shall have 
gained some insight into how hegemony works in the PRC, even if at each particular site, 
the preponderance of top-down power is overwhelming and any negotiation of consent to 
its domination is almost always but never quite inconsequential to the overall balance of 
forces. 
                                                 
18 Although the bewildering speed with which the USSR collapsed, and the almost complete lack of 
warning, does suggest how insubstantial in reality can be something such as a country or political system 
that seems so substantial just before it proves itself to be otherwise. 
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GLOBALIZATION & HYBRIDIZATION 
As one media site shaped by those forces, the reconfiguration of CCTV-9 as 
CCTV International under impact of its further development as an instrument of ‘wai 
xuan’ occurred in the context of the ‘going out’ project, a long term strategy launched in 
2001 to make the PRC’s external publicity internationally competitive (Liu, 2006; Xu, 
2002). The ‘going out’ project has three stages: 1) to restructure the whole external 
publicity industry under the leadership of the Central Committee and increase links with 
government departments responsible for culture, tourism, the economy, and education 
(timeline - two years); 2) to establish conglomerates based on Xinhua, CCTV and China 
Radion International (CRI), and the overseas edition of People’s Daily (timeline - five 
years); 3) to meet the final goal to create a position for the PRC’s overseas information 
system commensurate with the PRC’s overall standing in the world (timeline - ten years) 
(Zhang, 2004). 
The ‘going out’ project is part of the PRC’s globalization within modernity, 
which, in line with authors such as Liu Kang (2004) and Li Xiaojiang (2001a) I shall 
argue began in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s policy of reform and opening up. The PRC’s 
globalization then accelerated in 1992, when Deng ended further debate about political 
reform in the wake of Tiananmen and set the PRC firmly on the road to an indigenous 
form of state and non-state capitalism called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. 
The PRC is a problematic topic for globalization theory. As a number of theorists 
have noted, the ability of the CPC to appropriate and accommodate capitalism without 
ceding state power, including its regulatory power over media, to the market, suggests the 
emphasis on globalization as a process that removes barriers to external flows is at best a 
partial account of the complex dynamics at work. I discuss this at length below. 
However, here, I want to note that I shall be arguing that what characterizes the PRC’s 
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encounter with globalization is a process of hybridization that can be traced through 
Imperial and Republican China’s and then the PRC’s encounter with the world outside 
the borders of these quite different states. Hybridization is therefore a central and 
recurring motif of this dissertation. 
Kraidy (2005) has given us perhaps the best summary to date of hybridization, 
which he is concerned to strengthen through the concept of ‘critical transculturalism.’ I 
am less concerned to enter the debate over fine tuning the concept than to acknowledge 
what Kraidy and other authors before him have concluded: that ‘hybridization’ is a key 
concept for understanding globalization. 
The relevance of hybridization for understanding the PRC’s globalization should 
not be under-estimated, despite the dominant hegemony within PRC cultural and media 
policy, which constructs Imperial and Republican China, the PRC and Taiwan as part of a 
single monolithic entity, China, which has existed for five thousand years, peopled 
predominantly by the Han with a host of minor ethnicities playing different roles, 
including leading roles, throughout history. It is not my intention to enter this debate. 
Rather, I accept Kai-wing Chow’s (2001) analysis of the epistemic break that separates 
off Imperial China from modernity and use his insights to construct a framework for 
understanding hybridization in the development of media in late Imperial and then 
Republican China and finally the PRC. 
Although hybridization usually refers to cultural mutation of one form or another, 
at a more mundane level the concept is relevant to a channel such as CCTV-9, which 
mixes news and external publicity; is heir to the history of news and broadcasting in the 
PRC, yet welcomes consultants from entities such as Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation; in its everyday work mixes Chinese and foreign staff; mixes international 
and domestic source material in its stories; is broadcast locally and globally; and caters to 
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an audience of Chinese and foreigners. Kraidy (2005) notes that hybridity (hybridization) 
“invokes the fusion of two (or more) components into a third term irreducible to the sum 
of its parts” (p. 66). It is this CCTV-9 that I hope to invoke in this dissertation. 
OUTLINE OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My aim in this work is to construct a complex picture at CCTV-9 of news making 
as a social practice situated and embedded in the institutional relationship between media 
makers and the power structure, contextualized by the political economy and history of 
PRC media development. The broad research questions outlined above (and reproduced 
here) led to the following intermediate questions, which link the data chapters to the 
research questions: 
• How do media institutions such as CCTV negotiate their overall relationship with 
the Party and government? This question was dealt with primarily in Chapter 7, 
which analyzes the May 2004 relaunch of CCTV-9 and outlines the manner in 
which management negotiated the demand for transformation associated with the 
relaunch of the channel as CCTV International. The chapter answers two 
intermediate questions that followed from the relaunch: 
o What are CCTV-9 and CCTV International? 
o How did CCTV-9 negotiate the demand to relaunch CCTV-9 as CCTV 
International? 
• How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? This question was dealt with in Chapters 8, 9 and 10. Chapter 8 
outlines the editorial structure and system at CCTV-9, Chapter 9, the production 
system, and Chapter 10 focuses on the working of the reporters’ group. The 
intermediate questions each of the chapters addresses are as follows: 
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o How did the editorial system at CCTV-9 work? 
o How did the production system at CCTV-9 work? 
o What did journalists at CCTV-9 do? 
• With the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International in May 2004, over time 
what evidence of change emerged? This question linked the argument for 
evidence of change (or lack thereof) associated with the relaunch and introduced 
in Chapter 7, then reinforced in Chapters 8 & 9 with the empirical evidence of 
change (or lack thereof) provided in Chapter 11, which surveyed content before 
and after the relaunch. By using content in this manner, I was able to provide an 
objective correlation of the more subjective forms of data that resulted from the 
core of the research and constituted the bulk of the data in Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
The intermediate questions associated with this research question were as follows: 
o What was the content of CCTV-9 pre- and post-relaunch? 
o What did the survey of content over time indicate about the manner in 
which the May 2004 relaunch was operationalized? 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
This dissertation has twelve chapters. Chapter 1 is this chapter. The remaining 
chapters are as follows, with chapters two through five constituting the literature review: 
Chapter 2: China, globalization & hybridization 
This chapter discusses globalization and hybridization as two processes that frame 
and characterize the PRC’s media development. I argue that only by conceptualizing 
globalization from a Chinese perspective is it possible to establish cultural grounds for 
understanding journalistic developments in the PRC. 
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Chapter 3: The development of television in the PRC 
A discussion of the history of television in the PRC shows how the struggles of 
the past are very much alive in the present. What is clear from the history of the 
development of television in the PRC is that none of the debates in the literature reviewed 
in this chapter have been resolved and that the market does not offer a solution where 
politics has failed. 
Chapter 4: The journalist & journalism in the PRC 
The journalist and journalism in the PRC have their own history, which is both an 
embrace of certain values common with other forms of journalism and a specific 
response to the historical conjuncture of forces in which the journalistic field is 
embedded. In this chapter, I introduce the habitus of Chinese journalism and its 
commitment to social responsibility. 
Chapter 5: Theorizing journalism in the PRC 
In order to understand journalism in the PRC, a theory that accounts for the 
historical and cultural specificity of Chinese journalism is required. Gramsci’s account of 
hegemony is an important starting point. But Bourdieu, Certeau and Foucault provide the 
means for rethinking Gramsci’s political intervention on sociological, cultural and 
quotidian grounds. Together, the four authors contribute to an understanding of a tactics 
of resistance that co-opts rather than confronts the power structure. 
Chapter 6: Methodology 
In this chapter, I describe what I did in my data collection, analysis and write-up. I 
outline the role that participant observation played as the primary research method, and 
explain my use of interviews, documents and a survey of content as ancillary research 
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procedures. I look at limitations to the research and address the issue of working with 
human subjects. 
Chapter 7: The relaunch 
The first data chapter analyzes the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International 
and shows how the relaunch was negotiated by the different institutions and agencies 
involved. In particular, I look at the failure of the channel to implement the blueprint for 
the relaunch in the manner in which it was outlined in plans for the relaunch. 
Chapter 8: Editorial 
The second data chapter analyses the editorial structure at CCTV-9 and shows 
how news makers negotiate the hierarchy of editorial control that characterizes the 
journalistic field in which news making in the PRC is embedded. This chapter shows the 
limitations to the agency of news makers at CCTV-9, but also shows the limitations to 
external control of their work. 
Chapter 9: Production 
This chapter looks at the production process and shows how the reliance at 
CCTV-9 on third party sources for the majority of the news both enables and constrains 
the agency of news makers. 
Chapter 10: Reporters 
This chapter discusses the work of the CCTV-9 reporters as an engagement within 
the journalistic field with the full range of forces that enable and constrain its 
possibilities. Through analysis of a single story, HIV/AIDS, I show how journalists, as a 
mouthpiece of the Party and government, still find ways to speak truth to power. 
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Chapter 11: Content 
Content helps to inform data derived from participant observation, interviews and 
documents. In this chapter I illustrate what results from the production process and 
provide empirical evidence of the process of transformation associated with the May 
2004 relaunch. 
Chapter 12: Conclusion 
In my conclusion, I discuss the findings of the dissertation and relate them back to 
the theory and literature that framed the research questions. Based on my findings at 
CCTV-9, I offer a tentative theory of what is required if PRC news media are to develop 
not only as a mouthpiece for the Party and government, but also continue, in face of the 
encroaching market, the long tradition of socially responsible journalism associated with 
elements of Imperial and Republican Chinese media and media in the PRC. 
As part of my discussion of the possibilities for further research, I explain why I 
have not problematized the unwieldy term Party/State in my work, and why I have not 
addressed bureaucratic inertia as a problem at CCTV-9. However, in both cases, I am 
concerned at the need for PRC media research in general to address both issues, even if at 
CCTV-9 they were not a particular problem. 
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Chapter 2: China, globalization & hybridization 
INTRODUCTION 
The relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International took place in the context of the 
globalization of PRC media. As noted in the introduction, the relaunch was meant to 
mark a significant change in the channel’s identity, as it not only became a rolling news 
channel, but also shifted from being a window on the PRC to a window that provided 
Chinese perspective on world events and issues as well. 
In this chapter, I look at the concept of globalization, especially with relation to 
the manner in which China’s development problematizes globalization theory. Against 
the expectations of the theory (or theories) I look at the intransigence of the state and the 
rise of the nation in the context of China’s globalization, I deploy the concept of 
hybridization as both the condition and process of Chinese globalization, and I 
reconceptualize globalization from a Chinese perspective. This chapter provides the 
necessary contextual background for the discussion of the development of television and 
journalism in subsequent chapters, which frame the development of CCTV-9 and 
therefore constitute the habitus of the journalistic field in the PRC. 
By situating the development of CCTV-9 within the broader frame of the PRC’s 
globalization, I want to provide a context for seeing beyond the findings of this 
dissertation. As will become obvious as I move into the data chapters, CCTV-9 is still 
only in its infancy as a global broadcaster. But to write it off by contrasting it in the short 
term with the performance of its rivals would be to miss the quite different goals of media 
associated with the ‘wai xuan’ system from those media with which CCTV-9 competes. 
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GLOBALIZATION THEORY 
David Held and Anthony McGrew (2000) note that “[n]o single universally 
agreed definition of globalization exists” (p. 3). However, a range of positions cluster 
around a set of processes that permit a working definition, which is sufficiently clear to 
make globalization a viable concept for analytical purposes. Against internationalization 
or regionalization, which focus on the nation state or combinations of states (see Held, 
McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2000; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Sinclair, 1996), what 
characterizes the globalization thesis is that its proponents take the ‘global’ as the unit of 
analysis (Appadurai, 1990; Castells, 2000b; Featherstone, 1990; Giddens, 1997; Hardt & 
Negri, 2000; Harvey, 2000; Held & McGrew, 2000; Robertson, 1990 et al.). They then 
tend to apply this unit of analysis to one or more of four fields of social life: politics, the 
economy, technology, and culture. 
With respect to politics, Mike Featherstone (1990, p. 7, ) notes that, under 
globalization, development of nation-states increasingly takes place within a global 
political system that imagines the nation in terms of universal human norms, orders it 
according to universal standard time, while submitting it in varying degrees to the 
governance of supranational institutions and agencies. A global political system points to 
the reconfiguration and even dissolution of borders in the complex interactions and 
accommodations the state must increasingly make in its encounter with supra-national 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade 
Organization and extra-national institutions such as transnational corporations (TNCs) 
(Castells, 2000b; Giddens, 1997). 
Political globalization is closely associated with economic globalization. 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1990) bases the world system on the logic of ceaseless 
accumulation of capital, and identified its roots in the 16th century. But as Johann 
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Arnason (1990, p. 225, ) points out, in its early form this system remained centered on the 
nation state as a functional unit within the international division of labor. 
Notwithstanding the experience of isolated states such as the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Cuba, Edward Friedman (1999) suggests that the system 
becomes global only with the collapse of Soviet and East European socialism, and thus, 
according to many theorists of globalization, of any alternative to capitalism (at least for 
the foreseeable future). In a global economy, financial flows in particular increasingly 
challenge boundaries associated with the sovereignty of political power (Appadurai, 
1990; Castells, 2000b; Giddens, 1997; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Sassen, 2001 et al.). 
Symptomatic of economic globalization is the neo-liberal turn: the displacement 
of Keynesian interventionism and demise of the development state, and the revival of 
laissez-faire with the increasing expansion and autonomy of capital (Arrighi, 1994). The 
nation-state system, often traced back to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, but never stable 
(Hopkins, 2002), begins its latest reconfiguration in 1989, resulting in the current 
situation of U.S. and G7 political and economic hegemony within the world system 
(Castells, 2000b; Giddens, 1997; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Held & McGrew, 2000; Lash & 
Urry, 1987 et al.). 
The political economy of globalization drives and is driven by technologies from 
the steamship and railroad to satellites and the internet that increasingly collapse space 
and time in processes of ‘time space compression’ (Harvey, 2000) and ‘time space 
distanciation’ (Giddens, 1997). Compression and distanciation point to the erosion of 
constraints on global patterns of organization and interaction. Compression points more 
to the temporal dimension, emphasizing the intensification and acceleration of 
globalizing processes (Harvey, 2000). Distanciation emphasizes the spatial dimension of 
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globalization, the increasingly “complex relations between local involvements … and 
interaction across distance” (Giddens, 1997, p. 19, ). 
Associated with compression and distanciation is a decrease in boundaries and 
increase of flows within the global system. Noting political, economic, and technological 
reconfiguration, Arjun Appadurai (1990) identifies an acceleration and expansion of 
flows across borders of people, finance, technology, symbols and ideologies. Under these 
conditions, the use of media to mobilize a national project comes increasingly under 
threat. Bracketing the U.S. experience, media systems have traditionally been harnessed 
to state building through enabling the construction of the nation as an imagined 
community (Anderson, 1983; Schlesinger, 1997). But as media systems commercialize 
under impact of the changing relationship between the state and capital, disjunctural and 
conjunctural flows increasingly reconfigure imagination in forms ranging from the local 
to the global, foregrounding the duality of homogenization and heterogenization in the 
cultural dimension. 
Roland Robertson (1991) describes cultural reconfiguration under globalization as 
a “massive, twofold process involving the interpenetration of the universalization of 
particularism and the particularization of universalism” (p. 73). Against the struggle for 
homogenization of world culture under the imperial sign of McDonalds (Barber, 1995; 
Friedman, 2000), Robertson et al. point to various forms of cultural adaptation, including 
‘glocalization’ (localizing the global), ‘hybridization’ (cultural fusion, resulting in 
cultural novelty), ‘creolization’ (linguistic hybridization), etc. as a better representation of 
the negotiated character of cultural interpenetration (Friedman, 2000; Galison, 1996; 
Garcia Canclini, 2001; Robertson, 1995; Tomlinson, 1991 et al.).19 
                                                 
19 Definitions of terms such as these are contested, as are the definitions of other terms such as 
syncretization and transculturation. However, what they share is opposition to homogenization. 
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Acknowledging interpenetration and the disjunctural logics of flow, many 
analysts, nevertheless, continue to draw attention to the conjunctural relationships 
between political economy and culture. Recalling the older arguments of cultural and 
media imperialism associated with the struggle against imperialism and colonization, 
they critique the normalization of consumerism as a lifestyle, and naturalization of 
capitalism as an economic formation in the era of globalization (Bagdikian, 1992; Boyd-
Barrett, 1997; Schiller, 1991 et al.). 
Globalization is characterized by complex interconnectedness that qualitatively 
changes relationships of sovereignty, in particular the sovereignty of the nation-state 
within the world system. Although globalization has systemic characteristics, it is 
characterized not only by a systematization that is functional to integration and 
homogeneity, but equally, if not more so, by a tendency to disintegration and 
heterogeneity (Castells, 2000a, 2000b; Friedman, 2000; Giddens, 1997; Hardt & Negri, 
2000; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 2000 et al.). In short, globalization points to 
the extension, intensification and acceleration of globally integrative and disintegrative 
processes that reconfigure not only nation states and regional actors, but also enable and 
constrain the actions of extra-territorial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, de-
territorialized actors such as Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) and de-localized 
individuals, such as money market managers and media practitioners with TNC media 
forms such as Reuters, CNN International, BBC World Service, etc. 
Finally, the periodization of globalization depends on the particular emphasis of 
the author. The term was first used in Western scholarship in the 1960s and early 1970s 
(Held & McGrew, 2000, p. 2). Wallerstein (1990), as noted, dates the processes to which 
it refers to the emergence of capitalism in Europe in the late 15th Century. Robertson 
(1990) recognizes several phases of globalization, but sees a qualitative shift to the world 
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as a whole with the global expansion, beginning in the 1880s, of the Westphalian state 
system. On the other hand, as Hopkins (2002) notes, a range of authors, who emphasize 
the decline if not demise of the nation-state under impact of globalization, tend to locate 
the starting point in events leading to and following from the fall of the Berlin Wall 
(Friedman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1992 et al.). Regardless, the literature invariably points to 
the latest phase of globalization as the culmination of a range of processes associated 
with modernity, the expansion of the capitalist world system and assimilation of the 
global political economy to its logics. 
THE PRC’S PROBLEMATIZATION OF GLOBALIZATION 
The U.S. and Euro-centric theory, or rather set of theories, summarized above 
provides at best only a partial account of China’s globalization. Politically, what clearly 
characterizes the PRC’s globalization is Beijing’s conceptualization of the world system 
as one in which nation-states remain sovereign. This is clear from Beijing’s insistence on 
the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis of its foreign policy. The 
principles are a) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, b) mutual non-
aggression, c) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, d) equality and mutual 
benefit, and e) peaceful coexistence (Peoples Daily, 2004). 
Beijing ignores the five principles when it suits, having supported numerous 
national liberation movements globally, especially during the era of de-colonization. The 
PRC fought U.N. forces in Korea, lent material support to Hanoi in its struggle against 
the U.S-backed South in Vietnam, and to the Khmer Rouge (which also benefited from 
U.S. support), in the bloody civil turmoil and attendant genocide in Kampuchea (Kiernan, 
2004). This mix of ideology and pragmatism continues today, evident in the PRC’s 
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support of East Timor’s struggle for independence from Indonesia (Kyodo, 2000a, 
2000b). 
Moreover, Beijing dismisses criticism of the PRC’s human rights record, 
reiterating national sovereignty in this field, even as it levels criticism of human rights 
abuse by other countries such as the United States. Despite the rhetoric of non-
interference, the Party operates from within an international relations paradigm that 
mixes ideology and realpolitik, not a globalization paradigm. Against the increasingly 
unconstrained ‘flow’ thesis at the core of much globalization theory, the processes of 
globalization are filtered through a pervasive political and ideological layer in their 
encounter with the PRC. Moreover, the sovereignty of politics within the PRC political 
and cultural economy and political penetration of the workplace through the Party-cell 
system mean that the filtering also extends into the economic, technological and cultural 
fields. 
A range of authors (Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Curran & Park, 2000a; Ferguson, 
1992; Kraidy, 2005; Ma, 2000; Sinclair, 1996) have commented on the premature death 
notice issued to the nation, state and nation state in the context of intensifying 
globalization. John Sinclair for example (1996) argues that the nation state “has to remain 
the definitive unit of analysis” (p. 56). The PRC’s globalization bears out this claim. 
However, few authors have analyzed the specific challenge for globalization theory that 
China’s globalization poses. Three who have are Friedman (1999; 1994c) John Hobson 
(2004) and Liu Kang (2004). 
Friedman is concerned to recover for Asia a history of democratization, against 
the ‘passive’ and ‘authoritarian’ Asia theses that have justified imperialism and 
authoritarianism, including within Asia. Hobson (2004) argues that globalization is first 
of all an historical process that began in the East and in particular in China around 500 
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CE, and that what is usually understood as globalization is in fact only the latest phase in 
centuries of “oriental globalization” (Hobson, 2004, p. 2). Hobson (2004, pp. 2-3) argues 
that the East, especially China, enabled the rise of the West through the export of ideas, 
technologies, institutions and products, which then returned as the weapons of 
imperialism and colonization, during which time Asia functioned as a source of material 
resources for the West. In short, Hobson (2004) is suggesting that in order to analyze 
globalization, an Asian rather than a European starting point is required. 
In contrast to Friedman’s and Hobson’s historical approaches, which call into 
question the definition of globalization and its periodization, Liu Kang (2004) embeds 
globalization in capitalist modernity and critiques neoliberal capitalist globalization in an 
attempt to recover for Mao Zedong’s revolutionary legacy the tenor of its idealism, 
without a return to the worst of its practices (the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution), in a bid to offer an alternative “so that the destructive and oppressive 
tendencies of global capitalism can be effectively curtailed” (Liu, 2004, p. 4). 
Liu (1998) argues that globalization within modernity began for the PRC in 1978 
when Deng Xiaoping moved to re-open the country to restricted engagement within the 
global system, primarily with the world market.20 Other possible starting points include 
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern tour in 1992, since it not only marked the shift from 
experimentation with the market in special economic zones to the full blown adoption of 
the market and ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, but also linked the PRC to the 
global implosion of communism which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. The PRC’s accession into the WTO in December 2001 is another key date for 
analyzing the relationship between the PRC and globalizing processes, since WTO entry 
                                                 
20 An earlier starting point would be the PRC’s entry into the United Nations in 1971, but the Cultural 
Revolution made this a formal rather than substantive opening. 
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marked the point at which the PRC further opened its economy, while agreeing to global 
trade rules set and arbitrated by the organization, i.e., giving up some political 
sovereignty in order to have greater access to the global economy. 
Whichever starting point one takes, explosive and sustained economic growth has 
transformed the PRC in recent decades, transforming its relations with the outside world, 
and, more importantly for globalization theory, transforming much of the global political 
economy as well. 
Manuel Castells (2000a; 2000b) analyzes the PRC’s globalization not only as an 
internal phenomenon, but as a process increasingly linking the country into the global 
system through increased flows of capital, information, technology, media, and people in 
networks both within the PRC and increasingly with the outside world through global 
nodes such as Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. However, Castells, like other theorists 
of globalization mentioned above, falls short in not recognizing the impact the PRC’s 
exports have been having on the global political economy, Beijing’s growing clout in 
regional and global political, diplomatic and military relations, and the country’s growing 
demand for external resources and impact on global trade. 
Although the full impact of the PRC’s transformation is only beginning to be fully 
felt globally, the decision to open up the country in 1978 was what triggered the process, 
when one of the two nodes of the socialist system began to jettison central planning and 
state-ownership as the core of the socialist economy, long before the Soviet Union began 
to experiment with economic restructuring (perestroika). Against globalization as 
primarily an economic process, as Li (2001a), Castells (2000a, p.309) et al. point out, 
from the outset the reform process in the PRC was a political project, set in motion by the 
Party, and subject to Party control in a fashion that undermines the characterization of 
globalization as a process largely beyond the control of the state, which is how celebrants 
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of U.S.-centric and neoliberal globalization (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1993) tend to 
analyze the failure of perestroika in the USSR. 
Emphasis on the economy at the expense of the state, which is seen as a “problem 
to be solved” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 157) highlights the neo-liberal and libertarian tenets of 
many proponents of globalization, who link economic liberalization and political 
freedom. However, as Stephen Manning (1994, p. 243), Friedman (1994a, p. 30), (Zhao, 
1998) et al. point out, the ability of the Party to open the PRC’s economy to global 
market forces, including most recently through joining the WTO, without losing political 
control is evidence of the argument that there is no necessary connection between the 
market and democratization, in contrast to arguments that focus on the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and collapse of the USSR as an indicator of this connection. 
In the case of the PRC, the East European and Soviet experience galvanized the 
Party’s further resistance to democratization in the wake of Tiananmen. Political debate 
within the Party over reform throughout the 1980s and popular dissatisfaction which 
culminated in the June 1989 crackdown and killings was displaced internally with a 
renewed emphasis on economic development as a way of legitimizing continued Party 
rule, despite the failure of socialism to deliver on utopian promises (Liu, 1998, pp. 164-
168; Zhao, 1998, pp. 1-9). 
Given the apparent failure of socialism, a range of authors have pointed to the 
manner in which the legitimation crisis facing the CPC problematizes continued Party 
rule (Friedman, 1994c; Lee, 2001; Liu, 2004; Zhao, 1998 et al.). However Zhao’s (2008) 
work on the neo-liberal turn within the Party and its ability to date to harness economic 
development to bolster its legitimacy suggests an indeterminate outcome to the PRC’s 
embrace of the market and capitalism. 
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The Party’s embrace of the market without political reform also problematizes 
assumptions about the role of information technologies in globalization. Globalization 
theory foregrounds the rise of the information economy as an instrument of greater 
openness (Castells, 2000a; Featherstone, 1990). An open information architecture 
predicated on rapid communications is considered a prerequisite for success in the global 
economy, which, some suggest, poses a problem for authoritarian political systems  
(Castells, 2000b, p. 66; Ferguson, 1992, pp. 78-79). 
However, the PRC’s success in developing its domestic and export markets, 
without the Party ceding political ground, undermines the argument that the technologies 
of globalization erase constraints on political oppression and information flows. The PRC 
has a relatively developed telecommunications infrastructure and nationwide state 
broadcasting system, exemplified by CCTV, and increasingly competition from 
provincial and municipal broadcasters. It also has a highly developed international 
broadcasting network in radio, television, and increasingly online in a variety of 
languages.21 The government is rapidly deploying the internet. By the end of 2006, the 
PRC reported 137 million internet users, 10.5% of the population and, after the United 
States, the world’s biggest user-group, although its remains a small and privileged sector 
of the PRC’s population.22 
The Party is attempting to balance information access in the interests of economic 
efficiency with restrictions on information that would undermine official ideology 
(Harrison, 2002; Lynch, 2000). As a result, political control of elements of the 
                                                 
21 The state-run China.org.cn “China’s official gateway to news and information” is available in Chinese 
(simplified and traditional), Arabic, English, Esperanto, French, German, Japanese, Korean, Russian and 
Spanish. (see www.china.org.cn) 
22 Source: State Internet Network Information Centre (CNN-IC), homepage: www.CNN-Ic.net.cn 
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telecommunications and media system such as internet content and national news media 
remains a priority (Lee, 2000f; Zhao, 1998). 
Whether this balancing act can succeed is uncertain. Since Tiananmen in 1989, a 
relaxation control cycle has characterized the Party’s approach to ideology, suggesting 
future developments cannot be predicted (Lynch, 2000; Ma, 2000; Zhao, 1998, 2001). 
Externally originating news flows associated with satellite broadcasting largely have been 
muzzled in China outside of big cities and for privileged citizens (although extra-legal 
satellite reception is widespread and may be on the rise).23 However, even if the PRC’s 
media borders become more porous, TNCs such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation 
tailor programming to meet political expectations in Beijing (Lee, 2000d, p. 303; Ma, 
2000, p. 28; Zhao, 1998, p. 173). Shifting away from his 1993 claim in the wake of 
Tiananmen that satellite television was “an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes 
everywhere” (Pashupati, Sun, & McDowell, 2003), which angered Beijing to the 
detriment of News Corp.’s plans for expansion into the PRC, Murdoch now says “[t]he 
truth is that authoritarian countries can work” (Ding, 2001), especially where the country 
offers foreign investors lucrative opportunities in return for slavish support of the status 
quo (Lee, 2003b; Liu, 2004). 
The neo-liberal turn within the Party, triggered by Deng’s repeat in 1992 of an 
earlier statement: “let some people get rich first” (“rang yi bu fen ren xian fu qi lai” – 
usually and wrongly translated as “to get rich is glorious” (Fan, 2007)) and a conscious 
policy of fostering economic development in some areas as a way of seeding growth in 
others, has changed the ideological orientation of the Party. However, at core the political 
structure predicated on one-party rule remains intact (Wang, 2006a), which suggests that 
                                                 
23 Several interviewees stated how easy it was to access BBC, CNN, etc., via satellite. 
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economic globalization and technologization of the cultural economy may be changing 
the PRC in many ways, but not in the ways predicted by globalization theory. 
HYBRIDIZATION IN CHINA’S GLOBALIZATION 
Hybridization is both the condition and process of China’s globalization. By 
condition, I mean, following Kraidy (2005), that hybridization, however understood, “is a 
prima facie global condition caused by voluntary and forced migration, wars, invasions, 
slavery, intermarriages, and trade” (p. 46); and that as Said (1994) notes in Culture and 
Imperialism “all cultures are involved in one another, none is single and pure, all are 
hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic” (Said, 1994, p. 
xxix, cited in Kraidy, 2005, p. 59). By process, I mean that the condition of hybridization 
results in cultural mutation, the result, especially under conditions of imperialism and 
colonization and now globalization within modernity, of “various processes of 
accommodation, appropriation and resistance” (Kraidy, 2005, p. 60, referring to Said, 
1994). 
Under impact of Western encroachment throughout the nineteenth century, 
Chinese reformers and then revolutionaries appropriated Social Darwinism and turned it 
against its source, while it also served as a new way of thinking about China. As Chow 
(2001) notes, “European discourses of race, nation, and history were resisted and 
reconfigured as they were appropriated by the Chinese in the production of knowledge of 
China itself” (p. 48). Chow (2001) argues that armed with these new concepts of history, 
race and ethnicity, reformers and then revolutionaries took the earlier geo-cultural 
differences that had enabled the Dynasties to retain the name Zhongguo (Middle 
Kingdom) for their domain regardless of who was in power and recast them as racial and 
ethnic differences which both separated off Zhongguo from surrounding domains, and at 
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the same time localized the European concept of national sovereignty as the exclusive 
right of the dominant ethnic group within the claimed territory. 
In this refashioning of the concept of Chinese, the reformers first separated the 
yellow races (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Tibetans) off from the ‘white’ races, then 
separated the Chinese off from the other ‘yellow’ races. Finally, as the revolutionary 
movement gained traction, the concept of ethnic difference within the Chinese triumphed 
in the narration of identity. Through the recasting of imperial lineage in popular terms, 
the roots of the Han were traced back to their mythical source in the Emperor Huangdi, 
who was recast from being one dynastic leader among others in the Middle Kingdom to 
become the common ancestor of a massive lineage that glossed the ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic diversity of the myriad peoples of the region in terms of a racialized concept of 
nation that could underpin popular defense of the state. 
Narration of this lineage enabled the shift from imperial history, as the history of 
a succession of ruling families fated by Heaven to rise and fall, to popular sovereignty, 
which centered the Han as the agent of history and the rightful heir to the Middle 
Kingdom. Conceptualization of the Han as the dominant Chinese ethnic group called for 
the suppression of linguistic and cultural differences within the Chinese, while non-
Chinese ethnicities were excluded in the process and marginalized. Now recast as an 
ethnic minority within the Chinese, the Manchu (of Imperial China’s last dynasty, the 
Qing) for example, had lost any right to the throne even before Heaven withdrew its 
mandate in 1911 (Chow, 2001, p. 74). 
In effect what took place in China between increasing contact with an 
expansionist Europe and the collapse of the dynastic tradition was an epistemic break in 
the Foucauldean sense, after which traditional China was conceived in terms that were 
introduced through the appropriation and reconfiguration of Social Darwinian concepts of 
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history, race, the state and nation that underpinned a discourse of identity and 
simultaneously a discourse of resistance to colonization and invasion. Through this 
process of hybridization, a new China emerged characterized by the discursive 
construction of the Chinese nation led by the Han as the subject of its own history in 
contrast to the discourse of the imperial tradition, which was characterized by an 
unbridgeable gap between ruled and rulers, who rose and fell according to the mandate of 
Heaven. 
The result was the imagining of a nation that was both familiar and strange. As 
Chow notes: “It is highly questionable whether foreign concepts and discourse, much less 
epistemes could be transplanted in the soil of another culture without losing some of the 
cognitive functions in the host language” (Chow, 2001, p. 62). The result is “semantic 
hybridity” (Chow, 2001, p. 48), the “consequence is the creation of a new term with 
meanings that are not entirely foreign to the user of the guest language while carrying 
some shade of meanings from the host language” (Chow, 2001, p. 48). In their 
appropriation of the Social Darwinian discourses, the Chinese changed the meanings of 
the discourse, even as the country’s new rulers and their identity politics were changed by 
adopting and adapting the discourses to their own purposes. 
MEDIA, THE NATION & CULTURAL POLICY 
The process of hybridization has been underestimated in Chinese identity politics. 
Chow (2001) notes that most Chinese, regardless of political allegiance, “would agree 
that the largest ethnic group in China is the Hanzu [Han]” (Chow, 2001, p. 47), while 
scholars have consistently treated the Chinese as a group that is ethnically almost if not 
entirely homogeneous (Chow, 2001, p. 47). In the same way, the PRC’s globalization 
suggests globalization theory has under-estimated the degree to which global processes 
 50
can serve national ends. From a Chinese perspective globalization cannot be separated 
from (inter)nationalization, given that the nation has been developing out of the same 
dynamics of modernity, imbrication into the world system, that characterize China’s and 
the PRC’s globalization. The focus on the global as the unit of analysis has undermined a 
better understanding of the relationship between the national and the global in 
globalization. Nowhere is this more evident than in the use of media in the PRC. If 
globalization theory in addressing communication has largely focused on globalization’s 
“hostility to the state”  (Kraidy, 2005, p. 157) and increasing control of the airwaves by 
transnational corporations (Kraidy, 2005, pp. 97-103), this understanding ignores the 
logic of the PRC’s insistence on attempting to balance commercial with political, 
ideological and educational goals. Core elements of this logic are evident in the role of 
the media, the rise of the nation, and the revival of Confucianism. 
The role of the media 
Historically, the Party has always deployed mass media in service of a national 
project, understood as the fashioning of a nation in a world system of states. Beginning in 
the 1910s with pamphleteering and then with the press and radio, and then film into the 
1970s, the Party put media to use as an institutional mouthpiece in the interests of 
securing its own position and building the nation-state (Zhao, 1998, pp. 14-16). 
Construction of a national television network began in the late 1970s (Yin, 2002, p. 28). 
Today, through the use of satellites, CCTV reaches most of the population, and the 
Chinese diaspora. Although the system is commercial, its programming is consistent with 
elements of the public service model, emphasizing news, information and education, as 
well as entertainment. However, in line with CCTV’s status as a Party mouthpiece, the 
editorial function of CCTV is not autonomous of government control (Sun, 2001; Zhao, 
 51
1998, pp. 192-193). Therefore the system is hybrid, a commercially funded state 
broadcaster with a propaganda function that makes CCTV unique, although it has been 
cobbled together over the decades from elements of all of the major models (state-
controlled, public service broadcaster and commercial). 
The use of media for a national project recalls Benedict Anderson’s (1983) 
argument concerning the imagined character of the modern political community governed 
by the state in the name of the nation. Anderson (1983) pointed to the rise of print 
capitalism in the emergence of and tenacity with which citizens imagined themselves 
members of a shared national political community and identified with the nation-state. As 
Sinclair et al. (1996, p. 25) point out, electronic mass media such as broadcast systems 
lend a multiplier effect to the kind of imagining of the modern nation that Anderson 
identified. 
Modernization in China began well before traditional history came to an abrupt 
halt with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Shocked at how easily Western forces 
had defeated imperial power in a series of encounters in the mid to late 19th century, 
reformers and revolutionaries alike embraced nationalism as a European-style project for 
fashioning a nation state, but oriented this fashioning against colonization and invasion 
(Su, 1994, p. 222; Zhang, 2001, p. 142). 
The rise of the nation 
As Chow (2001) notes, when China’s anti-feudal forces looked for the markers of 
a nation in China, they found little on which to base national unity. At the turn of the 20th 
century, few Chinese were literate24 and China had no common language. Most of the 
                                                 
24 Fairbank (1986, p. 67) draws a distinction between functional literacy, which stood at 30-45% for males 
and 2-10% for women by the 1800s CE and the classical literacy that was unintelligible even to the 
functionally literate and set the thin ruling strata apart from ordinary people. The CPC claims 80% of the 
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country’s 400 million people spoke mutually incomprehensible dialects (Chow, 2001, p. 
51). With the adoption nationwide of Putonghua (lit. ‘common tongue’) in 1956 as the 
language of schooling, mutual understanding without translation or recourse to writing 
became possible for the mass of the people. However, even today, Putonghua remains at 
best a second language for some thirty-five percent of the population, whose native 
tongue is one of the dialects or a non-Chinese language. In 2006, the government said at 
least 40% of the population were still unable to speak Putonghua (China Daily, 2006a). 
However, as Kraidy (2005) notes, in the international system “most states speak for their 
nation as a unified cultural entity, even when national diversity is acknowledged” (p. 
157). This has been the case for the PRC, with diversity marginalized even as it has been 
recognized. 
After 1949, the Party focused nation building on building socialism through the 
use of the press, radio and film (Chu, 2002, p. 44; Sun, 2001, p. 52; Zhao, 1998, p. 4). 
Nationalism took a back seat to fraternal socialist solidarity in the international arena. 
However, following the break in 1960 with the Soviet Union, and then in the wake of the 
Cultural Revolution and the onset of economic reform beginning in 1978, although the 
Party retained control of cultural policy, socialist culture was undermined by adoption of 
the market (Yin, 2002, p. 33). In the turn away from the international cosmopolitanism of 
socialism to the market, cultural policy forestalled any return of the diversity of the 
Chinese peoples, except as ethnic minorities subject to the paternalism of the Han-
dominated nation (Castells, 2000a, p. 312; Jenner, 2001). 
Today, in the PRC’s orientation to the outside world, national policy is 
emphasized. As a ‘responsible’ member of the world community and member of the UN 
                                                                                                                                                 
population was illiterate in 1949, and that this figure had been reduced to 23.5% by 1985 (Mackerras & 
Yorke, 1991, p. 218). 
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Security Council, the Party has all but forgotten its roots in revolutionary and 
international socialism and the PRC’s support and inspiration for national liberation 
movements worldwide during and after the anti-colonial movements of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. 
Internally however, the rhetoric if not the practice of socialism remains an 
important pillar of the Party’s legitimacy (Liu, 2004). Whether a double-sided project 
imagined in this manner remains feasible under impact of neo-liberal globalization in the 
long term is debatable.25 James Lull (1991) provides the paradigmatic study of audiences 
in the PRC reading against the grain. Other authors point to the proliferation of meanings 
within both the PRC’s official and unofficial cultures (Donald, Keane, & Hong, 2002; 
Jia, Lu, & Heisey, 2002; Lee, 2000b). Lull (1991) pointed to a populace disillusioned 
with socialism. Zhao (2008) contests this understanding, suggesting that the disillusion is 
with the Party for jettisoning its traditional support base, as much as it is for popular 
disillusion with socialism among sectors that have benefited from economic reform. 
Balancing nationalist with socialist rhetoric is both functional to mobilizing a 
national project, and to defusing the legitimation crisis associated with the demise of 
socialism, even as internally at least the rhetoric of socialism is finding new life with 
exacerbation of social tension due to the spread of capitalism (Chen, 2002, p. 153; 
ChinaOnline News, 2001; Hu, 2002, p. 197; Zhao, 2008). At the same time, media’s 
handling of national sentiment associated with events as different as NATO’s 1999 
                                                 
25 And the historical dangers of bringing socialism and nationalism close together, which resulted in both 
Stalinism and Nazism is not lost on observers willing to make the connection: “… the one thing you rarely 
see discussed in just how right-wing China is. Not just right-wing for a communist country, with an 
injection of American investment here and there, but full of gut-instinct right-wingery; right-wingery of the 
sort that regards China’s newly enormous disparity of wealth as perhaps natural, at worst a necessary evil; 
right-wingery that regards authoritarian, paternalistic control, particularly of the poor, as a duty of 
government; right-wingery of the sort that elsewhere has student radicals marching in the street crying 
fascist.” (Spencer, 2004, cited in Zhao, 2008) 
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bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade and Beijing’s choice as the site for the 2008 
Olympics suggests a Party both in tune with and adroit at harnessing the popular mood to 
the national project (Chen, 2002; Hu, 2002). Clearly, today’s proliferation of meanings 
within both official and popular culture do not threaten the Party’s control of cultural 
policy, even as it loses control of culture. And ironically, the erosion of official culture 
through commercialization has been as a consequence of the Party’s embrace of 
commercialization (Yin, 2002, p. 33). 
The Confucian Revival 
Since 1978, the Party’s increasing rejection of socialist egalitarianism and 
embrace of nationalism and has been increasingly linked to a hotly debated revival of 
Confucianism in the PRC (Chow, 2001; Jenner, 2001; Liu, 1998). Under the more 
pragmatic line taken by Deng Xiaoping and his successors, the Party has reconceived its 
relationship with Confucianism, rejected by the earlier leadership as anti-modern. 
Confucianism is now conceived of as a form of nationalism, and defended by critics of 
Mao as an alternative to political voluntarism (Liu, 1998, p. 172). However, as Elman 
(1998) notes, multiple ‘Confucianisms’ vie for hegemony within the debate. Moreover, as 
Chow (2001), Liu (1998), Elman (1998), and Jenner (2001) point out, Confucianism as 
nationalism remains mired in Western-style conceptualizations of race and identity, 
through the elevation of the Han identity as a shared ethnic and cultural marker that both 
authorizes an unbroken national lineage and obliterates the diversity of the Chinese 
peoples. 
Critics of the revival of Confucianism in China and of the Party’s use of 
Confucianism, point to Maoism, not only as a disaster for China’s modernization, but 
also as an alternative both to the masked hegemony of capitalism in globalization theory, 
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and to a race-centered re-conceptualization of Chinese identity within the global nation-
state system (Liu, 1998). These critics point to the irony of reviving Confucianism in 
terms of a race-based nationalism conceived of in the very manner that justified Western 
and Japanese imperialism, and colonization, from which the long Chinese revolution 
freed the Chinese people (Jenner, 2001; Liu, 1998). However, as these critics note, the 
Party is not uncomfortable with these contradictions, since they bolster both its own 
legitimacy by linking the Party to the cultural legacy of Confucianism, and strengthen the 
PRC’s position as a nation-state within the global system (Jenner, 2001; Liu, 1998). 
RETHINKING GLOBALIZATION FROM A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
Under impact of globalization, Appadurai (1990) argues that the hyphen 
separating nation and state points to disjuncture putting nation and state “at each’s throat” 
(p. 304). However, what characterizes the PRC’s encounter with globalization is not the 
weakening of the nation-state. In the PRC, something else is happening. Since Deng 
initiated ‘reform and opening’ in 1978, the relative de-emphasis of socialism and the 
ability of the Party to refashion itself as the representative of the people in national and 
nationalist terms has reconfigured the national imaginary, allowing the country as a 
nation state to integrate more successfully into the global capitalist system. 
Historically, globalization theory is a successor to Western-centric development 
and dependency theory (Chen, 2002). However, as Chen (2002) notes both development 
and dependency theory as a Western-centric project bypassed the socialist camp, 
including the PRC, bracketing for globalization theory the specificity of their 
development (Chen, 2002). With the shift away from socialism to nationalism and 
capitalism, China’s modernization moves closer to the trajectory imagined for 
developmentalism, the more deeply the PRC becomes inter-connected into the global 
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system. Castells (2000a) suggests that if the Party manages the transition to a market 
economy, against the assumptions of neo-liberal globalization theory that Keynesian 
interventionism is not sustainable under capitalist globalization, the development state 
will be “alive and well for at least one-fifth of humankind” (p. 337). However, as analysts 
such as Zhao (Zhao, 2008) and Liu (2004) point out, neoliberalism with Chinese 
characteristics, not Keynesian interventionism, is driving the PRC’s rise, even if the 
rhetoric of developmentalism legitimizes its deployment. 
Economist Fan Gang noted in 2005, due to the privatization of state assets the 
“private sector” already accounted for “70% of gross domestic product” (Engardio, 
2005). However, as He Qinglian (2000a) notes, the principal form of reallocation of 
public resources “has been a process of privatization of juridically public assets by the 
power-holding stratum” (p. 70). As a result of the country’s historical development, the 
Party’s embrace of the market is not predicated on abandoning the ability to step into the 
economy in the manner assumed by neoliberalism and globalization theory. Rather, 
various forms of non-state ownership co-exist uneasily with state capitalism. Whether the 
Party/State can sustain this balancing act is unclear. But increasing it appears less in 
control of the political economy, so much as entering into a parasitic relationship with it 
while attempting to “ride the tiger” of economic expansion. 
Friedman (1999) suggests that the theorization of globalization from the 
perspective of developed capitalist states reflects “the all-embracing binary of capitalism 
versus socialism in Europe and North America [which] serves mainly to legitimate neo-
liberal hegemony where the free market is the solution and the state is the origin of all 
problems” (p. 259). (Western) globalization theory considers globalization a successor to 
(Western) modernization and part of a single historical trajectory. The PRC’s 
modernization, begun in the late 19th century, intensified after 1978 when the 
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complementary discourse of the PRC’s modern globalization began (Li, 2001a). At the 
same time, with the eclipse of Maoism, socialism was overshadowed and nation building, 
against the expectations of (Western) globalization theory, intensified with China’s 
opening up to the world (Jenner, 2001). 
However, as Liu (2004) and Zhao (Zhao, 2008) note, the legitimation crisis 
haunting the Party since the onset of the reform and opening has intensified given the 
historical legacy of the Party’s legitimacy in revolution and revolutionary rhetoric. 
Whether the Party can successfully make the transition from coercion and repression to 
consensual domination (hegemony) as the country shifts from socialism to capitalism and 
a ruling ideology that draws as much on China’s anti-imperial and anti-colonial historical 
nationalism as on its socialist and revolutionary past is debatable. However, the history of 
brutality – imperialism, colonization and two world wars – triggered by the West’s and 
Japan’s embrace of nationalism in the context of its capitalist modernization within 
globalization suggest potential pitfalls lie ahead for the PRC. 
In this context, the call by President Hu Jintao for the development of a 
“harmonious society” should not be dismissed as Party jingoism, but an attempt, however 
compromised, to resolve the fundamental contradictions of the PRC’s globalization, 
predicated as it is on the embrace of neoliberal capitalism, and characterized by a 
legitimation crisis, which “lies precisely in the incompetence of the state in reproducing 
social cohesion and a broad alliance of the general public in the face of widening social 
and economic polarization” (Liu, 2004, p. 12) 
Finally, the struggle over terms in which to define the Party’s quest for legitimacy 
highlights the danger of conceptualizing globalization in terms of mutually exclusive 
binaries (Friedman, 1994b, p. 6; 1999, pp. 254-259; Zhao, 1998, p. 9). In the case of 
China, these binaries include voluntarism versus pragmatism, socialism versus 
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capitalism, cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, revolution versus evolution, the masses 
versus the intellectuals, the countryside versus the city and increasingly the East 
(Confucianism) versus the West (Enlightenment). Binary thinking essentializes and 
reifies conceptual categories, displacing the dynamics of historical transformation to 
social formations conceived of in largely static terms, risking, in the final analysis, a 
‘clash of civilizations’ mentality. Friedman (1999, pp. 258-259) points out that neither 
state nor market are exclusively European inventions, and that acknowledging the history 
of both in Asia would go a long way towards making globalization theory truly global. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have argued that hybridization is both the condition and process 
of China’s globalization, and I have analyzed three ways in which the PRC problematizes 
globalization theory. Firstly, the failure of globalization theory to account for the PRC’s 
historical development suggests the theory’s limited character as a snapshot of a 
particular conjuncture in European, U.S. and Japanese history presented as an image of 
international development. Even as the PRC embraces globalization and integrates more 
fully into the global political economy, identity politics is revived in ways that are both 
functional and dysfunctional to the country’s further development. A relative de-
centering of the core capitalist countries and a shift in the relationship between borders 
and flows, with a greater emphasis on borders, is required if globalization theory is to 
account for the PRC. A good starting point for a re-thinking of globalization would be to 
start with 1978 and see how the PRC’s rise has changed the global political economy. 
Secondly, the specific character of the PRC’s globalization suggests a different 
and overlapping globalization to neo-liberal G7-centric globalization. This opens up the 
possibility of alternative globalizations of which the neo-liberal G7-centric version is 
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only one. Alternative globalizations is implied in Held & McGrew’s (2000) 
acknowledgement that no single definition of globalization exists. The growing power of 
Asia’s economies,26 the slow revival of Eastern Europe and Russia, the growing power of 
the European Union and, culturally, the re-emergence of Islam and revival of 
Confucianism in the PRC, all point to globalization as a far more dynamic and 
fragmented process than Western-centric globalization theories suggest. 
But from this perspective is globalization any longer any use as an analytical 
category? Globalization theory takes the global as the unit of analysis. However the case 
of the PRC suggests that the unit of analysis remains fragmented. Conversely, for 
analytical purposes alternative globalizations call for a different unit of analysis, 
suggesting more attention should be paid both to the regional and the nation-state as well 
as the global, within globalization. Globalization theory in its Western-centric form is not 
sustainable. More attention ought be paid to historically specific conjunctures of 
transformations in global politics, the economy, technology and culture, of which G7-
centric globalization is only one. 
Finally, the PRC problematizes the normative dimension of globalization. What 
‘should’ happen under impact of globalization processes and what is happening, due in 
part to the unforeseen consequences of the theory’s failure to account for the rise of the 
PRC, suggest globalization theory is at best a starting point for analyzing global 
developmental dynamics, but that new variables must be factored into analysis. Against 
                                                 
26 The emphasis in the theory on the G7 ignores the rise of Asia, outside of Japan, the G7’s sole Asian 
member. In the early 1990s, the World Bank predicted that by the year 2020, five of the world’s seven 
largest economies would be in Asia: Japan, China, India, Indonesia and Korea (Friedman, 1999, p.248). 
Granted, the 1997 Asian economic crisis slowed regional growth. But it strengthened China’s position 
within the regional economy (Friedman, 1999, p.246). Moreover, globalization theory ignores a growing 
consensus within Asia that, from a long-term perspective, which conceptualizes change over periods 
unthinkable in terms of the dynamics of laissez-faire capitalism, the eras of European and U.S. hegemony 
within the world system have a limited shelf life (Friedman, 1999, p.249; Hopkins, 2002, pp.19-21). 
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the assumption that flows and processes of homogenization and heterogenization would 
undermine national boundaries and political borders, the PRC is embracing nationalism 
and rapidly expanding its powers within the global political economy. Beijing’s rejection 
of criticism of its human rights record, popular pride in the country’s history, the debate 
over the legacy of Confucius are all part of the reconfiguration of global political and 
cultural economy under impact of the rise of the PRC. 
From a Chinese perspective globalization is a project that involves the 
transmission of ideas, technologies, institutions and products that enabled the rise of the 
West, leading centuries later to Western encroachment on China during the European 
imperial and colonial eras. China’s modern globalization begins with its encounter with 
an expanding Europe and is characterized by the appropriation and reconfiguration of 
Social Darwinian ideas of history, race and the nation-state which result in an epistemic 
break that changes both the discourses of history, race, the nation and state, even as the 
Chinese are changed by their appropriation and reconfiguration of these discourses as 
part of their resistance to Western and Japanese encroachment and invasion. The imperial 
regime was de-centered and the state positioned as the embodiment of the people, making 
possible Chinese nationalism. Thus hybridization emerges as both the condition and 
process of China’s globalization. 
What characterizes the PRC’s globalization is the intensification and expansion of 
economic development, strengthening of the nation, and reconfiguration of the state, as 
the Party relies less on coercion and more on consent to buttress its rule. Whether the 
Party has unleashed forces it cannot ultimately control, and how it will respond to that 
crisis, if it occurs, is unclear. What is clear with respect to the PRC is that globalization 
has not dissolved national boundaries and political borders so much as strengthened them 
as the opposition between socialism and capitalism gives way to a revived nationalism 
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and identity politics that, from a Chinese perspective, privileges the nation-state over the 
global as the unit of analysis within the international rather than global system. 
Acknowledging this shift in perspective suggests the need for a re-
conceptualization of globalization theory that can account for the impact the PRC’s 
reform and opening has had on globalization processes, in contrast to defining the PRC’s 
reform and opening as an effect of globalization, in other words a going out, as much as a 
coming in. Nowhere is this project of ‘going out’ more visible than in the political and 
economic spheres. But in the cultural sphere, the PRC has also impacted on the global 
scene, including through the development of television such as CCTV-9 and its sister 
Spanish and French Channel as instruments of state policy, and the continued importance 
of CCTV’s global Mandarin language service for imagining the Chinese nation as a 
single people dispersed globally, regardless of their nationality. In the context of the 
PRC’s globalization, the ‘going out’ project of which CCTV-9 is part is much more than 
a publicity or propaganda device. Rather it represents engagement with the world on 
terms that the PRC is determined to set. Moreover, it has its roots in the long history of 
the development of television in the PRC, to which I now turn. 
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Chapter 3: The Development of television in the PRC 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the concept of globalization and its meaning 
in the context of the development of the PRC. The history of television in the PRC is part 
of that process, since television developed through the adoption and adaptation of 
imported technologies in the context of international ideological and political struggle. 
CCTV-9 is only the current manifestation of a long-term project to project globally the 
Party/State’s image of the PRC. Only by understanding the history of television, can one 
begin to understand the particular form television journalism takes in the PRC. For 
historical reasons, electronic media and in particular television were as much constitutive 
of the field, as television itself evolved in the context of a conjuncture of forces both 
internal and external that shaped the possibilities of the medium. 
In this chapter, I discuss the development of television and television news in the 
context of the two major institutions, the Party/State and the market, that have influenced 
their development. The first of these institutions has shaped the development of television 
from its inception in the late 1950s. The latter institution was re-introduced followed its 
eclipse in China after the communist victory in the civil war in 1949 in response to the 
twin failures of bureaucratism and voluntarism within the economy. The 
commercialization of television that began in the early 1980s was a state-driven strategy 
to free the state from financial responsibility for television. However, commercialization 
was not achieved through privatization of the sector, but through the introduction of the 
market into what was historically and remains a strategic sector within the political 
economy. 
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In this chapter, I introduce CCTV-9 in the context of the historical development 
of television. Although CCTV-9 was not subject to the discipline of the market at the 
time I did my research, the media system as a whole, including CCTV, increasingly is. 
As a result, CCTV-9 cannot be shielded from the market, even if it is protected by its 
status within the ‘wai xuan’ system. Even at the time of writing, the tension that resulted 
from this conjuncture of forces was putting enormous pressure on the news making 
system in which CCTV-9 was imbricated. The system was responding with a range of 
defensive and innovative tactics that are reshaping the field as much from below as 
institutional pressure is reshaping it from above. The relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV 
International was a major innovation within these changes. But the blueprint from its 
reform was at best a starting point. Whatever hopes SARFT and management had for the 
channel were subject to the discipline of the field. 
POLITICS IN COMMAND 
Broadcast television in the PRC 
Television was launched in the PRC in 1958. The service was extremely limited. 
Experimental broadcasting began on May 1 from a single channel, Beijing Television 
(BTV). BTV began regular broadcasting on September 2, 1958 (CCTV, 2006). The 
station was only available in the capital city and the audience was restricted to the few 
hundred television sets then available in the country (Yin, 2002, p. 28; Yu & Xu, 1997). 
Commentators (Huang, 2000; Yin, 2002, p. 28; Yu & Xu, 1997) note that television as a 
mass medium did not begin to develop in the PRC until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping 
launched the policy of domestic reform of agriculture, industry, science and technology, 
and defense, and the opening up of the PRC to increased international engagement in 
terms of export markets and foreign investment. The reform and opening signaled a 
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switch away from Maoist political voluntarism to state-controlled economic determinism 
as the guiding principle of Party work (Saich, 2004, pp. 57-64). However, the earlier date 
of 1958 is instructive for the context within which television was launched, and the aims 
of the Party in developing the medium. 
The early years (1958-1978) 
Originally, the CPC had planned to launch television in the PRC no earlier than 
1959. However, learning that the Taiwan-based Guomindang (Nationalist Party) planned 
to launch its own national service in 1958, the CPC determined to beat the Guomindang 
to air, deciding that BTV must be on air before October 10, or National Day in Taiwan 
(Yu & Xu, 1997).27 Behind this competition to be first was the uncertain relationship 
between the PRC and Taiwan, which continues in a somewhat altered form today. The 
PRC considers Taiwan a renegade province, even as Taiwan has democratized and 
developed a strong independence movement in opposition to the re-unification-minded 
Guomindang, which in 1991 abandoned its claim to governing the mainland. In the late 
1950s, Taiwan occupied China’s seat at the United Nations and had the full support of the 
United States. The PRC’s closest ally was the Soviet Union, although that relationship 
was already souring even before Nikita Khrushchev pulled Soviet technical advisers out 
of the PRC in 1960 (Fairbank, 1986, pp. 310-312). 
The launch of television in the PRC coincided with the Great Leap Forward, when 
in 1958 the CPC launched a nationwide campaign that broke with the Soviet model of 
development in a bid to catch up with and surpass the West. The campaign involved de-
centralization of power away from the Soviet-style central planning bureaucracies, and 
                                                 
27 The Taiwan launch date is not clear in Yu & Xu (1997). The original reads “… it was decided that the 
first Chinese television station would be set up in Beijing before 10 October 1958 to preempt Taiwan.” Yu 
& Xu also cite Mei Yi, Director General of the Central Broadcasting Bureau: “… the news reached us that 
the Nationalist Party in Taiwan was set to launch its television broadcasting service in October 1958.” 
 65
the mass mobilization of people at all levels in a drive to rapid industrialization (Saich, 
2004, p. 39). The Great Leap Forward was an unmitigated disaster. The PRC’s gross 
national product fell by some 35 percent between 1958 and 1962 (Saich, 2004, p. 41). 
The burden was especially heavy for the peasantry (Fairbank, 1986, pp. 281-283, 296-
302; Saich, 2004, pp. 37-43). Disruption to the agricultural cycle because of 
collectivization led to famine. By 1962, hunger and malnutrition had killed as many as 30 
million people, perhaps more, some five percent of the 650 million population (Becker, 
1996). 
For the engineers, journalists and administrators developing television in the 
capital city and isolated from the disaster unfolding in the countryside, these were heady 
days. The first television sets in the PRC had been imported from the USSR, and since 
1953 Chinese technicians had been studying television technology in the Soviet Union, 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia (Yu & Xu, 1997). Given US support of Taiwan and 
the rapid cooling of relations between the PRC and USSR as Khrushchev moved towards 
détente with Washington, broadcasting in the PRC from the outset was never entirely a 
domestic affair, but also an instrument of ‘soft power’ in international politics. When the 
Soviet adviser to the broadcasting industry at the time told Mei Yi, Director General of 
the Central Broadcasting Bureau that the PRC lacked the basic expertise and equipment 
to launch ahead of Taiwan, Mei recalls: “We simply ignored his words and made up our 
minds to show Taiwan and the Soviet Union what we could do.” (Yu & Xu, 1997) 
When BTV began experimental programming on May 1, 1958, the lineup that day 
was a mix of propaganda, educational and cultural programming in line with guidelines 
provided by the Central Broadcasting Bureau (the following list is from Yu & Xu1997, 
verbatim): 
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• 19:05 Model workers talked about the political significance of carrying on the 
‘Great Leap Forward’ campaign. 
• 19:15 A political documentary about ‘Going to the Countryside’. 
• 19:25 Poem and dance, art performances. 
• 19:50 Scientific and educational documentary supplied by the Soviet Union. 
In the ‘can do’ spirit of the Great Leap Forward, other stations at the provincial 
and municipal level soon went to air. By 1960, sixteen provinces had set up television 
stations, although as Yu & Xu (1997) point out, a lack of broadcasting equipment, 
expertise and a lack of receivers – perhaps 12,000 in the whole country by 1960 – limited 
expansion of the medium. 
Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the central leadership attempted 
to constrain Mao. In line with a prior agreement, he ceded the presidency to Liu Shaoqi 
(Saich, 2004, p. 41). Deng Xiaoping remained CPC General Secretary. Under Liu and 
Deng’s guidance, the Party shifted towards a more gradualist approach to economic 
development, reviving the bureaucracy, but balancing its power with the re-introduction 
of market incentives into the agricultural economy (Saich, 2004, p. 42). However, in 
1966, Mao plunged the country into a second round of chaos when the faction he had 
since built up within the CPC was strong enough to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (GPCR) against what Mao considered the stultification of the spontaneous 
creativity of the masses as a result of the re-emphasis on centralized planning and the role 
of the bureaucracy in the industrial economy (Saich, 2004, pp. 45-46). 
The GPRC was aimed at shaking up the bureaucracy, rekindling the revolutionary 
enthusiasm of the country’s youth and at destroying Liu Shaoqi, an ardent supporter of 
Mao during the 1940s, but estranged after the Great Leap Forward, when Liu supported 
Deng against Mao (Saich, 2004, p. 41). Compared to the earlier Great Leap Forward, the 
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GPRC was less destructive, wrecking the country’s administrative structure and purging 
from public service perhaps a million intellectuals, many of whom did not survive the 
humiliations to which they were subjected (Fairbank, 1986, pp. 335-336). 
However, in contrast to the Great Leap Forward, during the Cultural Revolution 
the development of television was curtailed. By January 1967 only Shanghai TV and 
Guangzhou TV were still on air, and then only sporadically. Although the Party formally 
ended the GPCR in April 1969 and Beijing TV resumed broadcasting that year, the 
Shanghai faction of the GPCR led by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, remained in control of 
media, and used it to further their aims within the political struggle. However, they were 
unable to translate control of media into control of the government and the economy and 
were purged after the death of Mao in 1976. By 1978, Deng had emerged as paramount 
within the central leadership (Fairbank, 1986, p. 339; Yu & Xu, 1997). 
Clearly television from the outset was seen as an instrument of power. 
Hybridization characterized its creation. The medium was developed by borrowing 
formats and genres from other media, and importing technology from the industrialized 
socialist countries. Content was a mix of imported programming and local news, 
information, educational materials and entertainment. Television from the outset also had 
an international scope, not only in programming, but in development of the medium as a 
showcase for the PRC’s achievements. 
Media as an instrument of power 
From its earliest days, communist governments have used the press and then 
broadcasting – radio and television – as instruments of power. The Russian communists 
founded and used various incarnations of the Party newspaper Pravda (‘Truth’) as an 
instrument of political agitation and mobilization, as well as centralization and unification  
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(Esarey, 2004, p. 1). The Leninist theory of the press ascribes a central role to media not 
only as a “collective propagandist and a collective agitator” but also as a “collective 
organizer” (Esarey, 2004, p. 5). As Esarey (2004, p. 5) notes, these two priorities are also 
key in the Chinese context, especially given the cultural and linguistic diversity of the 
Chinese peoples that the Party had to overcome to unify the country in the face of civil 
war and foreign intervention and invasion. Forging a nation from the diversity of the 
Chinese peoples was also part of the modernization project that had been underway since 
the mid-19th century in late Imperial China (Chow, 2001). 
On the same day the CPC was founded on November 7, 1931, the Jiangxi-based 
government of the Party-controlled regions launched the Red China News Agency, 
predecessor to today’s Xinhua. Successive PRC leaders from Mao Zedong on have 
emphasized the subordinate and instrumental role of the press as a tool of the Party. A 
2003 training book on journalism cites Liu Shaoqi, president from 1959-1968 on the role 
of the press: 
How is the Party to lead the people? Besides relying upon the military and mass 
units, more often the Party relies upon the role of newspapers and wire services. 
At present, when the roads are blocked and the postal service performs poorly, the 
means of reaching the people are Xinhua news and radio stations. The central 
government relies on these tools to keep in contact with the people, to lead the 
people, and to lead the work of the Party and governments across China. (Esarey, 
2004, p. 6) 
Both the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution less than a decade later 
were attempts by Mao to bypass the burgeoning bureaucracy in the interests of direct 
mobilization of the people. Significantly in both movements, in line with Liu Shaoqi’s 
definition of the role of media in Party work, media were key, first in mobilization in the 
hands of the radicals (leftists) and then when each movement spun out of control, as 
agents of stabilization in the hands of the conservatives (rightists). 
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Media policy in the early years of building the PRC 
As Yu & Xu (1997) note, two approaches characterized media policy throughout 
the Mao era. The first was “Mao’s ‘thought-determining-action’ approach” associated 
with mass line politics. The second was the “state paternalism” of Liu and Deng. In 
Marxist terms, Mao’s approach recognized the possibility of the superstructure 
influencing the base, and the importance of ideology in determining action.28 A People’s 
Daily editorial at the time summed up Mao’s approach: 
Work is done by man and man’s action is governed by his thinking. A man 
without the correct political thinking is a man without a soul. If politics does not 
take command, there can be no direction. In every job we undertake, we must 
always insist that politics take command and let political and ideological work 
come before anything else. Only when we are both thorough and penetrating with 
our political and ideological work can we guarantee the accomplishment of our 
task. (People’s Daily, Nov. 11, 1960, cited in Yu & Xu, 1997) 
 
Yu and Xu (1997) also provide a definition of state paternalism, which perfectly 
sums up its differences with Maoism: 
[S]tate paternalism … owed its origin to the former Soviet Union and its satellite 
eastern European socialist nations, [it] placed more emphasis on the role of the 
state apparatus in achieving national integration and in meeting modernization 
needs, although it did not lose sight of the need for political and ideological 
control. In other words, this approach underscored, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the importance of the obligation to edify the audience within the frame of 
reference of authority-defined values and tended to give priority to 
institutionalization, modernization and professionalization. Thus the role of 
broadcasting in developing and promoting national culture and education needed 
to be emphasized. 
                                                 
28 No evidence exists that Mao had read Gramsci (1971), especially as the publication history of the Prison 
Notebooks (see bibliographical note) almost certainly rules out that possibility. However, Mao’s 
theorization of the relationship between base and superstructure and the importance of ideology has an 
affinity with the role that Gramsci ascribed to what Althusser (1971) would later call ‘ideological state 
apparatuses’ in the maintenance of hegemony. For a discussion of the relationship between Gramsci’s work 
and Maoism, see Liu (Liu, 2004). 
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As Yu & Xu (1997) note “the struggle between the two approaches was a 
manifestation of intense intra-Party warfare.” Liu Shaoqi’s great crime was to oppose 
Mao. But it was less a clash of personalities than a clash over how best to operationalize 
leadership by the Party, whether through greater emphasis on the role of bureaucracy or 
through direct appeal to the people. Although during the years of civil war Liu had been a 
strong supporter of Mao (as had Deng and Zhou Enlai, who was indirectly targeted 
during the Cultural Revolution by the campaign to “criticize Lin Piao [Lin Biao] and 
criticize Confucius [Zhou]” (Fairbank, 1986, p. 335)), all of them disagreed 
fundamentally with Mao about how to carry forward victory in the civil war into 
construction of the PRC (Fairbank, 1986, p. 328). At stake were different attitudes to the 
roles of the Party, the State and the market in economic development. Once the Shanghai 
faction of the GPCR was purged from the leadership, the pragmatists within the Party, led 
by Chen Yun and Deng, re-established state-controlled economic construction as the 
guiding principle of development (Saich, 2004, pp. 57-59). 
Chen’s and Deng’s approach was not classical socialist economism, but a hybrid 
economic form that mixed elements of socialist-style macroeconomic control in the form 
of five-year plans with various forms of management and ownership from de-
collectivization of the peasantry, through to wholly state-owned strategic industries down 
to private ownership of small businesses (corner stores, barber shops, etc.) (Fairbank, 
1986, pp. 342-360; Saich, 2004, p. 61). Deng and his allies cobbled the model together 
from Imperial and Republican China’s history, their knowledge of conditions in the 
socialist east and capitalist west and from the lessons of the Party’s successes and failures 
since 1949. Deng famously characterized this hybrid approach to economic reform as 
fumbling one’s way across a river by groping for stones (Liu, 2004, p. 52; Pan, 2000, p. 
78). At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee in December 
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1978, Deng launched the reform and opening, committing the CPC to building what he 
called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Jiang, 1997). 
To sum up the development of television until 1978, the medium was seen as a 
state-controlled instrument of power, whose function was to promote the Party line and 
provide news, education and entertainment. However, it was also a deeply contested site, 
subject to shifting political winds and ideological struggle and therefore a site of potential 
disaffection. Both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution impacted 
tremendously on television, although in the case of the former it was a paradoxically a 
time of growth, even as the country suffered, whereas the Cultural Revolution almost 
shut down television, making its subsequent revival all the more remarkable. 
ENTER THE MARKET 
Although many commentators tend to gloss the complexity of the PRC’s 
development since 1978, simply describing it as a form of nascent or proto-capitalism, a 
teleological fallacy is at play in this kind of reasoning, since an assumption is built into 
the argument that the PRC is developing towards capitalism understood as an end-point. 
The Party has never completely abandoned the rhetoric of social equality, even if the 
Party has changed its character radically since Mao’s death, and the economic 
pragmatists have developed a right-wing that has increasingly aligned itself in recent 
years with the PRC’s nascent entrepreneurial and capitalist classes, to the neglect of its 
core constituency, the rural and working populations, whose representatives Wang 
(2006a) suggests “have wholly disappeared” (p. 36) from the leading organs of the Party 
and State. 
Economic priorities are constantly being adjusted, even as economic determinism 
has increasingly become indistinguishable from neo-liberalism. However, if the 
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administration of Zhu Rongji, premier from 1998-2003, was still consistent with the 
policy initiated in 1978 of economic growth at any cost, the administration of his 
successor, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, has been characterized by some recognition of the 
growing contradictions within the political, social and cultural economies of the PRC, as 
indigenous capitalism expands within the system and the system is further imbricated into 
the global capitalist economy. At the 4th Plenum of the 16th Congress in September 
2004, President and CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao began addressing the negative 
aspects of his predecessors’ economic determinism, calling for the Party to “build a 
harmonious society” 29  and pay more attention to the increasing income and wealth 
disparities uneven development of the market and private enterprise have triggered (Lam, 
2005; Xinhua, 2004a). 
Finally, capitalism is itself not a static end-point but constantly changing. 
Theorists of neo-liberal globalization usually cite 1989-1991 and the collapse of Soviet-
style socialism as the key moment in the latest configuration of the global political 
economy. As I have already noted, less understood is the degree to which since 1978, the 
PRC’s developmental trajectory has been as much a cause as a reaction to those later 
changes. 
Commercialization and the development of a national television network (1978-
1989) 
Regardless of the argument about the status of capitalism in the PRC, nobody 
denies that the market has changed the face of television in the PRC. Beijing TV was 
renamed China Central Television on May 1, 1978, marking the formal launch of state-
controlled CCTV as the PRC’s sole national broadcaster. The take-off point came some 
                                                 
29 Although the term is vague, Hu has noted that a harmonious society features “democracy, the rule of 
law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, vitality, stability and order and harmonious co-existence between man 
and nature.” (Xinhua, 2005a) 
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four years later, when the government created the administrative structure of the national 
television system and at the same time called on broadcasters to begin looking for 
alternatives to state subsidization (Zhao, 1998, p. 54). 
Based on earlier success using radio to communicate and mobilize during the war 
against Japanese invasion and in the civil war with the Guomindang, and on the use of 
radio for mass mobilization during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the 
Party recognized the role television could play in administering its rule, choosing 
television as the primary vehicle of disseminating its views both to the people, and to 
Party cadres nationwide (Hao, 2000; Li, 2002; Yu & Xu, 1997; Zhao, 1998). Hao (2000) 
notes that the centralized political system required an “efficient national communication 
network to ensure the smooth implementation of central policies and directives” (p. 158), 
which provided the rationale for the development of broadcasting as the medium of 
political communication. Television (and radio) was identified as “the most effective 
connections between the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government and the 
Chinese people” (Li, 1991, p. 341). The 11th National Radio and Television Conference 
in 1983 set the framework, calling television a ‘powerful’ and ‘modern tool’ for 
“encouraging the people of the nation to strive to create a socialist civilization that is both 
materially and culturally rich” (Li, 1991, p. 341). 
The literature is unclear whether the Party was aware that the assumptions they 
were making about the power of television reflect those made by diffusion theorists such 
as Everett Rogers (1971) about the role of media in modernization. In a paradigm 
example of the diffusion of innovation, the number of television stations in the PRC 
began to proliferate, rising from 52 in 1983 to some two thousand in 2003, depending on 
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how one counts.30 The number of television sets also began to increase rapidly, from 
some 12,000 nationwide in 1960 to 350 million in 2003 (Anon., 2003b). From a single 
channel serving some 200 television sets in 1958, by 2005 CCTV’s stable of channels 
had grown to reach 1.2 billion people or 96% of the PRC’s population (Anon., ; CCTV, 
2006; Yu & Xu, 1997). 
The primary reason for the explosive growth of television was commercialization 
of the medium with the introduction of advertising, and the revenue streams it promised 
television managers and hence the government. The first television advertisement in the 
PRC aired on Shanghai TV on January 28, 1979. Other channels including CCTV 
quickly followed suit (Li, 2002, p. 19). Since then, television advertising nationwide has 
grown from nothing to become a multi-billion dollar industry (Zhao, 1998). According to 
Guo Zhenxi, CCTV’s advertising director, in 2004 the national broadcaster earned 8 
billion yuan (986 million USD) in advertising revenue (Landreth, 2005). At the same 
time, as Li (2002, p. 19) notes, government subsidies have contracted to 0.5 percent of 
CCTV’s revenue with advertising responsible for the bulk of the remainder. By 1998, tax 
on media revenue had already become the 4th biggest generator of revenue for the 
government (Akhavan-Majid, 2004, p. 558). 
Although CCTV is the sole national broadcaster, 31  and the system has a 
hierarchical structure, with CCTV alone at the top, lower level broadcasters are extremely 
powerful, as Sun Wusan’s (2006) ground-breaking work shows (see p. 18). The 1983 
                                                 
30 Figures that limit the number to about 300 correctly distinguish between stations that have production 
facilities, and content relay stations at the county level and below that after 2002 were banned from 
initiating content, including their own news, which had been encouraged in 1983. (Esarey, 2004, p. 12) 
However, the smaller figure under-emphasizes the sheer scale of the system (for an excellent discussion of 
the problem of counting the number of television stations in the PRC, see Liebman, 2005, pp. 18, note 47). 
31 Strictly speaking, the PRC has a second national network, China Education Television (CETV), a 
national distance learning network. However, CETV is not a broadcaster as it is not publicly available 
outside of the education system. (For more information, see Li, 2001b; US Dept of the Army, 1986-1998) 
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regulations called for the development of provincial and lower level broadcasters and 
stations, giving them a high degree of autonomy in programming, including for some 
time in news, outside of what was required to be carried from CCTV (Esarey, 2005, pp. 
41-42). As of 2002, the PRC had 36 provincial-level broadcasters and almost 1,600 
county and city level television stations (Esarey, 2005, p. 51). Because the PRC has opted 
for satellite distribution of broadcast television, provincial-level stations on satellite are 
available beyond provincial borders and in many cases nationwide. 
Despite the power of provincial-level stations, the national network structure 
clearly privileges CCTV’s position within the system. The administrative regulations for 
setting up television stations emphasize their “unified planning, rational layout, 
construction at different levels, and co-ordinated development” (Chang, Wan, & Qu, 
2003, p. 29). The four-tiered administrative structure set up in 1983 – central, provincial, 
municipal and county – ensured that below the national level, all channels relay and 
provide space for major CCTV programs (Chang, Wan, & Qu, 2003, p. 29; Hao, 2000, p. 
158). Moreover, regulations issued in 2002 forbade television stations at the county and 
below level from initiating their own programming, including news, or from competing 
with the national network, essentially turning them into relay stations for the national, 
provincial and municipal broadcasters, although lower level broadcasters continued to 
flout the regulations, indicating that the PRC television industry is much more than the 
regulations, which purport to govern it (Chang, Wan, & Qu, 2003, p. 24; Esarey, 2005, p. 
52; Guo, 2003a, p. 8; Hao, 2000, p. 158). 
In short, at least on paper a top down structure exists within television in the form 
of a pyramid with CCTV at the apex, although the pyramid metaphor provides a 
misleading image of CCTV’s dominance within the system. Today, the national 
monopoly broadcaster faces strong and growing competition, especially from the 
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provincial and municipal stations, and in the major cities from local broadcasters (Esarey, 
2005, p. 52; Jirik, 2003). Nevertheless, from the outset in 1983, clearly the Party intended 
television to be a highly centralized, state-controlled, commercially funded medium with 
a number of functions, principally news and information, education, culture and 
entertainment (CCTV, 2006). Among these, its role as a political instrument was 
paramount. The Party has not budged on that role for news media today, although the 
proliferation of commercial and entertainment oriented television and its popularity 
indicate that audiences have become increasingly oblivious to television as a 
developmental project even as the medium has diffused throughout most of the 
population. 
Tiananmen and the WTO (1989-present) 
Throughout the 1980s, as media expanded under influence of the market, the 
leadership eventually turned to open debate of the need for media reform, including 
greater scrutiny of politics. Zhao (1998) calls the mid-1980s a time of “struggle for media 
democratization” (p. 35). She notes that under the leadership of CPC General Secretary 
Zhao Ziyang the question of media reform was put on the political agenda for the first 
time at the 13th National Party Congress in October 1987. The General Secretary’s report 
to the Congress dropped the term ‘Party mouthpiece,’ and called for “political 
transparency” (Zhao, 1998, p. 35). In a move reminiscent of the Maoist ‘mass line’, the 
CPC leader called for “supervision by public opinion” and noted that the Party and State 
should not only inform the people, but that the people should be involved in the 
discussion of major issues (Zhao, 1998, p. 36). Journalists, academics and political 
leaders were soon involved in an intense debate about the scope and depth of reform, 
which came to a shuddering halt with Tiananmen (Zhao, 1998, pp. 42-45). 
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In the run-up to the June 3-4 crackdown on the students and their supporters 
among the Party and citizens, many journalists including members of a number of 
CCTV’s news departments had sided with the students in their confrontation with the 
conservative wing of the Party, which eventually prevailed over opposition, led by CPC 
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, to the use of force (Nathan, Link, & Zhang (compiler), 
2002; Simmie & Nixon, 1989).32 Greater editorial freedom for media had been a key 
demand of the students and their supporters. In the wake of Tiananmen, media were 
savaged in the settling of accounts (Esarey, 2005, p. 50; Nathan, Link, & Zhang 
(compiler), 2002; Simmie & Nixon, 1989). 
The media system did not begin recovering from Tiananmen until 1992, when 
Deng Xiaoping made his so-called ‘southern tour’ and called for an end to ideological 
debate and an expansion and acceleration of the market economy nationwide. Once the 
central leadership endorsed development of the ‘socialist market economy’, authorities 
gave non-news media considerable leeway to develop autonomously of Party control 
(Zhao, 1998, pp. 1-3). In line with these decisions, the Ministry of Culture ended the 
remaining government subsidies for many media, allowing them to diversify and retain 
much of their advertising revenue (de Burgh, 2000, p. 551). 
This period is characterized by what Wang (2006a) calls the “consolidation of 
depoliticization” (p. 37) within the PRC. By “depoliticization” Wang means that the 
Party “is no longer an organization with specific political values, but a mechanism of 
power” (p. 32). As such, the Party has lost its ability to formulate anything other than 
                                                 
32 The best account of Tiananmen in English is Black Hands of Beijing (Black & Munro, 1993) since it 
shifts the focus of June 3-4 to the ordinary people of Beijing, since they, not the students bore the brunt of 
the army’s assault. The documentary film ‘Gates of Heavenly Peace’ is commendable for showing the 
complexity of the student-led demonstrations, which barely stand up to scrutiny as a movement. For the 
role of the leadership, The Tiananmen Papers (Nathan, Link, & Zhang (compiler), 2002) is a good starting 
place, although it is a partial account, perhaps designed to frame future discourse about the role of different 
leaders in the crackdown. 
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policy instrumental to economic development, defined as GDP growth. The ensuing 
problems the Party has had with dealing with the contradictions of developing capitalism 
are a direct result of depoliticization, since the Party is no longer capable of critically 
analyzing capitalism given development of the market as the economic regulator and 
growing acceptance of private ownership of the means of production and therefore the 
fundamentally antagonistic relations of production necessary to this mode of 
production.33 
According to the World Bank, despite a 6-fold increase in GDP from 1984 
through 2004, and an increase in average income from 280 USD in 1985 to 1,290 USD in 
2005, income inequality as measured by the Gini index34 has risen from 0.28 in 1981 to 
0.41 today (World Bank, 2006a). This contradiction and stark evidence of the tendency of 
the rich to get richer faster than the poor get rich, which critics of capitalism argue is a 
structural characteristic of this mode of production, is evident in the growing unrest 
nationwide in the PRC. Police reported 10,000 “mass incidents” in 1994, 58,000 in 2003, 
74,000 in 2004, and 87,000 in 2005 (Lim, 2005; Macartney, 2006). In October 2005, 
police said 1,826 officers had been injured in the line of duty already that year, and 
twenty-three killed in the incidents, which ranged from face-offs to riots. Grievances of 
mainly the poor working and farming classes and the unemployed,35 now thought to 
                                                 
33 At its annual sitting in March 2004, the PRC’s parliament, the National People’s Congress, approved an 
amendment to the 1982 PRC Constitution that reflected the CPC’s determination to develop capitalism. 
The wording “Citizen’s lawful private property is inviolable” indicates the CPC’s intention of developing a 
hybrid of market-based and capitalist economics within a Leninist political framework. Jiang Zemin’s 
theory of the “Three Represents,” was also written into the Constitution, providing the ideological 
justification for permitting businesspeople to join the Party (Ching, 2004; Parry, 2004). 
34 “Gini-coefficient of inequality: This is the most commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient 
varies between 0, which reflects complete equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person 
has all the income or consumption, all others have none)” (World Bank, 2006b). In 2004, the PRC’s Gini 
coefficient was 0.465 (Anon., 2005a). Zhao (2008) also discusses the relevance of GDP growth for 
measuring development and the current debate in the PRC over its suitability as a measure. 
35 The PRC’s unemployed are drawn from the ranks of laid-off state-sector workers, and ‘surplus’ rural 
labor, farmers who have lost their land to development or left the land either because it is no longer 
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number some 170 million, ranged from non-payment of wages through the confiscation 
of farmland for development projects to industrial poisoning of the eco-system by 
polluting factories. Socially conscious journalists strive to report these issues in 
mainstream PRC media, but as often as not are prevented by directives issued by SARFT, 
but originating from within the Central Publicity Department (Brady, 2006; Lim, 2005; 
Macartney, 2006; Pei, 2005; US State Dept., 2006; Xinhua, 2006; author’s experience at 
CCTV 9). 
The current direction of overall media development was set at the time of Deng’s 
‘southern tour.’ Reflecting concern over the involvement of media in Tiananmen, since 
then a partial re-centralization of media administration has been launched, although 
provincial and municipal level media have been strengthened with respect to the CCTV 
monopoly at the national level. In August 2000, the State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television (SARFT) called for a merger of terrestrial and cable television at all 
levels. In effect this meant in most cases a new television station emerged using the old 
name of the terrestrial station, while taking over the cable operations within the 
jurisdiction of the administrative section to which they answered (Redl & Simons, 2002, 
pp. 17-18). As a result, by 2003 powerful television groups had emerged at the national, 
provincial and municipal levels, which combined terrestrial, cable, and satellite assets. 
At each level, these conglomerates had a monopoly over television networks and 
channels where they operated. The biggest of them was the single national level group, 
the China Media Group, which managed CCTV’s assets. However, Beijing 
                                                                                                                                                 
profitable to work it, or to seek more remunerative employment elsewhere, usually in the major cities on 
the eastern seaboard. The figure of 170 million is derived from adding the 20 million estimated by the 
World Bank to be out of work in the cities (2002 data) to the 150 million ‘surplus’ farmers. The Marxian 
category of ‘lumpenproletariat,’ which signifies “that in extreme conditions of crisis and social 
disintegration in a capitalist society large numbers of people may become separated from their class and 
come to form a ‘free floating’ mass…” (Bottomore, 1983, p. 292) comes close to describing the 
unemployed, especially the rural ‘surplus’, in the PRC today. 
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(municipality), Guangdong, Guizhou, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shanghai 
(municipality), Shenzhen (special economic zone), Tianjin (municipality), and Zhejiang 
Television were all members of conglomerates by 2003, which were both cooperating 
and competing with CCTV (Esarey, 2005; Kender, Redl, & Simons, 2003, pp. 19-24; 
Redl & Simons, 2002, pp. 17-18). At the same time, their establishment has not been 
without problems, and their future is unclear. As Sun (2006) and Hu (2003) note, in 2003 
SARFT stopped the process of building further conglomerates in order to digest the 
lessons to be learned from the existing conglomerates and to assess whether the 
restructuring of the industry had been a success. 
The PRC’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 – 
to which in part the above-noted policy of building conglomerates was a response – and 
the top level change in leadership in October 2002/March 2003 – when Hu Jintao was 
elevated first as CPC General Secretary and then as President – and preparations for 
digital television have also had important effects. With Hu’s ascendancy, Liu Yunshan 
replaced Ding Guangen as head of the Central Publicity Department. His deputy, Wang 
Taihua, like his predecessor Xu Guangchun, is simultaneously head of SARFT, ensuring 
tight Party control over the broadcasting regulator. WTO entry does not expose the 
PRC’s state-controlled media assets to direct foreign competition, except to a very 
limited degree in selected sites such as three star and above hotels, and in Guangdong 
Province where in 2001 AOL-Time Warner and News Corporation were granted limited 
landing rights for Mandarin language channels, in a province predominantly switched on 
to the Cantonese programming that originates in neighboring Hong Kong. 36  The 
                                                 
36 To date, the plans of the transnationals to use Guangdong as a gateway into the PRC have not succeeded. 
By 2003, CETV had managed to capture only two percent of the market in the provincial capital, 
Guangzhou. In July of that year, AOL sold a 64% stake in the channel to Tom.com, owned by Hong Kong 
entrepreneur Li Ka-shing, in a bid to improve its access to the relationship-driven Chinese business system 
(Kan, 2003; Young, 2003). Rupert Murdoch of News Corp. is married to a Chinese, Wendi Deng. Perhaps 
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telecommunications sector has been partially opened to foreign investment (Lynch, 2000; 
Zhao, 2001). 
Digitization promises to change the television landscape again. Experimentation 
at the provincial and municipal level in digital delivery began in late 2002. Nationwide, 
digital delivery is planned to overtake analog delivery by 2010. If all goes according to 
plan, CCTV plans to switch off its analog signal by 2015. Concurrent to the development 
of digital delivery, SARFT is planning for a massive increase in the number of channels, 
although analysts foresee a shortfall in domestic production, which could signal another 
opening for foreign investment into the media sector (Anon., 2003b, 2003c; 2002). 
Summary 
So far, I have outlined the changes undergone by the PRC’s television system 
with the move away from funding by state subsidies to advertising, begun in 1978 and 
fully realized in 1992, when most subsidies were ended. However, commercialization has 
not undermined political control of news media, despite calls in the mid to late 1980s 
from within the Party/State as well as from within media for journalism reform. The 
Tiananmen incident and resultant crackdown on media ended any hope of the Party 
changing its attitude to journalism in the foreseeable future. 
From its birth in 1931 and its roots in the Leninist concept of a revolutionary 
party, the CPC has sought to develop media as a political instrument of domestic 
development with an international ‘soft power’ dimension in the case of television. 
Despite Tiananmen, what has changed is the class character of the CPC’s membership, 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a result cynics suggest that News Corp.’s ‘guanxi’ (relations) may be better than Time Warner’s. But 
News Corp. has also not been able to expand its television presence in the PRC much beyond its original 
stake in Guangdong. An attempt to buy into provincial broadcaster Qinghai TV in 2005 fell afoul of the 
regulators, and analysts believe the central authorities may even be questioning the wisdom of the limited 
opening granted in 2001 (Dickie, 2005). 
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which now includes businesspeople, while its traditional base in the peasantry and 
working class has been eroded, although the Party remains committed as the guiding 
principle of its work to democratic centralism, which requires that the “individual is 
subordinate to the organization, the minority is subordinate to the central committee” 
(Saich, 2004, pp. 91, 81). Also changed is the range of entertainment-based alternatives 
to the formulaic television of the news system, which is hemorrhaging viewers, while 
development of provincial and municipal television is also providing strong competition 
to the monopoly national broadcaster CCTV. 
THE LAUNCH OF CCTV INTERNATIONAL 
The origins of CCTV International can be traced to programs like ‘Follow Me’, 
launched in the early 1980s to help English-language learning in the PRC. In 1986, 
CCTV launched a program called ‘English News’ (Liu, 2006). For its first nine years, the 
English news was a daily fifteen minute bulletin of items translated into English from the 
previous evening’s edition of the national news, Xinwen Lianbo, from CCTV-1 (Jirik, 
2000). Beginning in 1995, management began to expand the English news team. By 
1999, the English News had developed its own identity within CCTV’s Overseas Service 
Center (OSC), which would be the department responsible for CCTV-9 and CCTV-I 
once they were launched. The English News was responsible for three daily half hour 
bulletins on CCTV-4, produced by an editorial team with some thirty members. By that 
time, the English News was already under the leadership of Jiang Heping, who was 
appointed Director of the English News Department in 1998, after working as Deputy 
Director of the News Editorial Department at CCTV-1 (Jirik, 2000). On September 25, 
2000, CCTV-9 was launched, transforming the English Department within CCTV-4, 
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which broadcast globally, but primarily in Mandarin, into its own 24-hour international 
channel. 
In 2001, Xu Guangchun, who was then deputy head of the Central Publicity 
Department and head of SARFT launched the “going out” project as part of the 
Party/State’s aim to take the PRC’s voice to the world (Xu, 2002, cited in Liu, 2006). 
With respect to television, the goals of the project were within the first five years to land 
a full range of PRC television overseas, especially in North America and Western 
Europe. Then within a further ten years, the aim was for PRC to consolidate multi-
language global and regionalized services (Liu, 2006). Xu outlined a series of strategies: 
both CCTV and high profile lower tier stations were encouraged to expand overseas and 
enter into cooperative agreements with overseas broadcasters; managers were called on to 
develop strong overseas marketing and distribution teams and agencies; channels were 
called on to improve their understanding of media laws, regulations and policies in target 
regions and countries; they were also asked to study the culture and audience tastes, the 
politics, history, economy, etc. of target countries and regions to “help with the 
government’s policy-making” (Xu, 2002, cited in Liu, 2006). In short, as Liu (2006) 
notes, the expansion of services such as CCTV International was aimed at increasing the 
PRC’s political influence through media. 
A media manager involved in the “going out” project told me in 2003 that the aim 
for CCTV International was to be “China’s CNN, only cleverer.” My understanding of 
what was meant by this comment was that CCTV International would have the dual 
function of providing both a global news service, while remaining the voice of the Party 
and State in the international media sphere, obscuring any differences in the process. 
Whereas an objectivist news ontology would find this a contradiction in terms, from the 
viewpoint of the hybrid media form developing in the PRC, the task manifests itself as a 
 84
challenge for reporters to pay attention not only to a story, but to its meaning for the 
country’s internal development and external image, and the danger in reporting facts that 
could embarrass the government. 
According to CCTV management, the first time they heard the term ‘China’s 
CNN’ was in a meeting with SARFT and the CPD in 2001, when Xu Guangchun used it 
to describe the role of CCTV-9 in the context of the “going out” project. The first step in 
realizing this goal had been the launch of CCTV-9. Previously, CCTV’s English 
language programming had shared CCTV-4 with Mandarin-language programming, 
which was primarily aimed at the Chinese diaspora. In contrast, the 24-hour English 
service was aimed at the global English speaking audience, including inside the PRC and 
launched on a series of satellites that provided the channel with a footprint covering 98% 
of the planet, reaching over one hundred countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa 
and Oceania (Liu, 2006). 
In October 2001, CCTV expanded CCTV-9 into cable delivery and began to 
partner with media giants such as AOL Time Warner (AOLTW) and News Corporation, 
giving them limited access to the PRC’s television market in Guangdong Province in 
exchange for AOLTW cable delivery in the US cities of New York, Los Angeles and 
Houston and access to News Corp’s BSkyB’s satellite service in Europe. In the United 
States the potential audience when the service was launched was two million subscribers, 
and in Europe, six million (Hui, 2003). In September 2004, CCTV signed a deal with 
EchoStar to make its ‘Great Wall TV Package’ available to satellite subscribers of the 
DISH Network in the United States (Liu, 2006, p. 59).37 The ‘Great Wall’ package 
                                                 
37 Subscriptions details for the “Great Wall TV Package” are available at 
http://www.dishnetwork.com/content/whats_on_dish/international/Chinese/packages.aspx. 
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features a selection of CCTV and provincial-level channels in Mandarin Chinese as well 
as CCTV International and CCTV E&F (Spanish and French). 
The strategy of bundling CCTV-9 into a package makes determining its audience 
extremely difficult. Figures for the subscription package bear no necessary relationship to 
actual viewer numbers. When I asked CCTV management in 2005 how many people 
were watching CCTV-9 overseas, the reply was “no idea.” An advertising brochure used 
by CCTV International in 2005 gave the figure of “2.3 million subscribers outside China” 
(CCTV, 2005). Against this, CCTV’s website in May 2007 stated that CCTV-9 
“programs can now be seen by 45 million subscribers outside China” (CCTV, 2007). 
However, these latter numbers appear to reflect potential rather than actual viewers. 
CCTV reported in early 2005 that subscriptions to the ‘Great Wall’ package had 
surpassed thirty thousand (CCTV, 2006), which, according to management was the break 
even point for commercial sustainability. However, apparent success in one market was 
matched by failure in another. On April 11, 2007, the Houston Chronicle reported that 
CCTV-9 would be “discontinued because of low viewership” (McDaniel, 2007). I 
confirmed this with Comcast, who had acquired Time Warner’s cable operation. Comcast 
would not release viewer figures, but told me that they were “very low” and not high 
enough to justify carriage of CCTV International on a commercial basis. 
Given that CCTV argues that its global expansion is driven by commercial 
considerations (Collier, 2004), the possibility of failure must be vexing. On the one hand, 
should CCTV’s stable of international channels fail to cover costs, then the government 
would be in the potentially embarrassing situation of having to face questions whether its 
intentions were purely commercial in launching channels like CCTV International and 
platforms like the ‘Great Wall’ package. On the other hand, were CCTV to succeed in 
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generating subscription figures high enough to cover production and distribution costs, 
the Party/State would surely enjoy the irony of projecting ‘soft power’ for a profit. 
Meanwhile, CCTV continues to aggressively market its stable of international 
channels, and is finding no shortage of willing partners, who hope to leverage association 
with CCTV into access to the PRC market. In Britain for example, News Corp’s Sky 
includes CCTV-9 among its package of news channels, which otherwise consist of Sky 
News, BBC NEWS 24, BBC Parliament, CNN, Community Channel, DD-News 
(Doordarshan), EuroNews and France 24 (see Illustration 1). Simply through association 
with the likes of BBC and CNN, CCTV-9’s mix of news and Party/State publicity is 
legitimized. 
Illustration 1: Webgrab of BSkyB basic news package38  
                                                 
38 Source: URL http://www.freesatfromsky.co.uk/?pID=3 Accessed October 31, 2007. Note also the 
presence of the French government-funded publicity channel, France 24. 
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Although, CCTV-9 had been broadcasting on a 24-hour cycle to an international 
audience since its launch on September 25, 2000, its relaunch in May 2004 as CCTV 
International was meant to mark a significant change of direction. The Controller at the 
time described the changes in the following manner: 
From the former external publicity aim to “let the world understand China, let 
China go out to the world, open to the world a window for understanding China,” 
the channel has become an “antenna for the world, the eye of China, a window for 
the world.” The key is that the original single window has become two windows, 
not only is the channel a window for the world to understand China, but it’s also a 
window for the world to understand itself … The existing news-oriented 
comprehensive channel has been transformed into an English-language news 
channel. The quantity of foreign news has been increased and this foreign news is 
being reported from China’s standpoint and with Chinese perspective. General 
news has become a rolling service. The respective features of specialized news 
are prominent. Economic, cultural and sporting news have all been strengthened. 
(Jiang & Liu, 2004, p. 54) 
The key differences were the re-focusing of the channel away from being a 
“window on China” to also being a “window on the world,” the implementation of a 
rolling service for general news and the strengthening of the channel’s identity as a news 
channel, rather than a comprehensive channel. The refocusing was characterized by the 
channel’s slogan being changed from “your window on China” to “your window on 
China and the world.” The rolling service was implemented by increasing the number of 
hours of news and putting news at the top of the hour, every hour. The shift away from 
CCTV-9’s identity as a comprehensive channel similar to e.g. ABC, NBC, CBS or Fox in 
the United States towards ‘China’s CNN’ was achieved according to management by not 
only emphasizing news on the channel, but with new and revamped shows, a lineup more 
appropriate to a news channel, and a broadcast schedule that targeted audiences in Asia, 
Europe and the Americas, without forgetting its traditional service for foreigners living in 
the PRC (Jiang & Liu, 2004). 
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I noted above (see p. 9) the role CPC Politburo member in charge of publicity Li 
Changchun played in initiating the relaunch. Li’s interest in the channel’s development 
continued after his visit to Latin America. Beginning in 2003, he made a number of 
comments “on the question of improving television’s external publicity work.” 39  Li 
issued a written instruction to CCTV on September 16, 2003 making “extremely clear 
demands of CCTV-9”40: 
我国的视角审视世界；以外国人感兴趣的问题为切入点（如经济，旅游）展
示中国；以较高的时效报道全世界新闻，应成为 CCTV-9 改进的途径.41 
[looking at the world from our perspective; taking what interests foreigners (e.g. 
the economy, travel) as a starting point for showing China; reporting the world’s 
news in a timely fashion – these have to become the ways of improving CCTV-9 
(author’s translation)] 
Less than a week later, on September 22nd, Xu Guangchun led a delegation of 
senior leaders to CCTV for a discussion on external publicity. He called for the 
“transformation” (改造) of CCTV-9, “to make CCTV-9 in a real sense an international 
news channel (“把CCTV-9 办成真正意义上的国际新闻频道”42). 
On the back of these two demands, CCTV-9 management set about restructuring 
the channel, although from the outset what might have appeared like a clear demand from 
the perspective of the Politburo and SARFT created an ambiguous space and room for 
channel management to maneuver, given the simultaneous emphasis on Chinese 
(government) perspective, a focus on issues ranging from economic development to 
tourism and a call for a timely news service. Core to understanding CCTV-9’s further 
development is to recognize that a starting point was given, but no more. 
                                                 
39 Source: unpublished CCTV document 
40 Source: unpublished CCTV document 
41 Source: unpublished CCTV document 
42 Source: unpublished CCTV document 
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DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
The transformation of CCTV-9 takes place within a general transformation of the 
field of journalism. But the long history of that general transformation indicates that the 
conjuncture of forces associated with media reform in general is neither singular, nor 
linear. From the outset, the Party/State has seen media as an instrument of power. At 
times the flow of power has been theorized in top down turns, at other times more of a 
circular motion is evident, in particular in Mao’s ‘mass line’ theory and in Zhao Ziyang’s 
later call for greater political transparency. 
Although the Party/State clearly sees CCTV International as an instrument for 
projecting its voice in the global arena, the channel must also compete for influence with 
the likes of CNN International, which suggests a more ambitious project than pure 
propaganda. However, the moniker ‘China’s CNN’ does rely on obscuring the separation 
of political economic and regulatory regimes within which its competitor global 
broadcasters operate. The obfuscation of CCTV-9’s dual role is deliberate, and it is 
consistent with a regulatory system that cannot see television as anything other than an 
instrument of the Party and government. In short, the launch of CCTV International was 
less an initiative than an evolution in line with the development of television within the 
PRC. Consistent with the post-1978 development of television in the PRC as a hybrid 
service that functions as a cross between commercially-funded public service television 
and an instrument of state-controlled propaganda, CCTV-9’s further development 
remains subject to the vicissitudes of political economic change. 
The Party/State has called for CCTV International to become in a real sense an 
international news channel with a Chinese perspective. Against an objectivist news 
ontology, which would reject this possibility, the hybrid media model developing in the 
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PRC draws no necessary distinction between news and external publicity (soft power), 
especially as the Party/State sees news media in general, including in the West, as an 
instrument of power. 
Nevertheless, domestically the legitimation crisis triggered by the Party/State’s 
embrace of neo-liberal capitalism has impacted on media, especially news media given 
their instrumental status. The efficiency of the Party/State’s external publicity depends in 
large part on media practitioners. But with the imbrication of media ever deeper into the 
market and the increasing contradictions the market is playing in the overall political 
economy, news makers are unwilling to play the role of Party/State lapdog without also 
playing the role of Party/State watchdog. They argue that their own legitimacy, and ipso 
facto that of the Party/State given their institutional relationship, calls for a broader 
definition of their current role. 
What is clear from the long history of the development of television in the PRC is 
how close the practitioners of today are to their forebears. The launch of CCTV 
International plays out the same quest of international recognition that drove the original 
launch of television in 1958. Li Changchun’s and SARFT’s call for the reconstruction of 
CCTV-9 as a hybrid news, information and publicity channel echoes the same debate 
about the role of media in development and governance that have characterized television 
since its inception in the PRC. 
Not surprisingly, given how high are the stakes, the inner-Party struggle for 
control of television in the PRC has been contentious from the outset. With the shift to 
commercialization of the medium the stakes were raised even higher. Not least among 
those demanding a voice in the further development of the medium are the practitioners 
themselves, including journalists, a conflicted species in the PRC, an instrument of power 
which demands to speak truth to power. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the history of television in the PRC up to and 
including the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International. That history shows how close 
the past is to the present. Despite evident breaks in the development of television, in 
particular during the Cultural Revolution, the introduction of the market, Tiananmen and 
Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, continuity of the core function of television as an 
instrument of the authorities has never been in question. Only the organization of that 
function has been debated. The commercialization of television in the PRC was 
sponsored by the Party/State and the Party/State has been its prime beneficiary. With the 
launch of CCTV International, the Party/State is seeking to extend its voice further into 
the international arena. However, it cannot do so without the intellectual labor of program 
makers and in the case of television news, journalists. 
The field of journalism is rife with contradictions as the different forces that shape 
television – political, economic, institutional and cultural – struggle for control of the 
space of its development. Within this space, journalism occupies a powerful niche. 
Historically, in the absence of electoral politics in communist systems, news media have 
functioned as something of a feedback mechanism for the power system. Unlike the 
market, which is mute but subject to the control of the dominant hegemony, the 
journalistic field has a voice, and it is to the development of that voice that I now turn. 
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Chapter 4: The journalist & journalism in the PRC 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, I have introduced CCTV International in the context of 
the PRC’s globalization and the development of television. Central to both processes has 
been an official understanding that media are instruments of the power structure. 
However, although news makers may be instruments, they are also cultural workers – 
socialized subjects in terms of Bourdieu’s (2005a) frame of reference that insists 
correctly on always locating journalists within the full range of forces that enable and 
constrain both their subjectivity and their practice (for more on this, see p. 354). Their 
habitus is not singular nor is the journalistic field uncontested. Journalists are embedded 
in a range of discourses and social practices that both enable and constrain their work and 
make their work meaningful, including to themselves. In the PRC, these discourses have 
a history that goes back to the middle of the 19th century and the encounter with the West 
out of which China’s globalization within modernity develops through processes of 
hybridization. 
The progenitors of Chinese journalism are not that removed from today’s 
practitioners. The turmoil, triumphs and setbacks associated with the ongoing 
modernization project inaugurated in the late Qing Dynasty, in which media played an 
important role, continue even as that project continues. Retired journalists today survived 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Some currently practising journalists were active during the 
Cultural Revolution. Journalism in the PRC is a successor to the intellectual vocation as it 
was practiced in late Imperial and then Republican China. As a result journalists may be 
conflicted people. 
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The roots of ambivalence in the journalistic vocation can be traced back to the 
ambivalence of the intellectual vocation embedded in the epistemological break that 
sundered Imperial from modern Chinese history, yet bridged the gulf between the ruler 
and ruled with the re-invention of tradition and consequent imagination and narration of 
the nation. 
In this chapter I examine the history of the relationship of the Chinese journalist 
to political authority and I look at the origins of journalism in the modernization project, 
which continues to characterize development in the PRC. Finally, I discuss the 
contemporary theorization of journalism as a social practice that is both enabled and 
constrained by the relationship between the power structure and its instruments and by 
changes in that relationship due to economic development. 
In terms of theory, the Party/State and the market are the major institutions that 
have shaped the field of journalism in which the news makers at CCTV-9 are embedded. 
As individuals, particular journalists bear the stamp of this historical development, which, 
coupled with culture, takes on the form of the diachronic dimension of habitus. The 
synchronic dimension is characterized by the complete conjuncture of institutional forces 
in which the field is embedded at any given time. Only by positioning the “socialized 
subjectivity” (Bourdieu, 2005b, p. 211) that constitutes journalistic agency within this 
deep historical trajectory are we able as researchers to begin to overcome a tendency 
within the literature to identify ‘real’ journalism as something that Chinese news makers 
know nothing about, since a journalism so constituted is not journalism at all, but 
propaganda. As a result, PRC journalists are constantly being told, and often telling 
themselves, they need to learn how to make news from people who remain alien to their 
habitus even if the field is familiar, when the long history of journalism in the PRC 
reveals a deep and complex structuration of the field that has become constitutive of 
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everyday practice that produces the best news possible under all the conditions that 
enable and constrain its making. 
MEDIA AND POWER 
At a Party meeting in May 2005, according to The New York Times, CPC General 
Secretary Hu Jintao formally launched a ‘smokeless war’ against ‘liberal elements’43 in 
society (Kahn, 2005). Media controls were tightened. From ensuing developments, it 
appears that progressives within the media were among the targets. In any case, since 
then, a number of high profile cases have been filed against journalists, and a number of 
them have been jailed.44 Although CCTV-9 appeared to have avoided this war at the time 
of writing, journalists I spoke to in late 2004 were clearly concerned that something had 
changed in the political wind. After one editorial meeting, one reporter summed up his 
colleagues’ sense of frustration, saying “we’re being crushed.” When I questioned 
management about policy changes coming from the government regulator SARFT, one 
manager, also visibly agitated, told me angrily “I have no idea what is happening”. 
As the ebb and flow of power within the PRC ceaselessly changes the 
configuration of the leadership at the center, Hu Jintao’s ‘smokeless war’ is a clear sign 
of his determination to shape political discourse. However, that Hu had to declare a 
smokeless war is also a clear sign that some journalists are beginning to find their voices 
again after Tiananmen and over a decade of economic development at any cost has 
                                                 
43 By liberal, Hu means small ‘l’ liberal and progressive (socially conscious, left-wing, neo-Marxian) 
critics of the Party/State’s authoritarianism. Liberals should not be confused with neo-liberals, part of the 
right-wing within the PRC. Neo-liberals hold to Friedmanite and Hayekian economic principles, and in so 
far as the Party/State has embraced these principles are comfortable with authoritarianism. 
44 The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CJP) notes that the PRC is the world’s leading 
jailer of journalists, with 31 behind bars, according to its annual report on the state of journalism 
worldwide, released on December 8, 2006. Although the number 31 is meaningless without analysis of the 
comparative proportion of media behind bars in different countries, Reporters Without Borders ranks the 
PRC 163rd out of 167 countries on its Global Press Freedom Index. 
 95
created contradictions in the political economy that progressive elements within the Party 
and media are concerned to address, with media playing a key role as the ideological 
mouthpieces of Hu’s ‘harmonious society’. 
The role of news media as an active participant in the PRC’s political economy is 
an extension of their instrumental character as organs of political and administrative 
power. However, the negative characterization of media as a mouthpiece ignores the 
dynamic nature of the relationship between Party/State and media. From its earliest days 
the Party and State-affiliated media were expected to function not only as a mouthpiece 
from the Party to the people, but likewise as a mouthpiece, speaking on behalf of the 
people to the Party. Mao authorized this dual function of media in his elaboration of mass 
line theory. 
Even if Mao’s intentions were cynical and oriented to inner-Party struggle, he 
authorized a discourse which has been utilized to argue that the Party should listen to and 
learn from ordinary people. Mao’s critics characterize the mass line in top down terms 
(Zhao, 1998, p. 5). However, another member of the collective leadership at the time, Liu 
Shaoqi, called for media to act as a bridge between the Party and people in what Zhao 
(1998) calls a “bottom-up flow of communication” (p. 25). Clearly different leaders have 
used ‘mass line’ in different ways. 
Decades after Mao, Premier Zhu Rongji described the roles of the media as 
“public supervision, people’s mouthpiece, government’s mirror, vanguard of reform” 
(Swartz, 2006, p. 73). In his report to the 16th Party Congress in 2002, CPC General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin called on the Party to “tighten organizational and democratic 
supervision and give play to the supervisory function of the media” (Jiang, 2002). In 
September 2004, the CPC released a document outlining its approach to governance. 
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Again the issue of media supervision was stressed, within an overall framework of Party 
control (Xinhua, 2004b). 
Notwithstanding, the research literature to date (Brady, 2005a, 2006; Donald, 
Keane, & Hong, 2002; Esarey, 2004, 2006; Jia, Lu, & Heisey, 2002; Lee, 1994b, 2000f, 
2003b; Sun, 2001; Zhao, 1998; Zhou (Zhao), 2000 et al.) is pretty well unamimous in 
identifying the failure of the Party/State to promote more than token supervision of its 
work by media, resulting in the mouthpiece role predominantly developing as a one-way 
and top-down medium, to which people have increasingly turned a deaf ear as their 
voices are ignored. 
Although in the run-up to Tiananmen in 1989, media and associated policy reform 
were on the agenda, the de-politicization of Party work after 1992 and the 
commercialization of media worked to silence news media as a voice of the people. 
However, the continued failure of the Party/State to deal with the contradictions 
emerging in the political economy has emboldened some journalists, editors and 
journalism educators to begin speaking up once again. 
Characteristic of this trend in media has been the work, alternately praised and 
condemned, of Southern Weekend (‘Nanfang Zhoumo’) and Southern Metropolis News 
(‘Nanfang Dushi Bao’), a weekend paper and tabloid daily respectively, both published 
by the Southern Daily Group, which is controlled by the publicity department of the 
Guangzhou-based Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CPC. Amongst academics 
Jiao Guobiao, a former Beijing University journalism professor, stands out for his blunt 
and sarcastic attack in May 2004 on the Central Publicity Department, ‘Declaration of the 
Campaign against The Central Propaganda Department’ (Jiao, 2004) which ultimately 
cost him his job. Another prominent example occurred in early 2006, when the Central 
Publicity Department suspended the Freezing Point (‘Bing Dian’) supplement to China 
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Youth Daily (‘Zhongguo Qingnian Bao’) and sacked its editor Li Datong after he 
published an essay by historian Yuan Weishi, which criticized history textbooks for 
concealing what Yuan called the brutality and fanaticism of the anti-foreign Boxer 
Rebellion that swept Imperial China in the early twentieth century. 
CONFUCIANISM45 AND THE ROLE OF THE JOURNALIST 
The contradictory function of the journalist as both an instrument and critic of 
political authority can be traced in Imperial Chinese history to the influence on 
Confucianism on education and political legitimation. In the post-Imperial struggle to 
overcome feudalism, the legacy of Confucianism as the social framework of everyday 
life was never abandoned even as its role in the legitimation of Imperial power was co-
opted first by quasi-Republican values that were rendered meaningless under the 
Guomindang, and then into Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, under the CPC (Fairbank, 1986; Lee, 2004). 
For an understanding of the weight of history that anchors the PRC in a past re-
conceptualized to justify and simultaneously gloss the break with Imperial China, the role 
of Confucianism must be taken into consideration. The chief instrument that defined 
intellectual work as above all political work was the imperial examination. Following the 
Warring States era (403-221 BCE), the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) elevated the 
teachings of Confucius to canonical status (Fairbank, 1986, pp. 27-28). As Simon Leys 
                                                 
45 By Confucianism, I do not mean the practice of venerating Confucius, which is increasingly becoming 
the state religion in the PRC. Rather, I mean the ensemble of justifications, motives and practices that have 
evolved over the centuries in the name of Confucius. This ensemble is as confusing, contradictory and 
meaningless if parsed for logic and consistency as is the ensemble of practices associated with terms such 
as Christianity or Islam. Without falling into the trap of essentialism associated with the likes of Samuel 
Huntington (1993) and the promotion of civilizational exceptionalism, what I mean by Confucianism is 
meaningful for understanding the history, politics and practice of identity in the PRC, just as Christianity 
and its formalization in the church was central to the development of the politics and practice of identity in 
the West, and Islam for the politics and practice of identity in the Arab world. 
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(1997) notes, the itinerant scholar taught that “government and administration of the state 
should be exclusively entrusted to a moral and intellectual elite of “gentlemen”” (p. 
xxviii) thereby establishing “an enduring and decisive link between education and 
political power: only the former could provide access to the latter” (p. xxviii).46 However, 
by the time the teachings of Confucius were institutionalized they were also well on their 
way to becoming much more and much less than the pithy statements and arguments of 
the original Analects. 
They had become much more, because as Leys (1997, p. xv) argues, in the 
following two thousand years Confucianism would become an imperial cult. Even after 
the end of empire and during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and Cultural Revolution of the 
PRC, intellectuals were persecuted less for being intellectuals not averse to a strong and 
centralized state than for disagreeing with Mao about how best to serve that state 
(Fairbank, 1986, p. 338). As Leys (1997, p. xxix) observes: “The Maoist concept of ‘re-
education’ that was to generate such dreadful excesses at the time of the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ was in fact one of the many unconscious resurgences of the Confucian 
mentality, which paradoxically permeated the psychological substructure of Maoism” (p. 
xxix). Just as in earlier times, the intellectual was central to the justification and 
maintenance of the political economic system (Fairbank, 1986, p. 338), and just as fated 
to its whims. 
Liu Shaoqi died in 1969 at the height of the Cultural Revolution, hounded out of 
power and into an early grave by Mao. Following Mao’s departure, as part of a move by 
the more cautious and somewhat chastened leadership, given the failure of the Great Leap 
                                                 
46 Walter Lippman had something similar in mind in his arguments with John Dewey about the role of the 
journalist. As history teaches us, Lippman won out and the today’s top-down news systems run by a coterie 
of professionals was the result. Against this model, Dewey argued for journalism as a dialogical practice, a 
mode Habermas would later take up and make central to his theory of communicative action, and Merritt 
would attempt to codify in civic and public journalism (Bybee, 1997; Habermas, 1984; Merritt, 1998). 
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Forward and chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping posthumously 
rehabilitated Liu in 1981. Liu was one of several hundred thousand ‘rightists’ whose 
records were cleared, although many of them were already dead and many of them had 
been victims of Deng himself when as CPC General Secretary in 1957, he supported 
Mao’s purge of intellectuals in the ‘Anti-Rightist Campaign,’ a backlash against the 
‘Hundred Flowers Movement’ (Fairbank, 1986, pp. 295, 344). 
The Hundred Flowers Movement, launched in 1957, was an attempt to involve 
intellectuals47 in building the revolution, still defined in Soviet terms as modernization 
and industrialization. However, when the Party called for their input with the slogan “let 
a hundred flowers bloom together, let the hundred schools of thought contend,” 
(Fairbank, 1986, p. 292) intellectuals attacked the Party for obstructing rather than 
facilitating their work. The movement quickly turned against so many of the Party’s 
practices that Mao, with Deng’s support, initiated a struggle against intellectuals, the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign, targeting between 400,000 and 700,000 of the very people the 
Party needed to modernize the country. They were investigated, demoted, fired or 
imprisoned (Fairbank, 1986, p. 293; Saich, 2004, p. 39). 
These two campaigns highlight the problem facing intellectuals in the PRC, a 
common problem in communist countries, given the uncertain status of the intellectual 
within Marxist theory, which prior to Gramsci never developed a consistent answer to the 
question whether intellectuals were part of the productive classes or non-productive 
strata. Mao was ambivalent about the role of the intellectuals in revolution. On the one 
hand, he stated “[w]e can’t get along without them” (Fairbank, 1986, p. 291). On the 
other hand, he turned on them whenever their own thinking deviated from the Party line. 
                                                 
47 At the time, intellectual was defined as having high-school or above education. Intellectuals numbered 
five million out of a population of 400 million (1.25%). Of those, about 185,000 had a college-level 
education (0.05% of the population). (Fairbank, 1986, pp. 291-293) 
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The original statements and arguments of the Analects had become much less 
because the institutionalization of Confucianism as a set of rules for governing the empire 
over the millennia had largely evacuated Confucius from the texts. The rote learning of 
the classics by the administrative class did not protect them from the pressures of the 
myriad familial, collegial and professional relationships that brought success in the 
imperial examination. The examination system may have been egalitarian in principle, 
but as the Qing Dynasty began to crumble, it had become elitist and corrupt in practice 
(Fairbank, 1986, p. 31). 
Nevertheless, against the cult of Confucianism, the Analects of Confucius remain 
intact. Against their institutionalization as precepts for imperial governance, Elias Canetti 
suggests that “[t]he Analects of Confucius are the oldest complete intellectual and 
spiritual portrait of a man. It strikes one as a modern book” (cited in Leys, 1997, p. xxi). 
In this sense, Leys’ translation of the Analects can be read as a call to put Confucius back 
into Confucianism. In justifying the translation, Leys (1997) wrote: 
Karl Marx once warned overenthusiastic followers that he was not a Marxist. 
With better reason, one should say that Confucius was certainly not a 
Confucianist. Imperial Confucianism only extolled those statements from the 
Master that prescribed submission to the established authorities, whereas more 
essential notions were conveniently ignored – such as the precepts of social 
justice, political dissent, and the moral duty for intellectuals to criticize the ruler 
(even at the risk of their lives) when he was abusing his power, or when he 
oppressed the people. (p. xvi) 
Here we have quite a different picture of Confucius and departure point for an 
understanding of the role of the intellectual as it has evolved among journalists in the 
PRC. Combining this shift with an understanding of the manner in which the intellectual 
vocation in China and later the PRC was always-already political work, one can see the 
cultural roots of the career intellectual’s commitment simultaneously to the established 
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order and to social justice. These cultural roots are the source of the deep and ambivalent 
tensions that characterize the intellectual vocation and journalism as a profession in the 
PRC, once social justice was de-linked from service to the imperial family and linked to 
serving the newly invented nation. 
SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER 
Analysts (de Burgh, 2003a; Lee, 2004; Swartz, 2006; Zhao, 1998) trace the 
history of the Chinese journalist back to agitation for political-economic, technological 
and cultural ‘modernization’ in the decades preceding the collapse of Imperial China’s 
Qing Dynasty in 1911 and foundation of the Republic of China in 1912. From the outset, 
reformers theorized modernization as a critical engagement with Confucianism, and 
embrace of ‘westernization,’ which peaked with the Reform Movement of the 1890s and 
the May 4th Movement (1915-1925). De Burgh (2000) notes the conflicted character of 
this movement: 
… although many of the reformer-journalists of the early years of the century 
sought to reject Confucianism as social ideology, they remained wedded to the 
Confucian idea of the function of the literati and arrogated to themselves the right 
to teach, exhort and berate their fellow Chinese (p. 556). 
Several writers (de Burgh, 2003a; Lee, 2000a; Swartz, 2006) point out that 
westernization as such was never the aim of the reform movement. Rather, westernization 
offered a set of conceptual and cognitive tools which reformers and subsequently 
revolutionaries used to dismantle and rebuild the political, economic, technological and 
cultural spaces of China’s emerging modernity in the context of collapse, conflict, civil 
war between warlords, nationalists and communists, anti-imperialist war against the 
Japanese, and the expulsion or withdrawal of European colonial forces from concessions 
in several major cities. This period lasted from the waning years of the Qing Dynasty 
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(1644-1911), and bloody aftermath of its collapse in 1911 to the retreat of the 
Nationalists (Guomindang) to Taiwan in 1949, and subsequent proclamation of the 
People’s Republic of China on the mainland on October 1 that year. 
For the Chinese press this was an era of immense ferment, experimentation, and 
growth. Despite, or perhaps even in response to decades of unrest and violence, media 
flourished. According to de Burgh (2003a, p. 198), by 1911 Imperial China had over 500 
newspapers and possibly thousands of magazines. As the country descended into chaos, 
the number grew. By 1935, despite turmoil across much of the country with foreign 
forces in control of concessions in key cities, communists fighting nationalists and both 
fighting the Japanese invasion, 910 newspapers served the reading public (de Burgh, 
2003a, p. 203). That number had risen to 1,781 by 1947, although the Guomindang had 
moved increasingly throughout the 1930s to censor the press and the Communists would 
soon do the same (de Burgh, 2003a; Fairbank, 1986, p. 221). As de Burgh notes, not until 
the mid-1990s did the PRC enjoy the scope and variety in the press that had characterized 
early post-imperial China. 
The first modern Chinese journalists practiced their craft in the treaty ports and 
Imperial capital. De Burgh (2003a) lists five preconditions of their emergence: 
An intellectual movement aimed at subjecting Confucian orthodoxy to rational 
scrutiny began to undermine complacency about the Chinese world as the epitome 
of civilisation; large numbers of Chinese went abroad to live in countries outside 
that world and a trickle returned wealthy and knowledgeable about lands which it 
was increasingly difficult to accept were barbarian, as tradition would have it; 
European military strength shook Chinese confidence; the need to counter the 
overwhelming power of the Europeans gave rise to a reform movement of 
intellectuals who rapidly moved from criticizing military shortcomings to 
identifying political and social weaknesses; European missionaries, forcing their 
way into China behind the traders and soldiers, learned Chinese and began to 
publish. (p. 196) 
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The first modern Chinese daily was Chong Ngoi Sam Bo, launched in 1854. The 
first mass circulation daily was Wahji Yatbo, published in 1864. The early papers had the 
character of a ‘yellow press,’ mixing business reporting functional to trade with gossip 
from the capital. Journalists at first had little standing in the community, and were even 
referred to as “scum” (de Burgh, 2003a, p. 197). However that began to change when the 
reform movement began to use the press to circulate its ideas (de Burgh, 2003a, pp. 196-
197). 
The reform movement grew up around literati who were part of the intellectual 
milieu seeking work in the Imperial bureaucracy. But with new avenues for employment 
opening up as the modernization movement developed, candidates who failed to make 
headway in the imperial examination were among those who organized themselves into 
‘self-strengthening’ study and discussion groups beginning in the 1860s. As de Burgh 
(2003a) notes, when Kang Youwei, one of the leading reformers, lent his considerable 
prestige to the nascent press by using it as a vehicle for his ideas, the image of journalism 
began to change. Among his protégés was Liang Qichao who would go on to become one 
of the founding practitioners and editors of modern Chinese journalism (de Burgh, 2003a, 
p. 197; Fairbank, 1986, p. 134). 
From its inception Chinese journalism was a patriotic profession. From the outset 
the Chinese journalist, whether a reformist or revolutionary, was committed (de Burgh, 
2003a, p. 197). Would-be bureaucrats increasingly turned to letters. Their training had 
been in thinking and writing. They were the natural progenitors of an indigenous 
journalistic tradition. Rooted in the affinity of the intellectuals with political authority 
through their association with the Imperial bureaucracy, this tradition was one of keen 
engagement in the affairs of the day. It was characterized by a strong commitment to 
defending the empire, and later the state against foreign incursion and occupation, even if 
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the techniques of that defense were largely borrowed from the very people, of whom 
these early journalists were determined to rid the country (de Burgh, 2003a). 
At the time, following the Empress Dowager’s coup d’etat in 1898 against the 
reformist Emperor Guangxu, many prominent reformers, including Kang Youwei and 
Liang Qichao, had taken refuge in Japan. In Tokyo, Liang launched a new paper, Current 
Affairs, which became a paradigm for the emerging Chinese press. In an editorial, Liang 
laid out its role (Britton, 1933): 
To report in detail the new government measures in the several provinces, so that 
readers may know that modern innovations actually do yield benefits; and also to 
realise the difficulties of those in authority, and their aims.… To delve into and 
fully expose details of important Sino-foreign problems, so that readers may 
understand that China is not established internationally, that because of internal 
disorganisation China is humiliated by other nations, and that because of our 
ignorance of international law we are duped by other nations; and thus to 
stimulate the new learning, and cause readers to give thought to purging the 
nation of its humiliations. (p. 89, cited in de Burgh, 2003, p.197) 
The refugee and émigré Chinese community in Japan was full of students and 
journalism was the ideal career. Their journalism was patriotic and change oriented. Their 
goal was salvation of the nation (Britton, 1933, cited in de Burgh, 2003, p.197). As 
intellectuals, they devoured the learning available from Europe and the United States, 
including the works of the social Darwinists, classical political economists and Marx 
(Chow, 2001; Fairbank, 1986; Lee, 2004; Zhao, 1998). From these and similar works, 
read and adapted to local conditions in a form of hybridization that changed the works as 
much as they were to change Imperial and Republican China and later the PRC, China’s 
first generation of journalists were among those thinkers, who forged the ideological 
weapons that were to first defend the empire, and then justify its overthrow. 
An epistemological break occurred at this point in Chinese history when Kang 
Youwei read social Darwinian ideas into the Confucian classics and discovered a 
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Confucian evolutionism (Chow, 2001; Fairbank, 1986, pp. 132-133). The concept of 
history as a relationship between past, present and future became possible as Chinese 
reformers and revolutionaries embraced the concepts of change, progress, race, nation 
and survival of the fittest. This form of history replaced the endless cycles of Imperial 
China, where the passage of time was marked only by the occasional irruption when 
Heaven withdrew its mandate from one imperial family, unrelated to the people they 
ruled over except by the unbridgeable gulf that separated them, and granted it to another 
(Chow, 2001; Fairbank, 1986, p. 133). In short, an epistemic shift took place in the space 
where the PRC is today in the period between the introduction of modern western thought 
into Imperial China in the mid-19th century, and the triumph of the communists in 1949. 
When Mao called the PRC ‘New China,’ he was speaking literally. Against an endless 
revisionism and the invention and re-invention of tradition that characterizes official 
historiography in the PRC48 today, Mao’s recognition that New China was literally a 
break with the past, was an insight that later generations have forgotten, or ignore.49 
THE SOCIAL THEORY OF MODERN JOURNALISM IN THE PRC 
Rooting modern journalism in the PRC in the encounter of Confucianism and the 
West during the late Imperial era foregrounds two dynamics that are present in the 
literature, but not usually the focus of sustained attention. The first of these dynamics is a 
relatively comfortable association intellectuals traditionally have had with the power 
structure and the sense that journalism is a vocation with real social responsibilities. The 
                                                 
48 And Taiwan, though in the case of Taiwan the harking to an imaginary past is less the result of 
revisionism than the legacy of neo-Confucianism as one cultural ground of the Guomindang’s guiding 
ideology. 
49 For an analysis of the invention and re-invention of ancient Chinese history, the conceptualization by 
Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao et al. of the modern Chinese nation in racial and ethnic terms and their 
narration of the myth of the Han majority functional to the suppression of China’s cultural and linguistic 
diversity in the interests of building a modern nation state in the manner prescribed by European theories of 
race, nation and state see Kai-wing Chow (2001). 
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second is the ambivalence experienced by practicing journalists because of the danger in 
speaking truth to power, when the interests of the Party and government are at odds with 
journalists’ interests or the interests of the people. 
In the case of television, as a highly technical and professionalized medium 
requiring highly specialized managerial, technical, production and representational skills, 
from the outset what Gramsci (1971, pp. 5-23) would call “organic” intellectuals, that is 
intellectuals functional to production and reproduction, were key to the functioning of the 
medium, even if they were not in control. Moreover, in so far as journalists were the 
successors of what Gramsci (1971) called the “traditional” intellectuals, self-styled “men 
of letters, philosophers, artists” (p. 9) the medium was peopled from bottom to top by 
potentially disaffected employees, especially given their historical treatment at the hands 
of the authorities and their ambiguous position in Marxian theory, with implications for 
their insecure position within any state predicated at least in part on that theory. 
I want to suggest that in these dynamics as much as in a nascent public sphere 
associated with the rise of a middle class or in the market are the seeds of a defensible 
form of socially responsible journalism that is being practiced in the PRC today, and that 
should be nurtured rather than dismissed because it does not meet the normative criteria 
of ‘objective’ journalism as its proponents imagine it is practiced in the West. 
Two writers who have looked carefully at the history of Chinese journalism are de 
Burgh (2000; 2003a; 2003b) and Lee (2000a; 2000e; 2004; 2000f). Both scholars provide 
a detailed and sustained account of the development of Chinese journalism from its roots 
in the intellectual stratum and its development beyond the ‘yellow press’ of the treaty 
ports to become a medium which fostered the aspirations of a middle class growing out 
of the encounter of the literati with the possibilities of trade and mercantile professions, 
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even as that emerging middle class remained passionately defensive about China’s 
position in the world. 
Both authors trace the travails of the profession through the post-Imperial era up 
to the founding of the PRC and show the courage of the journalists, and the range and 
depth of their work. They also note how the trajectory of Imperial and Republican 
China’s journalism, especially its editorial independence, was truncated by censorship 
applied first by the Nationalists, and then by the Communists and by institutionalization 
of the Leninist role of the media in the PRC as a Party/State mouthpiece. 
Put another way, both writers point to a history of Chinese journalism up to 1949 
that is not that dissimilar to the origins of the press in the West. Both systems are rooted 
in the growth of a restricted reading public among the monied and educated in an 
arguably Habermasian (1989) sense, as the shift from feudalism to mercantilism and 
capitalism creates a bourgeoisie.50 However the rise of this class was cut short by the 
peasant and workers’ revolution, and the bourgeoisie was cast aside, until the PRC begins 
to again develop the market and then capitalism after 1978. 
Lee (1994a; 2000a; 2000b; 2000d; 2000e; 2001; 2004; 2000f) has provided 
perhaps the best account of the stakes in play with development of the market. In a series 
of articles, he examines three prominent social theories of the political economy that 
account for media reform in Imperial and post-Imperial China and then the PRC. The 
three theories that he examines are liberal-pluralism, socialism (reformist Marxism) and 
radical Marxism (China’s New Left) (Lee, 2000a). 
The project of a reformist Marxism developed in the PRC after 1978. It reflected 
the Hegelian re-reading of Marx then current in Eastern Europe and was seen by its 
                                                 
50 Elman (1998) dismisses attempts to apply Habermas to the Imperial Chinese context as a misuse of 
inappropriate theory. 
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proponents “as the major vehicle for advocating change within the system, without 
seeking a change of the system” (Lee, 2000a, p. 563). Its representatives include writers 
such as Su Shaozhi, Wang Ruoshi, Hu Jiwei and Sun Xupei (Lee, 2003a, p. 21). They 
argued for socialist renewal and reform, and called for attendance to the voice of the 
people, and not simply the Party (Lee, 2000a, pp. 565-566). These scholars were active in 
the 1980s in the journalism reform movement and backed leaders such as Hu Yaobang 
and Zhao Ziyang, only to become victims of the power struggles within the Party in the 
lead up to and aftermath of Tiananmen (Lee, 2000a, p. 564). Lee (2000a) argues that 
“[t]ighter ideological control since 1989, combined with the dazzling ascendancy of 
consumer culture amid China’s forceful articulation of its political economy into the 
process of globalization since 1992, have consigned these writers into exile, dissent and 
irrelevance to both intellectual and everyday discourse” (p. 564). 
More problematic for Lee is the rise of the New Left in the PRC, a group of 
radical Marxists exemplified by the likes of Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui and Wang 
Shaoguang (Lee, 2003a, p. 20). According to Lee, the New Left offers “a timely radical 
critique of various brutal and distorted consequences of the state-led market reforms that 
have become manifested in the 1990s” (Lee, 2003a, p. 22). However, in their refusal to 
address what Lee calls the “despotism” of the Party/State and opposition to any possible 
accommodation with the market, Lee argues that the New Left is dangerously romantic. 
He criticizes Cui, for example, for wanting to reinvigorate “institutional innovation by 
remaking selective elements of Maoist experimentation dating back to the dreadful Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution” (Lee, 2003a, p. 22). Lee suggests that 
without a concrete action program the agendas of the New Left “remain no more than a 
preliminary outline for utopian imagining” (Lee, 2003a, p. 23). 
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For Lee (2000a; 2001; 2004) the only defensible alternative is liberal-pluralism, 
both as a model for media reform and as a critique of the distortions of the political 
economy associated with neo-liberalism and state control. Liberal-pluralism offers a 
bottom-up and politically motivated accommodation with the market that fosters the 
development of pragmatic possibilities in reform, including journalism reform and it 
recognizes the unconstrained state as the primary problem for a democratized press (Lee, 
2001, pp. 5-7). 
Unfortunately, as Lee himself is the first to acknowledge, liberal-pluralism has 
only ever been associated with failed democracy movements in Republican China (the 
1919 May 4th Movement) and the PRC (Tiananmen in 1989) (Lee, 2000a, p. 560). 
However, he argues that this does not undermine the efficacy of liberal-pluralism as a 
critical theory of the abuses associated with the Party/State, and a viable alternative to 
top-down developmentalism. According to Lee (2000a), its proponents “interpret the 
[current] situation as an already weakened authoritarian party-state trying desperately and 
instrumentally to trade financial privileges for media loyalty. Competition, even in a 
distorted market, has lessened the ideological rigidity of official journalism while 
broadening the space for non-political discourses” (p. 562). 
In accounting for the failure of liberalism and liberal-pluralism to develop in the 
PRC, Lee (2004) cites the familiar argument that capitalism is a precondition for 
democracy: “If Barrington Moore (1967) is correct in pronouncing “No bourgeoisie, no 
democracy” then it is clear that the Chinese society had not gone through capitalist 
development and there were no significant middle classes to speak of” (p. 14). Citing 
Berger (1986, pp. 79-81),  Lee (2000a) suggests that capitalism is a “prerequisite for 
democracy,” since it provides a social zone “relatively independent of state control” (pp. 
560-561). Following Berger (1986) for whom capitalist development and liberalization 
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are “necessary but not sufficient conditions” (Lee, 2000a, p. 561) for democracy, Lee 
(2000a) argues that “Chinese journalism cannot be expected to make substantial advances 
in press freedom without the backing of a viable market economy, but the existence of a 
market economy does not guarantee press freedom” (p. 561). 
The caveat that the market is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
development of a democratized press is crucial to Lee’s argument, since it enables him to 
attack the distortions that the market has introduced into the PRC’s media since full 
blown marketization began after 1992, while retaining the market as a democratizing 
counter force to the coercive character of the state apparatuses and the distortions 
associated with the Party/State’s control of media (Lee, 2000d, 2001; Lee, 2003a). 
However, in holding to Barrington Moore’s “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” thesis, Lee 
(2004, p. 14; Lee, 2003b, p. 23) is unwilling to acknowledge not only the democratic 
aspirations of the revolutionary traditions in both Imperial and Republican China from 
which both the reformist and radical Marxists drew their inspiration, however anti-
democratic their realization, but also treats as necessary what is historically contingent. 
In a collection of essays on democratization in Asia, Friedman (1994a, pp. 1-2) 
traces the history of the concept of democracy back to the particular European experience 
of the development of democracy in association with the institutionalization of middle 
class representation in politics, beginning in 16th Century Europe. This experience was 
then de-historicized, universalized and conceptualized in opposition to Oriental 
despotism. In classically ‘orientalist’ terms in the manner in which Said (1995) uses the 
term, Montesquieu argued that Asia’s climate and geography inhibited liberty (Friedman, 
1994c, p. 1). Hegel simply stated that Asia was beyond liberty (Friedman, 1994c, p. 1). 
While Marx theorized the Asiatic mode of production as a series of absences that set it 
off from the dynamism of Europe (Bottomore, 1983, p. 36). As a result, and by 
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definition, the Asian experience has not been, and cannot be ‘authentically’ democratic 
(Friedman, 1994c, p. 1). 
In the case of China and the PRC, in his list of democratic movements, Friedman 
(1994a, p. 5) adds the truncated reform movement of late Imperial China to Lee’s list of 
the May 4th movement in 1919 and the student movement of 1989, and notes that their 
failure is typically explained with reference to the authoritarian and Confucian cultural 
roots of the political system, as anti-democratic by nature. Conveniently ignored is the 
democratization of Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc. (Friedman, 1994a, p. 5). Moreover, 
as Friedman notes, democratization primarily is a political not an economic project. In 
contrast to theories that must wait for the right conditions for democracy to emerge, 
“political action can rapidly change the conditions that matter” (Friedman, 1994a, p. 4). 
A paradigm example of this was the 1989-1990 “global surge of democratization, from 
Muslim Albania to Buddhist Mongolia, [which] dramatically negates the Eurocentric 
hypothesis that democratization rests on uniquely Western foundations of rational 
secularism, modernized middle classes, and radical individualism” (Friedman, 1994a, p. 
26). In short, if Friedman (1994a, p. 5) is correct and democratization is paradigmatically 
a political project, then the market is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for 
democratization. 
The first sustained attack on the “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” thesis in its 
application within contemporary PRC media studies was launched by an academic 
associated with the New Left, Zhao Yuezhi (1998): 
While some people still believe that China’s capitalist revolution will eventually 
lead to a democratic political system, there is no necessary relationship between 
capitalism and political democracy even though capitalism and liberal democracy 
have been ideologically and historically fused together in the West. (p. 188) 
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Prior to the publication of Zhao’s (1998) work in 1998, non-Marxist analysts of 
media reform in the PRC had tended to accept as a truism that marketization is a 
precondition for democratization, tracing back to 1978 and the shift to advertising with its 
assumed links to reader and audience preference the starting point for a new 
democratization project in PRC media. 
However, as Zhao and other New Left critics and their radical Marxist analogs in 
the West51 argue, the substitution of participation in the market, including through greater 
choice in media, for political participation masks the degree to which participation in the 
market is radically anti-egalitarian in class-based political systems. In so far as the PRC is 
now developing as a class-based political economy in which the emergent bourgeoisie are 
closely linked to power structure, the market is functional to maintaining the political 
system, and poses little threat to the dominance of the Party/State. Unlike in developed 
capitalist democracies, where the process of evacuating effective democratic participation 
from politics in the guise of fostering participation in the market is as old as bourgeois 
and parliamentary democracy itself, in the PRC this process is relatively new, beginning 
in 1978, accelerating in 1992 and accelerating again with the PRC’s entry into the WTO 
in 2001. 
The substitution of participation in the market for political participation only 
further entrenches the anti-egalitarian character of the Party/State since 1978, when Deng 
in a paradigmatic application of modernization theory suggested some areas should be 
allowed to get rich as exemplars for the rest of the country to follow. The subsequent 
uneven development of the PRC poses no threat to elite dominance within the political 
economy. In the absence of even token representation in parliament as genuine workers’ 
                                                 
51 Lee (2001, p. 5) lists Golding and Murdock (1991; 1997), Herman (1988), Mosco (1996), Schiller 
(1992), Smythe (1994) and Thompson (1990). 
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and farmers’ deputies disappear not only from the Party/State apparatus, but also from the 
National People’s Congress (Wang, 2006a, p. 36), the situation for the disenfranchised 
strata within the PRC is even more precarious than it is in systems where token 
representation in the form of parliamentarianism is taken for granted. 
Taking as her starting point the introduction of the market into the political 
economy of the PRC, Zhao (1998, pp. 5-7, 196) uses post-Marxian theories associated 
with the writings of the likes of Stuart Hall (1982), John Thompson (1990) and John 
Hartley (1994) to show how ideology functions in the PRC to mask a state-driven project 
developed by Party/State elites that since 1978 has systemically disenfranchised the 
people from popular participation in politics, trading off democratization against 
participation in the market. At the same time, the Party/State is developing the market in 
a manner that benefits not only the country if GDP growth is used as the measure, but 
even more so benefits the Party/State itself, whose agents are best positioned to not only 
benefit from marketization of the state-owned economy, but through control of the media 
are also able to hide their activities in the market in so far as their private gain associated 
with stewardship of the market is in conflict with their obligations to the people as 
stewards of the state (He, 2000a). 
As a result, as even liberal-pluralist critics of the PRC’s New Left acknowledge, 
the gulf between the rich, which includes many actors within the Party/State, and the 
poor, the majority, is growing. But consistent with their belief in the democratizing 
potential of the market, these critics continue to argue that this trend is transitional rather 
than a structural feature of the system itself. Against this, the New Left argues that no 
political program which is based on further liberalization of the economy can reverse the 
trend of the relative impoverishment of a growing number of Chinese even as the country 
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continues to record record GDP growth and more and more people in real terms are lifted 
out of poverty. 
This uncomfortable contradiction is the truth that some journalists and academics 
have begun to insist on speaking to power. But as already noted, the Party/State is 
determined to prevent the publication of embarrassing facts and data that would 
undermine its legitimacy. As a result, progressive journalists and academics are 
conflicted. Some speak out, and suffer the consequences. Understandably they are the 
minority. For most journalists personal interest and the imperative to serve the Party and 
government remains a stronger justification and rationalization for their silence than the 
demand for truth. Moreover, the organic association of journalists with the rising middle 
class, and hence their commitment to sustaining and developing the current system makes 
them willing accomplices of the system, even if they are not blind to its shortcomings. 
However, as I show in the following chapter, the work of Pan Zhongdang (Pan, 2000, 
2005) and Pan & Lu Ye (Pan & Lu, 2003) suggests that silence does not necessarily 
mean consent, nor is visible inaction necessarily indicative of an inability and failure to 
act. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Neither the paradox of the PRC’s uneven development nor the trajectory of media 
reform seem promising of a better future for journalism. Despite the long history of the 
profession, and the demand to balance service to the Party/State with public service, both 
in the public pronouncements of the leadership and the cultural roots of the profession, 
for revenue and ideological reasons the Party/State has no intention of releasing its grip 
on media. Hence success for the liberal pluralist project for the reform of media through 
development of the market as a counter to the Party/State is unlikely. As Zhao and her 
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colleagues have shown, the commercialization of media in the PRC currently poses little 
threat and actually enhances Party/State control of media. As commercialization of the 
political economy proceeds, the Party/State is developing a class character which 
institutionalizes the anti-egalitarian character of media. Meanwhile media mask this 
structural adjustment of the political economy with increasingly complex ideological 
forms that buttress the power structure, which seeks to neutralize criticism and forestall 
political reform in a process begun in 1978 of shifting popular participation exclusively 
to the market. 
Both Lee Chin-chuan and Zhao Yuezhi warn against binaries and the 
dichotomous framing of the problem for media reform in the PRC as a false choice when 
presented as an either/or choice between Party/State and market. Lee and other liberal 
pluralists continues to hold out hope for the market as a counter to the Party/State, in 
some form of accommodation. However, Zhao argues that media, especially news media, 
are caught between the Party line and the bottom line. For her, no account of the possible 
emancipatory potential of the market can ignore the reality of the emerging class 
character of media in the PRC and their continued function as a mouthpiece for the Party 
and government, which increasingly have turned to the market to shore up their position, 
even as the Party’s traditional constituency among workers, farmers and the strata 
disenfranchised by development is increasingly ignored. 
Nevertheless, as the gap between rich and poor in the PRC continues to widen, 
within media some journalists and academics have begun to address the growing 
contradictions of the ‘socialist market economy’ and ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’. Not surprisingly, the Party/State has hit back against media and the 
academy, launching a ‘smokeless war’ against small ‘l’ liberal and socially progressive 
elements in society, including in media. Whether these are isolated voices or the 
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beginnings of a new push for social justice and journalism reform is unclear, although the 
developing class character of journalism suggests it is unlikely. 
The social theory of media reform operates primarily at the structural and 
institutional level of media reform. In line with that project, I am interested in the 
ongoing process of negotiated tensions within the political economy that is measurable as 
the pressure for change. But my focus is media practice. In the following chapter, I take 
up the challenge of Zhao’s project to provide an account of media reform that does not 
place false hopes in either market, or Party/State. But rather than focus on the structural 
and institutional contexts that frame the possibilities of journalism, I want to include in 
this analysis the practice of journalism as a form of agency that brings pressure to bear on 
the contexts of its own development. 
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Chapter 5: Theorizing journalism in the PRC 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that journalists have agency and affect the reform process is not new in 
PRC media studies. Several analysts, in particular Pan Zhongdang (2000; 2005) 
separately and in association with Lu Ye (2003) have written extensively on the topic. In 
focusing on practice, their work both references yet departs from that of the social 
theorists such as Lee Chin-chuan and Zhao Yuezhi, who take as their starting point the 
political economy of media reform. However, the two approaches are complementary. 
Only the foci are different. In one sense, their point of intersection is the structure/agency 
debate, which has characterized much social theory since the concepts of determinism 
and free will first clashed in the philosophy wars of late European romanticism and early 
European modernism. 
Zhao (1998) suggests that no matter how detached an analyst hopes to be, “a 
political stance is always implicit” (p. 6). Nowhere is this more obvious than in the 
position one takes on ontological issues. Karl Marx wrote that people “make their own 
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and 
transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1852, p. 595). This phrase captures a sentiment that 
informs much later materialist social theory, of which Zhao’s work is a paradigm 
example. Against the concept of free will, Marx posited a determinism that was never the 
mechanical soullessness alleged by his idealist critics, but recognition both of the limits 
to action and the ability of actors to alter the constraints under which they labor. This was 
not the agency of individuals, but recognition that class both enabled and constrained 
action. Following Marx, a number of theorists developed concepts that attempted to 
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operationalize his core insight into the manner in which agency is enabled and 
constrained by the historical conditions under which work is done. 
In this chapter, I take up one of these concepts, hegemony, as a starting point for 
an analysis of how media makers negotiate change in the PRC. I then review the 
literature that shows how journalistic agency is central to a notion of contestation that 
both maintains and changes the dominant hegemony. This chapter functions as an 
introduction to the body of the dissertation, which follows. In the context of globalization 
and the development of television in the PRC, journalism emerges as a social practice 
that is both enabled and constrained by the institutional relationships in which it is 
embedded. Against a media-centric account of the power of news makers, this chapter 
functions as an introduction to journalism as social agency, outlining how it operates as a 
field and engages with and changes the dominant hegemony, reproducing its own limits, 
even as it seeks to extend them. 
HEGEMONY AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR PRC MEDIA STUDIES 
In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci (1971) writes of hegemony as: 
The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the 
general direction imposed on the social life by the dominant fundamental group; 
this consent is “historically” caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) 
which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world 
of production. (p. 12) 
Gramsci (1971, p. 160) considers hegemony the struggle for consent to 
domination in civil, as opposed to political society, which is the domain of coercion, 
although he noted that the distinction was methodological and in reality overlaps occur 
(Bottomore, 1983, p. 202). As later theorists have taken up the concept, hegemony has 
been used to analyze not only bourgeois society, but also to analyze socialist societies 
(Bottomore, 1983, p. 203). Zhao (1998, pp. 4-7) has picked up on this theme with respect 
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to the development of the PRC, using a definition of ideology derived from British 
Cultural Studies to show how the Party/State works, in part through media, to achieve 
consent to domination in a society where no conceptual distinction can be drawn between 
civil and political society, given the roots of the PRC’s nascent bourgeoisie in the 
Party/State and their commitment to maintaining the conditions of political control that 
have nurtured their rise. Gramsci’s (1971) own analysis, albeit not of China, is still 
apposite: “But since in actual reality civil society and State are one and the same, it must 
be made clear that laissez-faire too is a form of State “regulation”, introduced and 
maintained by legislative and coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its 
own ends, and not the spontaneous expression of economic facts” (p. 160). 
Gramsci (1971) also gives intellectuals a prominent place in securing and 
maintaining the dominant hegemony, calling them “the dominant group’s “deputies” 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). Gramsci identifies two different types of intellectuals: traditional 
intellectuals identified by their work as professional thinkers (ecclesiastics, scholars, 
scientists, theorists, philosophers, etc. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 7)) and organic intellectuals, 
whose task is organizational within any particular class. 
The more high-flown definition of journalism as a vocation would give it a role 
typical of the traditional intellectual. However, through elaboration of the concept of the 
organic intellectual, Gramsci (1971, pp. 3-4) overcomes the distinction between 
intellectuals and non-intellectuals in the traditional sense, arguing that everyone is 
potentially an intellectual, and those that are, are so by dint of their social function, rather 
than the alleged quality of their thinking, or their attachment to the scholarly professions. 
This is relevant to the PRC because it breaks down any attempt to bracket off 
intellectuals as an indigenous species of ivory tower academic. Rather, intellectuals 
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include not only traditional intellectual roles such as journalism, but include the vast 
apparatus that fuels the bureaucracy and associated functions that constitutes the State in 
the PRC including instruments such as media. Moreover, given the roots of Chinese 
bureaucratism in Confucian intellectualism, Gramsci’s expansion of the intellectual role 
is apposite. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Gramsci’s work for understanding the role 
of the journalist in the PRC is attention to the contested character of hegemony. Against 
mechanical determinism, Gramsci outlined a concept of the manner in which protagonists 
actively engage in class struggle, including through media for control of the means of 
expression, dissemination and reinforcement of the dominant ideology. Although the 
term hegemony can have a static sense in which domination is given, as Daya Thussu 
(2000) notes, Gramsci’s deployment of the term points to hegemony as a dynamic 
process wherein domination is only achieved at some expenditure of effort and must be 
ceaselessly reconfirmed. According to Daya Thussu (2000) hegemony “cannot simply be 
assumed or guaranteed and has to be renewed” (p. 68), suggesting not a state but a 
process that is contested and cannot be taken for granted. The contested character of 
hegemony points to ideological pluralism, reflective of the compromises between 
competing classes, groups and strata that constitute the successful defense of hegemony 
(Bottomore, 1983, p. 202). 
Since the reform and opening began in 1978, contradictions have proliferated 
within the PRC’s political and cultural economy even as the Party/State has evolved 
away from coercion more towards consensual domination. As noted in the introduction, 
attempts to think through these contradictions with concepts such as “ideological 
pluralism” (Zhao, 2008) and “unintended ideological pluralism” (Zhao, 1999) provide 
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insight into the manner in which hegemony is contested and defended even as the 
political and cultural economy changes in the PRC. 
Analysts have applied the concept of hegemony to the PRC to show how the 
Party/State “absorbs the power of the market and shores up popular support by the 
dialectic of occasional coercion and winning of general consent” (Ma, 2000, p. 28). 
Although Zhao (1998) does not use explicitly use the term in Media, Market, and 
Democracy in China, clearly hegemony is what she was talking about. 52  However, 
Zhao’s emphasis is less on the struggle for hegemony than the ideological forms 
produced in that struggle. In particular, she is concerned to analyze the character of media 
that are caught between the Party/State line and the ‘bottom line,’ even as the profit 
motive pushes media managers to develop media that attempt to balance an allegiance to 
both the market and the Party/State. Whereas liberal pluralism assumes that a dual 
allegiance of this type is unsustainable in the long term, Zhao’s work shows how the 
development of the market in the PRC as a project of the Party/State actually has 
strengthened rather than diminished the dominant hegemony, even as the form of the 
dominant hegemony has radically changed with the greater emphasis since 1978 on the 
market as a core structural feature of the political economy. 
Although the paramount position of the Party/State within the PRC’s political 
economy has not changed since 1949, since 1978 the political economy as such has been 
changing radically and continues to change. Whether the reality today is moving towards 
a neo-liberal break with the past, or whether the Party/State may yet revive its links with 
the farming and working classes, which historically have been its core constituency, 
remains to be seen. Moreover, as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s 
                                                 
52 I have confirmed this through conversations with Zhao. 
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“Harmonious Society” suggest, even if the Party/State does seek to revive its relationship 
with sectors being disenfranchised by the neo-liberal turn in the political economy since 
1992, it will not be at the expense of the ruling, bureaucratic and entrepreneurial classes, 
but rather as part of an attempt to create an all inclusive coalition of interests that spans 
the entire political, economic and social spectrum. Friedman et al. (1994c, p. 294) note 
that this kind of “grand coalition,” of which they argue Asian democratization is 
paradigmatic is a general rule of democratization, which too often is thought of only from 
the viewpoint of the specific development of democracy in Europe. 
Zhao’s (1998, pp. 4-7) re-definition of ideology as complex, contested and 
negotiated forces re-examination of the actual processes of change in the political 
economy, including in the political economy of media. Rather than assume that 
commercialization would liberate media from Party/State control and deliver it up to the 
demands of the market, more analysts now are examining the manner in which 
commercialization has impacted particular media sites. Part of this shift away from a one-
dimensional analysis grounded in the assumptions of Western media models, in particular 
the US system of hyper-commercialized media, results from a growing awareness that 
even if the analytical schema developed to critique those media can be usefully applied in 
other institutional settings, if the different settings do not share a single or even similar 
social, political and cultural economy, the results obtained in one setting may be 
irrelevant in others. 
Zhao’s subsequent work has been only one example of a commitment to the kind 
of analysis that remains wary of rigid ideological schema steeped in binary thinking 
about freedom and control and the over-determination of data by inappropriate theory, 
instead foregrounding the ambiguous and uncertain character of media reform in the 
PRC. Other analysts have taken a similar tack, although this is not to suggest that PRC 
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media is somehow unique. Ma (2000, p. 32) takes up Downing’s (1996) challenge for 
media analysts to contextualize their work in the specific environments to which it 
applies, but argues that so long as the political economic context of media reform in the 
PRC is foregrounded, analytical models developed to account for Western media can 
usefully be applied. Ma (p. 32) calls for the boundaries between liberal and critical theory 
to be taken down so that appropriate aspects of both theories can be applied fruitfully to 
the PRC context. Similarly, Lee (2001), calls for a “critical synthesis at a higher level of 
abstraction… a dialectical perspective that will account for the mutually constituting, 
implicative, and embedded relationships of the state and capital” (p. 18). 
Given the different ontological assumptions associated with liberal and critical 
theory, the former embedded in free will, individualism and the war of all against all, and 
the latter embedded in false consciousness, determinism and class conflict, 
rapprochement might seem unlikely. But the 20th and 21st Century PRC is not 17th and 
18th Century Europe or later the United States. And a theoretical disjuncture in the one 
place and time does not rule out a theoretical conjuncture at another place and time. 
However, I am not going to attempt that synthesis. Rather, I want to take up an analytical 
theme that was developed as a means of avoiding the theoretical conflict by focusing 
instead on the practice of journalism. 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND JOURNALISTIC AGENCY 
Pan (2005) has referred to the troubling character of media theory that is forced to 
“pile up contradictory dichotomies such as communist-capitalist media and market-based 
Party-media system” (2005, p. intro) to explain in the static terms of Western-centric 
theory the dynamic character of media change in the PRC. Against the forced nature of 
this kind of theorizing, he calls for: 
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a dynamic account based on the recognition of the intrinsic interconnectedness 
between politics and emerging markets in the course of media change. It must 
incorporate the active role of the state and recognize that China’s media change is 
a process filled with “contradictions and ambiguities” (Lee, 1994a) and 
constituted by “ad hoc adjustments, pragmatic experiments, and lively analytical 
discussion” (Watson, 1992, p. 1). It is a process of an uneasy collusion between 
the party-state authorities and media practitioners in preserving the Party-press 
system under a market economy. (Pan, 2005, p. intro) 
Pan (2005) shifts the analytic focus away from macro-level analysis of the 
political economic structure, which too often assumes the kinds of changes it is 
concerned to explain and then cannot when those changes do not occur, and he criticizes 
the overly formal character of institutional analysis that focuses only on the types of 
structural and institutional changes required to meet certain normative criteria such as 
developing more press freedom without explaining how such changes might come about. 
He provides an overview of the work that has been done on institutional change in PRC 
media under impact of the changing political economy and demands placed on media as a 
result. However, he concludes that although analysis at this level: 
tells us that institutional change was both the core of and prior condition for the 
ongoing media change in China … it provides us with only a “thin explanation” 
of how institutional change takes place because it does not specify theoretical 
linkages between institutional change and everyday practices of media operation 
under specific historical conditions. 
Although Pan does not call his own contribution “thick explanation,” the analogy 
with Geertz’s (1973) call for “thick description” is apt, as Pan takes an almost 
anthropological approach to media analysis, seeking in the minutiae of the everyday 
practice of journalism and the ongoing negotiation between journalists, media managers 
and regulators, that part of the explanation of institutional change that is a black box for 
political economy. 
Whereas the social theorists are concerned to link institutional change to changes 
in the political economy, Pan focuses on the relationship between everyday practice and 
 125
institutional change. Both types of theory are concerned to explain institutional change, 
but their approaches have radically different starting points. One is concerned with 
clarifying the big picture, the other with focusing in on the messy detail that characterizes 
the negotiation, contestation and implementation of change in working media institutions. 
Pan (2005) takes as his starting point the mutual constitution of social agents and 
institutions. He references the work of Giddens (1984) on the mutually implicative 
constitution of structure and agency and North (1990) on institutions as sets of “humanly 
devised rules” that only come to life in the actions of the social agents that constitute 
them. Pan (2005) argues that although media changes in the PRC have been a Party/State 
project from the outset, and that officials and media practitioners agree that media reform 
is not concerned to challenge the “principles and basic rules of the Party-press system” 
(2005, p. 7), nevertheless the PRC’s media reforms “are not a well-planned and coherent 
project with a clearly specified destination. Rather, they have been unfolding as a joint 
adventure into some unknown terrain by the collaborating party-state and media 
practitioners” (2005, p. 8). Media reform is an open-ended project that is characterized by 
what Pan calls “bounded innovation” (2005, p. 5). 
Pan (2005, p. 4) associates “bounded innovation” with what he calls the two 
cardinal principles of media reform in the PRC: a) Deng Xiaoping’s call for “crossing the 
river by groping for the stones” and b) maintenance of the fundamentals of the Party-
press system, i.e. acceptance of the overall Party/State control of media and their 
continued function as propaganda organs. He argues that the former condition is met by 
the constant innovations that media practitioners and managers are required to make to 
meet the demands of the Party/State, market and increasingly the public. The latter 
condition is recognition, especially since 1989 (Tiananmen) and the role media played in 
fostering open political debate, that no attempt to loosen the Party/State’s control of 
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media that is not approved by the Party/State itself will be tolerated, although as Pan 
crucially argues, that approval often comes in the form of post hoc legitimation, rather 
than approval before the fact. 
Pan (2005) argues that the concept of “bounded innovation” provides insight into 
the manner in which media reform is both enabled and constrained in the PRC, 
permitting institutional change without systemic change. However, to my mind, Pan’s 
work begs the question whether “bounded innovation” does not lead to systemic change? 
To my mind, the structural changes to the political economy, most obviously through 
introduction of the market, less evidently in the changing relationships between the Party, 
State, legislature, consultative mechanisms such as the CPPCC53 and judiciary mean that 
systemic change has been underway since 1978 in the PRC, including in media. 
In particular Pan’s (2005) recognition of the ad hoc character of the reform 
process, especially the changes made to media practices with only limited prior consent, 
point to the very real impact that media practitioners and media managers have on the 
reform process. These informal changes go beyond what previously had been permitted 
at the institutional level then feed back into systemic change when the innovations are 
legitimized by the Party/State (Pan, 2005). When other media take up those new practices 
they become formalized and part of the media system. I.e. the media system has changed. 
From Pan’s account, media oversight and regulatory reform are constantly lagging media 
innovation. Although the Party/State often institutes change and even colludes in the 
informal practices that constitute innovation, Pan’s work points also to the phenomenon 
of the Party/State in some cases only being in control of the reform project in the limited 
sense of endorsing or rejecting institutional changes that practitioners are constantly 
                                                 
53 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an annual gathering of Party and non-Party elites 
that meets in Beijing each  year at the same time as the sitting of the PRC’s unicameral legislature, the 
National People’s Congress. 
 127
undertaking, which then become systemic changes when formalized and made available 
to other media institutions. 
As examples of this process, Pan (2005, p. 8) notes that the first advertisements in 
the PRC press were not ‘authorized’ by the central authorities, but a local experiment run 
by media managers in Shanghai with the “acquiescence” of municipal authorities. Only 
after the experiment, which both sides took at some risk to themselves, proved a success, 
did the practice become legitimized at a higher level. Similarly, major newspapers had 
begun to distribute week-end editions and diversify their content and output as a means of 
maximizing advertising revenues well before 1996 when the Party/State approved the 
formation of the first “newspaper group” (2005, p. 4). In the broadcasting industry, TV 
and radio stations were setting up shadow companies as a means of attracting capital 
investment well ahead of the decision in late 2001 to formalize the practice through the 
formation of media conglomerates. 
Pan (2005) describes this process of “bounded innovation” as one fraught with 
challenges and danger for both media practitioners and its sponsors within the 
Party/State: 
Sprouts of institutional innovations grow from the imperatives embedded in 
media practices. Translating such ideas and incorporating non-routine practices 
into institutional rules involve a fiercely political process of winnowing and 
molding among various options. This is a process dictated by the political-
economic-ideological complex of the party-state hierarchy; it is highly charged, 
both ideologically and politically. (p. 10) 
He continues that the power structure selects among the options and co-opts 
innovative practices: “any non-routine practice, on its way to policy or institutional rule, 
must go through the tunnel of such a political process and lose its sharp edge along its 
way. It gets molded to fit the existing system that is jealously guarded by the regime” 
(2005, p. 10) But to my mind, through the constant adoption of innovation, especially if 
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an innovation starts out as non-routine and then becomes legitimized, the existing media 
system has changed, no matter how jealously the regime guards it. In his conclusion, Pan 
comes close to stating as much: 
The basic principles of the communist Party-press system remain heavily guarded 
and constantly fortified during the reforms… journalists must effectively manage 
the tensions between market forces and Party-press system in order to reduce 
political—as well as financial—risks in media change… their extra-official 
practices are not prescribed in the principles of the Party-press and/or approved 
explicitly by the authority of the regime at the time of their initiation… Devising 
such bounded innovations, while not challenging the legitimacy of the Party 
overtly, reveals a wide range of tactics of ideological incorporation, 
circumvention, or resistance, hence constituting, to paraphrase James Scott 
(1990), an art of resistance. (2005, p. 23) 
Pan & Lu Ye (2003) have written about this ‘art of resistance’ in terms of the 
manner in which journalists cannibalize existing ideas and forms of journalism to create a 
professional practice that is institutionally acceptable, professional and personally 
satisfying, while evolving the profession. Drawing on the work of Certeau (1984) they 
discuss the ‘tactics’ journalists use to “resist, appropriate, and evade the [strategies of the] 
established order” (Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 217). 
Typical of these practices are the manner in which the team at CCTV’s premier 
investigative shows Jiaodian Fangtan (‘Focus’) and Xinwen Diaocha (‘News Probe’) 
would beat the on-site censor by presenting two versions of a story close to air time, one 
poorly done with the ‘correct line,’ the other produced beautifully but pushing the 
envelope, forcing the editor to choose between the two. Another tactic was to air 
politically correct stories at sensitive times, like the annual meetings in early March of 
the NPC and CPPCC, and air more sensitive stories outside of ‘political season’ (Pan & 
Lu, 2003, p. 228). 
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In Certeau’s terms, tactics like these empower the powerless, “who poach the 
established order and turn cracks in it into opportunities to act” (Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 217). 
Tactics are the “art of the weak” (Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 217) and show “how power is 
played – both organized and evaded – by focusing on what social actors do in their 
everyday lives” (Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 217). 
These kinds of tactics are the stuff of journalism in the PRC. Moreover, they are 
exactly the practices one would expect from journalists culturally predisposed to both 
serve and critique the authorities. They also indicate something of the manner in which 
journalists manage their relationship with their superiors and the censors, and by 
implication how the journalistic field manages their relationship with the media system 
and political economic structure. In short, this is a picture of change not from the top 
down, or even from the bottom up, but a picture of the micro-physics of power in the 
Foucauldean sense, where the dominant hegemony is constantly contested and negotiated 
in relations of power that exist only in the exercise of power,54 resulting in a process of 
constant though incremental innovation, which may or may not constitute revolutionary 
change, depending on the specific conjunctural relations within the political, economic 
and cultural economy. 
Importantly, “bounded innovation” somewhat shifts the balance of power away 
from visible institutions such as the Central Publicity Department to the largely invisible 
practices of everyday working life. Rather than the caricature of journalists as 
marionettes of the Party and government and ventriloquist mouthpieces for Party/State 
propaganda, Pan & Lu (2003) show just how much control journalists actually have in 
the newsroom and the news making process, despite the power of the censorial and 
                                                 
54 I am indebted to Sun Wusan (2006, p. 43) for this formulation of the relations and exercise of power in 
the PRC context. 
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regulatory authorities and institutional constraints of the workplace, and how they 
exercise that control to change the norms of journalism in the PRC and hence I would 
argue the media system. 
Neither Pan & Lu (2003), nor other analysts such as He Zhou (2003), de Burgh 
(2000; 2003a; 2003b), Lee (2000; 2004) and Zhao (1998) who have addressed 
journalistic practice in the PRC, are suggesting news media are a hotbed of dissidence. 
On the contrary, only through the mundane struggle over the operationalization of core 
journalistic concepts such as professionalism which masks the ‘art of resistance’ in 
everyday newsroom practice are journalists able to change the discursive context in 
which they work. In short, precisely because they are not dissidents but professionals, are 
journalists able to initiate and manage change. 
Following Certeau (1984), Pan & Lu (2003, p. 217) argue that this is an example 
of social actors using a prevalent ideology as a resource in devising a diverse range of 
practices under specific historical conditions. Although each incremental change 
achieved through “bounded innovation” barely registers, when the practices of the entire 
profession, some half million practitioners by some counts,55 are added up, some sense is 
possible of the agency journalists exert on the development of media. 
On the ideology of professionalism, Pan and Lu (2003) take up a theme earlier 
developed by Lee (2000c) on the conception of journalists in the PRC. In this schema Lee 
outlines four ‘types’ of journalism associated with China’s and the PRC’s modernization: 
Party-press, Confucian intellectual, Professional (in the sense of an internationally 
recognized set of practices associated with concepts such as balance and objectivity), and 
Market-oriented (cited in Pan & Lu, 2003, p. 219). However, as Pan & Lu (2003) argue, 
                                                 
55 See above, p. 5 
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these are not static conceptions isolated within particular historical periods. Rather “they 
are interpenetrative, creating a scene of discursive construction, contestation, and 
appropriation in the reforms” (p. 218). As such, professionalism is not a single discourse, 
nor can it ever be reduced to a single discourse such as the demand for balance and 
objectivity that in the ideal but rarely if ever in practice legitimizes mainstream Western 
journalism. Rather professionalism in the PRC is a complex set of beliefs and evolving 
practices that enables and constrains journalistic work. It involves balancing Party 
discipline, culturally constituted social commitment and responsibility, objectivity more 
so than balance, and attention to the bottom line. As Pan & Lu note (2003) to the extent 
that ideologies are competing – for example, management may insist that professionalism 
means subjecting oneself to Party discipline, while a journalist may see her technical 
skills, knowledge and fame both within the newsroom and with the public as more 
important discursive parameters – the task of reconciling contradictory demands is not 
easy. 
Within the complex of professional practices, social responsibility is highly 
regarded. De Burgh (2000) asks: “In what senses are Chinese journalists still arms of the 
government? The tradition of the Chinese journalist is of an intellectual engaged with the 
future of his or her country. The journalist is not an outsider, looking in, still less merely 
an individual professional with a personal mission or ambition, but a social activist” (p. 
556). Swartz (2006), in a comparison of journalists at Voice of America, the BBC World 
Service, China Radio International, CCTV and Xinhua found that Chinese journalists 
placed greater “relative emphasis on justice as compared with their Western 
counterparts” (Swartz, 2006, p. 217). 
However, perhaps justice is as elusive to Chinese journalists as objectivity and 
balance is to their Western counterparts. Pan & Lu (2003, p. 228) point to frustration and 
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burn out amongst journalists committed to more than the Party’s definition of 
professionalism. He Zhou (2000b) writes of journalism as a form of spin control for the 
Party/State and “ideological dissonance” (p. 600) as a working hazard of the profession. 
With physical attacks on journalists in the field increasing, some insurance companies in 
2004 listed journalism as the third most dangerous career in the PRC (after police work 
and coal mining) (Suhasini, 2004). Other analysts (Huang, 2000; Pan, 2000; Zhao, 1998) 
point to the easy option of paid journalism and the possibilities for bribery and corruption 
associated with embrace of the market. Nevertheless, as Pan (2005) notes, after an initial 
and confused infatuation with the market, ‘serious’ (as opposed to tabloid) journalists in 
recent years have become more suspicious of its impact on their professional aspirations, 
look to professionalism as an empowering practice and distinguish between acceptable 
and unacceptable levels of collusion between media and the market, although success in 
the market remains a key source of inspiration (Pan, 2005, pp. 16-19). 
In short, the literature (de Burgh, 2000, 2003a, 2003b; He, 2000b, 2003; Lee, 
2004; Pan, 2005; Pan & Lu, 2003; Zhao, 1998 et al.) clearly shows that journalists are not 
the marionettes assumed by mass persuasion and propaganda analysis that takes a 
caricature of the political economy of the PRC and derives from it a monolithic image of 
a Party/State invading and controlling every aspect of journalistic institutions through 
instruments of surveillance and control such as the Central Publicity Department and 
SARFT, resulting in a picture of journalism as a profession that is crippled by coercion, 
censorial intervention and regulatory oversight. By taking seriously the power of 
journalists to shape the discursive practices of their work, Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu 
(2003) in particular have shown how institutional reform in media is very much a project 
that is mutually constituted by the power structure and by media practitioners. 
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Moreover, and for my purposes this is the core insight of their work, they show 
how media practitioners manage the expectations of the authorities and are active agents 
in the reform process, changing the media system from within in a manner that forces the 
power structure to constantly negotiate the limits of the profession. Their negotiated 
approach to power also suggests by implication that media managers have exactly the 
same type of agency in negotiating with the CPD and SARFT, when it comes to higher 
level issues and that the ‘art of resistance’ is as relevant for understanding how media 
managers deal with regulatory and central Party authorities as it is for understanding how 
media practitioners negotiate the workplace.56 The reality of media reform in the PRC is 
better characterized not by the Foucauldean frame of the panopticon, which might be how 
media are structured and appear to function, but as Sun Wusan (2006) forcefully argues 
by the microphysics of power expressed as a “complex strategic relationship in a 
particular society” (p. 43) where multiple interests compete for resources and dominance 
within the system. Against the static image of a coercive top-down system inured to 
change, something of the dynamism, vibrancy, challenges, opportunities and of course 
dangers associated with the PRC’s developing journalism can be seen in the implications 
of Pan & Lu’s (2003) analyses. 
As a caveat, less evident in their micro-analysis of the impact of media 
practitioners on institutional change is the sense of pessimism provided by Zhao’s (1998) 
macro-analysis of the neo-liberal turn in the PRC’s political economy on institutional 
change. Like Lee (2000; 2001; 2003) et al., Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu (2003) see the 
market as providing a discursive space that frees up media workers from some of the 
pressure of the Party/State. However, Zhao’s (1998) work suggests that the corporate 
                                                 
56 For more on the contested character of power and the agency local media managers display in resisting 
the central authorities, see Sun Wusun’s (2006) excellent account, based on a Foucauldean argument, of 
one television station’s experience as an example of the microphysics of power at work. 
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alliance between the Party/State and capital in the PRC will not be radically challenged 
by the ‘art of resistance’ practiced by media workers, who increasingly have a vested 
interest in maintaining that alliance, even if they can force the Party/State to negotiate the 
terms of their co-operation. 
The work of Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu (2003) does not directly reference 
Gramsci, although it does reference Zhao (1998), whose work provides an implied 
Gramscian frame for the analysis of PRC media. Whereas the work of Pan (2005) and 
Pan & Lu (2003) provides a means of understanding how institutional change is always a 
negotiated outcome managed by practitioners, the social theories of Zhao (1998) and Lee 
(2000; 2001; 2003) provide a framework for understanding the limits to institutional 
change within the structural constraints of political economic development. 
In my analysis of the work of journalists at CCTV-9, I link these two levels of 
analysis through the work of Bourdieu (2005a; 2005b), in particular through its 
articulation of the relationship between structure and social agency in the concept of 
journalistic field. Despite Certeau’s (1984 ) antagonism to Bourdieu, I would argue that 
through the concepts of field and habitus outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, 
the macro-oriented work of the likes of Zhao and Lee can be linked to the micro-analyses 
of everyday practice that Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu (2003) focus on. Combined, this 
complex of approaches goes a long way to showing how media change (or don’t change) 
in the PRC. 
Nevertheless as Zhao (1998) paradigmatically has shown, for critical and 
reflexive news media to further develop in the PRC, a structural change in the emerging 
corporate relationship between the Party/State and capital is required. What role 
journalists’ negotiation with the power structure might play in such a change can only be 
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assessed with future hindsight. However Pan & Lu’s (2003) analysis suggest that 
negotiation is already underway. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
The use of a theoretical ensemble that links Bourdieu, Certeau, Foucault and 
Gramsci is obviously problematic on a number of grounds. Firstly, the theorists traverse 
different grounds. For Bourdieu, as a Marxian sociologist the economy looms large in a 
way that it does not for Certeau and Foucault, who are more concerned with issues of 
power. But at the same time, Certeau explicitly opposes his work to that of Bourdieu and 
Foucault. Gramsci and Certeau are both concerned with culture in a way that Bourdieu 
and Foucault are not. Nevertheless, despite this complex problematic, I believe that this 
kind of deployment of theory is valid on two grounds.57 
First, all four theorists in one form or another address the relationship between 
structure and agency in the sense that for all four subjectivity is always already socialized 
subjectivity. Whether such a form of subjectivity is more or less malleable is less 
important than their common opposition to any form of individualism. 
Second, each of the theorists separately can be deployed to answer particular and 
interesting questions. But if one is attempting to make sense of an ensemble of practices 
such as constitutes the everyday character of news making in the PRC, with practice 
understood as a social activity embedded in the political, economic and cultural economy, 
and enabled and constrainted by censorial, regulatory and institutional regimes, that each 
have their own interests, then no single theory will suffice. 
                                                 
57 I want to acknowledge my debt to Joseph Straubhaar (2007), whose discussion of a somewhat similar 
conundrum led me to abandon attempts to theorize about CCTV-9 from the viewpoint of a single thinker. 
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Gramsci provides an understanding of the negotiated character of hegemony, but 
not of the minutiae of everyday news making as potential resistance in the sense Certeau 
uses the term. Foucault provides an insight into both the panoptic mechanism of 
surveillance and control associated with the CPD and SARFT and of the microphysics of 
power that constitutes the negotiation of hegemony and exercise of resistance. But his 
theories do not account for the hierarchy of power associated with the political and 
cultural economy of Gramsci and Bourdieu. Bourdieu provides an understanding of the 
spatial dimension of hegemony in the concept of field that is less developed in Gramsci’s 
work with its focus on the historical dimension of hegemony. Finally, Certeau shows how 
social theory in its very insistence on taking the social as the unit of analysis, cannot 
account for particular instances of practice in all their variety, despite what they share as 
a class or field of practices. 
Reliance on a single theorist tends to limit what a social scientist can do. When 
the object of analysis yields an answer to a narrowly defined question, no problem should 
result, but when a question is broadly defined, reliance can become over-reliance, which 
can lead to a certain one-dimensionality in the results. Faced with the task of theorizing 
about CCTV-9, and faced with the scope of the questions I was asking, I had to choose 
between one-dimensionality with the promise of theoretical clarity, and a multi-
dimensional analysis and the problems for theory that such an approach poses. Given that 
CCTV-9 in all its complexity would not yield itself up to a single theory, I felt justified in 




In this chapter, I have outlined how the concept of hegemony can usefully be 
strengthened through deploying Certeau’s understanding of how institutional change is 
negotiated through the everyday practices of social agents embedded within institutions. 
As a macro-level concept, hegemony provides a framework for understanding the 
corporate relationship developing between the Party/State and media in the PRC. As a 
micro-level concept, the ‘art of resistance’ shows how social agents negotiate with the 
power structure. 
Linking these insights to the discussions in previous chapters, as a capitalist class 
emerges within the PRC, journalists remain instruments of the Party/State, doubly so 
given their support for and identification with the emerging middle class and the consent 
to domination that enables and constrains its rise. However, the cultural roots of 
journalism in the intellectual vocation and the intellectual compulsion to speak truth to 
power coupled with the social responsibility associated with the legacy of the journalistic 
function in the PRC’s socialist modernization clash with the emerging class character of 
the profession. 
Under impact of the PRC’s globalization and the development of media, the 
journalist is a conflicted figure. Torn between disjunctural cultural and class identities, 
journalists are forced to constantly negotiate conflicting institutional, professional and 
cultural pressures. If media in the PRC are caught between the Party line and the bottom 
line, media makers are caught in a complex and constantly changing conjuncture of 
institutional forces enabled and constrained by the macro-level relationship between 
politics and the economy. 
However, as Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu (2003) have shown, in the almost invisible 
traces left by everyday practice can be found an ‘art of resistance.’ Using Bourdieu 
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(2005a; 2005b) to link structural analysis with everyday practice, I now analyze one 
media institution, CCTV-9, for evidence and the meaning of those traces. 
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Chapter 6: Methodology 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the manner in which I carried out this research. The 
choice of a longitudinal study that is best described as a case study characterized by 
participant observation was effectively the result of the possibility of such a study and the 
chance it provided to answer the types of questions that only an extended case study can 
permit. These questions were reflected in the broad research questions outlined in the 
introduction: 
• How do media institutions such as CCTV negotiate their overall relationship with 
the Party and government? 
• How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? 
• With the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International in May 2004, over time 
what evidence of change emerged, given the plans for transformation of the 
channel? 
The intermediate questions that linked the data chapters to the research questions 
were outlined at the end of Chapter 1: Introduction. In addition, in each of the data 
chapters that follows, I provide a series of secondary questions that show how each 
chapter answers the intermediate questions associated with that chapter. 
To answer the research questions in terms of the intermediate questions, I 
arranged to join CCTV-9 as a ‘foreign expert’ with permission to do research into the 
news making procedures within the channel. A restricted set of methods followed almost 
inevitably. These methods were those typical of a case study: observation (in this case 
participant observation), interviews, and documentation (Babbie, 2001; Deacon, 
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Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 1999; Marshall & Rossman, 1999). In addition, as I also 
had the opportunity to systematically collect the scripts of news stories, I did so with the 
aim of surveying content as part of the procedure of triangulation necessary to 
strengthening the validity of the more observational and inter-subjective elements of the 
project. However, as the survey of content was also necessary to the argument that I 
make in the conclusion that is counter intuitive to some of the observational data and 
much of the interview data, the survey of content became an important intervention into 
what observation, interviews and documentation alone might have suggested. 
Because of the range of data included in this dissertation and my particular status 
within CCTV-9, strictly speaking my approach was neither sociological (treating 
CCTV-9 as an object of study), nor anthropological (in the sense of attempting to observe 
without changing the researched environment). Rather I triangulated a survey of content 
with and against combined elements of sociology and anthropology through participant 
observation, with a strong emphasis on participation and inter-action through joining in 
the news making process, in-depth interviews and ongoing dialogue with my colleagues. 
The result was a highly personalized account of my time at CCTV-9, that was tempered 
by what a survey of content suggested that was not visible to observation, heard in 
interviews, or seen in documentation. 
What I offer is a starting point for understanding something of the complexity and 
diversity of news making in the PRC, especially in terms of the relationship between 
political, economic and institutional structures and journalistic agency, seen from the 
viewpoint of journalists themselves, but refracted through what a survey of content tells 
us about their work. 
My approach to understanding CCTV-9 was based more on inductive than 
deductive analysis. I emphasized induction because I wanted to reflect as much on the 
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theoretical and methodological frameworks that shape understanding of PRC media as 
much as I produced new knowledge about PRC media. But even in so far as I produced 
new knowledge about media in the PRC, three methodological caveats should be noted at 
the outset. 
Firstly, the extremely personalized character of association which is the hallmark 
of the practice of relations (‘guanxi’)58  in Chinese culture meant that my ability to 
interact with my colleagues at CCTV-9 was only as good as my guanxi. After spending 
over two years at the channel, clearly I had better relations with some people than with 
others. This opened certain pathways and closed others. For example, certain people 
became much easier to talk to and interview, others closed themselves off from me. I 
have no way of knowing what I missed by not talking to those people, with whom I was 
not able to form ‘good relations’. Although I hope the sensitivity of the observations, 
coupled with recognition of patterns in work styles, etc. will overcome the deficiencies 
caused by my lack of ‘guanxi’, I make no claim that my observations are complete. 
Secondly, because I was involved in the re-design of the channel for its relaunch 
on May 3, 2004 my participant observation was as much an attempt to change the 
environment in which I was working as much as it was an attempt to fit in. Under the 
conditions I was working, I would characterize my participation as immersion, a position 
                                                 
58 The role of guanxi should not be underestimated in Chinese culture, even if de-mystification of the 
practice reveals it to be at core little more than reciprocity in the giving and expectation of respect, and 
mutual obligation in practical matters (Castells, 2000a; Yang, 1989). Within the Confucian system, the law 
was held to be an inferior means of achieving and extending association and practiced only by those who 
had failed to learn or had forgotten the arts of self-restraint and accommodation of others in their everyday 
lives (Leys, 1997). Guanxi and its roots in reciprocity is thus incommensurable with Western culture, 
understood as culture rooted in the assumption of an individual’s original sin and submission to the law (the 
word of God), over and against the social origins of the untainted individual implied by Confucian 
humanism. Moreover the extremely instrumental character of Western modernity (Abbey, 2004; Taylor, 
1989) and its obliteration of the past (Ward, 2000) is at odds with the cultural layering and historical 
memory that are key to Chinese association. So guanxi practiced in the Chinese cultural context has a 
meaning that comparative sociology would ignore at its own peril if too much is made of the apparent 
similarities between Western and Chinese newsrooms and news practices. 
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sociology of the newsroom warns against (Cottle, Undated; Schlesinger, 1987). However, 
as I shall argue below, immersion handled carefully has its own strengths, which can add 
to an understanding of the newsroom and news making process. 
Given my position as a consultant to the May 2004 relaunch, I must take 
responsibility for failure as much as success in the relaunch. In so far as I experienced 
satisfaction or disappointment in my role as consultant, I cannot be sure that I have not 
over-emphasized my own contribution in the case of success or under-emphasized it in 
the case of failure. When management asked me to be part of the re-design team, I was 
torn between the loss of objectivity that would entail and the insider’s perspective that 
would accrue. Given that I would have access to some of the inner-workings of 
management, I felt the risk was worth taking. Whether this has been the case, perhaps 
others are better positioned to judge. 
The problem of a participant observation that is best understood as immersion is 
closely associated with the problem of ‘going native.’ Although the literature (Babbie, 
2001, p. 287) warns against it at the risk of losing one’s scientific detachment, I felt the 
risk was worth taking given that the practices and values of a PRC news site might only 
make sense when understood from the viewpoint and interests of my Chinese colleagues. 
Moreover, as a non-Chinese with a limited grasp of Mandarin the fact that I could not 
culturally ‘go native’ gave me some hope that I would retain an element of the critical 
distance required in the research process to make accurate observations and 
measurements, although my lack of facility with the language also created obstacles for 
data collection. 
Cottle (Undated, p. 54) offers a way out of the conundrum of ‘going native’, 
suggesting that the write-up can be constructed as a space and time some distance from 
the participant observation. To this end, in the write-up period I left CCTV and the PRC 
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to distance myself as far as possible from the research site in which I had been immersed 
as a fully fledged member of the production team for over two years. However, in so far 
as friendships formed during my time at CCTV-9, I have maintained contact with some 
of my colleagues from that time, and our conversations since I left Beijing in December 
2005 cannot but have influenced the manner in which I processed the data and 
information I gathered during the study. 
The third methodological caveat is that the specific findings of this dissertation do 
not lend themselves to generalization, although certain of my findings might be of use if 
researchers are seeking patterns in PRC media which result from the relationship between 
the conjuncture of forces that shape news making. The non-generalizable results are those 
which are site specific, in particular the May 2004 relaunch, which is a core focus of the 
dissertation. The results that may be of use to researchers who are seeking patterns in the 
development of PRC media relate to the manner in which news makers handle the 
different forces – political economic, institutional, regulatory, censorial and agency-
related – that enable and constrain news making in the PRC. Although the way agents at 
CCTV-9 handled the conjuncture of political economic and institutional forces was 
necessarily unique, in so far as similar if not the same forces are at work in other news 
making sites some insight into how uniquely different agents might behave in a similar 
situations can be derived from my findings. 
Bracketing these caveats, I open this chapter with a discussion of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the four types of data collection I deployed: participant observation, 
interviews, document collection and a survey of content. Secondly, I look at the processes 
of data collection as they were deployed and analyze my use of them. Thirdly, I discuss 
the IRB and the impact the rules of ethical research had on this dissertation. Finally, I 
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look at problems I had with the research and their impact on the data and my analysis of 
it. 
CONSTRUCTIVISM AND METHODOLOGY 
For me, an important starting point in researching news making is to deploy 
methods that recognize the ontological presuppositions of the constructivist epistemology 
that informs my understanding of news as the social construction of reality. These 
presuppositions assume ontological relativism. Reality is local, experiential, and enabled 
and constrained by the discursive possibilities associated with meaning making 
materialized in practice. As a result of the over-determination of data by theory, facts are 
theory-laden. Theory saturates the available data and flows into the social structuration, 
both synchronic and diachronic, of the meaning making process. Reality is neither 
subjective nor objective, but socially constituted. Within a socially-constituted reality, 
one role of the researcher is to strive to understand how people construct their worlds. 
Knowledge is a condition and consequence of human activity, in the case of social 
science a construction that results from the interaction between the researcher and the 
researched. 
One aim of research that assumes ontological relativism is to foreground 
knowledge construction. The key to understanding knowledge construction is to 
understand the self-understanding of the lived experience of those who are researched, 
bringing to light people’s self-understanding of their social environment. The ideal 
research methods for this kind of activity are participant observation and interviews since 
these methods put the researcher and researched in a relationship of knowledge 
production that does not privilege either position, but allows for self-understanding to 
develop in a social context. 
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Acknowledging that ontological relativism privileges the viewpoint of the double 
subject (researcher and researched), in order to avoid the charge of subjectivism, I used 
triangulation to qualify the inter-subjective components – participant observation and 
interviews – of my research. Triangulation measured these components of the project 
against analysis of documents and a survey of content. Thomas Lindlof (1995) and John 
Creswell (1994), define triangulation as a way of stabilizing data by deploying a mix of 
methods. The strength of triangulation is its multidimensional character, enabling rich 
description and explication. 
A second function of triangulation was its contribution to what Schwant calls 
“scientific realism” – a careful, and rigorous examination of data in a natural setting, in 
which objectivity (in the research process) has a regulative rather than normative 
character with an emphasis on how research is conducted, rather than what results it 
obtains (Sinha, 2002). 
Scientific realism is compatible with constructivism. With its focus on the 
regulative character of research, scientific realism validates the knowledge claims 
negotiated in the phenomenologically grounded process of inter-subjective meaning 
making associated with constructivism. Given the lack of situated knowledge about news 
making in the PRC (at least in the English language literature), this study did not test 
theory, but sought to identify the grounds on which it might be built. Only in the 
conclusion do I outline a tentative overall theory of what was actually happening at 
CCTV-9. The bulk of the dissertation is given over to describing and analyzing that 
process. 
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DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Participant observation 
The goal of participant observation at a news making site is to provide an inter-
subjective experience of news making which enables the researcher to experience for 
herself what it is that news makers do (Babbie, 2001; Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & 
Murdock, 1999). At the same time, the natural setting of the observed environment lends 
a realism to the research that is lacking in methodologies that do not place the researcher 
inside the researched environment (Babbie, 2001). The roots of participant observation 
lie in anthropology and the Chicago school of sociology (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & 
Murdock, 1999, p. 252). According to Cottle (Undated) participant observation typically 
involves a) observation (while participating) b) attention to talk and c) the scrutiny of 
documents. 
As the literature (Babbie, 2001; Creswell, 1994; Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & 
Murdock, 1999; Marshall & Rossman, 1999) notes, one strength of participant 
observation is that the news makers’ self-understanding of their work is foregrounded. 
Secondly, participant observation allows the researcher to see what Malinowski (1922, p. 
18) called the “imponderabilia of everyday life” (cited in Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & 
Murdock, 1999, p. 258). These imponderabilia are those quotidian phenomena news 
makers engage in such as continually monitoring news, working to constant deadline 
pressure, etc. that have become second nature, and as such do not easily yield to surveys 
and interviews, which may elicit honest and thoughtful responses, but may not be a 
reliable account. 
Seeing the unseen is the result of a particular strength of participant observation – 
being there. The researcher is witness to the actuality of news making, and not restricted 
to second-hand accounts. Being there results in what is probably the greatest strength of 
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participant observation – the richness and color of the observations, what Clifford Geertz 
(1973) called “thick description.” 
Of particular value in a participant observation of CCTV-9 was the possibility of 
researching the degree to which the “mouthpiece” metaphor for PRC news holds. This 
metaphor relies on a characterization of news media as instruments of Party and 
government policy, suggesting that journalists have rather less agency than is implied in 
the assumptions of editorial independence that underpin objectivist news theory. By 
taking part in the news production process at CCTV-9 and working closely with seasoned 
news makers, I was in a position to flesh out the mouthpiece metaphor, and determine to 
what degree it held, given the complexity of the news making process. 
Through participant observation, I was able to open up and look inside the black 
box of political economic, institutional, regulatory and censorial contexts that are 
assumed to account for output in PRC news. I was able to shed light on the actual manner 
in which the mouthpiece metaphor worked, and to what degree it was valid. Against the 
assumption that news is a well-oiled and smoothly functioning instrument of policy 
dissemination, I was able to foreground the tensions and complexity of news making at 
CCTV-9, to find out, as Cottle (Undated, p. 47) asks, whether it was clean, tidy, 
organized and disciplined as critics assume. I believe I was able to overcome what Cottle 
(Undated) calls the “problem of inference” an “illicit leap from a critical reading of media 
content to inferences and about motivations or explanations accounting for this output” 
(Undated, p. 45). 
Finally participant observation allowed me to see first hand how the newsroom 
coped with the task of relaunching itself as a news channel in a bid to compete more 
effectively with global news channels such as CNN-I and BBC-WS, while 
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simultaneously defending and promoting the PRC’s image overseas and inside the PRC 
for English speakers without Mandarin. 
The problems of participant observation, ‘going native’ and immersion 
Against the strengths of participant observation are a number of weaknesses. A 
principal concern is ‘going native’ (Babbie, 2001; Cottle, Undated). As a former 
television news producer, the danger for me was multiplied. As Herbert Gans (1979) 
noted, the “hardest task in fieldwork is to study people who are politically or culturally 
akin to the fieldworker and who take the same things for granted” (Gans, 1979, p. 77, 
cited in Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 1999, p. 262). Although my research 
site was a Chinese, not a Western newsroom, my previous work (Jirik, 2000, 2004) 
pointed to the great similarities between elements of news production in the PRC and in 
the West, despite cultural differences. 
However, (media) cultural differences did matter. Given the differences in 
editorial policy between CCTV-9 as an element of the PRC ‘wai xuan’ system and 
newsrooms I had worked in that were not part of a state publicity system (even if in cases 
they functioned as such in their focus on and constant repetition of government messages 
as part of the rhythm of ‘normal’ news work), I believe that at no point while I was at 
CCTV-9 did I lose my analytical distance to the point of “personally identifying with the 
studied value system” (Soloway & Walters, 1977, pp. 168, cited in Marshall & Rossman, 
1999, p. 1992), which Marshall & Rossman (1999) suggest is an indicator that one has 
‘gone native.’ 
As a result, although I was deeply invested in my work at CCTV-9, and fully 
emphasized with my colleagues’ desire to make the best news possible, at no time did I 
believe I was working in a news system that was not subject to the regulation of SARFT 
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and censorship of the CPD. Equally however, none of my colleagues appeared to make 
this mistake either, suggesting a degree of reflexivity in relationship to the work place 
that calls into question the assumption of ‘nativism’ implied in ‘going native’.59 
Although it is important to let subjects speak for themselves, equally important 
according to Deacon et al. (1999) is the goal of attempting to move beyond description to 
explanation, which can only be achieved if what Philip Schlesinger (1980) calls 
“disengagement” (cited in Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 1999, p. 256) is 
achieved in the writing process. Schlesinger (1980) noted that it was only possible to 
achieve this distancing required for reflection and analysis once he was writing his 
second draft (cited in Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 1999, p. 257). 
Schlesinger’s is a warning I took seriously. After failing to find the necessary distance to 
begin writing while I was still working at CCTV-9, which had been my original intention, 
I left Beijing in December 2005, before attempting my write-up. 
Against my self-understanding that cultural and institutional differences prevented 
me from ‘going native,’ paradoxically, I did ‘go native’ to the degree that I became so 
immersed in my role in the May 2004 relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International that at 
times I lost myself in the project. However, by keeping a diary, I was able to provide an 
account of what happened in the critical months either side of the relaunch. Of course, the 
diary was also embedded in my immersion. But on reflection, only through the constant 
writing up of an account of my work and reflection upon what I was experiencing at the 
time, regardless of how much critical distance I had lost on the project in which I was 
engaged, was I able to make my sense of the relaunch in retrospect, especially when I 
compared my notes to what I experienced, what my interlocutors were telling me in 
                                                 
59 The ‘native’ is assumed to have an uncritical attitude to her own position. To ‘go native’ implies a 
superior, inferior distinction, which is unwarranted and not borne out by the facts. To ‘go native’ implies 
that the native is a child of nature, who has none of the critical reflexivity of a reasoning person. 
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interviews (all done after the relaunch) and what I saw in documents that related to the 
newsroom and the relaunch. 
In defense of immersion, I believe that only by becoming immersed in the news 
making process and the design and implementation of the relaunch was I able to 
experience something of what my colleagues were going through as they grappled with 
SARFT’s demand to change the channel. Therefore, I would suggest that the danger of 
‘going native’ should not be over-emphasized to the point where a researcher loses access 
to invaluable insights. The real problem with ‘going native’ is not ‘going native’ per se, 
but failing to extricate oneself from that position at an appropriate point in the write-up 
process. 
If my immersion in the news making process and the May 2004 relaunch was an 
example of what Deacon et al. (1999, pp. 262-268) caution against as the problem of 
losing sight of the point of being there and participation hindering observation, I also 
must recognize that the peculiarity of my position at CCTV-9 also meant that I 
encountered the problem of observation hindering participation (not getting involved 
enough). In particular, the problem of a dual language newsroom and my facility in only 
one (English) of those languages meant that not only were my observations hindered by 
my lack of facility with Mandarin but I was also limited in observation to the degree that 
facility with Mandarin would have fostered greater participation. 
I do not know how much of the production process I missed because of the 
language issue. Against this, I assume that the length of time I spent in the newsroom and 
the fact that English almost always was the language of communication between 
foreigners and Chinese (although not amongst the Chinese), my interviews and my prior 
experience as a news maker made up for my lack of Mandarin. However, not being fluent 
in Mandarin resulted in a methodological blind spot that I can only acknowledge, without 
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being able to give a precise weight in terms of any compromise to the data collection and 
analysis that resulted. 
Immersion was also part of another problem, the fact that I indelibly and 
deliberately tainted the research environment. Although I originally intended a classical 
participant observation, in which the researcher attempts to fit into existing routines and 
thereby minimizes disruption to the research site (Babbie, 2001), because CCTV 
management asked me to take part in the design and implementation of the May 2004 
relaunch, consult program makers and train staff, my role as a participant was designed to 
change CCTV-9 as it became CCTV International. 
Although the literature prevaricates on the issue of the researcher changing the 
research environment, it agrees as Babbie (2001) puts it that “[u]ltimately, anything the 
participant-observer does or does not do will have some effect on what’s being observed: 
it’s simply inevitable” (p. 278). The more important consideration is what effect might 
that change have? (Babbie, 2001, p. 278) In so far as management asked me to help with 
the relaunch of the channel, my interventions were well-intentioned, although I have no 
measure beyond the thanks I received from some colleagues and my sense that senior 
management appreciated what I was trying to do, that I succeeded in any way.60 
Against the problem of immersion, I believe that the length of my stay – two and 
a half years, of which one year, February 2004 through January 2005, was the window of 
observation and data collection – brought me much closer to an understanding of my 
topic than would have been the case had I taken the classical research route of a relatively 
disengaged participant observation. In my diary, I attempted to be reflexive about my role 
                                                 
60 However, as the reader will discover in the body of the dissertation, I seemed to have as many detractors 
as supporters for what I was doing at CCTV. So perhaps my sense of having been a positive influence on 
the channel’s development is overly optimistic. 
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in the May 2004 relaunch, while retaining the critical edge that is expected of research. 
Whether this has been the case, I am not in a position to judge. 
Interviews 
In addition to participant observation, as part of the social constructivist 
component of my research, I conducted a series of interviews with personnel at CCTV-9 
from writers to senior management. Interviews are only one form of media talk. 
However, I dealt with the other forms – the ongoing banter of the newsroom, meal time 
conservations, chats over coffee breaks, an occasional social engagement outside of work 
that brought together CCTV-9 staff – as an element of the participant observation, since 
they were part of the everyday process of working in a news making environment. Many 
of these elements of talk were recorded in my diary. 
An interview is somewhat different, as it is a structured conversation. Lindlof 
(1995) suggests that an interview is not an objective report about “thoughts, feelings, or 
things in the world,” but the talk of “socially situated speakers” whose information “must 
be examined within the context of all information collected regarding the interview topic 
and relevant research questions” (p. 165-6, cited in Christensen, 2001, p. 110). 
Methodologically the interview is a hermeneutic exercise in which ideally the 
interviewer and interviewee come to a common understanding about something through 
dialogue. As Deacon et al. (1999, pp. 279-286) point out, as a form of oral history, the 
interview can provide particularly rich insights, which would otherwise remain invisible, 
unavailable to research because the everyday thoughts of media makers are not the ‘stuff’ 
of history, and are rarely recorded, but instead remain part of the background hum. 
Through interviews, I was able to flesh out issues that were relevant to the news making 
process that I had already identified through participant observation. Interviews also 
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enabled me to get a much more detailed understanding of what I was doing, seeing, and 
recording, than would have been the case had I not had the chance to sit down with staff 
and talk to them at length. Finally, in so far as CCTV-9 was a newsroom, it had 
distinctive dynamics and language of news making. And although I was familiar with 
much of the news making process, I was able to investigate atypical features of news 
making deployed at CCTV-9 by interviewing staff about their work. 
Although an interview is similar to participant observation in its reliance on a 
constructivist epistemology, as Deacon et al. (1999) note, interviewing is more of an 
intervention into the research site than is observation. In this sense, the researcher is very 
visible in the interview. Data collected through interviewing is therefore 
epistemologically different from data collected through observation and from documents, 
because the researcher is always already present in the interview data (Deacon, Pickering, 
Golding, & Murdock, 1999, p. 292). However, like participant observation, the data 
obtained through interviews is relative. The combination of interviews and participant 
observation provided a much richer understanding of the media environment than would 
either approach alone. But ontologically both methods remain within the realm of 
constructivism. In order to better fix in space and time the self-understanding CCTV-9 
staff had of their work and understanding I had of their work and their self-understanding 
of it, I deployed the analysis of documents and a survey of content as a third and fourth 
dimension of triangulation. 
Documentation 
The most important document that I kept from CCTV-9 was my diary. However, I 
do not deal with it here, but below, as a recording device for participant observation. By 
documentation I mean the types of documents that were not central but ancillary to 
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participant observation. Apart from the scripts used for the survey of content (see below), 
all the documentation I acquired from CCTV-9 came from my participation in the news 
making process, including the design and relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International. 
These documents consisted of papers that senior management distributed as part 
of the redesign process, papers such as the SARFT and CPD directives that entered into 
my view as part of my work in the newsroom and papers issued by different members of 
management and by the head of the Foreign Experts that pertained to the work place. 
Examples of the latter were schedules, emails, etc. I also kept all the emails staff 
circulated among themselves that included me as an addressee, as these provided a rich 
insight into quotidian elements of news making and staff reflections on the work place 
and their colleagues. 
Creswell (1994) notes that the strength of documents is that they enable a 
researcher to obtain “the language and words of informants” (p. 150), allow for 
convenience of access, and are unobtrusive. The drawbacks include the difficulty of 
acquiring documents and their handling and storage. Nevertheless, to my mind, the 
strengths of documentation outweigh the drawbacks, especially as a material record in a 
case study that was very much a personal account of work at CCTV-9. As Marshall & 
Rossman (1999) note, researchers “supplement participant observation, interviewing, and 
observation with gathering and analyzing documents produced in the course of everyday 
events or constructed specifically for the research at hand” (p. 116). 
The problem of documentation in the PRC 
Although documentation should be a fairly straight forward question for a 
research project, documentation at a state-owned enterprise in the PRC has a special 
status that can cause problems for the researcher, and more importantly for the research 
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site and its members. The key problem with government-related documents in the PRC is 
that the authorities define as a state secret many documents not released to the public. But 
they do not designate these documents as state secrets, only labeling them as such after 
their unauthorized publication and alleged misuse (Esarey, 2006; He, 2004; Sun, 2001, 
2004; Yardley & Kahn, 2006). 
In order to avoid the problem of documentation, with a single exception, I made a 
point of using in this dissertation only documents that were part of the everyday day news 
making process and either available to all members of staff or made available to me as 
part of the news making process, including the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV 
International. The single exception to this self-imposed rule was a fax that SARFT sent to 
the zhubian’s (news editor) office with a directive about coverage. Although I refer to 
this document, I did not copy it but wrote a note in my diary about it. 
Survey of content 
I deliberately do not use the term ‘content analysis’ to describe the survey of 
content, or strictly speaking survey of bulletin rundowns and scripts (see p. 176 for an 
explanation), that constitutes Chapter 11 of this dissertation, since my use of content 
cannot do justice to the method, classically understood, with its sophisticated techniques 
and practices. My use of content was quite basic: statistical analyses of a limited range of 
variables derived from rundowns and scripts. My goal in surveying content was to 
measure claims made by news makers about their work against their work. 
Hansen (1996) notes with respect to content, that the characteristics of data 
isolated for analysis “should relate directly to the overall research questions or 
hypotheses” (p. 137) that prompted the choice of method in the first place. The survey of 
content served two purposes in this dissertation. Firstly, it provided the only empirical 
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evidence of the production process. Secondly, as empirical evidence it was used in 
triangulation of the observation, interview and document related data. 
In so far as the survey of content did not tally with claims made by news makers, 
my intention in discussing such contradictions was not to expose false consciousness, 
which is an ideological issue. Rather, I wanted to show how content can shed light on 
elements of news making which news makers do not pay attention to, but not for 
ideological reasons so much as for the reason that on the one hand the more quotidian an 
element of news making the less is the news maker likely to pay it any particular 
attention. On the other hand, regardless of what news makers think they are doing, the 
institutional environment and available sources invariably enable and constrain what 
news can be made. 
What I learned at CCTV-9 is that news makers, however reflexive, face 
operational constraints which shape the news in particular ways, and operational blind 
spots which render invisible to them certain elements of their work. The content surveyed 
in this dissertation provided material evidence of the news making process. As such, it 
showed the manner in which the political economic, institutional and regulatory 
environments shaped news. By surveying content and discussing output with media 
makers, my understanding of the production process was enhanced. Moreover, should my 
colleagues and interlocutors at CCTV-9 read this dissertation, their self-understanding of 
their work might also be enhanced. 
Surveying content was also not an attempt to reduce to a set of outputs the very 
real complexity, sophistication and occasional messiness of news making. Rather, it 
strengthened my analysis by tempering the regulatory aspect of scientific realism. The 
survey of content presented here was concerned to further enrich the picture of news 
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making at CCTV-9 by using content to show the relationship between news makers and 
their product. 
If news making is seen as a manufacturing process, then news makers play the 
role of workers who assemble news from its component parts. What sort of product 
emerges from this process is a fascinating topic in itself. But as part of a case study, what 
the news is saying is less important than how it is made to speak. What are the structural 
and institutional frames that enable one kind of product, over and against another? What 
mix of components go into the product and why? Is this the best possible product under 
the circumstances? How would news makers do their work differently, if they could? Are 
the workers and managers happy with the product? These are questions of discovery, 
relevance, richness and applicability for which a survey of content provides at best a 
starting point. 
Summary of procedure 
In the preceding sections, I have outlined the process of triangulation that was 
core to developing a systematic and rigorous database of information about CCTV-9. 
Through participant observation, interviews, documentation and content research, I 
sought to show the logic of the news production process and the relationship between 
inputs and outputs and the manner in which this relationship was articulated by the 
agency of news makers in the social construction of reality. As a participant my work fed 
back into the production process. As a member of staff tasked with helping in the 
redesign of the channel and the training of journalists, I changed the reality under 
construction. 
I have characterized my position at CCTV as one of immersion, rather than 
participation. However, I also sought to strengthen the analysis of my participant 
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observation (understood as immersion) through systematic rigor in data collection, 
including in keeping a diary, doing interviews, collecting documents and surveying 
content. Through this complex of methods, I have constructed a narrative which I believe 
is a relatively stable and detached account of the process of change in which I was 
involved. 
DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND WRITE-UP 




Site: China Central Television, CCTV-9, Beijing 
Time frame: February 2004 – January 2005 
According to Creswell (1994, p. 149), the key questions for data collection in a 
participant observation are what is to be recorded, and how? What I recorded was 
evidence of every aspect of the news making process to which I had access. My primary 
roles at CCTV-9 were copy editor, trainer to some junior writers, consultant to the 
reporters’ group and World Insight61 team and consultant to senior management. 
As a copy editor, I had access to the following aspects of news making: 
• Newsroom management by the zhubians, directors and head of the foreign experts 
• Story selection by zhubians and directors 
• The manner in which writers, copy editors and political editors processed stories 
                                                 
61 Because World Insight was not part of General News, their work and my work with them was peripheral 
to this dissertation. 
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• The everyday dynamics of newsroom activity, from banter among staff to 
disputes over stories, staffing levels, workload, pay scale, etc. 
• Relations between management and production staff 
• Relations between CCTV-9 staff and technical staff who reported not to CCTV 
management, but to the CCTV Technical Section, which was responsible for all 
the channel’s technical needs 
• Relations among the copy editors and between the copy editors and Chinese staff 
As a trainer, I had access to the following aspects of news making:  
• The different levels of skill with which new Chinese staff arrived at the channel 
• Insight into the manner in which staff were allocated to production teams 
• The testing system which management used to decide on staff rankings and pay 
scales 
• The process of in-house development of staff associated with particular shows on 
which I worked 
• Relations between newly arrived and more experienced staff members, both 
Chinese and foreign. 
As a consultant to the reporters’ group, I had access to the following aspects of 
their work: 




• Observation of the internal dynamics of the group 
• The relationship of the group to the rest of CCTV-9 
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• Reporters’ self-understanding of their work as evident in the discussions they had 
about their work 
As a consultant to management, I had access to the following aspects of news 
making: 
• The manner in which staff, both Chinese and foreign were chosen for the channel 
• The process of channel development associated with the May 2004 relaunch of 
CCTV-9 as CCTV International 
• Relations between managers and between management and outside consultants, 
such as those provided by News Corporation 
• Relations between management and staff, both Chinese and foreign 
• Access to management’s hopes for development of the channel, reflected in 
conversations between managers at meetings and with managers as part of my 
consultancy 
Observation was conducted through day-to-day participation in the news making 
process. As a ‘foreign expert’, I worked between four and five shifts per week. During 
that time, I recorded my participation and observations in a diary, which I kept for the 
twelve month period from February 2004 through January 2005. 
I had intended to keep notes during my work time, but I found that this was both 
impossible to do for two reasons. Firstly, copy editing is a job that requires intense 
concentration on stories that are being processed because of the conveyor-belt and 
deadline driven character of news making. During that time, taking notes was impossible. 
Secondly, and paradoxically, in the periods of down time between stories, I also found it 
impossible to take notes, because no work was being done, and I found I was drawing 
unwanted attention to myself when I was writing or working on my laptop in the 
newsroom, while my colleagues were taking a break. As a result, I discovered that the 
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only practicable and unobtrusive method of keeping the diary was to write it outside of 
the work place, after I had returned to my flat at the Friendship Hotel at the end of the 
day. 
Keeping a diary in this manner influenced the data in several ways. Firstly, the 
immediate impact of my impressions was lost through the normal process of 
memorization and recall. Even only hours after a shift, I had the sense that I was writing 
from memory rather than with a direct sense of observing or participating in events. 
Moreover, on occasion it was either impossible or inconvenient to write up my diary 
immediately after a shift. In these cases, I would write it at the earliest possible 
opportunity. But this only compounded the sense of distance that had accumulated 
between the record and the events it referred to. 
As a result, at best, the diary can be described as a narrative account of my 
impressions of what I thought had happened during the day at work. In short the data was 
always already influenced by my reflections upon and distance from the events recorded 
therein. As such, my diary was a valid and reliable account of my own thought processes 
about the news making process, but not a series of notes taken at the time of my 
participation in it and observation of it. 
Despite this, the diary did function as a record to which I could return time and 
again in the write-up to validate information I derived from other sources. And it served 
as a vehicle of moving from description to explanation in my account of the news making 
process. Particular instances of news making that I recorded triggered thoughts about the 
how of news making that often went beyond the who, what, where and when of 
participant observation to the why. 
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Data analysis 
Renata Tesch (1990) argues that there is no “right way” to analyzing data in a 
participant observation, and that the process is eclectic (cited in Creswell, 1994:153). 
Creswell (1994) reminds the researcher to remain open to alternative explanations than 
those originally considered for findings. Key then in participant observation is the 
process of conducting analysis simultaneously with data collection, interpretation and 
narrative writing. Although my diary was at best a very rough first draft of this 
dissertation, it did fulfill some of that analytic function. However, the more rigorous 
analysis was carried out after I left CCTV. 
Because of the sheer quantity of data participant observation generated, analysis 
consisted in the first instance of “data reduction.” I took the data collected and reduced it 
to manageable categories through the identification of patterns and themes. Through de-
constructing and reconstructing the data, I attempted to build a holistic and consolidated 
picture of news making at CCTV-9. 
The process of data reduction involved firstly the reading and re-reading of my 
diary with the intent of developing a sense of what emerged as the major themes 
associated with the news making process and the May 2004 relaunch. Secondly, I read 
through the documents I had collected, discarding those that were not relevant to the 
themes emerging from the diary and from reflection on the interviews (see below). 
Finally, I began comparative analysis of data derived from participant 
observation, interviews and the survey of content setting up a feed back circuit that fed 
into the data chapters as I developed them. 
Write-up 
Originally, I had intended to produce a draft of this dissertation during my time at 
CCTV. However, the problem of immersion I outlined above prevented me from gaining 
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the distance necessary during my time at CCTV to periodically step back from what I 
was doing and maintain the attitude of skepticism, essential to the kind of research such 
as “grounded theory” (Babbie, 2001, p. 284) that generates data and theory 
simultaneously. My work was therefore more in the mould of a classical case study, with 
write up following data collection, for which I used Schlesinger’s (1987) Putting Reality 
Together and his discussion of news making at the BBC as a model. 
Although I stopped recording my observations in January 2005, I remained at 
CCTV until December 2005. I spent most of 2006 analyzing my data and I did not begin 
the write-up until late 2006, after I returned to the United States in August of that year. 
Because of the time lapse between data collection and write-up, the importance of my 
diary became extremely clear as I attempted to make sense of what I had been 
experiencing, now armed with the critical distance necessary to evaluate the data. 
In the presentation of the data and its analysis, I have opted for a reportorial style 
inflected by first person observations. My reason for so doing was to present a readable 
dissertation that a non-specialist audience could access, since several of my former 
colleagues at CCTV have expressed an interest in reading my work. At the same time, the 
use of the first person acknowledges that in the final analysis this is not a scientific work, 
although it is grounded in scientific realism. Although I use statistics and present data in 
tables to summarize findings in an easily accessible form, this dissertation is first and 
foremost an historical document, an account of one person’s observation of and 
participation in the news making process at CCTV-9 and relaunch of the channel as 
CCTV International. 
As a case study, the unit of analysis was the newsroom as a whole. My history of 
a brief period in its development is presented as a holistic narrative, segmented into the 
core elements of the news making process: editorial, production, reporting, and content. 
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However, although my work is a history first and foremost, it does attempt to explain 
how the CCTV-9 newsroom worked with an eye to its further development. Moreover, 
elements of my work, in so far as they relate to the institutional and regulatory context in 
which CCTV-9 was embedded, have some value towards generalizing about certain 
aspects of news making at other, similar sites (China Daily, China Radio International, 




A good interview requires planning. My own plans for interviews involved a 
structured set of questions, with slight differences for different levels of personnel within 
the news making process (see Appendix 1, p. 464 for sample question sheets). I 
attempted but failed (see below) to interview a representative and diverse but not random 
sample of CCTV-9 personnel. The aim for representative diversity at CCTV-9 promised 
what Lindlof (1995:126) calls “maximum variation sampling” (cited in Christensen, 
2001:104). In this form of sampling, individuals are selected according to variations in 
their levels of experience, age, gender, etc. Within CCTV-9, I drew my sample from 
management and editorial at all levels, with the exception of the political editors, whom I 
was unable to interview (see below). I also interviewed one media theorist62 and one 
outside consultant to CCTV. The total number of interviews was twenty-three. 
Among personnel at CCTV-9, in choosing whom to interview I originally 
attempted to include at least two of every category of worker associated with the making 
                                                 
62 The theorist was Sun Xupei, who was responsible for innovations in media theory tolerated by the Party 
post-1978 into the late 1980s, but was himself purged when his theories were published (Sun, 2001). As my 
dissertation developed, my focus shifted away from what I had discussed with Sun. As a result, no part of 
that interview is referenced in this work. 
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of general news. For the most part, my potential interlocutors were enthusiastic about the 
possibility of speaking, since they saw participation in my study as a chance to explain 
their experience of working at CCTV-9. Many also saw it as a chance to clarify what they 
considered ill-informed speculation about news making in the PRC in the press and on 
blogs. 
Although the process of choosing potential interviewees was guided by a concern 
for maximum variation in the sampling, I was constrained by suspicion of my work on 
the part of several persons with whom I asked to speak. By the time I stopped 
interviewing, I was aware that ‘convenience sampling’ best explained the method by 
which I had chosen my interlocutors, although I did have a fairly good maximum 
variation sample in any case, covering almost every level of news maker from 
management to writers. The following list of twenty-one indicates the final number for 
interviews for each category: senior managers (3), managers & zhubians (8), directors 
(1), reporters (3), political editors (0), copy editors (1), writers (2) and anchors (3). 
The sample was biased towards senior management, management and zhubians. I 
only managed to interview one director (I did not have particular good relations with the 
directors, and the only other director I asked for an interview declined). However, four of 
the six zhubians (one was interviewed twice) had previously worked as directors, so I 
was able to ask them about directing in addition to their work as zhubian. I felt my own 
position as a copy editor made interviewing more than one copy editor somewhat 
redundant. Missing from the interviews was an in-depth discussion with any of the 
political editors. Although one originally agreed to speak with me, he later withdrew 
permission. Another whom I asked declined to be interviewed. I did not ask the 
remaining two for fear of drawing attention to my research, given my interest in editorial 
control and censorship. Apart from the political editors, one Chinese and one foreigner 
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whom I asked declined the request for an interview. The agreement rate following 
interview requests was therefore twenty-three out of twenty-seven (85%), which I 
considered an acceptable success rate. 
Although convenience sampling is rightly criticized in the literature for its 
efficiency at the expense of information and credibility (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 
78), I only stopped the process of seeking interviewees once I had a cross section of the 
news makers except for the political editors and responses began to show, on an initial 
reading of the data, signs of continuous repetition of themes with less and less new 
knowledge emerging. Therefore, apart from the political editors and directors, and 
counting myself as a copy editor, I had achieved my original goal of interviewing at least 
two of each category of worker. 
However, I also realized on reflection that with one exception I had not 
interviewed people with whom I had poor relations. The exception was a manager for 
whom I had a lot of respect, but with whom I had a difficult relationship. I was extremely 
pleased at getting that interview, which proved a fruitful addition to the sample. 
I have already discussed (see p. 141) the problem that ‘guanxi’ (relations) poses 
for someone attempting to research a Chinese social or working environment. This 
problem was particularly troubling to me in attempting to get as broad a range of 
interviewees as possible. At the time of doing the interviews, I was unaware that I had 
biased my choice of interviewees in this fashion. But I realized after I had left CCTV-9 
that in the final analysis, I had almost invariably sought to interview people whom I liked 
or respected. On reflection, I am unsure whether the sample would have benefited from 
attempting to interview excellent news makers with whom I had poor relations, since 
excellent news makers constituted the majority of those interviewed. Conversely, 
although a potential lacuna in information follows from the failure to interview news 
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makers with whom I had poor relations, I am unsure how much their inclusion would 
have added to the study, in so far as I tended not to like news makers whose work I did 
not respect, and such work was not representative, in my judgement, of the general tenor 
of work at CCTV-9. 
The interviews with CCTV-9 personnel fell naturally into two categories: 
management, news makers. Each of these categories of worker demanded a slightly 
different set of questions, although the basic set of questions was the same for each (see 
Appendix 1). Each set of questions was driven by the function of the category of worker 
involved. Questions to management pertained primarily to management, reporters to 
reporting, etc. Within the newsroom, slightly different questions were required for the 
sub-categories involved in the news making process: zhubian, director, copy editor, 
writer and anchor. 
I prepared two interview templates. Template 1 (see p. 464) covered the following 
categories of worker: executive producer, zhubian, director, copy editor, writer, reporter, 
anchor. However, the interviewees were given great control to guide the interview, so the 
final transcripts usually did not match the templates. In addition, the template section E) 
The work of the [job category] was adjusted slightly for each of the job categories. 
Template 2 (see p. 471) covered senior managers. I also prepared questions for two other 
interviewees, whose templates I do not show here in the interests of protecting their 
anonymity, since their roles in relationship to CCTV-9 were unique and thus these 
persons are potentially recognizable from the interview questions I asked. I did not 
prepare a template for political editors, as I did not interview any political editors. 
Although the May 2004 relaunch was a major focus of this dissertation, the 
questions I asked in interviews about it were relatively few, primarily because the early 
interviews suggested that staff, apart from senior management, did not treat the relaunch 
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as a significant point in the channel’s development. However, in an interview when a 
staff member did have a lot to say about the relaunch, I allowed them to do this and shift 
the interview away from the template. 
My approach to an interview was to begin with a specific set of questions, but to 
make it open-ended. As such, in many cases, the interviews veered away from what I had 
planned. In each such case, I allowed the interview to take its own course, since I see an 
interview as a dialogue not a closed set of questions, regardless of each particular answer. 
By remaining open to the concerns of my interlocutors, I was able to allow them to steer 
the conversation, if they wished. Although I had a tentative set of questions for the two 
categories of interviewee, I did not restrict myself to these questions. To my mind the 
point of the interviews was to allow the interviewees to express themselves. Any attempt 
to put constraints on expression by limiting dialogue to the set of questions I had would 
have closed off my research site to potentially rich findings. Therefore, for the purposes 
of understanding how I conducted the interviews, the questions outlined in Appendix 1 
should be treated as a starting point for the interviews, not a framework. 
The general tenor of the general news and reporter interviews focused on what 
each person did, how they felt about their work, the pluses and minuses associated with 
working at CCTV, who they were, their past and their ambitions for the future. In 
addition, I asked each category about relations with other categories, and how the 
dynamics of news making were reflected in the teamwork or lack of teamwork they 
experienced in the channel. For senior management, I wanted to know how the channel 
developed and what were their plans for the future were, as well as how they felt about 
the channel’s successes and failures through to late 2004, especially in the context of the 
design and execution of the relaunch. More broadly, each interviewee was asked about 
issues of censorship and the institutional and regulatory environments that enabled and 
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constrained their work. They were also asked hypothetical questions about the potential 
for the development of journalism in the PRC and what they felt should be done or not 
done to realize the changes, if any, they felt the news making system required. 
Each of the interviews was conducted one-on-one at a mutually agreed site. I 
recorded each interview on a cassette tape. The shortest interview ran a little under an 
hour. The longest ran almost three hours. Although the length of almost all the interviews 
was determined by exhaustion of the questions, in one case (the shortest), the interviewee 
cut short our discussion because her shift was about to start. 
With the exception of the single interview that was cut short, at the end of every 
interview, I asked the interviewee whether they had anything to add. When they did, that 
was recorded too. However, almost all the interviewees had nothing to add beyond what 
had already been discussed. Nevertheless, it was at this stage, early on in the interview 
process that one of the most interesting methodological problems I encountered arose. 
One of the early interviewees suggested that I was asking the wrong questions, and that 
my concern with issues such as censorship were irrelevant to the main concerns of the 
majority of workers, who were primarily and almost exclusively concerned by issues of 
pay and conditions, and the dynamics of the news making process itself. 
That criticism prompted me to reshape my questions to the extent that I felt the 
criticism was justified. In particular, after that interview I paid much more attention to the 
dynamics of news making and questioned interviewees where possible about their 
finances and work conditions and their understanding of the internal politics of the 
channel and its development. Although almost all my interlocutors were reluctant to go 
into detail about pay and conditions, a picture of dissatisfaction with pay and conditions 
did emerge, which became central to understanding the dynamics of the channel’s 
development. 
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The criticism of my interlocutor that I was asking the wrong questions was a 
salutary reminder that an interview is only as good as the questions that are asked. In 
short, although I felt the interviews were exhaustive, I have no evidence that they were, 
although as noted I stopped the interview process only when repetition became the norm 
in terms of themes. Moreover, as I began to analyze my data and write up my findings, I 
began to understand how an issue such as censorship, which is prominent in academic 
analysis of media in the PRC, is of less concern to media makers working within the 
system. As my discussion of Foucault and Certeau in the introduction indicated, despite 
the formal hierarchy of power within which media are embedded and the ubiquitous 
character of censorship in PRC media, paradoxically my interlocutors had every reason to 
suggest that regulation and censorship of PRC media are far more contested than would 
be inferred from the formal character of the relations of power alone. 
Another potential lacuna associated with the interview process was my use of 
English. Apart from the interview with Sun Xupei, I conducted all the interviews in 
English. In my opinion, all of the interviewees had good to excellent English, which one 
would expect given that they were putting an English-language bulletin to air. But it was 
still their second language in every case except for the foreigners interviewed. The 
facility with which some of my interlocutors expressed themselves is evident from the 
verbatim transcripts, which in part are reproduced as quotations in the dissertation text. 
Where there appeared to be a problem with expression during an interview, accord was 
sought through rewording questions, asking the same question again, or asking for 
clarification of an answer. Despite this, I cannot rule out that my interlocutors may have 
expressed themselves differently had they answered in their native tongue.63 
                                                 
63 For some of the interviewees, their native spoken language was not Mandarin, but another dialect within 
the Chinese language family. 
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Finally, given the character of the research site – a state controlled newsroom in a 
one ruling party state – with all the implications, positive and negative, that this has for 
workers’ security etc., the question of confidentiality was paramount in the interviewing 
process. In line with IRB protocols (see below) each interviewee was informed prior to 
their interview that all recorded data was confidential and that precautions would be 
taken to keep it that way. Interviewees were also informed of their right to withdraw from 
participation in the interview at any time, and to withdraw my right of access to their 
interview. I retained copies of the interview transcripts, but I do not present them as 
appendices because of concerns for the privacy not only of the interviewees, but also of 
colleagues to whom they refer. 
Data Analysis 
The unit of analysis for the interviews was the statement. Initial data analysis 
proceeded apace with the interview process. The nature of an interview almost forced this 
approach, since I was able to shape ongoing and upcoming interviews to reflect what I 
was learning or had learned in previous conversations, keeping in mind the basic set of 
questions that guided the research. 
Once the interviews were completed, I transcribed them and coded them 
inductively in an attempt to identify those key themes and topics which were of most 
value in understanding the news making process. To this end, I deployed NUD*IST64 
qualitative research software, which simplified the process of finding themes and topics 
of greater or lesser concern to my interviewees. Each interview was put into NUD*IST 
with the paragraph defined as the unit of analysis. Although a paragraph is not a 
statement, of the three options offered by NUD*IST – line, sentence or paragraph – the 
                                                 
64 The NUD*IST website is at http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_previous-products_n6.aspx.  
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sense in which a paragraph ideally contains a single idea was closest to the sense of a 
statement. 
Using NUD*IST, and echoing Creswell’s (1994:167) suggestion, I organized data 
categorically and compared interviews with one another, and with my impressions from 
taking part in the news making process. Keeping in mind the diversity of the 
interviewees’ positions within the newsroom and experience in news making, I was not 
surprised that my first pass through the interviews produced seventy-nine separate 
themes. One advantage of using NUD*IST is that I was then able to collate those themes 
into broader categories of understanding as follows: attitudes to oneself, ones colleagues 
and the workplace; the audience; editorial values; regulation, censorship and attitudes to 
the Government and Party and their influence on news making; the place of CCTV-9 in 
global media and competition with other global broadcasters; attitudes of management 
and about management; the news making process; reporting; the effect of the market on 
media and technical aspects of broadcasting. These core themes were then woven into the 
discussion that I developed in the presentation of data. 
Although the narrowing of categories involved a high degree of data reduction 
where redundancies were involved, I was also concerned to preserve nuances, 
divergences, discrepancies, and diversity, since the richness of CCTV-9 as a news 
making site was not only in finding commonalities, but just as importantly in finding the 
small differences that lent the newsroom and staff character and enabled them to 
negotiate in different ways the various pressures they were facing as news makers. 
Write-up 
Because the interviews were treated as an ancillary data form, which functioned 
to strengthen participant observation, rather than present the interviews as a separate 
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chapter within the dissertation, I have woven the impressions I derived from my 
conversations with colleagues into the broader picture of news making that I develop in 
the body of the dissertation. I made no attempt to read hidden motives into the interviews. 
I assumed my interlocutors were engaged in the communicative process as Habermas 
(1984) would define it in terms of truth, trust and sincerity as the preconditions of 
communication. 
By not treating the interviews as isolated elements within the research but as 
elements in the dynamics of news making, findings from participant observation were 
strengthened, lending greater internal validity to the research. In so far as interviewees 
discussed topics and themes that extended beyond the newsroom to the broader contexts 
of news making in the PRC, they provided qualified support for my discussion of the 
development of a theory of news making at CCTV-9 in the context of ongoing media 
reform and globalization of PRC media. 
Documentation 
Data collection 
Apart from keeping my diary, as part of the participant observation I also 
collected on-site documents that came to my attention during the normal course of the 
working day. These documents ranged from scripts that related to the particular handling 
of a story, emails issued to staff and exchanged formally and informally between staff, 
directives issued to the newsroom, whether from regulatory or censorial authorities, 




The unit of analysis for documents was the document. Once I began analysis, the 
documents I collected were separated into categories that were useful and not useful to 
the overall thrust of the dissertation. The kinds of documents I retained were then sorted 
into those in Chinese and those in English. 
Chinese documents include directives, documents associated with the May 2004 
relaunch, production plans developed by the reporting group and documents issued in 
Chinese to the newsroom, such as schedules. The first step in analyzing Chinese 
documents was to translate them. I did all the translations of documentation for this 
dissertation. I had two native Mandarin readers, both with good English,65 check against 
the originals all the translations I used in the dissertation. 
English documents included foreign expert schedules and emails issued to the 
foreign experts by management or circulated among Chinese and foreign staff or between 
foreign staff. As with the Chinese documents, I first sorted the English documents into 
those that were useful for understanding the news production process and those that were 
peripheral. 
Perhaps the most difficult decision I made with respect to English documents was 
to decide not to quote emails that the foreign experts circulated among themselves, 
sometimes inadvertently, about their attitudes to working at CCTV-9, their attitudes to 
one another and their attitudes to their Chinese colleagues. Some of these emails were 
incendiary. But in the final analysis, CCTV-9 was something of a pressure cooker. As in 
any deadline driven working environment, people sometimes tended to say and write 
things that they would later come to regret. In my own case, frustration at the news 
                                                 
65 Both were tertiary educated. One had lived and work in the US for several years. The other was a 
Beijing-based certified teacher of Chinese to foreigners. 
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making process led me to lose my temper several times at CCTV-9, and, as one of the 
most experienced journalists working there, I should have known better. I do not see any 
point in embarrassing anybody else who happened to have worked there or is still 
working there, whether foreign or Chinese. So I have chosen to not cite from those 
emails. However, such emails cannot but have influenced my understanding of the 
dynamics at work at CCTV-9, and as such they cannot but have influenced my analysis. 
Perhaps my strongest reason for not drawing more on those emails was my sense that 
despite the occasional lapse, most staff at CCTV-9 seemed to enjoy their work, liked the 
social (if not the physical)66 environment, and at least tolerated if not respected and/or 
liked one another. 
Write-up 
The documentation described above was drawn upon to reflect upon and 
triangulate other data. As such, when used, it was woven into the data chapters, which, 
apart from the survey of content, were organized more according to the research 
questions than according to the diverse methodologies deployed. 
Survey of content 
As already noted, I conducted what I call a survey of content rather than a content 
analysis of CCTV-9 output. Babbie (2001) notes that content analysis is oriented to 
answering the “why” and “with what effect” in the classical question: “Who says what, to 
whom, why, how, and with what effect?” (p. 305). However, content analysis would 
seem to be also able to answer “who says what to whom,” and “how” depending on how 
                                                 
66 The CCTV building was rundown. Even a revamp of CCTV-9’s facilities associated with the May 2004 
relaunch did not improve what seemed to be a general sense of contempt many staff had for their work 
place. I was at a loss to explain this, because it was at odds with what I felt was their generally positive 
attitude to their work and one another. 
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on uses the technique. My survey of content addresses the questions of who says what to 
whom and how, which are precisely those questions which Babbie (2001) brackets for 
content analysis. I also address the question why,67  but not through analysis of the 
meaning of texts, instead focusing on how texts relate to sources. 
Data Collection 
The survey of content drew on two forms of data: rundowns and scripts. The 
rundown is the director’s list of elements that go into a bulletin, of which stories are only 
one element (see Appendix 3, p. 487, for an example with coding). The rundown is the 
working ‘menu’ that represents the bulletin. The script contained the voiced content of a 
story, as well as instructions to technicians about keying in overlay that would identify 
story elements such as the ‘slug’68 and ‘super’ and identify any speakers within the story 
(see Appendix 3 for an example with coding). I collected the scripts rather than the on air 
versions of stories because this simplified the process of data collection, coding and 
analysis. 
In order to get a representative sample of rundowns and scripts, I used the method 
recommended by Anders Hansen (1996 p. 134) of one whole week of programming 
followed by seven consecutive days of the week, one day per week, covering eight 
consecutive weeks. I used a version of this procedure either side of the May 3, 2004 
relaunch, mirroring the first set of data with the second, rather than repeating the 
procedure. That is, I reversed the procedure for the second set of data, finishing with the 
                                                 
67 Depending on what Babbie (2001) means by “why”, no doubt content analysis can address this question. 
However, as I have noted already, Cottle (Undated) cautions against an “illicit leap from a critical reading 
of media content to inferences and about motivations or explanations accounting for this output” (p. 45). 
68 The ‘slug’ is a single line of text summarizing the story. It is keyed as overlay to a story during the first 
few seconds of the visual element, following the anchor’s lead in. The ‘super’ is one or two words of text 
super-imposed at the bottom of a ‘shoulder box’ that appears to the top right of the anchor (from the 
viewer’s point of view) during the anchor’s introduction of the story. The ‘shoulder box’ is a box that 
contains a still taken from the story’s visuals and designed to summarize the story 
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seven consecutive days of data. This made the distribution of dates equidistant from the 
middle point, May 3, 2004, the relaunch date. The dates for which I collected data were 
Feb 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16, 24, March 3, 11, 19, 27 and June 9, 17, 25, July 3, 11, 19, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, August 1, 2, 3. I started with February 1 because I wanted the data to be 
inside the one year of keeping a diary, which also began on February 1. In addition, I 
wanted to distance as far as possible the data sample from the relaunch date, since I 
wanted to allow as much as possible for the possibility that in the immediate run up to 
and aftermath of the relaunch, the newsroom would be at its least representative in terms 
of the normal rhythms of news making. 
I collected rundowns for two bulletins, 1200 and 2400, and coded scripts for one 
bulletin, 1200. The choice of rundowns for two bulletins was to test whether the average 
bulletin changed during the day, as the news cycle moved its focus from China, reflected 
in the 2400 bulletin, to the wider world, reflected in the 1200 bulletin, which one might 
hypothesize would include a greater proportion of stories from daytime in Africa, Europe 
and the Americas when it was overnight and early morning in the PRC. 
I coded the rundowns for both sets of bulletins, since any shift in focus due to the 
changing news cycle in any twenty-four hour period would be evident from the source of 
the news, which was an element manifest in the rundown (see Appendix 3, p. 488). To 
test for changes pre- and post-relaunch I coded the scripts of the 1200 bulletin (see 
Appendix 3, p. 489 for an example). Twenty-eight rundowns were collected for coding: 
fourteen for the 1200 bulletin and fourteen for the 2400 bulletin. Five hundred and 
nineteen scripts were collected from the 1200 bulletin pre- and post-relaunch. 
A problem emerged at this point with respect to comparing the scripts pre- and 
post-relaunch. Management added to the post-relaunch 1200 bulletin a short block of 
sporting news prepared by the sports department. That block would go into the bulletin 
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regardless of the merits of the stories. Although the segment only included two to three 
short stories each bulletin, preliminary analysis suggested that the inclusion of these 
sporting stories into the coded sample would skew several of the coding categories, in 
particular place, when comparison was made with the pre-relaunch 1200 bulletin, which 
did not have any special segments. The reason was that sports stories often involved 
multiple places, since each player in any game or tournament was named and their 
country of original given. 
To control for this problem, I removed from the coded sample all stories for 
which the sports department was responsible, leaving in the bulletin only stories the 
zhubian considered of merit. Pre-relaunch, this removed two stories from the 1200 
bulletin population, reducing the sample from 242 to 240 scripts, a loss of less than one 
percent. Post-relaunch, thirty-four stories were removed from the 1200 bulletin, reducing 
the sample from 268 to 234 or by thirteen percent (Table 1). 
 
Perhaps thirteen percent was high. However, I reasoned that as only one source 
category (sport) was affected while rendering possible the comparison I wished to make 
of the 1200 bulletins pre- and post-relaunch in terms of all other categories, the loss of 
precision69 in terms of the aggregate of elements that constituted a bulletin seemed to be 
                                                 
69 By precision, I am adapting Babbie’s (2001) definition that it “concerns the fineness of distinctions made 
between the attributes that compose a variable” (p. 140) treating the bulletin as a variable and the elements 
that make it up as attributes. 
 Table 1: Stories collected and used for comparison (source: CCTV-9) 
1200 Bulletin Pre-relaunch Post-relaunch Total
Sport included 242 268 510 
Sport excluded 240 234 474 
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an acceptable trade-off. Nevertheless in the presentation of the results of the survey of 
content in Chapter 11 the reader should keep in mind that the data have been manipulated 
for the sake of comparison and that the audience saw a slightly different bulletin than the 
statistics represent. 
That difference can be represented by comparing bulletins with and without 
inclusion of those stories for which the sports department was responsible. This 
comparison is shown in Table 3, a comparative breakdown of the bulletins according to 
their major components, a) news elements and b) filler, which are defined in Table 2. The 
ratios remain approximately the same, regardless of whether stories for which the sports 
department were responsible are included since filler associated with sport has also been 
excluded. The only noticeable difference is the loss of the thirty-four sports stories post-
relaunch. 
Table 3 also contains examples of the use of duration, rather than discrete counts. 
For all analysis of content where the variable could be measured by duration, I have used 
duration for analysis, since duration better reflects the overall distribution of story types 
and bulletin elements within a bulletin. For the sake of consistency all statistics relating 
to the bulletins have been generated from the sample that excluded stories generated by 
the sports department. Three different N values were used in the analysis where 
appropriate: N = 742 (Table 3, #5, #6 & #7); N (stories) = 474 (Table 3, #5) and N (filler) 
= 260 (Table 3, #7). 
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70 This kind of practice is typical (and not only in the PRC) of television news production, which is 
concerned to hide the production process behind the façade of authorship. Veteran war correspondent Peter 
Arnett pointed to this practice when he stated during the furor over the story for which CNN sacked him, 
the Tailwind incident which involved the alleged use of nerve gas by US special forces against defectors in 
Laos during the Vietnam War: “I contributed not one comma .... They gave me the list [of questions]. I 
asked [them]. The producers took the tape and I was gone. I was the face” (CJR, 1988). From my 
experience at NBC, where, for example, neither of the broadcaster’s Moscow-based correspondents 
covering the USSR during its collapse spoke Russian, Arnett’s description of his role (as on air narrator) in 
the story was one of the most honest statements I have ever read about news making. Unsurprisingly, after 
CNN retracted the story when its central premise remained unproven, Arnett was made the scapegoat for an 
industry which is deep in denial. Against this, some news makers have begun in recent years to 
acknowledge the production process. Reuters, for example, has begun to list a range of inputs into a story. 
On a typical example, ‘Dalai Lama calls for end to violence in Tibet’ (dateline: Beijing, March 18, 2008) 
by Chris Buckley and Lindsay Beck, Reuters acknowledged “Additional reporting by Benjamin Kang Lim 
and Guo Shipeng in Beijing, Jonathan Allen in Dharamsala, Marine Hass in Brussels, Paul Eckert in 
Washington and Francois Murphy in Paris; writing by John Chalmers; editing by Andrew Roche” (Buckley 
& Beck, 2008). The industry needs much more of this. 
71 Strictly speaking, in television jargon a ‘2-way’ happens when the anchor in the studio speaks by 
telephone or video link with someone off site. For the sake of simplifying my categories, I have included in 
the definition of 2-way in-studio interviews with guests. 
Table 2: Definitions of story types and bulletin elements 
Story type or element Definition 
Copy story No video: Anchor on screen reading from a script produced 
by a writer or foreign expert. 
Take story Includes video or graphics: Written by writers or foreign 
experts. Entire story read by anchor, with video or graphic 
overlay following the introduction. 
Story (writer or reporter) Include video: Produced by staff from source material (writer 
story) or as self cover (reporter story). Following anchor’s 
introduction, story narrated by other person, usually the writer 
or reporter, but in the case of writers who had not passed the 
in-house ‘voice over’ test required for staff who narrated 
stories, narrated by a third person, often a foreign expert, who 
would sign-off on the story, saying e.g. “John Jirik, CCTV”, 
giving the impression they were responsible for the story, 
when they had no role in its production.70 
2-way An exchange between the anchor and a person either in the 
studio, or off-site.71 
Filler All other elements of a bulletin: opening and closing credits; 
headlines, promotional spots; anchor’s sign off; weather (for a 





For the survey of content, two units of analysis were used. The first unit of 
analysis was the bulletin, represented by the rundowns. The second unit of analysis was 
the story, represented by the scripts. Table 4 shows the two units of analysis, the variables 
associated with the coding, the level of measurement associated with each variable and 
the depth or specificity of each variable as a function of content as manifest (specificity) 
or latent (depth), which I used to decide whether to test for inter-coder reliability (see 
below) 
As Babbie (2001) notes, latent content refers to the “underlying meaning” (p. 310) 
of texts whereas manifest content is the “visible, surface content” (p. 310). This 
difference is that associated with the difference between denotation (manifest content) 
and connotation (latent content) in structural linguistics (Barthes, 1972; Saussure, 1986). 
I was primarily concerned only with the visible, surface content, since this was the reality 
Table 3: 1200 Bulletin comparison of news elements & filler 
#  Pre-relaunch Post-relaunch 
 Bulletin 
Elements No. % 
Duration 




included    
1 Stories 242 63.4 5:11:15 74.6 268 64.1 5:17:17 74.9
2 2-ways 4 1.0 0:12:27 3.0 4 1.0 0:09:41 2.3
3 Filler 136 35.6 1:33:43 22.5 146 34.9 1:36:22 22.8
4 Total 382 100.0 6:57:25 100.0 418 100.0 7:03:20 100.0
     
 Sport 
excluded    
5 Stories 240 63.2 5:08:37 74.4 234 64.6 4:40:48 75.0
6 2-ways 4 1.1 0:12:27 3.0 4 1.1 0:09:41 2.6
7 Filler 136 35.8 1:33:43 22.6 124 34.3 1:23:46 22.4
8 Total 380 100.0 6:54:47 100.0 362 100.0 6:14:15 100.0
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(materiality) of the news and represented visible evidence of the choices news makers 
made from the range of available inputs. 
Content analysis will often treat the story as the unit of analysis, since the story is 
designed to appear as a seamless whole to the viewer. Although I take the story as the 
unit of analysis for scripts, what I focus on in analyzing the bulletin in terms of its 
constituent elements in relationship to the story is what the bulletin and the story are 
designed to hide from the viewer, their constructed character and the elements from 
which they are cobbled together. 
Against the news as the natural (the only possible, the true) representation of an 
objective reality, my use of content is designed to show news as the social construction of 
Table 4: Units of analysis, variables, measurement & depth 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Variable Measurement Depth or 
Specificity
Date (of bulletin) Nominal Manifest 
Time (1200 / 2400) Nominal Manifest 
Length (of bulletin) Ordinal Manifest 
a. Duration anchor on screen & speaking Ordinal Manifest 
b. Duration anchor not on screen but 
speaking 
Ordinal Manifest 
c. Duration story not voiced by anchor Ordinal Manifest 
Story duration (index of a., b., and c.) Ordinal Manifest 
Run (first / repeat) Nominal Manifest 
Department (responsible for story) Nominal Manifest 
Source (source material of story) Nominal Manifest 
Rundown 
Type (of story or bulletin element) Nominal Manifest 
Topic Nominal Latent 
Referred to Nominal Latent 
(de-facto) 
Speaks Nominal Latent 
(de-facto) 
Place Nominal Manifest 
Story 
Orientation Nominal Manifest 
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reality by situated agents embedded in the journalistic field who make strategic and 
tactical choices about each building block of the stories and bulletin as they put them 
together. In short, I am concerned with words, pictures, sounds and graphics as markers 
that distinguish the different building blocks of the news, not as markers that point to the 
seamless meaning often assumed in the narrativization of reality. 
All the elements of the rundown were manifest content, since the rundown 
functioned as a mapping of the bulletin. These elements were not tested for inter-coder 
reliability, since coding the rundown was an act of transcription.  Illustration 16 
(Appendix 3, p. 488) provides an example of that act. With respect to scripts, strictly 
speaking only the variable topic involved choice in meaning. However, I also treated 
referred to and who speaks as de-facto latent content, given the complexity of the 
categories derived from inductive coding (see below). In testing for inter-coder reliability 
on the variables referred to and who speaks, I was checking the degree of congruence in 
the meanings implied by the distribution and combination of the original fifty-nine 
variables into ten new variables that in effect were indexes constructed from the original 
variables. Therefore inter-coder reliability was not checking what the variables meant, 
but whether the indexes I had constructed were valid. 
The coding sheets for both the rundowns and the stories and definitions of the 
variables in terms of attributes which were used to make coding categories exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive are provided in Appendix 2. 
The definitions of the rundown elements are given in Table 4. The definitions of 
the categories coded from the scripts were as follows: 
Topic 
Topic referred to the overall meaning of the story, its point. I derived the 
categories for topic from an initial inductive coding of the 474 scripts in the 1200 
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bulletin, pre- and post-relaunch. Reading through the scripts, I listed what appeared to me 
to be a topic that I had not already encountered. The list produced twenty-three categories 
(see Table 5). I then collapsed these categories into nine for the purpose of developing a 
manageable and testable coding schema and with an eye to what as a former news 
producer seemed to me to be an intuitively comprehensive set of mutually exclusive 
categories (Table 5).72 Collapsing the original categories also involved the splitting of 
several of the original categories (Development, Environment, Judicial and Weather) and 
reallocating stories preliminarily coded to those categories to the new categories. An 
additional category ‘Other’ was included in the new categories to ensure that the test of 
inter-coder reliability (see below, p. 189) was exhaustive. The Topic coding sheet and 
definitions of the attributes of the variables are provided in Appendix 2 (p. 481). 
                                                 
72 Of some interest to me was the emergence of ‘security’ as a category of topic that refused to be reduced 
to politics. Clearly so-called terrorism and the acts of violence associated with it and concerns of states with 
this situation have taken on a life of their own, at least in media. 
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Following the test of inter-coder reliability (see p. 189), I collapsed politics and 
economics into political economy in recognition of the deep inter-penetration of the two 
in the PRC.73 I also collapsed crime and disaster into a single category for the sake of 
                                                 
73 See p. 424 for a footnote discussing what was lost in collapsing these two variables. 







































comparison, as the original inductive coding used to derive the categories indicated too 
few crime stories to warrant a separate category. Finally, the category ‘other’ was 
dispensed with, since it was only introduced to ensure that the inter-coder reliability test 
was exhaustive. The resulting categories that I used for topic were: crime & disaster, 
culture, history, nature & science, political economy, security and society. 
Referred to & who speaks 
For the categories of person(s) referred to and who speaks, I used the same 
variables and sets of attributes. Again, using the original population of 474 1200 News 
bulletin scripts, I coded inductively for what appeared to me to be a type of person or 
institution (understood as an agglomeration of persons) that had not been previously 
encountered. The original coding produced fifty-nine variables (see Appendix 2, p. 482), 
which I collapsed and redistributed into the following ten: 
• Business 
• Expert 








The attributes used to define the variables as exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
were included in the coding sheet, of which a copy is provided in Appendix 2 (p. 482). In 
the test of inter-coder reliability and in the coding of the sample (the population of 1200 
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CCTV News scripts: N = 474), each unique person and/or institution was counted once 
per story, no matter how many times they occurred in the story. The rationale for so 
doing was that in a given story multiple references to unique person and/or institution 
could logically only be the same person. 
Place 
In coding place in the scripts, rather than code for where a story took place, in 
order to code place as manifest content I coded for place(s) in the news. The difference 
can be illustrated with reference to the following story (‘Flu Controllable’, Illustration 2).  
Intuitively, this story appears to ‘take place’ in Cairo, since it refers to President 
Hu Jintao’s remarks, which were made in the Egyptian capital. However, on reflection 
did the story ‘take place’ there? What part of ‘Flu controllable’ happened where? It was a 
‘take’ story, which meant it was not reported from Cairo, but written in the CCTV-9 
newsroom. In addition, this particular story had no moving video, only a still picture of a 
meeting of President Hu, which was not the meeting with journalists referred to in the 
script, but apparently a meeting with Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak, although that can 
only be inferred from the still picture in the context of the story. So the shoulder box 
shows a meeting in one place while the script refers to a different meeting in another 
 
[Super] FLU CONTROLLABLE 
[Slug] Chinese govt. confident of bird flu controls 
[Lead in] Hello, and welcome to CCTV News. I’m Xin Hui, in Beijing. Chinese 
President Hu Jintao, who is in Cairo on a state visit, has stated his government’s 
confidence in authorities’ ability to control bird flu. He made the remarks while meeting 
media on Saturday in Cairo. (TAKE GRAPHICS) Hu Jintao says the government has 
taken a series of measures to control the bird flu in China. He stressed the government 
has the capability to solve the problem and prevent transfer from animals to persons.  He 
promised that the government will to do its utmost to protect people’s health. (OUT) 
Illustration 2: Script for ‘Flu Controllable,’ aired February 1, 2004 
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place. In addition, the script also refers to measures the government in the PRC has taken 
to control bird flu in the PRC. So, where does this story take place: Cairo, the PRC, 
somewhere else? And how should it be coded? 
However the question of ‘place’ in ‘Flu controllable,’ only presents a problem if 
the researcher is dealing with the latent content of the story and attempting to answer 
where the story, understood as a seamless whole, occurred. My emphasis on manifest 
content and its importance for understanding the constructed character of news allowed 
me to sidestep the problems associated with this approach. I coded for the markers of 
place rather than for the meaning of the markers. In short, for place I coded the above 
script as: a) Cairo and b) PRC since Cairo and China were the markers of place 
mentioned in the story. 
From place, regardless of type (rural, village, county, town, city, province (state), 
country), I was able to build an index of countries and regions in the news. In coding for 
place, markers of place were transcribed directly from scripts onto the Excel spreadsheet 
used for analysis (see Appendix 2, (p. 486) for a screenshot of the spreadsheet). The 
indices of place used in analysis in Chapter 11: Content – province (municipality), 
country and region – were derived from manipulation of the data. 
Orientation 
The category of orientation was derived from place and as such was manifest 
content. Orientation was coded as a) domestic, b) foreign policy or c) foreign in line with 
Chang & Chen’s (1998) recognition that PRC news presents a significantly different 
perspective on events and issues depending on orientation. I also included Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan as separate categories of orientation, given the special status of Hong 
Kong and Macao as Special Administrative Regions (SARs) within the PRC under the 
‘one country, two systems’ formula and the ambiguity of Taiwan’s de-facto status as an 
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entity separate from the PRC, but not a foreign country. The categories for orientation 
were defined as follows: 
1. Domestic (Only places inside the PRC, but not Hong Kong and/or Macao, were 
mentioned in the script. Alternately, no places at all were mentioned in the script, 
which defaulted to Beijing, since such stories were invariably about governance in 
the PRC.) 
2. Foreign Policy (At least one Domestic place or Hong Kong or Macao and one 
place that was neither the PRC nor in the PRC (including Hong Kong or Macao), 
nor Taiwan or in Taiwan were mentioned in the same script. In the example of 
coding, in ‘Muslim Festival’ (Appendix 3, p. 489) Orientation was coded Foreign 
Policy because at least Saudi Arabia and China (PRC) were mentioned) 
3. Foreign (no PRC (including Hong Kong or Macao) nor Taiwan place was 
mentioned in the script. But at least one other place was mentioned.) 
4. Taiwan (Any mention of a Taiwan place, regardless of any other entity mentioned 
was coded as Taiwan.) 
5. Hong Kong and/or Macao (Only mentions of Hong Kong and/or Macao were 
made in the script.) 
Test for inter-coder reliability 
Two coders independently blind coded a five percent stratified random sample of 
the story types – copy, take, (writer or reporter) story – of the 1200 scripts, pre- and post-
relaunch, coding for a) topic, b) referred to and c) who speaks. The operationalization of 
the three categories coded to ensure comprehensiveness and mutual exclusivity is 
outlined in Appendix 2 (topic – p. 481; referred to & who speaks – p.  482). The fourth 
story type, 2-way, was not included in the test of inter-coder reliability, as I did not have 
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transcripts for this story type. I chose a stratified random sample rather than a random 
sample in order to get a representative sample of news from a) pre- and post-relaunch 
bulletins and b) from the three story types for which I had scripts: copy, take and (writer 
or reporter) story. 
Using the story as the unity of analysis, Table 6 shows the number of scripts 
allocated to each story type in the stratified random sample. The scripts used for the inter-
coder reliability test are provided in Appendix 4 (p. 490). 
The test of inter-coder reliability used was that described in Holsti (1969), which 
defines reliability in terms of “the ratio of coding agreements to the total number of 
coding decisions” ( p. 140), using the formula Inter-coder Reliability = 2M/(N1+N2), 
where M is “the number of coding decisions on which the two judges are in agreement, 
and N1 and N2 refer to the number of coding decisions made by judges 1 and 2, 
respectively” ( p. 140). Although this test has been criticized for not accounting for 
chance, as Holsti (1969 p. 140) notes agreement by chance alone should decrease as the 
number of categories increases. Given that the two coders were working with ten 
categories for all three tests (topic, referred to and who speaks), the possibility of 
agreement by chance was minimal. The test and its results are provided in Appendix 5, 
(p. 548). Inter-coder reliability was as follows: 
• Topic = 0.75 
Table 6: Number of stories of each type used in random stratified sample 
 Pre-relaunch  Post-relaunch  
Story Type No. 5% Sample Sample No. 5% Sample Sample 
Copy 26 1.3 1 21 1.1 1 
Take 108 5.4 6 114 5.8 6 
Story 106 5.3 5 99 5.0 5 
Total 240 12.0 12 234 11.9 12 
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• Referred to = 0.79 
• Who speaks = 0.72 
Write-up 
The survey of content has been presented as Chapter 11. I have presented the 
survey of content as a discrete chapter and the final data chapter, because output provides 
evidence of the news making process discussed in preceding chapters and opens the way 
to the concluding chapter, which discusses how content and production are related. 
Drawbacks to the method of surveying content 
The key potential criticism I feel I should answer about the way I have treated 
content is that I have ignored the audiovisual elements of the stories. In other words I 
ignored the television component of the content, since this is what one sees and hears on 
screen, in favor of analyzing the form (the different elements that go into a news bulletin) 
that content took. However, in so far as I am seeking to explain why what appears on air 
does so, I believe that by focusing on form rather than content I have correctly oriented 
myself towards identifying the range of forces at work that shape content. I am not 
concerned to understand what the audience might have made of what they saw, which is 
designed to appear as a seamless representation that hides the character of its 
construction. Rather, I am concerned to show how the surface of television betrays what 
it attempts to hide. 
ACCESS 
There were two levels of access in this study: formal and informal. CCTV-9 
management gave me permission to do this research, and the permission was included in 
the original IRB authorization (see below) for this study. However, formal access was 
only the first step in gaining the confidence of my colleagues in the newsroom and 
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getting them to open up to me about the news making process. Although I had worked at 
CCTV in the past, as already noted I was not able to establish good relations with all of 
my colleagues. As a result, as I have already acknowledged, my interview sample was 
biased towards people with whom I had good relations. I have attempted to account for 
this bias in my analysis and have relied on triangulation to mitigate its effects as much as 
possible. In addition, I cannot discount that my observation of my colleagues’ work was 
not biased in the conclusions I drew depending on the quality of the relationship with the 
person with whom I was inter-acting. Again, triangulation provided the best defense 
against bias in observation developing into bias in general. 
IRB & THE ISSUE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 
Because this study involved human subjects, I required IRB approval to go ahead. 
Permission to do the study was received from CCTV. This permission was included with 
the original IRB proposal, which also included the required consent forms (see Appendix 
6). Because of the sensitive character of the interview data I was dealing with and 
because of my concern not to leave any kind of paper trail linking my work to my 
interlocutors, IRB granted waiver of informed consent for observation and waiver of 
documentation of consent for interviews. 
Before each interview, the interviewee was given the consent forms in English 
and Chinese. In the filing data for the interviews, each interviewee’s name was assigned a 
randomly generated three digit number, which was the only identifying mark printed on 
the cassette used to tape the interview. The number was also used to identify the 
transcripts, which ensured that the transcripts were anonymous. Nobody but I had access 
to the number key to the names, which I kept in an encrypted file. 
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IRB consent to the research protocol was obtained for the period May 30, 2003 to 
May 30, 2004. The original consent was extended three times, each time for one year. 
The protocol was closed on April 22, 2007. 
In undertaking this research, my paramount concern was for the people at 
CCTV-9 with whom I was working. Given the unpredictable character of the future of 
media reform in the PRC, I have taken a range of precautions to protect my former 
colleagues. Nobody is identified by name in this research, unless their name was already 
part of the public record. However, even when a person was part of the public record, I 
have only named them with respect to that record. At all other times, they appear in this 
dissertation without name. In addition, I have also made anonymous certain persons 
whose names are on the public record. I did so in order to not draw attention to a person, 
when it was not the person that was the focus of my analysis, but their actions in the 
situation or context with which their name was associated. 
One final caveat with respect to participant observation and the issue of human 
subjects is the question of secrecy. Should a researcher identify themselves as such? The 
literature (Babbie, 2001, pp. 278-279; Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 1999, pp. 
372-373) gives a range of answers as to the question of researcher anonymity, arguing in 
some cases that deception can be justified if it “will not be harmful to the participants in 
the research” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 90), while others maintain “that there is 
never any justification for covert observation” (Deacon, Pickering, Golding, & Murdock, 
1999, pp. 272-373) and that it is both “wrong and unnecessary” (Deacon, Pickering, 
Golding, & Murdock, 1999, p. 373). 
I conducted all my research openly at CCTV, not attempting to conceal anything, 
and my colleagues would occasionally joke that I was a spy as they watched me 
gathering data. Whenever my colleagues asked me what I was doing during data 
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collection, I was open and honest in answering. When my colleagues asked about my 
progress, I informed them of the state of my research, including data collected, analysis 
and findings. 
PROBLEMS WITH THE RESEARCH 
Language 
Although I was working in an English-language newsroom, and the editorial and 
managerial staff all spoke English, much of the newsroom talk was in Chinese. Although 
I speak some Chinese, my level was not sufficient to follow natural Chinese banter and 
conversations between Chinese or to conduct more than a minimum of the research in 
Chinese. I took a twelve-week immersion course in Mandarin on my arrival in Beijing. In 
addition, I retained a private tutor following the end of the immersion course. During the 
data gathering process, I was able to conduct simple conversations in Chinese. However 
my level of listening comprehension was not to the point that I could clearly understand 
what e.g. television and radio were saying, although if I was party to a conversation, I 
was usually able to understand what was going on, and make myself understood. By the 
time I was doing the analysis and write-up my reading was to the point where (as noted, 
see p. 174) I was able to do all the translations for the materials I used in the dissertation. 
However, I must acknowledge that language remained a barrier that has affected 
the quality of the observations. In particular, the meetings of the committee to plan the 
relaunch (see p. 214) were conducted in Chinese, and I simply did not understand much 
of what was being said. Although I made a point of speaking to other committee 
members after the meetings, I believe my access to the data available at those meetings 
was severely compromised. 
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Guanxi 
I have already discussed the issue of ‘guanxi’ and its implications for who opened 
up to me, whether in interviews, or in the general collegiality of the news making 
process. As a result, I must acknowledge that the potential for bias exists in my 
interviews and observation and as a result in my analysis. 
Personal attitude to news making 
I must acknowledge a personal ambivalence about broadcast news, which affected 
how I saw CCTV-9. My first encounter with broadcast news making was in 1988, when I 
briefly worked at the US network CBS in Moscow as an assistant to the office manager 
during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit of May 1988. Later, between 1990 and 1992, I 
worked with the US network NBC, again in Moscow. Dissatisfaction with the stereotypes 
and superficiality that characterized CBS’s and NBC’s coverage of the Soviet Union and 
Russia led me to abandon broadcasting in favor of agency work with Reuters, beginning 
in 1992, in the hope that removing one layer of the production process would bring me 
closer to ‘the story’ since Reuters supplied much of what NBC put to air.74 In the long 
run, I found Reuters hardly less one-dimensional, although I loved the process (and still 
do) at both broadcasters and agency of “putting reality together” as Schlesinger (1987) 
has described it. 
My work at CCTV-9 was a return to broadcasting. In the meantime, I had come to 
the conclusion that broadcast news is a contradiction in terms. To my mind, news makers 
have not yet learned how to use television to make news, except in the most superficial of 
ways. To my mind, in its current form the anchor and the journalist in television have 
                                                 
74 NBC’s coverage of the coup attempt against Gorbachev in August 1991 was a case in point. So 
disappointed was I by the manner in which NBC had covered the coup that I joined two friends, both of 
them experienced former Soviet journalists, and we edited a book, available at 
http://www.geocities.com/jjirik/, which attempted to tell a different story about the coup attempt, one in 
which the people in Moscow at the time might have actually recognized themselves and their roles. 
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become obstacles that stand between the audience and the story. However, while I 
believe that journalists – as people who have something to say about the world – could 
have an important role to play in television news (although most seem to play or are 
forced to play that role badly), what I dislike most about broadcasting and see no place 
for is the anchor, and the manner in which the role has come to dominate the news to the 
exclusion of the story. 
My antipathy to the role of the anchor is evident in the work that follows. I must 
acknowledge this and allow my readers to decide how much of an impact it had on the 
story that I tell. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
The methodological challenge for doing the research associated with this 
dissertation was finding a workable balance between deployable methods and necessary 
lacunae in a manner that would produce defensible data. Triangulation was probably the 
single most important methodological component of this research, since each of the 
methods deployed by themselves had deficiencies. In addition, my inability to operate in 
fluent Chinese was a further deficiency that required triangulation to deliver defensible 
results. Nevertheless the hope is that each of the strengths of the different methods has 
gone some way to mitigating the weaknesses of each of the others. 
Each of the four methods deployed – participant observation, interviews, analysis 
of documentation and the survey of content – added something to the overall picture I 
present below. But throughout the presentation, analysis and write-up of the data, I hope I 
have remained tentative where appropriate and avoided the problem of unjustified 
inference. I am confident that I have grounded my analysis in the data, and I am confident 
that my findings are valid. But I am also acutely aware of the responsibility that has come 
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with this research, since I was able to isolate a period within the development of CCTV-9 
that cannot be repeated. As a result, the research itself cannot be repeated. As a case 
study, this dissertation is unique. As an historical document, this dissertation only has 
value if I have succeeded in finding that balance I outlined above. Whether I have 
depends on whether what follows is a just account of my time at CCTV-9.  
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Chapter 7: The relaunch 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the changes associated with the relaunch of CCTV-9 as 
CCTV International on May 3rd, 2004 at 0400 Beijing time, when the channel formally 
switched from being “Your Window on China” to being “Your Window on China and the 
World.” According to CCTV-9 management, the order for the transformation came from 
within the highest level of the Party, the Standing Committee of the Politburo: “[The] top 
ideological boss, Li Changchun, made it very clear that CCTV should improve, CCTV 
International should in the two ways: to be more timely in news coverage, and also on the 
feature programming, to focus on economy and tourists” (interview with senior 
management).75 
The aspirations of the Party, SARFT and channel management were lofty, a 
complete overhaul that would provide another competitor in the rapidly expanding world 
of global English-language news services (including BBC-WS, CNN-I, Al-Jazeera 
International, Russia Today, France 24, and Iran Press TV). Moreover, a great deal of 
change of a kind did take place within the channel. New programs were launched and 
other programs dropped from the line up. Elements of the news editorial system were 
partially restructured. Personnel were shuffled. The channel was provided with a new 
news studio. The general news editorial and production room was moved from the 8th to 
the 2nd floor and re-equipped in a renovated space. The offices of sections remaining or 
                                                 
75 I have reproduced the spoken English of my interlocutors as they used it. No attempt has been made to 
rewrite quotes. My reason for so doing was to show the level of command of English at CCTV-9, which in 
my opinion was very high.  
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newly installed on the 8th floor of CCTV’s Beijing headquarter were renovated.76 The 
on-air graphics, including the virtual sets, were revamped. 
However, most of the programming was retained from the previous lineup despite 
the changes to studios, backdrops and on-air graphics. Moreover, changes to the editorial 
structure failed to achieve the goals set during planning of the relaunch. In particular an 
attempt to restructure the editorial system and institute an assignment desk at the heart of 
the news making system failed. In addition, most of the channel’s personnel remained in 
their previous positions, doing the same work. As a result, the outcomes of the relaunch 
were mixed. In some respects major changes took place. In other respects, little changed, 
even in some cases where more change was expected. 
In this chapter I analyze the process, successes and failures of the relaunch. 
Although I discuss non-news programming at length here, I include it because the 
relaunch was meant to inaugurate CCTV-9 as a news and news-oriented channel, with a 
shift away from ‘soft’ programming like the arts. However, it did not, although 
management claimed that after May 3, 2004 the channel had made substantial headway in 
acquiring the “basic qualities of an international news channel.” What did change was the 
discursive construction of what CCTV-9 should be, allowing management the above 
claim, while barely adjusting its output (i.e. what the audience saw, which I deal with 
extensively in Chapter 11). 
In terms of the theoretical schema outlined in the introduction and discussed in 
Chapter 5, the process of the relaunch provided a unique opportunity to analyze the 
negotiation of power and the manner in which the journalistic field in which CCTV-9 
was embedded was shaped not only by the political institutions that enabled and 
                                                 
76 Features was located in offices that CCTV rented in a building adjacent to CCTV. Their offices were not 
renovated. 
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constrained it from above, but also by the agency of journalists and media managers, 
embedded in habitus characterized as much by the arts of resistance as by a disposition to 
obey. Against any assumption that media are relatively helpless to determine the 
trajectory of their development, an analysis of the May 2004 relaunch at CCTV-9 paints a 
picture of entrenched interests, which resisted external attempts to impose change. 
The chapter begins with a comparison of programming pre- and post-relaunch. It 
then looks at the planning process of the relaunch, including internal negotiation and 
plans for partnership with external institutions such as Xinhua and China Radio 
International. As the planning process proceeded I analyze the adjustments management 
made to the original blueprint for the relaunch and the challenge for editorial that the shift 
to a rolling news channel entailed. Finally, I look at the manner in which the relaunch 
impacted on editorial control. As the focus of this dissertation is the news system at 
CCTV-9, this chapter is the only one that deals at length with non-news programming. I 
deal with news content in Chapter 11. 
The research question addressed in this chapter was: 
• How do media institutions such as CCTV negotiate their overall relationship with 
the Party and government? 
From this question, two intermediate questions followed, leading to a number of 
specific questions: 
o What are CCTV-9 and CCTV International? 
 What programming characterized the channel pre- and post-
relaunch? 
 What was the relationship between the news and feature 
programming at CCTV-9? 
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o How did CCTV-9 negotiate the demand to relaunch CCTV-9 as CCTV 
International? 
 What demands for change were put on the channel? 
 How did management negotiate these demands? 
 What were the guidelines for the relaunch? 
 What was the planning process for the relaunch? 
 What were the external constraints on the relaunch? 
 What editorial changes were envisaged with the relaunch? 
 What was the outcome of the relaunch in terms of changes internal 
to the channel 
 What was the outcome of the relaunch in terms of change visible to 
the audience? 
 To what degree and why did the planning process depart (if at all) 
from the guidelines during the planning process? 
THE PROGRAMMING PRE- AND POST-RELAUNCH 
I begin this analysis with programming, i.e. the outcome of the production 
process. Other starting points are possible – an analysis of management, content, etc. 
However, in so far as television is a product made for consumption, what is consumed, 
programming, is an appropriate starting point for an analysis of the relaunch. As this 
dissertation deals only contingently with the audience, I do not address the argument that 
Dallas Smythe (1977) raised within political economy that the audience rather than 
programming is better understood as the product of television (for a discussion of the 
argument, see Mosco (1996)). Rather, as I show below (see e.g. p. 209 & p. 212), the 
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audience occupied an ambivalent position at CCTV-9, utilized primarily in the discursive 
strategies management and program makers deployed to justify decisions. 
Schedules are an indicator of programming. Table 7 (p. 204) shows the weekly 
24-hour schedule for CCTV-9 pre-relaunch. Table 8 (p. 205) shows the weekly 24-hour 
schedule for CCTV International post-relaunch. Both tables have been shaded to show 
the four six-hour blocks of programming the channel used both pre- and post-relaunch 
(for discussion of the programming blocks, see p. 306). Table 9 (p. 206) shows which 
programs belonged to which production sections. CCTV-9 has two major production 
sections: News & Current Affairs and Features. Within news, the general news section, 
which was responsible for CCTV News and World Wide Watch, was separate from the 
specialist news and current affairs sections, which were produced by teams associated 
with particular programs (see Figure 2, p. 208). 
Although I do not intend to discuss in later chapters the content of the 
programming apart from that provided by the general news section and reporting group, 
Appendix 7 provides a brief description of each program, pre- and post-relaunch, taken 
from promotional materials produced by the channel.77 
Figure 1 (p. 207) shows the schedules (Table 7 & Table 8) broken down into 
hours of on-air content per week associated with each production section. Combined, 
they were responsible for 168 hours (7x24) of weekly programming. By ‘responsible’ I 
do not mean produced, since production implies the making of programming. CCTV-9 
relied heavily on repeat programming to fill the daily 24-hour cycle (for more on the use 
of repeat stories, see p. 319 & p. 406). I reserve the term ‘produce’ for programming 
made by the responsible department. Prior to the relaunch News & Current Affairs 
                                                 
77 I chose to use the channel’s own words to describe its programs rather than mine, as I paid little attention 
to programming apart from general news and within Current Affairs, World Insight, which I was invited to 
take a special interest in (see p.x) 
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programming constituted 99 hours (59%) of the weekly programming, with Features 
taking up 62 hours (37%). The two production houses were responsible for seven hours 
(4%).78 
After the relaunch, News & Current Affairs occupied 110.5 hours (66%) of the 
weekly programming. That taken up by Features fell from 62 hours to 53 hours, a 15% 
decrease. Although Table 9 and Figure 1 point to the degree of similarity in programming 
before and after the relaunch, Figure 1 does indicate a 12% increase in the hours of News 
& Current Affairs. 
                                                 
78 Although Shanghai TV is a broadcaster, it was also a ‘supplier’ to CCTV. Therefore, I have treated it as 
a production house for the sake of simplifying tables and comparisons. 
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Table 7: Schedule of CCTV-9 before May 2004 relaunch 
 Monday – Friday Saturday * Sunday * 
04:00 News Asia   
04:15 Sports Scene   
04:30 Centre Stage   
05:00 CCTV News   
05:30 Nature & Science 
05:55 Chinese Civilization  
World Insight  China Today  
06:00 Biz China  Financial Review 
06:30 Around China   
07:00 News Asia   
07:15 Learn to Speak Chinese   
07:30 Dialogue   
08:00 CCTV News   
08:30 Documentary   
09:00 Culture Express   
09:30 Dialogue (Mon.) 
Travelogue (Tue., Thu.) 
Rediscovering Chine (Wen. Fri.) 
Travelogue China This Week 
10:00 CCTV News   
10:30 Centre Stage   
11:00 Biz China Financial Review Business Guide 
11:30 Nature & Science 
11:55 Chinese Civilization 
World Insight China Today 
12:00 CCTV News   
12:30 Around China   
13:00 CCTV News   
13:30 Dialogue   
14:00 Biz China Financial Review Business Guide 
14:30 Documentary   
15:00 CCTV News   
15:30 Dialogue (Mon.) 
Travelogue (Tue.,Thu.) 
Rediscovering China (Wed.,Fri.) 
Travelogue China This Week 
16:00 Culture Express   
16:30 Centre Stage   
17:00 CCTV News   
17:30 Nature & Science 
17:55 Chinese Civilization 
World Insight China Today 
18:00 Shanghai Today   
18:15 Learn to Speak Chinese   
18:30 Around China   
19:00 World Wide Watch   
19:30 Dialogue   
20:00 Culture Express   
20:30 Documentary   
21:00 Biz China Financial Review Business Guide 
21:30 Dialogue (Mon.) 
Travelogue (Tue., Thu.) 
Rediscovering China (Wed., Fri.) 
Travelogue China This Week 
22:00 CCTV News   
22:30 Centre Stage   
23:00 Sports Scene   
23:15 Learn to Speak Chinese   
23:30 Nature & Science 
23:55 Chinese Civilization 
World Insight China Today 
00:00 CCTV News   
00:30 Around China   
01:00 Biz China Financial Review Business Guide 
01:30 Dialogue   
02:00 Culture Express   
02:30 Documentary   
03:00 CCTV News   
03:30 Dialogue (Mon.) 
Travelogue (Tue, Thu.) 
Rediscovering China (Wed., Fri.) 
Travelogue China This Week 
* A blank in the Saturday or Sunday column indicates the same program was on in this timeslot as during Monday – Friday. 
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Table 8: Schedule of CCTV International after May 2004 relaunch 
Time Monday – Friday Saturday * Sunday * 
04:00 CCTV News   
04:30 Documentary   
05:00 News Updates  
05:15 Sports Scene  
Sports Weekend 
05:30 Nature & Science 
05:55 Chinese Civilization ** 
Centre Stage Centre Stage 
06:00 Biz China   
06:30 Around China World Insight China This Week 
07:00 Asia Today   
07:30 Dialogue   
08:00 World Wide Watch   
08:30 Culture Express   
09:00 News Updates   
09:15 Learn to Speak Chinese  
09:30 Rediscovering China (Mon., Wed., Fri.) 
Travelogue (Tue., Thu., Sat.) 
 
Up Close 
10:00 News Updates  
10:15 Sports Scene  
Sports Weekend 
10:30 Documentary   
11:00 Biz China   
11:30 Nature & Science 
11:55 Chinese Civilization 
Centre Stage Centre Stage 
12:00 CCTV News   
12:30 Around China World Insight China This Week 
13:00 CCTV News   
13:30 Dialogue   
14:00 Biz China   
14:30 Culture Express   
15:00 News Updates   
15:15 Learn to Speak Chinese  
15:30 Rediscovering China (Mon., Wed., Fri.) 
Travelogue (Tue., Thu., Sat.) 
 
Up Close 
16:00 News Updates  
16:15 Sports Scene  
Sports Weekend 
16:30 Documentary   
17:00 CCTV News   
17:30 Nature & Science 
17:55 Chinese Civilization 
Centre Stage  Centre Stage 
18:00 Biz China   
18:30 Around China World Insight China This Week 
19:00 World Wide Watch   
19:30 Dialogue   
20:00 Asia Today   
20:30 Culture Express   
21:00 CCTV News 
21:15 
CCTV News  
21:30 Rediscovering China (Mon., Wed., Fri.) 
Travelogue (Tue., Thu., Sat.) 
 
Up Close 
22:00 Biz China   
22:30 Documentary   
23:00 News Updates  
23:15 Sports Scene  
Sports Weekend 
23:30 Nature & Science 
23:55 Chinese Civilization 
Centre Stage Centre Stage 
00:00 CCTV News   
00:30 Around China World Insight China This Week 
01:00 Biz China   
01:30 Dialogue   
02:00 Asia Today   
02:30 Culture Express   
03:00 News Updates   
03:15 Learn to Speak Chinese  
03:30 Rediscovering China (Mon., Wed., Fri.) 
Travelogue (Tue., Thu., Sat.) 
 
Up Close 
* A blank in the Saturday or Sunday column indicates the same program was on in this timeslot as during Monday – Friday. 
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Table 9: Section responsible for programs 
Section Pre-relaunch Post-relaunch 
   












































World Wide Watch 
Production House Learn to Speak Chinese 
Shanghai Today 




The number of hours weekly of news associated with each news section pre- and 
post-relaunch is shown in Figure 2. Within News, News Asia was dropped but was 
replaced by Asia Today, tripling the hours of Asian news. The amount of business news 
increased slightly, as the number of daily business news programs was increased from 
five to six. Two business programs, Business Guide and Financial Review, were dropped. 
                                                 
79 Weather is not included in Tables 7 & 8, as it was treated as part of the news broadcasts into which it 
was inserted. 
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But the weekday business show, Biz China, was expanded into the vacated ‘slots’ 
(times). The number of CCTV News bulletins was cut from ten to six daily. However 
one-and-three-quarter hours daily of News Updates were added. The result was a slight 
weekly increase of general news (CCTV News, News Updates and World Wide Watch) 
from 38.5 hours to 39.25 hours. Culture Express was moved from the top to the bottom of 
the hour in line with management’s desire to put hard news at the top of every hour. 
However its weekly programming remained at fourteen hours. China Today, one of two 
magazine style shows highlighting developments in the PRC, Hong Kong and Macao, 
was dropped. A studio discussion show, Dialogue, fell from sixteen to fourteen hours a 
week. Finally, in line with management’s desire to strengthen sports’ coverage ahead of 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics, sports news more than doubled, from 3.5 to eight hours a 
week. 
Minor changes were made to Features programming. Notably, the department 

























introduced a weekly studio guest show, Up Close, which was recorded before a live 
audience, a first for CCTV-9. Of the two programs delivered by production houses, 
Shanghai TV’s Shanghai Today was dropped, while Learn to Speak Chinese was 
retained. The number of programs on CCTV-9 remained the same at twenty-one pre- and 
post-relaunch (Table 9).80 Of the twenty-one, sixteen were the same show as prior to the 
relaunch. Of the remaining five, two (News Updates & Sports Weekend) were truncated 
or expanded versions of CCTV News and Sports Scene respectively. Two new shows 
were launched, Asia Today (News) and Up Close (Features). Weather was introduced 
and produced in association with the National Weather Station (中央气象台). 
                                                 
80 Management counted 19 post-relaunch (Jiang & Liu, 2004, p. 54). However this figure includes News 
Updates as part of CCTV news and Sports Weekend as part of Sports Scene. 
















































* China This Week
** World Wide Watch
 209
Substantial changes were made to the packaging of almost all of the programs, in 
both the News and Feature departments. Graphics were revamped, new ‘promos’ (short 
advertisements for shows that CCTV-9 inserted in programming breaks) made and in 
some case new computer-generated backdrops (video keys 81 ) were introduced for 
anchors. The general news section moved offices. The offices of specialist news 
programs were renovated. Finally, new sets were built in a revamped studio for CCTV 
News, News Updates, World Wide Watch, Biz China, Sports Scene, Asia Today and 
Dialogue. 
When the new look went to air, reaction was mixed. Writing in the August 2004 
issue of 电视研究 (Dianshi Yanjiu – TV Research), management hailed the relaunch as 
an almost unqualified success: 
On May 3, 2004 CCTV’s English Channel was relaunched with a completely new 
look … CCTV-9 has changed from being a news-oriented comprehensive channel 
to an English news channel. The number of reports on international topics has 
been increased, and international issues are being reported from China’s position 
and point of view. A rolling broadcast has been implemented for general news. 
Specialist news is prominent. In particular economic news, cultural news and 
sporting news have been strengthened ... (Jiang & Liu, 2004, p. 54) 
Jiang & Liu (2004) continue that the relaunch was well received by the audience. 
Over a thousand emails and telephone calls indicated overall satisfaction: “compared to 
the former channel, after the relaunch the lineup, the new sets, the performance of the 
anchors, etc. were seen as a marked improvement, imparting a fresh perspective” (p. 55). 
The only criticism of the relaunch appeared to come from a “number of viewers, [who] 
bluntly indicated that the rolling news needs to update more often, the anchors need to 
improve, stop fidgeting, pay more attention to their language and wardrobe, while the 
                                                 
81 Video keys and chroma keys allow for the substitution of background elements within a broadcast 
setting. World Insight used a video key set to blue. The anchor performed in front of an empty blue screen. 
However the audience saw a stylized globe revolving behind him with a giant monitor to his left on screen, 
neither of which existed in reality. 
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color scheme for the news sets needs further improvement” (p. 55). According to 
management, SARFT also welcomed the revamped channel: 
The SARFT is very pleased, very satisfied with our relaunch. 
Did they say why? 
The quality and the relaunch, we changed quite a lot of things, like the studio, the 
newsroom, the package, and the format, and also the overall design. 
But if SARFT and CCTV put on a public show of satisfaction with the relaunch, 
reaction within the channel was ambivalent. In its report after the relaunch, CCTV 
management listed the successes noted in the public document, providing more detail. 
However, present in the internal report, but missing from the public document was a key 
demand relating the relaunch to the goals for the channel set by Politburo member Li 
Changchun. 
The blueprint for the relaunch 
In the original blueprint for the relaunch, the Overseas Service Center (OSC) 
noted that in his directive dated September 16, 2003 (see p. 88), Li had indicated that “the 
objective [of the relaunch] is for CCTV-9 to become an internationally influential and 
competitive international news channel in line with China’s international status” (一个目
标是:把CCTV-9办成与中国国际地位相适应，具有国际影响力和竞争力的国际新闻
频道 ) (CCTV, 2003c). However, in its report following the relaunch, management 
concluded: 
[f]ollowing the relaunch CCTV-9 without doubt has acquired the basic qualities 
of an international news channel, but there is a considerable way to go for 
CCTV-9 “to become an internationally influential and competitive international 





路程 (CCTV, 2003a) 
However, if straightforward acknowledgement of shortcomings in the relaunch 
was typical of the stoic professionalism of CCTV-9’s senior management, both public 
and in-house reports after the relaunch glossed one salient dimension: the channel after 
the relaunch bore little resemblance to that envisaged in the first draft of the planning 
documents prepared before the relaunch. 
In its report dated October 10, 2003, prepared in response to Li Changchun’s 
September 16 directive and the September 22 visit to the channel by Xu Guangchun (see 
p. 88), at the time Director of SARFT and Deputy Head of the CPD, CCTV’s Overseas 
Service Center noted that among the “adjustments” called for was consideration: 
that all the programming [on CCTV-9] be news or news oriented; drop teaching 
and arts programming … 
(频道栏目设置全部为新闻和新闻性栏目，停办教学和文艺栏目) (CCTV, 
2003c). 
Although the OSC document qualifies the latter request, noting that events like 
the “China Pakistan Television week” or the “China France Year of Culture” were 
worthy of coverage as the OSC considered they had a news element, clearly radical 
change was on the agenda for CCTV-9. This is evident from the recommendations that 
the OSC drew up in response to the directives and tabled as guidelines for the relaunch. 
Among those recommendations, the OSC called for the following programs to be 
dropped (停办栏目) from the schedule: Centre Stage, Rediscovering China, Around 
China, China Today, Chinese Civilization, Learning Chinese, Financial Review, and 
Business Guide. However as already noted (see p. 206), of these, only China Today, 
Financial Review and Business Guide were missing from the revamped lineup, and all of 
these were news programs or news magazines. Post-relaunch, all of the educational and 
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arts programming was retained. In its report following the relaunch, management (CCTV, 
2003a) mounted a spirited defense explaining the change of direction: 
The point of a news channel is to first broadcast domestic and foreign news and 
then follow up with in depth analysis and report every aspect of a story. In the 
case of a big breaking story, stay with it for the interim, as for example the case 
was with our special reports on the Iraq War in 2003. But news like Iraq doesn’t 
happen every day. Putting the latest news at the top of the hour is enough for the 
viewer in most cases. Moreover, an audience watching a single channel won’t be 
satisfied only with news. They will have other demands. Therefore CCTV-9 has 
retained its documentary, feature and educational programming as they are 
absolutely necessary to enrich the channel as a whole, enliven the atmosphere of 









… if you want viewers to stick with CCTV-9, you have to have enough “bait” to 
attract them. China’s performing arts and their artistic enchantment are enough to 
conquer the Western audience. Programs highlighting China’s natural beauty and 
scenic spots, its local customs, food, even its character-based writing can win over 





… the emphasis on the channel’s character as “your window on China” is 
perfectly handled by our existing magazine programs like Travelogue, 
Documentary, Nature and Science, Rediscovering China, Around China, Chinese 
Civilization, etc. 
… 为了突显中国窗口的特色，精办已有的介绍中国的标志性栏目，如：
“旅游指南” (Travelogue), “纪录片” (Documentary), “自然与科学” (Nature 
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and Science)，“外国人看中国” (Rediscovering China)，“中国各地” (Around 
China) 和 “中华文明” (Chinese Civilization) 等。 
In the remainder of this chapter, I attempt to explain the process by which the 
relaunch was planned and carried out only to achieve almost the opposite in key respects 
of what was intended, yet still earn the praise of SARFT and by implication, the Party. 
PLANNING AND EXECUTING THE RELAUNCH 
In my time as a participant observer at the channel, I never doubted the 
commitment of the Controller to news or to his vision for the development of CCTV-9 as 
an international news channel. However, the Controller was only an element of 
management, and one of his deputies was also head of Features, suggesting that the latter 
department had a strong voice in management decisions. Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests that after initial hesitation as to whether the demands put on the channel were 
realizable, management collectively did attempt to transform CCTV-9 in the manner 
outlined in the OSC blueprint. However, management was only one, albeit the most 
powerful layer in a complex web of political, economic, institutional, professional and 
personal relationships that constituted daily life at the channel. 
From my discussion of Certeau’s (1984) analysis of the strategies and tactics of 
those more and less powerful within and between institutions, and the deployment of his 
analysis by Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu (2003) to account for resistance and bounded 
innovation in media reform in the PRC, clearly CCTV-9 was a contested site during the 
period leading up to the relaunch date. 
Management was sandwiched between the demands of the Party and SARFT and 
the willingness and ability of CCTV-9’s staff to meet those demands, as articulated by 
management. Moreover, unlike advertisement-driven and commercially profitable 
channels within the CCTV stable, although CCTV-9 did begin to carry some advertising 
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in January 2005, during the relaunch its budget was wholly provided from within the 
overall CCTV budget. As a result, budgetary constraints added further uncertainty to the 
development of the relaunch.82 
In addition, in so far as the blueprint envisaged a wide-ranging set of relationships 
with other powerful institutions within the PRC and international media systems, 
including Xinhua, China Radio International, Reuters and the Associated Press, much 
would also depend on how relationships were managed not only vertically from the top of 
the Party down to the lowest level within the production system at CCTV-9, but also 
horizontally with other media. Therefore, whether the blueprint would be followed 
depended as much on factors not under management’s control and on the willingness and 
ability of the rank and file staff to implement the blueprint, as it would on the wishes of 
the Party, SARFT and management at CCTV-9. 
To explain why the relaunch proceeded in the manner it did, I focus on the key 
institutions and persons involved in its planning: the Party and SARFT (as represented in 
the draft OSC blueprint); CCTV, including the OSC and CCTV-9 senior management; 
the relaunch planning committee (made up of CCTV-9 management, program producers, 
myself and the head of the foreign experts’ group); and a US-based consultant with 
considerable expertise in news production and management, whom News Corporation 
provided to CCTV-9 as part of its relationship with CCTV. My involvement in the 
planning of the relaunch was at the request of the CCTV-9 Controller. Given that my 
insight into the planning process began with the work of the relaunch planning 
committee, it is here, that I shall begin this discussion. 
                                                 
82 The CCTV-9 budget in 2005 was 100 million yuan (about 12 million USD). Beginning from January 
2005, CCTV-9 was permitted to carry advertisements at a maximum rate of four minutes per hour, but this 
did not cover costs. In addition, any advertising revenue from CCTV-9 did not go to the channel directly, 
but went to CCTV’s advertising department (source: CCTV Management). 
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Internal negotiation of the relaunch 
Management set up the committee in November 2003 to brainstorm issues 
associated with the relaunch. The committee first met on November 4, a Tuesday, at 
10.00am. This became its regular meeting day and time. Present at the meeting were 
CCTV-9 senior management, executive producers from News and Features and myself. 
The controller opened the meeting by tabling the above-noted blueprint prepared by the 
OSC. 
From the outset, the draft generated heated discussion, and from the side of 
Features, which was most radically affected by the relaunch, considerable consternation. 
Although it was only the first of several meetings, from the outset evidently the relaunch 
was going to prove a hard sell within the channel. 
In subsequent meetings (and more importantly, in discussions within management 
and between management and producers), both News and Features sought to establish the 
value of their programming to the channel in its current form. 
At stake was not only the existing programming, but more importantly, from the 
point of view of the personnel involved, their work. Should the relaunch go ahead 
according to the OSC blueprint, many in Features would be required to do an entirely 
different kind of work. Not only was most of the department’s existing programming 
facing the axe, but in line with the suggestion that all programming have a news 
orientation, Features was now being expected to move away from arts programming 
more towards magazine style programming with a news angle. 
According to one person in Features, the blueprint, once tabled, triggered “panic” 
within the department. Management and producers in Features held emergency meetings, 
the upshot of which was a decision that evolved over time to defend their department in 
its existing form, while revising implementation of the blueprint. 
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Beginning with the second planning meeting, Features began to lay out a series of 
reasons why the axing of their programming would be detrimental to the development of 
CCTV-9, and contrary to the spirit of the blueprint. In particular, their leadership argued 
that CCTV-9 could not provide a “window on China,” unless the arts programming and 
non-news magazine shows produced by Features were part of the lineup. 
Independently from the resistance to change within Features, resistance to any 
substantial change to the status quo also quickly gathered momentum within News & 
Current Affairs. The core of the relaunch was the demand to make all programming news 
or news-oriented. However, no clear provision was made within the blueprint for the 
extra staffing that would be required to run a rolling news service. Most of the extra work 
that the relaunch would levy on News & Current Affairs was to be met with existing staff 
levels, with little provision for additional compensation. 
Once program producers in News & Current Affairs understood that they would 
be expected to increase output without what they considered commensurate 
compensation, then they had little incentive to push strongly for the relaunch. This 
resistance resulted in staff in News & Current Affairs taking on few new responsibilities 
when the rolling news service was inaugurated on May 3, 2004. 
The potential for disruption to the status quo which the relaunch promised is 
obvious from the blueprint’s slate of axed, retained (and revamped), and new 
programming planned for the relaunch (Table 10, p. 217), and from the tentative daily 
rundown originally envisaged for CCTV International (Table 11, p. 218). Together these 
two tables indicate the direction in which management wanted to take the channel, and by 
comparison with Table 7 & Table 8 and Figure 1 & Figure 2, how little actually changed. 
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Of the ten planned new shows, three went ahead: Asia Today (News); People 
(Features) which went to air as Up Close; and Weather which was produced and 
packaged off-site and inserted as a short segment into News programming. 
 
Table 10: Planned changes to programming pre- & post-relaunch 
Retained Programs New Programs Axed Programs 
 
Biz China (N) 
CCTV News (N) 
Culture express (N) 
Dialogue (C) 
Documentary (F) 
Nature & Science (F) 
Sports Scene (N) 
Travelogue (F) 
World Wide Watch (N) 




News Digest (N) 
One World (F) 
On Location (F) 
People (F) 
Talk Biz (N) 
Weather (P) 
 
Around China (F) 
Business Guide (N) 
Center Stage (F) 
China Today (N) 
Chinese Civilization (F) 
Financial Review (N) 
Learning Chinese (P) 
Rediscovering China (F) 
Shanghai Today (P) 
(C) Current Affairs, (F) Features, (N) News, (P) Production House 
* The blueprint did not assign Many Voices to a particular department. 
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Table 11: Originally envisaged lineup for CCTV International 
0600 CCTV News 
0630 Culture Express 
0700 CCTV News 
0730 Dialogue 
0800 World Wide Watch (1 hour) 
0900 Globiz 
0930 Many Voices 
1000 CCTV News 
1030 Sports Scene 
1100 News Digest 
1130 On Location / One World 
1200 CCTV News 
1230 Travelogue / Nature & Science 




1500 CCTV News 
1530 Culture Express 
1600 Biz China 
1630 Sports Scene 
1700 CCTV News 
1730 On Location / One World 
1800 Asia Today 
1830 Many Voices 
1900 CCTV News 
1930 Dialogue 
2000 World Wide Watch (one hour) 
2100 Biz China 
2130 Culture Express 
2200 CCTV News 
2230 Sports Scene 
2300 Globiz (one hour) 
0000 CCTV News 
0030 On Location / One World 
0100 Asia Today 
0130 Dialogue 
0200 Biz China 
0230 Many Voices 
0300 CCTV News 
0330 Culture Express 
0400 Globiz 
0430 Sports Scene 
0500 CCTV News 
0530 Travelogue / Nature & Science 
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The shows that never got off the drawing board were (source: CCTV, 2003c): 
• Discovery (F): A lifestyle magazine that would feature foreign perspective on the 
PRC and Chinese perspective on other countries 
• One World (F): A news magazine that would look at the diversity of peoples 
around the world, with a special emphasis on developing countries 
• On Location (F): A reporter’s magazine 
• Globiz (N): A new show focusing on global business and finance 
• Talk Biz (N): A business discussion program 
• Many Voices: A studio discussion show with multiple guests (as many as four 
was the number given in discussion) 
• News Digest (N): A daily look at news in major newspapers, magazines, and 
online 
In asking why so many of the planned shows failed to materialize, from 
interviews, observation and discussion, the key problems were: 
• reluctance of management to let go of gains they had already made in 
programming 
• too few people and not enough time to carry out the design and implementation of 
the new programming, and re-orientation of existing programming 
• reluctance among staff to take on extra work, without what they considered 
adequate compensation 
The first of these problems related to an earlier revamp of the channel. The 
September 16, 2003 instruction to relaunch CCTV-9 came closely on the heels of 
changes introduced in May that year. Then, CCTV-9 had overhauled several of its 
programs and introduced new programs and program elements. Travelogue, Re-
discovering China and World Insight had all been lengthened from fifteen to thirty 
 220
minutes. In an excellent example of what Pan (2005) calls “bounded innovation,” 
management appointed foreigners as hosts of both Biz China and Culture Express, 
making them the first specialist news shows on CCTV-9 to feature non-PRC nationals as 
hosts (general news would following on November 11, 2003, when a Canadian became 
the first non-Chinese national to host the CCTV News, fronting the 2400 bulletin). 
Management was clear about the significance of the May revamp: 
Following more than three years of development, especially after this year’s 
revamp in May, CCTV-9 has already become one of the more successful channels 
worldwide for non-native English speaking countries. 
CCTV-9 经过三年多的发展，特别是今年5月改版以后已经成为全世界非母
语国家中较出色的英语频道。(CCTV, 2003c) 
Management’s conundrum with the demand to relaunch and re-orient the channel 
just as it was gaining momentum in the wake of a success revamp just months earlier 
made it less likely that management would resist resistance among staff to the blueprint. 
Expanding on the above problems, key issues staff were concerned about were: 
• too little time: exactly six months from the date of the first planning group 
meeting to the relaunch. 
• too much work: the relaunch was almost entirely an in-house project. 
Management expected themselves and staff to keep the existing 24-hour channel 
running up to the moment of the relaunch, while simultaneously planning and 
carrying out the design of eight new programs, and a new news studio and 
newsroom, even as existing facilities were being renovated around them as they 
kept working. 
• too few staff: management and staff regularly complained that they had “too few 
hands” to run the existing channel. When they were tasked with designing the 
relaunch and new programming, although personnel gritted their teeth and did a 
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huge amount of work to ensure the relaunch went ahead, the effort was exhausting 
and fed into a general sense within the channel that too much was being asked of 
staff, with too little incentive to justify the effort. 
• not enough incentive: staff at CCTV-9 were concerned about pay and conditions. 
Staff felt they were already putting in more than enough effort to justify their 
salaries. They had little incentive to do more for the same salary. 
These issues, coupled with management’s conundrum about the earlier revamp 
meant that for different reasons, management and staff were on the same side. 
External constraints on the relaunch 
Resistance to the relaunch was not only internal to the channel. Also damaging to 
the prospects for realization of the blueprint was the reluctance of external institutions to 
play the role allotted them. In particular, the OSC blueprint called for Xinhua and China 
Radio International (CRI) to play key roles in the development of CCTV International. In 
the September 16 directive, Li called for a transformation in the working style, not only 
of CCTV-9, but of the PRC’s major media that deal with external publicity. The details 
were provided in the blueprint: 
The transformation of style also means changing from CCTV’s current “one man 
army” style, to forming a “joint strike force” involving Xinhua, CRI and CCTV, a 
joint force for news reporting that would jointly forge a new image for China’s 




The blueprint issued by the OSC outlining its “recommendations” (考虑) for the 
relaunch called for the formation of cooperation agreements to broaden CCTV-9’s news-
gathering ability. The “initial conception” (初步设想) was as follows: 
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In any news program, use first person on the spot reports from the foreign 
correspondents of this channel, Xinhua and CRI, whether it is breaking news or an 
in-depth report. The most pressing issue is to find out which of these 
correspondents has the ability to report in English, and once that is known, they 
need to be trained in television. They need to be provided with video phones, 
digital cameras, etc. CCTV-9 must not be averse to using reports from Xinhua and 
CRI. On the contrary, we should publicize our cooperation with Xinhua and CRI 








The planned tie-up with Xinhua and CRI was ambitious and would have greatly 
extended CCTV-9’s foreign policy and foreign news nets. However, as the PRC’s 
premier news agency and an institution directly under the State Council, Xinhua had little 
to gain by partnering with a minor channel within the larger CCTV structure. At the same 
time, in the commercialized news environment that now predominates in the PRC, 
Xinhua undoubtedly sees CCTV as a competitor, regardless of the Party’s call for a “joint 
strike force” of the country’s major media. 
The plan to turn Xinhua’s and CRI’s foreign correspondents into multi-media 
reporters was also ambitious, too ambitious for the timeline envisaged in the relaunch, 
especially as most of them had no broadcast experience.83 It was not realistic to expect to 
identify, equip and train journalists, who themselves would have had little incentive to 
work for CCTV-9, between November 2003 and the relaunch in May 2004. Within 
                                                 
83 The kind of cooperation envisaged here is not impossible. When BBC World was launched, the BBC 
managed to turn its radio correspondents into television reporters. Conversely, when Reuters purchased 
Visnews as the platform on which to build Reuters Television, Reuters failed to turn its television news 
agency into a business broadcaster. I worked for Visnews at the time of the purchase and the resistance to 
plans to use its staff to service business television was palpable among staff, who saw themselves as ‘news’ 
people, and business news as almost a parody of ‘real’ news. 
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weeks of the first planning group meeting, any talk of involving Xinhua in the relaunch 
had ended, and the plans for the agency’s involvement were shelved. The case was much 
the same with CRI.84 
The blueprint also urged closer cooperation with foreign broadcasters: 
… invite reporters from foreign media with whom CCTV-9 has a relationship to 
be special correspondents, who can provide timely and objective reports on major 
news from their countries … 
聘用有合作关系的外国媒体记者为CCTV-9特约记者，在当地发生重大新闻
时能提供及时，客观的报道… (CCTV, 2003c) 
However, apart from a limited project (see p. 226) to use Reuters’ correspondents 
for live ‘phoners’85 on breaking stories, again the plans were not realized in the relaunch. 
In addition, the blueprint called for Shanghai TV to play an important role in the 
CCTV-9 operation, providing timely financial news from the PRC’s financial hub. 
However, Shanghai TV, which had provided a daily fifteen minutes news bulletin from 
the coastal city pre-relaunch, was missing from the rundown after the relaunch. 
According to people involved in the planning process, Shanghai TV had been 
reluctant to work too closely with CCTV-9 because they had their own plans for the 
future.86 Moreover, Shanghai TV was a limited option, with a news net that could serve at 
best the region that was home to the coastal city. Nevertheless, the loss of Shanghai TV 
was a serious blow for a channel, which has an extremely limited domestic news net (for 
more on this, see p. 417). 
                                                 
84 The BBC’s success in turning its radio correspondents into television reporters suggests that long term 
CRI may be a viable option for supplying CCTV-9 with news, and vice versa. But the bigger issue is that in 
the PRC, the major media see one another as competitors, not as potential partners. 
85 A ‘phoner’ is a report by telephone or telephone interview usually accompanied by video and a graphic, 
often a map showing the site, and a photograph and the name and title of the person speaking. 
86 Shanghai TV had been attempting to win SARFT approval for an English-language channel. That 
channel went to air on January 1, 2008. 
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In short, within a very short time after the planning process got under way, 
CCTV-9 had to face the reality that it could not rely on Shanghai TV, Xinhua, or CRI to 
provide reports. Li Changchun had envisaged a “joint strike force.” But in reality, 
CCTV-9 would continue to act as a lone soldier. 
Foreground our strengths, hide our weaknesses 
Faced with the realization that the planned external partnerships would not 
materialize, management called on staff to “foreground our strengths, hide our 
weaknesses” ( 还要扬长避短 ). 87  The onus to provide programming for CCTV 
International fell on the existing personnel and production departments within CCTV-9. 
Of the two options open to management, to force through the programming envisaged in 
the blueprint in the face of opposition from the production departments, or to change the 
blueprint to better reflect the possibilities of the existing channel, the latter option was not 
simply easier, it was both pragmatic and realistic. 
As the planning process proceeded, the blueprint was updated to reflect the 
changes management was making to accommodate the reality of the situation. In a 
revision tabled to the planning group as an appendix to the original, the changing 
parameters of the relaunch began to emerge. Three programs from Features on the 
original list of those facing the axe – Rediscovering China, Around China and Chinese 
Civilization – were moved to the list of programs to be retained. The rhetoric deployed by 
Features to defend its programs – that they were indispensable as a “window on China,” 
now entered the management discourse on development of the relaunch: 
                                                 
87 In Appendix 1 (discussed below) to the OSC blueprint, management writes 还要扬长补短 (“[We] must 
foreground our strengths, make up for our weaknesses”). The phrase either contains a typographical error, 
substituting the 5th character 补 (bu) for 避 (bi), which is how the traditional phrase is written, or it is a 
variation on the same theme. The idea was that CCTV-9 should make the best possible use of its existing 
resources, a major concession to the forces resisting change to the channel. 
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In order to emphasize the role [of the channel] as a “window on China,” the very 
popular Around China and Chinese Civilization should be retained as a daily 30 
minute block. 
The meticulously crafted audience favorites, Rediscovering China and 
Travelogue, will enable the channel to really become a window on China for the 
foreign audience. 
为了突显”中国窗口”的作用，要保留现在颇受欢迎的介绍中国的专题栏目”
中国各地”(AROUND CHINA), 与”中华文明”(CHINESE CIVILIZATION) 组
成一个日播 30 分钟的节目板块。 
精心制作观众反馈最多的”外国人看中国”(REDISCOVERING CHINA) 和”旅
游指南”(TRAVELOGUE), 使其真正成为外国观众了解中国的窗口。 
Moreover, of those programs still facing the axe, the language was softened, 
calling for elements of these programs to go into existing and news programs. “Elements” 
(部分内容) of Center Stage were to be “incorporated” (融入) in Culture Express. Those 
elements of Learning Chinese appropriate for teaching business and travel Chinese would 
be “incorporated” (融入) into Biz China and Travelogue. The “core content” (主要内容) 
of Financial Review and Business Guide would go into the weekend edition of Biz 
China. And elements of China Today and Shanghai Today would be incorporated in Asia 
Today (CCTV, 2003b). 
In the revised blueprint, management repeated its original recognition that 
CCTV-9 could not compete with the BBC-WS and CNN-I on big international stories, 
but should focus on its “relative strength” (比较优势) on the China and regional story 
and stories from developing countries. However, with the loss of Xinhua and CRI as 
possible sources for the foreign and foreign policy news, management increased the 
emphasis on using foreign and transnational media in an attempt to boost its story supply. 
In addition to the original plan for special reports from foreign journalists, 
management now planned to expand its relationship with video wholesalers Reuters and 
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Associated Press Television (APTN) and request special reports on breaking news from 
areas where CCTV-9 did not have representation. CCTV-9 approached Reuters, who 
made available its journalists worldwide for ‘phoners.’ However, as already noted and for 
reasons I discuss below (see p. 343), that initiative faltered soon after the relaunch. 
As the clock ticked down to the relaunch, the planning process stalled on the issue 
of programming. The meetings of the planning group shifted focus to other topics as it 
became increasingly clear that the most conservative plans for changes in programming 
were unlikely to be realized. Eventually management dropped its attempts to repackage 
elements of existing programs in the new programs originally envisaged, and the new 
programs were dropped in favor of the existing lineup. Of the ten planned new programs 
envisaged – Asia Today, Discovery, Globiz, Many Voices, News Digest, One World, On 
Location, People, Talk Biz and Weather – two were produced, Asia Today and Up Close 
(People). Weather was delivered already packaged. 
The new studio, sets and newsroom 
By early 2004, the possibility of transforming the channel in the manner outlined 
in the original blueprint had already been shelved. The focus of the planning group 
shifted away from programming to the design of the new news studio and sets, backdrops 
for other programs, graphics and personnel issues. 
When CCTV International went to air from its refurbished studio and new news 
set at 0400 on May 3, 2004 with a live half hour of CCTV News, the sets, the studio, the 
Master Control Room, the video and audio editing equipment, the newsroom, the news 
writing and editing computers, the anchors’ changing and makeup room, and the news 
editorial office were all new. Much had changed. 
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However, how much of the changes would have been visible to the viewer would 
have depended on how much attention one pays to the mise-en-scene of television, 
compared to how much attention one pays to the substance of what is being said and 
shown. A viewer would have seen a change in the back drop to the news anchor and 
different on-air graphics. Almost everything else on screen remained the same before and 
after the relaunch. 
The major changes associated with the relaunch were primarily internal and 
invisible to the viewer. As part of the relaunch, CCTV provided the channel with funds 
for remodeling its offices and News studio. The news editorial and writing sections were 
moved from the 8th floor to the 2nd floor into space vacated by CCTV’s “Western 
Region” channel.88 Other offices were refurbished. However, CCTV-9 did not have a 
budget for re-design, so much of the re-design was left to the CCTV Technical 
Department, which provides support services for all the channels. 
The new studio sets and the layout of the newsroom were designed in-house. The 
relaunch planning committee was actively involved in discussion of the new sets, and it 
would be wrong to single out any individual over the result, as the design supervisor was 
working with the input of the entire group. Nevertheless the final result fell short of 
expectations. Reaction among staff to the new facilities was mixed, but primarily 
negative. Because of problems with lighting, the new news studio provoked the most 
averse reaction: 
[Jirik] If you could change anything [associated with the relaunch] … what are 
the things you would change? 
                                                 
88 The “Western Region” channel was a failed attempt by SARFT, launched on May 12, 2002 and formally 
shut down on December 28, 2004, to use television to promote development in the PRC’s western regions 
(for details see Chen, 2006). 
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[anchor] I’d go straight for the studio with an axe… that’s what I would do... I 
think that’s a very sad thing that the people watching our program can’t see this 
very modern looking newsroom with so many people walking up and down, 
sitting at computers. They can’t see it in the background, like CNN has. And, I 
think that’s just tragic. 
[Jirik] What do you think of the new sets? The new on air look? 
[reporter] The anchor’s [backdrop] is really really bad. This is the worst thing I’ve 
ever seen in China. This reflects the old Cold War thinking, and centering China 
in the center. And making, this is not television, and making a map and the 
backdrop all resemblance of different continent, this is really really bad. I think 
China wants to make an international standard and open image, we should make a 
vague background, or even a China, Beijing’s background maybe, or whatever it 
is, but not that. 
When I asked management about the sets, they acknowledged problems and noted 
that the time frame had prevented better design: 
The new sets is done by CCTV designers, within CCTV actually. It was, it was a 
work of emergency actually, since we didn’t have much time to have more talks. 
At that time, before the relaunch we, we were totally occupied by the routine 
broadcasting at the same time we have to build, to have a brand new studio. We 
have to fight on two different fronts. 
Management also noted that plans were already afoot to replace the new news sets 
with a better design at the earliest possible opportunity. This was in fact done, but not 
before I left Beijing in December 2005. 
Reaction to the new newsroom was more positive: 
[copy editor] I really didn’t like it at first, and I think they could have given us 
somewhere with windows. It would have made a lot of difference to everyone. 
The sound booths are appalling, the doors don’t shut, the microphones don’t 
work. They’re continually having to call technicians in, and I think if they spend 
that much on it, they could have just got that pretty important part of the story 
right. And there were a lot of corners cut I felt. But overall I think the office is 
new, it’s modern, and it’s got a good feeling about it, it’s a real buzzing 
newsroom. Especially now that we’re much closer to the studio, closer to the 
makeup room, we can see who the anchors are when they come in, it’s much 
more, you know, you just, you’re part of a team much more now… 
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[anchor] When we moved down to the second floor, I thought, you know, this is 
really good, and I still feel that. 
[Jirik] What do you think of our new offices? 
[director] That’s the best we can get. They don’t have the choice, much better 
than the 8th floor. 
My own sense was that the planning committee, including myself, had failed the 
channel by not pushing harder for an audited design or external designers, especially for 
the sets and the studio. Although the question of bringing in outside designers was raised 
at the meetings, budgetary constraints ruled against their use. However, in hindsight, it 
seemed to me that corners had been cut in the wrong places, and that we, as the 
responsible committee, had nobody to blame but ourselves. 
As a participant and observer, my own frustration with the design process reached 
a low point one day when I saw technicians installing television monitors in the new 
newsroom. The monitors were essential for news editing, the first place a news editor 
looks for signs or confirmation of breaking or updated news. CCTV has access to the 24-
hour signals from both Reuters and APTN. In addition it has an internal channel system 
that can monitor every channel available by satellite or cable in Beijing, from CCTV to 
the BBC-WS and CNN-I. However, the ‘zhubians’ (主编 chief editor) tended to news-
edit blind in the old newsroom, because the necessary signals were not piped into the 
newsroom. With the move downstairs, I had hoped for a change. However, rather than 
installing small flat screen monitors where they should have gone in the zhubian’s office, 
the technicians were installing large television sets on brackets overlooking a space 
visible to nobody, apart from those editing video and the anchors in makeup, opposite 
this space. 
When I asked the design supervisor why the monitors were being installed there 
rather than as small flat screens in the zhubian’s office, I was told that the Technical 
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Department was responsible for installing the monitors, that they were frustrated already 
by the demands the relaunch was putting on them, and that I would only cause trouble by 
questioning what they were doing. 
As I watched the television sets being installed, in my head flashed an image of 
my favorite temple in Japan. The Tosho-gu Shrine in Nikko, north of Tokyo, has images 
of elephants carved by an artist who had only heard tell of these wondrous beasts. 
Opposite the weirdly misshapen but strangely recognizable elephants is a ‘sacred stable’ 
adorned by a famous carving of the three wise monkeys who see no evil, hear no evil, 
speak no evil, a Japanese representation of the Confucian edict imported from Imperial 
China. 
In a flash, I saw those television sets looming over an empty space as the emblem 
of a news channel designed by people unfamiliar with the concept of a rolling news 
channel, which was fated to see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no evil. And, as a 
member of the planning group, I was part of the problem. The planning process had 
failed the channel and the best hopes of the blueprint had died with that failure. 
Eventually two large television sets were installed in the zhubian’s office (which 
some zhubians would turn off for fear of radiation poisoning). But the direct feeds from 
APTN and Reuters never were. The monitors opposite the make-up room were soon 
permanently switched to entertainment channels, and served as a respite for staff in down 
time. 
Other assessments were more upbeat. One of CCTV-9’s advisors remarked in a 
note to management on the relaunch, that overall the channel had taken a major step 
forward: 
Last night I was introduced to several foreigners who live in Beijing… [One] 
remarked “Wow, CCTV-9 looks like CNN. It’s amazing how it has changed in 
 231
the just the past couple of years.” Of course, the foreigner is correct, and a 
comparison of videotapes from two years ago bears out this view. In fact, 
virtually every six months or so for the past two years we have remarked at the 
rapid and dramatic transformation of CCTV-9. Every creative challenge has been 
met as the channel has been transformed. With the latest relaunch and the new 
studio facilities, another new and dramatic phase of CCTV-9 now begins. It is 
typical when implementing the launch of a new channel that the actual execution 
of the on-air vision is flawed at first. Despite the number of rehearsals, and the 
best thought out plans of its creators, a new channel only evolves after it begins to 
air under the rigors of daily on-air performance. This is exactly the situation with 
the relaunch of CCTV International. The actual creative vision behind the new 
CCTV International is sound, and has every potential of being fulfilled, but first 
some significant issues in execution must be resolved. 
This assessment struck me as both correct in pointing to significant unresolved 
issues, and somewhat exaggerated in its emphasis on rapid and dramatic transformation, 
although management and producers were constantly tweaking the lineup and shows to 
improve the service. Moreover, substantive changes had taken place in recent years, in 
particular the May 2003 revamp already mentioned. But how much change one sees 
really depends on how one measures change. If the constant adjustments, new and 
revamped shows and changes to packaging as well as the introduction of foreigners on air 
was the measure, then much changed in the previous two years, and with the latest 
relaunch. But if the overall tenor of the editorial system (see Chapter 8), the production 
system (Chapter 9) and the content (Chapter 11) and the majority of the programs, and 
great majority of the personnel remained in place doing much the same work, then how 
much had really changed? 
Whichever way one looks at it, and especially if looked at from the long-term, the 
May 3, 2004 relaunch was another milestone in the evolution of the channel. Perhaps 
most importantly, with the scheduling of news at the top of every hour the relaunch had 
pushed CCTV-9 further in the direction of becoming a rolling news channel, i.e. a 
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channel in which news takes priority over all other programming.89 However, the caveat 
in the above assessment that “some significant issues in execution must be resolved” 
points to what, to my mind, was the single most difficult issue the channel faced in the 
relaunch, changing its editorial structure. 
The challenge for editorial 
One of the prime tasks the OSC blueprint laid out for the relaunch was an internal 
reorganization of the news editing process. Most importantly, the blueprint attempted to 
introduce into CCTV-9 a news editorial system based on news editing norms in 
newsrooms worldwide. What characterizes these systems are the structure and function of 
editorial. The structure is made up of the different components in the news making 
system: news monitoring, news gathering, news production. The functions are the roles 
each component plays separately, and just as importantly, in relationship with one 
another. 
To anybody familiar with news making processes at channels like CNN-I and 
BBC-WS, what strikes one immediately about CCTV-9 is the lack of a news editing 
structure organized around a ‘desk.’ In other words, CCTV-9 lacked the news making 
center that is the physical and organizational key to news operations at e.g. the BBC 
(Schlesinger, 1987), and news organizations like CNN and Reuters. I address the reasons 
why CCTV-9 lacks this mechanism and how the news editing system works in Chapter 8: 
Editorial. Here I want to discuss why with the relaunch, CCTV-9 failed to break away 
from its existing system and implement a news editing structure more in line with 
international norms. 
                                                 
89 Strictly speaking, news had topped every hour prior to the relaunch, because Culture Express and Sports 
Scene were part of the news department. However, after the relaunch, ‘hard’ news was put at the top of 
every hour. 
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The OSC blueprint discussed a restructuring of the news editing system, and 
crucially the introduction of an Assignment Desk (AD) into the system. The AD was 
modeled on documents prepared for CCTV-9 by News Corporation’s consultant. In those 
documents, the consultant argued that an assignment desk “must be created. This 
assignment desk will serve as the “heart” of CCTV Worldwide.” The AD would have 
three functions: suggest and assign stories, and do long-term planning; liaise with 
reporters and CCTV-9’s external partners such as Xinhua, CRI and Shanghai TV; and 
coordinate intake (the process of taking in and organizing news, whether from agencies, 
external partners, reporters or other sources, to make it available for news making). In 
short, the consultant was suggesting that CCTV-9 lacked what are known in industry 
parlance as planning and intake desks. 
In effect, under the existing structure, output (the news programs) was responsible 
for not only making the news for on air at CCTV-9, but also monitoring and gathering the 
raw materials, which went into the programs. Although this structure was suitable for 
specialist news programs, it put enormous pressure on the general news system, which 
was meant to be the heart of the CCTV-9 news system. Introducing a planning desk and 
intake desk into the CCTV-9 editorial system would have greatly eased the pressure on 
general news output to take responsibility not only for producing news bulletins and 
coordinating the rolling news service, but for monitoring and organizing the intake of the 
raw materials for news. Moreover, a number of functions would be introduced into the 
CCTV-9 editorial system, which CCTV-9 lacked prior to the relaunch. These functions 
related to news gathering from third parties and ad hoc sources. 
The importance of planning and intake for a news organization is clear from the 
consultant’s emphasis that the head of the assignment desk be appointed as a deputy 
controller, with the same authority as the head of output. 
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The OSC blueprint repeated this emphasis and included plans for an assignment 
desk: 
The assignment desk is the nerve center of the whole channel, responsible for the 
daily planning of news and feature programming, arranging for interviews and 
experts, and coordinating particular programs, etc. At the same time it is an 
information clearing house. Each day, each program must pool its information 
and planning with the assignment desk. This way the duty editor, chief editor and 
assignment desk can discuss with the team leader or producer and decide on 
particular topics and which section will handle them. The assignment desk will 
also be responsible for liaising with work units, experts etc. for interviews, as well 
as with the Overseas Service Center, and other media. 







The desk was to have a domestic and foreign editor as well as a team responsible 
for arranging the technical side of intake including live transmissions, recording 
incoming signals, etc. Finally, a graphics team, “responsible for packaging the 
programming of the entire channel” (责任全频道界么的包装工作) was attached to the 
assignment desk. 
Discussion within the planning group over establishment of the assignment desk 
was strained. In particular, output felt it was losing authority over the news. At the 
planning group meeting that decided the issue, as someone who agreed with the 
consultant that CCTV-9 lacked the appropriate news editorial structure for an 
international news channel, I argued for the establishment of a strong assignment desk. 
However, I also suggested that an assignment desk that did not have real authority within 
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the channel would be no more than a token gesture. My fear was that the assignment desk 
would be established but would lack the authority to do its job. 
When management created the assignment desk, I was seconded to work on it 
because of my experience on desks at NBC (in the US network’s Moscow bureau) and at 
Reuters. I began work on February 2, 2004. The desk consisted of a supervisor (at the 
level of executive producer), two editorial assistants (duty news editors in the industry 
parlance), an assistant to the supervisor and myself. In addition, the office was shared by 
a political editor (see Figure 4 p. 258 & p. 261 for an explanation of this role) and an 
accountant, neither of whom worked there every day. 
From the outset the AD faced opposition from within the existing editorial 
structure, which saw its creation as a diminution of their control of the news and 
programming. In fact, it was. However, what was not made clear in the OSC blueprint or 
in the planning group discussions was that creation of the AD was an attempt to 
strengthen general news by separating output from intake while coordinating their 
relationship and therefore increasing the efficiency and range of the news gathering 
process, freeing up producers to focus on putting the best available material in their 
programs. 
In a departure from the consultant’s outline, after some haggling over their 
relative authority, rather than report directly to the Controller, the supervisor put in 
charge of the AD was asked to report to the Deputy Controller, who was concurrently the 
Head of News. In theory this was a sensible decision, since it put one person in overall 
charge of the News, and ensured that output would have the final say in what went to air. 
That is, the intake side of the News would have to liaise closely with output to ensure the 
‘right’ stories were being chased and covered. 
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Nevertheless, once the hierarchy of power was established, the hoped for 
synergies did not evolve. The AD was seen as irrelevant by news producers, who 
reported to the Deputy Controller (News) (see Figure 4, p. 258) and were accustomed to 
filling their shows with stories supplied by CCTV-1 and the international news agencies 
(see Chapter 11: Content). Reporters felt they knew the story better than their colleagues 
on the AD, and therefore paid it little attention. To a degree, this was correct. Excepting 
myself, the AD was staffed by people who had no experience of working on an 
assignment desk of the form envisaged in the OSC blueprint. Moreover, apart from the 
supervisor, they were junior staff, who had little chance of making their voices heard. In 
my case, as a foreigner, I was considered an outsider, and although welcomed by my 
colleagues on the desk, I faced considerable opposition from within the newsroom: 
[zhubian] You are a someone from outside, and you want to exert an influence on 
it [CCTV-9]. We want things to go good, to go for the good. But you are a foreign 
force, and you want to make it different, make it so different, that many people 
think it’s offensive. 
[director] I don’t know about how many, how many people like you. But I know 
there are quite a few people who don’t like you frankly. 
[Jirik] That’s what I’ve heard. Why am I so unpopular? 
[director] I think that’s the reason why you have not planted your theory, your 
Western theory into the Chinese soil… You have heard of the story, the fight 
between Mao Zedong and his colleagues in the early days?.. It is that you are 
doing things that you think will help enormously, the organization. And probably 
it will. But you need the support of the people. 
Different sides had different theories about the failure of the AD to develop as the 
“nerve center” even of the news operation, let alone the whole channel, in the manner 
laid out in the OSC blueprint. On the one hand, cooperation is not something that can be 
forced on people, so the Controller’s hands were tied. On the other hand, his inability to 
intervene meant the situation had to resolve itself, and the existing institutional 
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arrangements and alignment of forces and relationships mitigated against any real change 
to the status quo in the editorial structure. 
The woman appointed head of the assignment desk was an experienced executive 
producer who came to CCTV-9 after working for two renowned CCTV-1 shows, Focus 
(焦点访谈 ‘jiaodian fangtan’) and Oriental Horizon (东方时空 ‘dongfang shikong’). 
However, precisely because she came from established shows outside of CCTV-9, like 
me she was perceived as a threat to entrenched interests within the channel, yet 
paradoxically also not a threat, precisely because she also was an ‘outsider.’ 
The assignment desk floundered within the CCTV-9 system and never established 
a foothold. After only weeks, my own frustration at the growing resistance to anything 
more than token input into the news editing process from the assignment desk resulted in 
my abandoning the AD and asking to be re-assigned. Management agreed to release me, 
and voiced disappointment at my decision. However, fearful of backlash at what would 
amount to criticism of entrenched interests, I concealed from management the real reason 
for my leaving, instead putting it down to concern that my PhD research was being 
compromised. 
In the months that followed, I watched as the AD desk was sidelined and 
eventually marginalized within the channel. By the time the time frame I had given 
myself for fieldwork ended in January 2005, the assignment desk, although still existing 
in name, had all but disappeared from the editorial process. In retrospect I believe I acted 
too hastily. I sometimes still wonder whether I would have made a difference had I stayed 
on the desk, although I suspect winning “the support of the people” was beyond me, 
given the institutional interest in maintaining the status quo. 
To my mind, the failure of the channel to develop an assignment desk in the 
manner outlined in the OSC blueprint was a serious blow for the relaunch. If the relaunch 
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had pushed the channel towards realizing management’s ambitions for a rolling news 
service, without an assignment desk the channel would lack the editorial mechanism 
necessary for servicing a rolling news service. 
The six months the planning committee existed were an exhausting time not only 
for its members, but for everybody involved in the channel. Management and staff did 
their best to carry on with daily production for the existing 24-hour channel, even as they 
designed the programming, infrastructure and editorial system required to turn that 
broadcaster into an international standard rolling news channel. 
In the end much was achieved, but most of that was in the form of mise-en-scene 
and did not influence the programming or editorial structure. Whether more of the 
original spirit of the blueprint could have been realized is debatable. In retrospect, 
perhaps too much emphasis was put on the date May 3, 2004 as a turning point in the 
development of CCTV-9. After all, the channel’s development had been one of sustained 
evolution in the years since its launch in 2000, and the future does not rule out the more 
radical changes proposed for the 2004 relaunch. 
Although Politburo member Li Changchun had triggered the relaunch and played 
a key role in its conceptualization through the instructions that framed its design, his role 
faded from consideration as the OSC blueprint was realized. Above all, what the relaunch 
showed was how difficult it is for even the highest levels of the Party to influence the 
development of media, when the interests of the authorities conflict with those of media 
makers themselves. 
The origins of the relaunch 
Planning for the relaunch did not begin with either the OSC blueprint, or later the 
meetings of the planning committee. On the contrary, what has characterized CCTV-9’s 
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development since September 2000, when it was split off as a channel separate from 
CCTV-4, is constant but uneven change. I have already traced the genesis of CCTV 
International to the ‘going out project’ launched in 2001. However, if a specific date was 
to apply to the transformation of CCTV-9 associated with the May 3, 2004 relaunch, that 
date would be a seminar hosted by CCTV on November 20, 2002, entitled “The Future of 
CCTV International (CCTV-9).” 
Present at that seminar were: 
• Mr. Zhao Huayong, President of CCTV 
• Mr. Zhang Changming, Vice-President of CCTV 
• Mr. Zhao Lifan, Deputy Chief Editor, CCTV 
• Mr. Sheng Yilai, Director of the Overseas Service Center, CCTV 
• Mr. Li Shushen, Deputy Director of Overseas Service, CCTV 
• Mr. Jiang Heping, Controller, CCTV-9 
• Ms. Ye Lulu, Deputy Controller, CCTV-9 
• Mr. Tian Jin, Deputy Minister and Editor-In-Chief, SARFT 
• Mr. Wang Guoqing, Deputy Director, Information Office, State Council 
• Mr. Lu Mai, Director, Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R.C. 
and Secretary General, China Development Research Foundation 
• Mr. Li Dan, President of China Radio International (CRI) 
• Mr. Zhu Yinghuang, Editor-In-Chief, China Daily 
• Mr. Liu Jianchao, Deputy Director General, Information Dept., Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
• Mr. John Terenzio, Consultant to CCTV-9, News Corporation 
From this list, the Party and government were clearly taking a keen interest in the 
development of CCTV-9 before Li Changchun’s instructions in September 2003 which 
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became the basis of the OSC blueprint for the relaunch. Although Li issued the 
instructions in the context of a visit to Latin America, repeating Xu Guangchun’s earlier 
call in 2001 for the PRC to have its own CNN-style channel, Li’s instruction was issued 
after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. 
Both that war and the 9/11 attacks on the United States in September 2001 
impressed upon the PRC government the power of a rolling news channel. On the 
mainland, CCTV’s coverage of the 9/11 attacks was tentative compared to that of Hong-
Kong based rival, Phoenix, earning the scorn of viewers and prompting acceleration of 
plans already in the pipeline for a domestic 24-hour news channel, formally launched on 
May 1, 2003 (Dong & Shi, 2007, pp. 183-184). 
Held in November 2002, the seminar on the future of CCTV International should 
be seen in light of these developments. CCTV had already learned its lesson after 9/11, 
and CCTV-9 reported comprehensively on the invasion of Iraq, but it was hampered by 
its format as a comprehensive channel. It was in light of the constant stream of imagery 
from 9/11 and the US invasion on news channels that Li issued the instructions for the 
transformation of CCTV-9 into a rolling news channel. So, although the November 2002 
seminar was ostensibly directed towards the May 2003 relaunch which did not tackle 
CCTV-9’s status as a comprehensive channel, the coalition of interests concerned with 
developing CCTV-9 as a rolling news channel was already in place well before Li 
ordered the transformation of the channel. 
Most importantly, as a rolling news channel CCTV-9 would remain subject to 
government control. The seminar shows the vertical and horizontal integration of 
CCTV-9 into the government’s system of ‘wai xuan’ (external publicity). SARFT was 
represented by Tian Jin, who is in overall charge of the PRC’s relationships with foreign 
media. The government was also represented by Wang Guoqing, Deputy Director of the 
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State Council Information Office, Liu Jianchao, Deputy Director General of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs information department, and Lu Mai, head of a government think tank. 
In terms of horizontal relationships, the Editor-in-Chief of China Daily, the state-
controlled English-language newspaper that is the print equivalent of CCTV-9, and the 
president of China Radio International, the state-controlled broadcaster that is the radio 
equivalent of CCTV-9, were both present. The only major player missing from the 
seminar but included in the blueprint was Xinhua. Clearly CCTV International was being 
positioned to play a major role in ‘wai xuan.’ Moreover, the Party and government were 
interested to hear from News Corporation’s consultant his suggestions for development 
of the channel. 
The consultant made clear that he thought the channel should be directed at the 
foreign audience, particularly overseas, and in particular at ‘opinion makers,’ and that 
seeking a mass audience (the target of a comprehensive channel) was the wrong approach 
for a channel that could at best have niche appeal, given the range of media available in 
countries like the United States. Whether the consultant influenced the development of 
the OSC blueprint is beyond doubt. I have already noted his input into the rationale and 
role of an assignment desk. His suggestion that the channel pay less attention to its 
existing audience, primarily Chinese seeking to learn English, and foreigners in the PRC 
lacking access to channels like CNN-I and the BBC-WS, and focus on winning access to 
opinion makers in target countries, fed into the emphasis in the OSC blueprint on 
developing a credible news channel, with an emphasis on objective, impartial and 
balanced reporting. 
However, the OSC blueprint also showed the Party/State’s understanding of these 
terms: 
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Be objective, impartial and balanced, and in being objective, impartial and 
balanced, reflect the government’s position and point of view. 
体现客观，公正，平街，在客观，公正，平街中体现我国政府的立场观点。
(CCTV, 2003c) 
I have already noted (see p. 10) the non-contradiction from the Party/State’s point 
of view that objective, impartial and balanced reporting in and of itself reflects the 
Party’s and government’s position. This is because the Party/State’s discourse on its own 
legitimacy, represented by the aphorism “seek truth from facts” assumes that the Party 
and government already embody these values. As a result, media should reflect the 
Party’s and government’s position, since according to the logic governing the Party/State 
discourse on their own legitimacy, their point of view is by definition objective, impartial 
and balanced. 
In other words, the Party/State was attempting to achieve through its instructions 
what the power structures in democratic countries with commercialized and public 
service broadcasting systems have achieved through the market and journalistic 
professionalism, legitimization of a discourse of objectivity, impartiality and balance for 
news that privileges the voices of politicians, government, and big business, to the 
effective exclusion of any substantive dissent from the status quo. 
Bracketing the relationship between Party, government and media in the PRC, 
which I have addressed in the introduction and literature review, what I want to 
emphasize here is the negotiated character of the channel’s development. To my mind, a 
typical mistake attending much analysis of the PRC governing system is to imagine the 
system in hierarchical terms with a top down flow of power that emphasizes the relatively 
greater ability of each ascending level of power to influence those below. While this is 
true with respect to the general theory of democratic centralism, which emphasizes the 
subordination of the subordinate unit to the superior unit within the power system, the 
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history of television, the contested character of mass line theory, and the push for reform 
from below, including from within media during the 1980s, all point to a rather more 
flexible and dynamic power system than one caricatured by conflating the ability of the 
Politburo to issue directives and leading Party and government organs to make policy 
with the negotiated character of policy implementation. 
The May 2004 relaunch and editorial control 
Although, I have focused primarily on what was not achieved in the relaunch, 
failure to realize the OSC blueprint in its draft form paradoxically strengthened the 
channel’s relative autonomy within the broader system of ‘wai xuan.’ Following the 
relaunch, the following was typical of what a number of staff told me: 
[staff] Before May the 3rd, we were told CCTV-9 will be the China’s CNN… we 
were told we should redesign our programs like that. 
[Jirik] Do you like the way we do the news? 
[staff] Not after May the 3rd. 
[Jirik] What has changed? 
[staff] We were told we cannot do some report. 
[Jirik] What kind? 
[zhubian] Bad things… Saying too much bad thing about China, like drug, AIDS, 
and also those economic issues, but for me, I think, sometimes I think it’s 
understandable. Actually CCTV-9 is a channel which is just sending, I think is 
sending good signals to other people outside China, so that’s why I think we may 
be redefine our function. It’s not, I don’t think it should be a kind of a news 
channel, it’s like really promoting China, like we would just have Travelogue, we 
just have Rediscovering China, and telling some moving stories about Chinese 
people, and the beautiful scenery spots about China, things like that. I think that’s 
enough. 
This staff member’s sense of depression was almost palpable. It was a reaction 
that was typical of journalists who had spent their time, in some cases their careers, at 
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CCTV-9 and its earlier incarnations developing news services. But what the Party/State 
had in mind with the relaunch was a channel that could compete with CNN’s production 
values while functioning primarily as a publicity instrument, whenever the Party/State’s 
interest was at stake in the story. 
Journalists at CCTV-9 were uncomfortable with this. In the first few months after 
the relaunch, the channel did some interesting and hard hitting stories, opening its post-
relaunch coverage of the PRC with a series China’s Challenges (see p. 360), but respite 
was short: 
[Jirik] Would you like to see more responsibility given to the people who make 
the news and not coming from outside?  
[staff] Yeah, I think so, and also we do, we feel that this kind of control being 
loosed for a certain period of time, but recently I think that kind of control come 
back. 
Nobody I interviewed at CCTV-9 was happy with this state of affairs: 
[staff] Many people are very critical of the propaganda machines, not only this 
criticism comes from the journalists, journalists who compete with us 
[foreigners], but inside, even inside, you know, even inside the media 
organization, including some of the high ranking media bosses. 
So, by failing to enthusiastically embrace the vision for the channel laid out by the 
OSC blueprint, not only did programming remain much the same, but the journalists in 
effect offered passive resistance to any shift in editorial values away from those that had 
come to define the development of the channel since its inception. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
What the relaunch at CCTV-9 shows above all is the manner in which power is 
negotiated in the PRC within specific institutions and at specific sites. Although one of 
 245
the most powerful people in the PRC, Politburo member Li Changchun, put his personal 
imprimatur on documents that were reflected in the blueprint produced by the OSC, the 
final outcome of the relaunch was quite different from that detailed in the first draft. 
What the process of relaunching CCTV-9 as CCTV International showed was how the 
weaker party in a negotiation can reconfigure the discourse of power to its own ends. 
However, what I am not suggesting here is that CCTV-9 failed to fulfill demands 
put on them by the Party and government. On the contrary, CCTV-9 appropriated the 
language of those demands and reconfigured their meaning to suit the channel’s 
purposes, convincing SARFT in the process that this new meaning was the appropriate 
one. Pan & Lu’s (2003) and Pan’s (2005) work on bounded innovation in PRC media 
reform goes some way to providing an explanation of this process. 
In particular the notion within the concept of “bounded innovation” that media 
managers have a degree of relative autonomy in the implementation of policy was borne 
out by the relaunch of CCTV-9. The call for the channel to remain a “window on China” 
was turned against the strategic demands for change on the grounds that feature 
programming was the best way to keep a window on China open. Emphasizing ‘soft’ 
programming about the PRC also resonated with the broader strategy for the channel 
within the “going out project,” in particular the demand to present a positive image of the 
PRC to the world, conducive to the country’s development.90 Given the failures as well as 
successes of the PRC’s development, doubtlessly the Party/State would prefer a softer 
image of the PRC than one dictated exclusively by news and news oriented 
programming, especially as the PRC’s journalists have increasingly shown in recent years 
their willingness to test the bounds of the permissible. 
                                                 
90 Comments made by CCTV Vice President Zhang Changmin on April 23, 2004 at the closing session of 
the annual “Rainbow Awards,” for media involved in the PRC’s ‘wai xuan.’ 
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Drawing on Certeau (1984), Pan & Lu (2003) “postulate that Chinese journalists 
use various discursive resources in their everyday practices as “tactics” to evade, 
appropriate, and resist controlling “strategies” imposed on them by those with power” 
(Lee, 2003a, p. 17). The behavior of production departments faced with changing work 
patterns, extra work at little to no extra pay, and in some cases job loss was typical of 
these kinds of tactics. 
However, if Certeau’s (1984) insights into power give some idea of the weapons 
journalists in the PRC use to defend their positions against political authority, only by 
situating their struggles within the broader field of journalism as Bourdieu (2005a) 
understood it can an analysis of their overall effectiveness be made. The blueprint for the 
relaunch at CCTV-9 shows the embedded character of journalistic institutions in the PRC 
within a field that is traversed by power. As part of the PRC’s system of ‘wai xuan,’ 
CCTV-9 was subject to controls that are quite different from those operating in 
commercial and public service media systems. 
Nevertheless, the partial and relative autonomy of CCTV-9 was obvious from the 
degree of resistance from within the channel to the OSC blueprint for the relaunch. Even 
the guidelines were framed as recommendation, not demands, despite their origin in 
instructions from a Politburo member. The OSC blueprint was almost apologetic in its 
framing of its recommendations: 
Given the current conditions for the transformation of CCTV-9, the following 
guidelines can be considered. 
在现行条件下对CCTV-9进行改版，可以考虑一下策略 (CCTV, 2003c) 
In short, from the outset, the relaunch was open to negotiation, since it was CCTV 
and specifically CCTV-9, that would carry it out, and it was these institutions that were 
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best placed, not the Party or SARFT, to determine what could or could not be done with 
the resources allocated for the relaunch and within the given timeframe. 
Keeping Features, despite the call for the axing of much of its programming in the 
original blueprint, was discursively re-positioned by CCTV-9 management as a ‘win-
win’ for the Party/State and CCTV-9, put in a difficult position by the reluctance of 
potential partners like Xinhua, CRI and Shanghai TV to play the role allotted them in the 
blueprint, hampered by staff reluctance to change existing work patterns, and concerned 
at a re-orientation of the channel away form the achievements of the revamp in May, 
2003. 
Because of the competitive character of news in the PRC, any attempt to build an 
overarching publicity system, combining the joint efforts of institutions such as Xinhua, 
CRI and CCTV, was likely to meet opposition from within these institutions, as the 
experience of the relaunch of CCTV-9 indicated. In short, the outcome of the relaunch 
was the only possible outcome under the circumstances. Recognizing this, SARFT 
acknowledged the achievements of the relaunch and the channel moved on.91 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have discussed the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International 
on May 3, 2004. Against management’s public endorsement of the relaunch as a radical 
transformation of the channel, I have shown that little changed beyond the mise-en-scene 
and that the revamped channel bore little resemblance to the OSC blueprint prepared 
according to the “spirit of the instructions” (指示精神) from Politburo member, Li 
Changchun. 
                                                 
91 In mid-2005, SARFT rewarded CCTV-9’s Controller by promoting him to head CCTV-5, CCTV’s 
flagship sports channel, which was to be the host broadcaster for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
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However, my analysis suggests that this did not indicate a failure of CCTV, OSC 
and CCTV-9 management to carry out instructions ‘from above.’ On the contrary, using 
Pan & Lu’s (2003) and Pan’s (2005) deployment of Certeau, and Bourdieu’s concept of 
field, the negotiated character of media reform is evident in the manner in which channel 
staff and management redeployed the discourse of the relaunch to their own ends. 
Moreover, the relative autonomy of media management in implementing policy 
was clear from the leeway given the channel, when the blueprint presented its guidelines 
for “consideration” (可以考虑), rather than as demands. Faced with the reluctance of 
potential partners such as Xinhua, CRI and Shanghai TV to play the role allotted them, 
CCTV-9 was forced to rely on its own resources to a far greater degree than the blueprint 
had envisaged. In this situation, immense pressure was put on the programming 
departments, which, given the lack of incentive to take on extra work, or change their 
working style, resisted, especially as the relaunch pointed the channel away from many of 
the gains of an earlier revamp in May, 2003. 
As a corollary of the passive resistance to change that characterized the process of 
re-negotiation of the blueprint, the editorial values of the channel also remained 
unchanged, despite the aim to strengthen the publicity character of the channel to the 
detriment of its news. 
As a participant in elements of the planning and aspects of the realization of the 
relaunch, I was struck by the strength of resistance to change, which was understandable 
given the circumstances, but also surprising given the assumption in much of the 
literature about the top-down character of political authority in communist political 
economic systems. Against any easy assumption about the prerogatives of the 
Party/State, what was evident in the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International was not 
only the latitude media managers had in interpreting instructions and implementing 
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reform, but also the tactics the weak use in an uneven but definitely not one-sided 
struggle to co-opt power. In short, what the process of implementing the relaunch showed 
is that power is negotiated and cannot be assumed in the PRC. 
Not surprisingly, where management did not face resistance were in those areas 
where the production departments saw the possibility for improvement in their 
conditions, such as in remodeled offices, a new newsroom and a new studio and sets, 
although as noted the latter proved to be less than inspiring. 
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Chapter 8: Editorial 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 7 I discussed the substantive changes to elements of the channel 
associated with the relaunch. But as noted, despite the dramatic overhaul of packaging 
associated with the relaunch, and the new sets, new newsroom and renovation of other 
work spaces, most of the programming, i.e. the ‘stuff’ of television, remained the same 
and the majority of staff remained in similar positions doing similar jobs. Despite an 
ambitious attempt to restructure the editorial system to better serve a rolling news 
channel, the editorial system remained largely unchanged. 
Therefore rather than change characterizing CCTV-9, continuity was also clearly 
a key feature of the channel and worthy of investigation. I approach this topic through an 
analysis of editorial control in this chapter, and in the following chapter, the news 
production process, arguably the most important form of production at CCTV-9, given its 
aim to be a rolling news channel. I say arguably because the previous chapter has shown 
how important feature and soft magazine programming has been and remain for the 
channel, especially in its role in ‘wai xuan’ and as a ‘window on China.’ Nevertheless, if 
CCTV-9 is to develop as a competitor to the likes of CNN-I and BBC-WS, Al-Jazeera 
International et al., it will be its editorial values and news production that make possible 
the comparison. 
This chapter opens with a description of the over-arching power of the Central 
Publicity Department in editorial, which distinguishes PRC media from media in 
countries where legal systems protect journalists from overt political interference. I 
discuss editorial control at CCTV-9 and the different constraints operating on news 
makers at different levels within the news production system. I look at the editorial 
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hierarchy within which CCTV-9 is imbricated and the external constraints on news 
production associated with the censorship and regulatory functions of the CPD and 
SARFT respectively. I then analyze the editorial structure within CCTV-9 showing the 
relative weights of authority within each level of the structure. Finally I address the 
regime of self-censorship which characterizes news making at CCTV-9 and I discuss how 
news makers negotiate editorial control. 
This chapter is the first of three that deal with elements of the research question: 
• How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? 
The intermediate question and subordinate questions this chapter addressed were 
as follows: 
o How did the editorial system at CCTV-9 work? 
 What was the structure of the editorial system at CCTV-9? 
 Who controlled the news at CCTV-9? 
 How did control function on a day-to-day basis in the newsroom? 
 What was the role of the CPD and SARFT in editorial control at 
CCTV-9? 
 How did news makers negotiate external editorial control? 
GENERAL NEWS & THE EDITORIAL SYSTEM AT CCTV-9 
General news 
Although I talked briefly about the overall programming structure at CCTV-9 in 
the previous chapter, in this chapter and those that follow I restrict myself to discussion 
of the general news section and the reporters’ group which supplied stories for general 
news, since general news was considered to be the ‘flagship’ output of the channel. In 
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addition to its own resources and those of the reporting group, general news, which was 
responsible for CCTV News, News Updates and World Wide Watch,92 could also access 
and air stories produced by the specialist news sections – Asia Today, Biz China, Culture 
Express and Sports. The importance of general news is clear from the description of 
CCTV News from the OSC blueprint, which can be compared with the substantively 
similar descriptions provided in the publicity materials in Appendix 7, indicating the 
continuity over time in internal understanding of this program: 
Comprehensive news program CCTV News: CCTV’s branded flagship news 
program. 30 minutes. Broadcast at the top of every hour. A timely and rolling 
broadcast of major domestic and international affairs; in addition to broadcasting 
major international stories, Chinese and Asian News are an important component. 
Utilizing self-cover and in-depth reporting, etc., it reflects Chinese perspective. 




The editorial system at CCTV-9 
The general news was structured and its practices governed by the editorial 
system at CCTV9. The core characteristic of the editorial system was its imbrication in 
the ‘wai xuan’ system of the Party/State, which set the channel off from commercial and 
public service broadcasters in other countries that are not state-controlled or protected by 
charter. In the case of non-state-controlled commercial broadcasters the relationship of 
media and the political economy is mediated through the market with regulatory 
oversight (if any exists) trusted to government agencies. In the case of state-controlled 
public service broadcasters, the media-government relationship is mediated by a charter, 
                                                 
92 Before the relaunch, general news also produced a 15-minute daily bulletin of news with an Asian 
regional focus. 
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such as is the case with the BBC, or analgous arrangement. In the case of the PRC, news 
systems are formally rather than informally part of the system of governance, hence their 
stated as opposed to unstated ‘mouthpiece’ role, the latter being more the case with 
commercial and public service broadcasters in mainstream Western news systems where 
media are legislatively separated from the political sphere, but still serve power. 
At CCTV-9, the editorial system has a number of mechanisms that ensure the 
Party/State ‘line’ is followed in broadcasts. These mechanisms range from the formal to 
the informal. The key formal mechanism is the editorial system. The key informal 
mechanism is self-censorship as a corollary of the newsroom editorial system, and 
associated with this, socialization into the routines of newsroom practice (“learning the 
ropes”). 
The editorial structure at CCTV and CCTV-9 
The editorial structure at CCTV-9 is part of the broader editorial system within 
which CCTV is embedded, the ‘wai xuan’ system of which CCTV-9 is a key part. The 
president of CCTV was in regular contact with SARFT (a once weekly meeting at 
SARFT according to staff at CCTV-9) and other government departments as needed. 
Early each Monday morning, the president and vice presidents of CCTV met to discuss 
major issues that would be in the news that week. Following that an expanded meeting 
was held, bringing department heads (of channels, the technical section, etc.) into the 
picture. In the case of CCTV-9, that meant the Controller, who reported to the head of the 
Overseas Service Center, who reported to one of CCTV’s Vice Presidents. Once that 
meeting had taken place, departmental heads met with section leaders, and finally a 
channel-specific editorial meeting was held. In the case of CCTV-9 the channel-wide 
meeting was on Tuesday afternoon, when the previous week’s work was discussed, and 
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any information relayed that had filtered down from the Monday morning meeting 
between the heads of CCTV. 
The place of CCTV-9 within the ‘wai xuan’ system within which it is embedded 
is shown in Figure 3. This hierarchy reflects the system of democratic centralism that 
defines the relationships of governance in the PRC. Each successive level is subordinate 
to the authority of that preceding it. Each lower level also has a role in synthesizing and 
passing to each higher level the consensus of the impact of policy on everyday life. In the 
case of media institutions, this function is called media supervision, although CCTV-9 
was largely denied that role because of its function in ‘wai xuan.’ 
Figure 3: The position of CCTV-9 within the ‘wai xuan’ editorial hierarchy 
1. Politburo Standing Committee (Li Changchun – oversees publicity) 
2. Central Publicity Department (CPD) (internal publicity) (Head, Liu Yunshun, also 
a Politburo Member, but not a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, 
therefore outranked in the Party hierarchy by Li Changchun)93 
3. State Council Information Office (external publicity) 
4. SARFT (Minister Wang Taihua, concurrently Deputy Head of the CPD, Vice 
Minister Tian Jin) 
5. CCTV (President Zhao Huayong) 
6. CCTV Vice President (Zhang Changmin) 
7. Overseas Service Center (Director, Sheng Yilai) 
8. CCTV-9 (Controller, Jiang Heping) 
                                                 
93 For an excellent overview of the publicity structure in the CCTV, see Brady (2006), on whose work this 
list is in part based. 
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I have given names for the leaders of particular organizations, because of the 
personal nature of power in the PRC. I have already discussed the role of guanxi in the 
system of governance in the PRC, including in media (see p.141). With respect to the 
news editorial system, information moved extremely rapidly and fluidly through formal 
networks of authority and informal guanxi networks within the formal networks. If 
anybody within the editorial system was unsure about how to proceed with a story, a 
phone call to a higher authority would quickly return a reply, even if the higher level had 
to go further up the chain of editorial responsibility. Similarly a phone call from ‘higher 
up’ would quickly revise or kill a story. 
As an example, in October 2003 CCTV-9 planned to broadcast live the address of 
President Hu Jintao to the Australian Parliament. However, just before the speech, the 
broadcast was cancelled. A similar cancellation prevented CCTV-9 from broadcasting 
President Hu speaking live in France in January 2004. Staff and management had 
different explanations for the problem: 
[Jirik] Twice we tried to do live coverage of Hu Jintao, once in France, once in 
Australia. Twice we had it set up and all ready to go. Both times it was cancelled. 
What is the problem here? 
[staff] I believe someone higher than CCTV, maybe they wrote a report, and 
originally they agree that you can broadcast, and then later they found there might 
be some Falungong, or anti-Hu Jintao sentiments, around Hu, so finally they 
would cancel. 
[Jirik] So what is the Party and the government afraid of? 
[staff] It’s hard to answer. There are open minds who say you can get freedom in 
reporting events, live events. But then when it comes in reality, you have to face 
reality, which might put yourself in a chaos situation. You have everything set up, 
and then someone very close to the top leader says “This time we are not ready, 
let’s wait for the next.” 
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[Jirik] Why did the attempt to cover President Hu Jintao’s speeches in Australia 
and France in the parliament, why did they not go ahead. 
[management] For technical reasons. The signal was abruptly blurred. When we 
do that sort of coverage, we must guarantee the quality of the signal. 
[Jirik] There was some talk that the CPPCC, in the case of Australia, the CPPCC 
Chairman actually told us not to do it at the very last moment. 
[management] The CPPCC Chairman? 
[Jirik] Accompanying Hu Jintao on his visit. 
[management] No. It’s simply for the sake of sake of safety of the signal. 
Although I am skeptical about management’s explanation,94 to their credit, they 
were as disconsolate as the staff about the cancellations. After CCTV-9 broadcast live US 
Vice President Dick Cheney’s address to students at Fudan University in Shanghai in 
April 2004, the irony of the situation was not lost on CCTV-9 management, who 
lamented that viewers were more likely to see the US president than the PRC president 
live on CCTV-9. 
The channel was constrained by an editorial system that is a part of the 
Party/State’s publicity system, what He Zhou (2000c) calls “Party Publicity Inc.” This 
system emphasizes that media are publicity instruments for the Party/State in a manner 
similar to the media management role a communications department plays within a large 
company. In the words of senior management at CCTV-9: 
The general principle we have to, we cannot do anything about anything that 
cause instability within the country, and we cannot say anything against the 
Communist Party, against the Central Government. That’s the taboo, because we 
                                                 
94 As a television news producer at Reuters responsible for daily satellite ‘feeds’ around the Asian region, 
the kind of “abruptly blurred” signal referred to here was unlikely out of Australia, which has generally 
reliable feed capabilities. Blurred signals were commonplace however in some parts of Asia. When I tried 
to feed an interview with Myanmar’s Aung San Suukyi out of Myanmar State TV in July 1995 after she 
was briefly released from house arrest, I was told by the receiving end at Reuters in London that the signal 
had suddenly become blurred and would be unusable. Myanmar State TV appeared to be interfering with 
the outgoing signal. This would not have happened in Australia. 
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are a subsidiary organization of the Central Government. Who is my boss? Right? 
The government is our boss, yeah. 
Editorial control from sources external to CCTV-9 involved a mixture of 
instructions ‘from above’ within CCTV and prohibitions from SARFT or the CPD in the 
form of instructions (see below, p. 276). On a day-to-day basis, the Central Publicity 
Department (CPD) and Xinhua were the final authorities on what could or could not be 
reported by CCTV-9. Once the CPD put an injunction on reporting a story, that story 
could no longer be aired until the ban was lifted. Once Xinhua reported a story, CCTV-9 
could report it without fear of recrimination.95 In addition, CCTV-1 and CCTV-4 were 
also considered reliable sources. CCTV-1 was considered more authoritative than 
CCTV-4, but not as authoritative as Xinhua, which is an institution directly under the 
State Council. One staff member put it this way: “[If we] follow whatever CCTV 1 or 
CCTV 4, what they’re doing, that’s okay, we just don’t have to worry all those producing 
good programs. You just translate them. That’s okay, one hundred percent we are safe, 
right!” Sensitive stories not sourced from either Xinhua,96 or CCTV-1 or CCTV-497 
represented more of a grey area for editorial that required decision-making within the 
channel from the level of writer and reporter up to Controller on their suitability for 
broadcast. 
Despite the threat of external intervention that hung over the heads of 
management, most editorial decisions both about what to report and what not to report 
were taken within the channel. Although the CCTV-9 Controller was at the bottom of a 
                                                 
95 Occasionally even this rule of thumb failed. When former CPC General Secretary Zhao Ziyang died in 
January 2005 having lived under house arrest since his removal during the Tiananmen incident, CCTV-9 
was ordered not to report it, although Xinhua had issued a statement recording his passing. Management 
told me they found this kind of injunction depressing. 
96 Or the CPC newspaper People’s Daily, although source analysis of content indicated People’s Daily was 
not a significant news source at CCTV-9 (see Chapter x). 
97 CCTV-4 sometimes also proved unreliable (see p. 275 for discussion of the Beslan incident). 
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hierarchy of editorial power within the ‘wai xuan’ system, responsibility for what went to 
air on CCTV-9 nevertheless stopped with him. Figure 4 shows the hierarchy of editorial 
responsibility within CCTV-9. At each level within the channel a person would take as 
much responsibility as they are willing to assume, seeking guidance from above when in 
doubt, and providing guidance below when asked. 
Figure 4: CCTV-9 hierarchy of editorial control by reporting line 
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*  Foreign anchors were hired on contract or as ‘foreign experts’ and formally had the same status 
and authority as copy editors. 
** Chinese anchors were ranked by seniority and reported to their corresponding level. 
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Within this structure, writers98 had little lee-way in how to deal with stories, with 
the producers and zhubians taking responsibility for their work. On sensitive issues, 
writers would be told how to handle a story. In addition, directors would often limit 
writers’ options by restricting source material from which they could work. “For 
politically sensitive issues we will not turn to Reuters,” is how one zhubian described the 
emphasis on sourcing stories with a domestic or foreign policy angle from sources like 
Xinhua.99 Directors had inordinate power within the news making system, a problem I 
discuss below (see p. 268). Moreover, they were not held responsible for programs to the 
degree producers and zhubians were. The reporting group had its own dynamics, which I 
address in Chapter 10: Reporting. 
Moving up the reporting line, copy editors and foreign anchors had the same 
formal powers and status. They were subject to the authority of the producers or zhubians 
for the shows for which they were copy editing or anchoring, but they did not have a 
formal reporting line within the Chinese human resources system (hence the broken lines 
surrounding the box). The Chinese anchors were ranked by seniority and reported to the 
corresponding level of management within the editorial system. 
As the ‘face’ of CCTV-9, the anchors had a form of ‘representational’ capital (in 
the sense that Bourdieu would use the term) that increased their value, beyond their 
formal status. Although the best of the anchors were extremely professional news people, 
who had come to anchoring through mastering the craft of news making, the status 
associated with anchoring was out of proportion to the ‘talking head’ function that 
constituted the bulk of their work, since anchoring is above all a performance art that has 
                                                 
98 Although reporters were technically at the same level as writers, because they were part of a separate 
team, whose leader reported directly to the Controller, they had somewhat greater control over their work 
than did writers, who were subject to a greater series of checks on their work. In addition, reporters did not 
face the problem of sources setting the news agenda, which I discuss below (see p. 268). 
99 For a discussion of the role of source materials in shaping the news, see Chapter 11: Content. 
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become institutionalized within television news as a way of branding a channel or show 
for the audience.100 Of my interviewees, anchors seemed to enjoy their work most. As a 
form of performance, anchoring almost guaranteed feedback. As one Chinese anchor 
noted, “I often hear people telling me that they like my shows, foreigners especially in 
Beijing that I meet. You see, that’s the big rewarding part.” 
The best anchors worked extremely hard to bring credibility to the position. As 
the public face of the channel, they also had the invidious role of reading news they knew 
was less than the full story: 
[Jirik] How do you feel as the public face of the channel, the person who actually 
reads the news, if you know that this system is structured as to actually deny the 
public access to the information they need? 
[anchor] I feel uncomfortable, but I don’t feel totally shameful, because when 
people are watching us, they know that this is China, China is changing, but not to 
a way that is that open, that is that more democratic, that is that ideal. So, just 
when you look at North Korea TV, he is not representing the South, he is 
representing the image, the practical situation of North Korea, so anything that 
you saw China, the limitations, that media can do, is the practical physical 
situation of China, that’s it. 
If the role of the anchor is to brand the channel, the persons on whom most 
responsibility fell for getting the news to air were the producers and zhubians. They took 
great pride in their programs and in taking responsibility for them, without recourse to 
seeking advice from above. When I asked them what degree of control they exercised 
over story choice, the answer consistently was a high degree, although this self-
understanding of their work ignored the small pool of sources (see p. 319) from which 
they were drawing stories, and their dependency on these sources: 
[Jirik] how much choice do you have in story choice? 
                                                 
100 For a discussion of the role of anchoring at CCTV, see Pugsley & Gao (2007). I personally think 
television news would be better off without anchors, and possibly without reporters, the route taken by 
Euronews with its ground-breaking program, ‘No Comment’ (see Carvajal, 2007). 
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[zhubian] We have pretty much, I think. Because as long as we come up with a 
good idea, it will all be approved. 
[Jirik] Okay, so on the one hand, you get people telling you to come and do this. 
On the other hand you can choose stories? 
[zhubian] Right. And sometimes if the story is really really minor, and not 
interesting, then we can just kill them, and we don’t need to report. 
[Jirik] Can you refuse to do a story that the government tells you to do? 
[zhubian] I don’t think so. 
[Jirik] Do you get directives on how to report? Like a certain thing you’re told 
you have to take this position. 
[zhubian] Well they will give us suggestions about what they think is good about 
it, and the significance of certain events, and how they think about it, and then 
we’ll just tell them according to our audience, and what they are interested in, and 
how we can tell. And what are the interesting aspects to the foreign audience. 
Yeah. 
Above the zhubians and producers were the political editors. Although technically 
the zhubian had the final say on a story and could in theory overrule a political editor, this 
rarely happened, and only happened if the political editor consented to the change the 
zhubian wanted to make. Like the copy editors and foreign anchors, the political editors 
had no formal position within the reporting lines of the Chinese Human Resources 
system (hence the broken line in the diagram). The political editors were former 
journalists who were hired by CCTV-9 to ensure copy did not include political mistakes. 
They were extremely experienced journalists and during my time at CCTV-9 were 
retirees from Xinhua, China Radio International and CCTV.  
Above the political editors were management and senior management, jointly 
represented by the Editorial Board, which had eight members: Controller; Deputy 
Controller (Head of News); Deputy Controller (Head of Features); Deputy Controller 
(Head of Personnel); Head of the Assignment Desk; Senior Producer, Current Affairs; 
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Head of the Reporters’ Group; Head of the Anchors’ Group. The Editorial Board met 
about once a month, or more often as needed, and set editorial policy for the channel as a 
whole. 
At the top of the CCTV-9 editorial structure were the Controller and Deputy 
Controller (Head of News). Both were considered excellent news editors, as was the 
Controller’s immediate superior, who was head of the Overseas Service Center. The latter 
two were also credited with changing the channel from a sleepy operation responsible for 
three recorded bulletins of news a day a decade ago into the current 24-hour operation: 
[staff] When I started working at CCTV, we have only 15 minutes of news. I get 
up in the morning to play badminton, and then I have a huge lunch and then I 
sleep till 3 o’clock, and then I finish work by 8.30 pm, and I work 4 days a week. 
So that was workload. Now I work night shifts. I work day shifts. I have extra 
work. And the program is 24 hours. You only have 1 o’clock news which is a 
repetition of 12, and every hour is brand new. So this is like only nine years. And 
when I started, CCTV English News Service is like the day before yesterday’s 
events, it’s not news. When [Controller], [Head of the OSC] arrived, they changed 
this. 
But as the Controller’s has risen within the CCTV system, some staff reflected 
that he had been forced to become more cautious, more of a manager, less of a 
‘newsman’: “[w]hen he was a smaller leader with a smaller group, and he would do most 
of his time staying in the newsroom. But where is he now? Most of his time is connecting 
relations upstairs, and only criticism people. This is not good.” 
However, there was also defense of his position: 
[Jirik] So, is [the Controller] under a lot of pressure? 
[staff] I think he must be under a lot of pressure. When he’s doing something he’s 
weighing which is the more important, keeping his position here, and upgrading 
it, or making the news value, and making some really good stories. Every day 
he’s struggling, he’s under great pressure. So far I have found that he is handling 
this well. But the easiest way for most of the officials, not like [CCTV-9 
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Controller], I have to say, is just to obey, and not do anything, and not make any 
changes. 
In recent years editorial control has gradually been shifting more in the favor of 
news makers, and away from external agencies such as the CPD and SARFT. 
Management and staff saw this as a significant gain for news and for the professionalism 
of reporting. For example, when a bridge collapsed at Miyun outside Beijing in early 
February 2004, killing 37, senior management immediately sent a crew to cover the story, 
only informing their superiors within CCTV, rather than asking their permission. 
Although reporting disasters in the PRC is becoming commonplace, news editors 
and journalists have had to fight hard in recent years to win even this limited opening, 
which is not at all guaranteed. In November 1999, when a ferry sank off the coast of 
Yantai in Shandong Province in the worst maritime disaster on record in the PRC, a 
reporter at CCTV-9’s predecessor, the CCTV English News, requested permission to 
cover the story, but was denied permission to travel. One manager noted the change: 
I think now [2004] in China, personally I feel we are much much better than one 
or two years before. We can report almost everything negative or positive, like 
you know the Huairo accident [Miyun bridge accident]. More than 37 people died 
because of the crowded audience. We send our journalists at midnight, and by 
early morning, we reported the footage. This is impossible two years earlier.  
However, with the Beijing Olympics fast approaching, the CPD is again 
pressuring media to stay away from disaster stories, banning for example all but Xinhua 
from reporting on a bridge collapse in August 2007 in Fenghuang, Hunan Province, that 
killed at least 64 people (Anon., 2007a). Commentators have noted that in the context of 
the upcoming Olympics, the relaxation control cycle (see p. 46) that has characterized the 
PRC’s media reform may well be swinging towards greater control, although by some 
measures the evidence is mixed. 
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On January 1, 2007 the government lifted some restrictions on foreign reporters 
as part of its preparations for the 2008 games. But, as veteran editor Li Datong101 noted: 
“The Communist Party policy always is to loosen up outside but tighten inside” (Liu, 
2007). Li may be right, but I would argue that any attempt to shrink the editorial space 
managers and reporters have won for themselves will only strengthen journalists’ resolve 
and resistance to push ahead with reform, even if the struggle remains largely invisible. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, the blueprint for the May 3, 2004 relaunch 
attempted to redefine what was news more towards what management and staff at 
CCTV-9 considered publicity. Resistance to the relaunch at least stalled that attempt, 
although future development of the channel may yet take editorial in the direction that Li 
Changchun wanted (see Chapter 12: Conclusion).102 
Day-to-day control in the newsroom 
Given that final editorial responsibility for CCTV-9 lay with the Controller, the 
Party/State through its agents in the CPD and SARFT only intervened in the news 
editorial system when a sensitive story broke between editorial meetings. As well as the 
weekly Tuesday meeting noted above (p.253), CCTV-9 had two daily editorial meetings. 
For the most part, the weekly and daily editorial meetings sufficed to establish what 
would be news on any given day. Within the channel, everyone from management down 
                                                 
101 In January 2006, Li Datong was fired from his post as Editor of the China Youth Daily supplement 
Freezing Point, and Freezing Point was suspended after Li openly criticized government media policy as 
intrusive, and his magazine published an article by historian Yuan Weishi about political bias in PRC 
history textbooks. 
102 In late 2007, a CCTV staffer told me the following: “To some extent, I think these years the freedom of 
media environment is not loosening, on the contrary it is tightening… President Zhang of CCTV says we 
should better not to do stories of anti-corruption of the Party during the [17th] Party Congress [in 2007]. I 
was so surprised and could not understand. The whole congress is about party building and corruption is as 
President Hu mentioned death and life for the party... Zhang also says CCTV-9 and 4 [the international 
Mandarin language channel] do not have the mission of media supervision. Its mission is to ‘publicize 
China, rather than publicize outside’.” 
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was aware of or soon learned through painful experience (see Chapter 10: Reporters) 
what could or could not be reported. Outside of the weekly and daily meetings, the 
routinization of news making ensured the political reliability of the broadcast. 
Routinization of the daily broadcasts began with the daily editorial meetings, 
which brought together the Deputy Controller in charge of news, the on-duty zhubian, the 
specialist news producers, and a member of the assignment desk, who had attended the 
latest editorial meeting at News Center, the centralized news making operation at CCTV 
that is responsible for Xinwen Lianbo. 
The report from News Center set the tone for the important stories of the day. 
After that, the Deputy Controller would relay any new instructions on reporting, the 
zhubian would report on general news, and each program producer as well as the head of 
the reporting group would outline their plans for the day. Once the meetings agreed on 
the news for the upcoming cycle, no changes would be made to the plans for coverage of 
leading stories, unless a major story broke and forced its way into the bulletin. However, 
in line with the channel’s commitment to rolling news, minor adjustments were made to 
the lineup throughout the day, as non-sensitive incoming stories from News Center, 
CCTV-4 and the agencies were slotted into the lineup to update existing stories, or to 
introduce new stories. 
Roles of the zhubian and director 
The responsibility of editorial oversight of news making at the operational level 
fell to the zhubian and the director, who oversaw the assembly of all editions of general 
news that occurred on their shift. The equivalent position of the zhubian at the BBC is 
that of Editor of the Day, the person responsible during their shift for the overall 
operation of the news system (Schlesinger, 1987, pp. 137, 156). 
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The zhubians were effectively senior producers with a trusted record of service at 
CCTV-9. During their shift they were responsible for monitoring the news for new stories 
and for updates on running stories, agreeing the lineup with the director, and checking the 
quality of the stories before they went to air. In addition, in the absence of any secretarial 
support, the zhubians were responsible for a raft of non-editorial duties ranging from 
arranging for staff without accreditation to enter the CCTV compound to ensuring the 
right number of lunches and dinners were ordered for each shift from the canteen. 
Following is how two zhubians described a typical day’s work: 
We try to arrange everything about the daily work. And we will have several 
meetings every day to decide the topics, or the stories, the main stories of the day. 
I mean to select some of them. And then we have to go over the pictures. 
Sometimes also go over the scripts of the stories. And also try to coordinate 
between different departments and between different staffs including foreign 
experts. 
Today I should be morning shift, so I start working at 8 o’clock in the morning. 
First I had a meeting with some other staffs from other, I mean the news center’s 
staff, to listen about what kind of topics they’ve collected from different sources, 
and then get these topics back, we have our own department meeting to have a 
short discussion, and to assign the work out, and then I will help the directors to 
go over the run down of the programs, and also to go over the pictures of every 
story, and also answering phone calls, like picking up the interns, or like the 
foreign expert who can’t have a pass into CCTV. And if there is some audience, 
they also call to our office, and have all different kind of questions. So we have to 
answer all questions about that. 
The extra-editorial role of the zhubians somewhat curtailed their ability to carry 
out their editorial duties: 
[Jirik] Okay, are there things you have to do, which you think you shouldn’t do? 
That somebody else should do? 
[zhubian] I think, because, like picking up some of the persons into the station, or 
like answering some phone calls of the audience, because not all the phone calls 
we have to answer. Some of them call us how to read a word, or when is your 
broadcasting. When is the show time of your program. So that kind of stuff, I 
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think maybe secretaries could take over them. Answering some unimportant 
phone calls, and also some times, I can think of a few things now. 
[Jirik] You said coordination was a problem. 
[zhubian] Coordination is a problem. Post production, new gathering, how they 
cooperate, and how can editors do their editing job in a proper way… News 
editors [zhubians], they have less time to do news editing. They are, I am often, 
often engaged in these phone calls, meaningless phone calls, and picking up 
interns at the East gate, and handing directions from the boss to the staff, 
irrelevant to news decision making. 
Moreover, with the May 2004 relaunch, several zhubians expressed a great deal of 
frustration at what they saw as the growing inability of the editorial system to deal with 
the pressure being put on it to service rolling news. 
[Jirik] Then, who’s in charge of the news? 
[zhubian] Nobody. Actually, I think it’s confused me at the very beginning … 
after May the 3rd, which means we started our new program, our new schedule, I 
just confused. I don’t know why. And people just think it’s totally nobody control 
the situation, it’s just out of control, nobody take care of the program, I don’t 
know why… 
[Jirik] What about the other producers, do they feel like you [depressed and 
confused after the relaunch], as far as you know? 
[zhubian] Yes, I think so… They will just keep working but not enthusiastically 
like before, I mean just to finish the work, and make sure there’s no severe 
problems happens, no bad mistakes take place, so that’s it. 
[Jirik] When you’re working is that a big problem, that you’re only concern is that 
you don’t make a mistake, is that like become the biggest issue? 
[zhubian] Yes, I think so. 
[Jirik] Do you care about the news anymore? 
[zhubian] Yeah, sometimes just, what you can care is the most important thing, 
but what we think is the most important thing now is just make sure you don’t 
make mistake… 
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Rather than feeling empowered as a result of the relaunch, this zhubian had lost 
confidence in their ability to intervene in the news making process, which had taken on 
the even more of the characteristics of a locomotive underway under its own momentum 
now that CCTV-9 was functioning as a rolling news channel. At best the zhubians could 
hope not to be crushed beneath its wheels. 
As a result and despite the daily editorial meetings, rather than the news reflecting 
pro-active planning and news gathering, CCTV-9 remained entrenched in a culture of re-
active news editing. The news agenda was being set by news sources, in particular 
CCTV-1 and the international news agencies (see p. 320). Under these circumstances, the 
zhubian and director were reduced to choosing from available materials stories that 
would go to air, despite their nominal authority within the editorial system. 
Technically, the role of the director was to organize the production of each news 
bulletin during their shift under supervision of the zhubian. However, at CCTV-9 the 
heavy dependence on third party material (see p. 319) effectively shifted the decision 
over what new stories to include in the lineup to the sources, which the zhubian and 
director monitored for developments on running stories and breaking stories. 
Moreover, because the director was physically present in the newsroom, he or she 
had control over the bulletin in a manner that the zhubian did not, partly because of the 
latter’s physical isolation from the writers, and partly because of the relatively greater 
number of connections to the production process the director had, compared to the 
zhubian (for more on this, see p. 316). However, the spatial disorganization of the news 
making process could be overcome if the zhubian and director had a good working 
relationship: 
[Jirik] What is the relationship between the zhubian and the director in terms of 
choosing what goes on the bulletin? 
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[director] They can change, basically we have been communicating to one another 
quite a lot. And normally they change a little. But it depends, maybe you know for 
[name] she’s a very diligent [zhubian] you mean, and probably she will change 
quite a bit. It depends. 
[Jirik] What about you, what do you feel a good director has to have? 
[director] You know, because I’m working on the rolling news service, basically I 
just update is the most important thing, and once a story, you know comes up, I 
just organize everything. 
Although the director and zhubian were responsible for choosing which stories to 
air, other staff from the writers up had a say in how each story was shaped. 
Role of the writers 
The writers at CCTV-9 ranged in expertise from interns with no knowledge of 
how to make news prior to their arrival at the channel to experienced personnel, who for 
reasons of their own had chosen not to try to move up the professional pecking order to 
become reporters. In my judgment, the best of the writers were as good as any personnel I 
encountered during my time at NBC and Reuters. They were professional journalists who 
took care and pride in their work. They were also acutely aware of the constraints under 
which they labored, in a manner largely absent from newsrooms where personnel labor 
under the shibboleth of editorial independence, seemingly oblivious to the diverse forces 
shaping their work: 
[Jirik] What is most important for you in your job? 
[writer] Getting the story right. 
[Jirik] And how do you feel when you watch your work come back on the screen, 
when you think you’ve done a good job? 
[writer] I feel, I do not feel very much about my work. 
[Jirik] You don’t feel pleasure? 
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[writer] Not pleasure, but you know, when you write a story, you just have, it’s 
not writing after all I think, it’s editing from different sources of news gathering. 
So, more specifically I think it’s, it’s the judgment of my own reason and sense, I 
think that’s the most important. 
[Jirik] Do you think that either [Controller] or [Deputy Controller] are actually 
good managers? 
[writer] They’re not managers, they’re just a middle level official. 
[Jirik] … If they’re not managers, who’s managing? 
[writer] Who is managing? I think it’s um… The orders from above manage the 
system. 
[Jirik] So within the whole system, even at the level of [Controller], you’re saying 
that he has very little autonomy? 
[writer] Right, and maneuver, to do, to maneuver. 
Role of the copy editors 
In the processing of each story, directly above the writers and reporters were the 
copy editors, for the most part native English speakers, who were hired by CCTV-9 as 
‘foreign experts.’ However, like the writers themselves, the foreign experts working at 
CCTV-9 ranged from university students and graduates attracted to Beijing but with no 
previous news experiences through to seasoned news professionals. The role of the copy 
editor was to massage the written English of the writers and reporters, who were often 
working with Reuters and Associated Press scripts or translating from Chinese scripts 
from CCTV-1 and CCTV-4, into natural spoken English for broadcast. Copy editors 
would also voice stories written by Chinese who had not passed a voice-over test, and 
were therefore prohibited from voicing their own stories. This meant copy editors in 
effect took public credit for others’ work, and in some cases attached their names to 
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stories with which they disagreed.103 The more capable ‘foreign experts’ also played a 
role in shaping stories through discussion with the writers about story angles, or simply 
through re-writing sloppy copy, which was sometimes not appreciated by the writers,104 
but usually improved their work. Following is a typical description by a copy editor of 
their work: 
I edit the copy, I basically polish the copy when it comes through from the 
Chinese writers, and try and improve on the English, and improve on the story, 
and then voice over certain stories if they ask us to. I also try and give a little bit 
of guidance to the writers, which goes beyond the scope of just grammar. It goes 
into journalistic fields, how and how not to report facts, and how to check up on 
facts. We write headlines, and we go through the lineups and we write links. We 
abuse [laughs] the people who do the shoulder boxes, because they are generally 
pretty awful. 
Given the ‘wai xuan’ function of the channel, the more experienced the foreign 
copy editor or the better their Chinese, which gave them access to Chinese-language 
sources, the more likely he or she was to encounter frustration in massaging stories that 
dealt with sensitive topics. Although PRC media operate without a legal and professional 
code of conduct, intentional falsification of news by journalists in major PRC media is 
probably no more prevalent than in mainstream Western media.105 However, PRC media 
often have no way of checking whether sources are falsifying stories. The mishandling of 
the SARS scandal, when media dutifully repeated government lies about the disease, 
                                                 
103 Copy editors were allowed to refuse to voice stories with which they disagreed. But during my time at 
CCTV-9, only one copy editor (not me) consistently did this. The others, including me, would rail against 
the stories, yet still attach their names to them. 
104 “You piss me off,” is what one writer with whom I had particularly poor relations angrily told me in 
front of the entire newsroom after I corrected a mistake in her script. This kind of public confrontation 
between writers and copy editors was rare. For the most part resentment simmered, but rarely came to the 
boil. 
105 The staggering attention to the alleged corruption of Chinese journalists in Western news stories about 
the PRC is in stark contrast to the actual evidence of fabrication. The celebrated ‘cardboard bun’ story of 
July 2007 (Blanchard, 2007), in which a Beijing TV journalist was charged with fabricating a story about 
adding cardboard to steamed buns as filler seems to be the exception, not the norm. For a discussion of the 
professionalism of journalists and the pride they take in their work and ‘getting the story right’, see Pan 
(2005) and Dong & Shi (2007). 
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occurred prior to my arrival in Beijing in 2003 (for an analysis of the SARS cover-up, see 
Sun, 2004). What does get written “is also very much affected by paid journalism” 
(Anon., 2007c) when a reporter will take money to either do or not do a story or shape it 
in a particular way (Chou Wiest, 2004). 
Where PRC media fail is not in falsification but in the partiality of their reporting, 
due to issues like institutional constraints on coverage and paid journalism.106 The CPD 
and/or SARFT can forbid reporting on sensitive issues or journalists practice self-
censorship by scrupulously telling only the government’s side of the story, without any 
reference to any other side. My own frustrations at this practice occasionally got the 
better of me and resulted in heated exchanges with management and political editors. 
However, in general the copy editors were ambivalent about their role at CCTV-9: 
[Jirik] Are you happy at CCTV-9?  
[copy editor] I have been very happy, I’ve noticed myself in the last few months 
getting more and more grouchy, or losing my temper quicker in the newsroom, 
put it that way. I think I’ve been getting, I think I just need a break from it. I am 
happy overall. I love the flexibility of the job. I love it allowing me to be here. I 
love my colleagues. And I still get a certain kick out of rushing towards the end of 
a bulletin, to do a story, to do a lineup, and headlines. I do enjoy this. But I find 
myself getting increasingly frustrated at the limits that are imposed on us. And the 
lack of progress that is made. 
[Jirik] What do you mean by limits? 
[copy editor] The censorship limits. The limits that the chief [political] editors and 
the powers that be impose when they just are not willing to take any little, I mean 
it’s their job not to, but it’s our job to try and push it a little bit I think, and it’s 
just a continual conflict of interests, and it’s frustrating, and also when, for 
example yesterday, when Culture Express we carried, I think it was three, four, I 
think maybe even five stories of concerts around China, commemorating Deng 
                                                 
106 This dissertation does not deal with corruption. CCTV-9’s general news section, in so far as most of its 
work was handling third party material, was not in a position to practice paid journalism. The head of the 
reporters’ group made clear to his team that paid journalism would not be tolerated. Whether other sections 
at CCTV-9 were practicing forms of paid journalism was a question I was not able to answer. 
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Xiaoping [on the 100th anniversary of his birth on August 22, 1904], put it in one 
story, have one spiel about how wonderful Deng Xiaoping is, not five stories 
saying exactly how wonderful he was, and I just find it incredibly frustrating 
when you get that, and when you don’t get any kind of balance at all in anything, 
and it’s just, it’s okay, but when you get it time and time again, and you’re having 
a bad day, it’s enough to make you go crazy. 
Most of the ‘foreign experts’, including myself, were either not Chinese speakers 
or were not fluent enough in Chinese or familiar enough with the mediascape to pick up 
on most of the gaps in stories and would dutifully repeat the Party and government line, 
without being aware of what more might have gone into the story. Moreover, technically 
our task was not to make editorial interventions, a criticism that was leveled at me more 
than once by directors, zhubians and in one case the Deputy Controller, although 
ironically we were constantly being asked by these same people how to improve the 
news. 
I and my foreign colleagues, for a range of reasons, believed we were doing the 
right thing by intervening as much as possible in the news making process. Most of our 
Chinese colleagues were unaware of our particular frustrations. Those that were seemed 
sympathetic, but also felt that none of us understood China, and that we really had no 
right to be changing their work, unless they were involved in or initiated the discussion. 
In principle these were excellent guidelines. But given the deadline pressure under which 
the copy editors worked, negotiating copy was not always an option. 
Moreover, it was hard to tell people, some of whom knew very little about news, 
that they were wrong, when copy editors picked up mistakes. Much unnecessary friction 
existed between the writers, reporters and political editors on the one hand and copy 
editors on the other because of misunderstandings and a lack of time to work through 
problems. The inexperience of some copy editors only exacerbated the problems, 
frustrating the better writers and reporters who could not make their story ideas 
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understood to their foreign colleagues. When copy editors, writers and reporters could 
find no agreement on a story, the political editors would be forced to adjudicate. 
Role of the political editors 
The role of the political editor was primarily to protect the channel from criticism 
from the censor (CPD) and regulator (SARFT) for using unauthorized terms such as 
“Mainland China” which might imply that Taiwan is a separate entity instead of “Chinese 
mainland,” which suggests there is more than the PRC to China, which from the point of 
view of the PRC government includes Taiwan. Apart from the grind of reading through 
every line of copy before it was voiced for air, what was left of their time was taken up 
with attempting to guide young and inexperienced writers and reporters so that their 
budding careers would not come to an abrupt halt for breaching editorial guidelines. 
However, their role also made them de facto censors, which would frustrate writers, 
reporters and copy editors attempting to push boundaries. 
The political editors did not work to a set of written rules. Rather, they brought to 
their judgments a wealth of experience of having negotiated and survived years if not 
decades inside the PRC’s media system. They were tasked with a thankless job and were 
the constant focus of carping from both the Chinese and the copy editors, although both 
groups would also thank them for picking up and correcting their mistakes. 
Although I respected their professionalism, I was ambivalent about their place in 
the newsroom and believed the channel would be better off without them, as I felt they 
erred too far on the side of caution. But operating without their insights into the limits on 
reporting was a risk management was unwilling to take, given the downside potential for 
putting a serious ‘political mistake’ to air, and the inexperience of many of the younger 
 275
staff. Perhaps in part due to the diligence of the political editors, CCTV-9 was not the 
target of a career-ending criticism from SARFT or the CPD during my time there. 
As an example of what can go wrong when editorial oversight is missing, at 
CCTV-9’s sister channel, the global Mandarin language channel CCTV-4, two producers 
were removed and a duty editor sacked when they ran a crawling news bar at the bottom 
of the screen on September 6, 2004, after the siege of Beslan, inviting viewers to text in a 
phone message for a prize, answering the question: “How many people have died so far 
in the Southern Russia hostage crisis? Is it A: 402, B: 338, C: 322 or D: 302?”107 A 
spokesman for the Russian President criticized the competition as the result of 
“incompetence and ignorance of what happened in Beslan on the part of the 
programmers… [and] monstrous hard-heartedness of those who composed the questions” 
(SCMP, 2004a). The Jiangnan Times (Nanjing) reported that the quiz “attracted the 
serious attention of the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Propaganda 
Department and SARFT.”108 In the wake of the scandal, SARFT issued a regulation 
banning unauthorized phone quizzes (Cheung, 2004). 
The primary role of the political editors was not to prevent this kind of mistake, 
which was the result of stupidity, but to deal with errors that more often than not resulted 
from inexperience rather than any attempt to subvert the editorial system. It was a 
measure of the immaturity of CCTV-9 as a news channel that it required political editors. 
But the example of CCTV-4 suggests management was wise to employ them. As already 
noted, despite their de-facto role, the political editors were not censors. That role fell to 
the Central Publicity Department and SARFT. 
                                                 
107 Source: translation by a CCTV-9 copy editor. 
108 Source: translation by a CCTV-9 copy editor. 
 276
Role of the CPD, SARFT and directives 
Censorship understood as prior constraint was a ubiquitous feature of CCTV-9 in 
its function within the ‘wai xuan’ system. Governing the actions of staff were the “four 
basic principles,” which Deng Xiaoping enunciated in 1979 as fundamental guidelines for 
CPC members and government organizations. The principles were written into the 
‘Preamble’ of the 1982 PRC Constitution and remain in force today (Li, 1995): 
1. Uphold the socialist road 
2. Uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat (in 1982, changed to “Uphold the 
people’s democratic dictatorship”) 
3. Uphold the leadership of the Communist Party 
4. Uphold Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought 
Staff at CCTV-9 said principle No.3 was de-facto the number one principle and 
the only one now taken seriously: 
These four principles are the guiding principles for our broadcasters, and have 
never been changed for decades, and will never be changed for decades ahead. 
But how to interpret is another story in China today. I think as long as you don’t 
openly publish articles to try to turn over the power of the CPC, you could be 
quite safe to say what you want. The margin of the other three principles is larger 
and larger, sometimes blurred. Few people care about them, and there has been no 
single definition of those concepts. China is much freer than it was ten years ago. 
But democracy is a long process and step by step, but the continued progress 
means people have stronger taste for making their own decisions. 
In practice, these principles governed the day-to-day practice of the staff at all 
levels, regardless of their Party affiliation, since they were working for a state-controlled 
broadcaster (for a discussion of the Party Principle system, see Zhao, 1998, pp. 19-33). 
The four principles meant certain stories simply could not be aired, or had to be aired in a 
particular way. As examples: 
• The Dalai Lama was only referred to if the reference was critical. 
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• Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian could not be called ‘President Chen’. 
• Taiwan must always be referred to as a province of China. The words ‘China’ and 
‘Taiwan’ cannot be used in the same sentence. 
• No story could be run that indicated or implied an overarching criticism of the 
CPC or government, although criticism of the performance of particular 
individuals, institutions or policies was acceptable if Xinhua or CCTV-1 was the 
source (i.e. discussing corruption as a systemic flaw was unacceptable, whereas a 
story about a particular instance of a corrupt official was acceptable). 
• Any story involving governance had to show the Party and/or government in a 
positive light (the rule of thumb was that the system was working, but individuals 
and/or institutions within the system failed) 
• As a rule of thumb, disaster stories required some mention of governance (for 
example, mine disaster stories, regardless of the cause of the disaster, emphasized 
the efforts Party and government officials were making to organize rescue work). 
• Video of senior PRC leaders should be sourced from CCTV, and not from Reuters 
and APTN if at all possible. 
• No reporting of family members of senior PRC leaders was allowed, even when 
they should have been in the news otherwise (When I asked at CCTV-9 why the 
news that the company, Nuctech, run by President Hu Jintao’s son, Hu Haifeng, 
had won a lucrative contract to supply security scanners at airports nationwide 
(Reuters, 2006), I was told “I have never heard of that news, I think none of the 
Chinese media has ever reported such story.”) 
• Any mention of the Tiananmen incident on June 3-4, 1989 was forbidden. 
• Any mention of Falun Gong was only to denounce the cult and its followers. 
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• The Catholic Pope was ignored (the PRC does not have diplomatic relations with 
the Vatican), although Pope John Paul II’s death produced a series of terse 
reports, each of them a single paragraph read out by the anchor with no video 
(Illustration 3).109 
 
Illustration 3: PRC reacts to death of Pope John Paul II 
This list is far from complete, and only includes what I picked up from working in 
the newsroom and wrote in my diary. Staff said they did not have written lists of banned 
topics, learning through experience what was and was not possible. Management 
provided updates on what were euphemistically called ‘editorial guidelines’ at the weekly 
Tuesday meetings. 
Research into banned keywords on the Internet in the PRC gives some idea of the 
range of impermissible topics in news. Brady (2005b) has summed up this research, 
noting that in 2004 about 30 percent of banned Internet keywords were sex-related, 
another 30 percent related to Falun Gong only, with the remaining 40 percent associated 
                                                 
109 The Vatican’s partial recognition of a Beijing-installed Bishop in September 2007 suggests that the 
Pope may come off the list of the PRC’s persona non-grata (Buckley, 2007). 
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with “the most sensitive topics in PRC politics” (Brady, 2005b). These ranged from 
“Sino-Russian border” (中俄边界 – zhong’e bianjie), due to accusations that former 
President and CPC General Secretary Jiang Zemin had ‘sold out’ the PRC in 1999 by 
signing a pact with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin accepting the existing borders 
between the two countries, through to the names of retired leaders such as former Premier 
Zhu Rongji (Brady, 2005b). 
Brady’s (2005a; 2005b; 2006) work is indispensable for understanding censorship 
in the PRC, and the role of the CPD in media control. She points to a vast mechanism of 
surveillance and control, which she likens to “the church in medieval Europe” (Brady, 
2006, p. 59). Like the medieval church, the CPD has absolute authority over media. As an 
example of its scope and powers of control, another analyst Sun Xupei (2004) points out 
with reference to the 2003 SARS scandal that it was “inevitable that the Chinese media 
would fail to report the SARS crisis in the early days of the outbreak” (p. 4), since 
“without permission from the Party and government, the media cannot report significant 
events” (p. 4). As Sun (2004)notes: 
Nothing in any media-related laws or regulations is designed to protect press 
freedom. Nor do the media have a right to independently report the outbreak of 
plagues so as to protect public welfare. And any report on important events or 
incidents must first be reviewed and approved by Party committees at all levels of 
the CPC or their propaganda departments; the standard for that review is whether 
the reporting is beneficial to stability and whether it is beneficial to the Party and 
the state. (p. 4) 
Sun outlines the responsibility system within media control, which puts media 
under the supervision of the government and Publicity Department at each of the four 
administrative levels – central, provincial, municipal, and county (prefectural) – and the 
hazards this poses for reporters and their sources. 
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Chinese media are all ranked within the political hierarchy, and they never 
criticize the departments of the Party and government at the same level, not to 
mention criticizing departments at a higher level. When they publish reports to 
criticize and inspect the departments of the Party and government at a lower level, 
Chinese journalists are aware of the need to protect the source of news so as to 
prevent the source from being threatened or some other revenge taken. But they 
will surely reveal the source of the news if it is demanded by the departments of 
the Party and government at the same or higher level. Nor will they conceal the 
source of news in court. The reason for all these is that Chinese media are all 
state-owned, and most are owned by the departments of the Party and 
government. Thus they have no choice but to reveal the source of their news. 
What’s more, the media are not entitled by law or social custom to protect the 
source of their news (Sun, 2004, p. 11). 
Here then is a hierarchy of control, which seemingly puts the power of the CPD 
and government over media beyond dispute. Directives and instructions from above, i.e. 
from the CPD, SARFT and CCTV management, were a fact of daily life at CCTV-9. The 
Chinese staff treated these interventions into their work as an unavoidable nuisance, as an 
injunction on reporting had the force of an absolute prohibition, until it was lifted, if at 
all. The Beslan story mentioned above was the subject of a directive that went into force 
soon after the militants occupied the school. CCTV-9 had reported the story when it 
broke with a ‘copy’ story (Illustration 4), a paragraph on a breaking story read by the 
anchor in the absence of video. CCTV-9 updated this story for the 1900 edition of World 
Wide Watch. But after that a handwritten directive was faxed to the channel banning 
further reporting. SARFT issued the directive of which the relevant part read “不要报，
不炒” (bu yao bao, bu chao – do not report it, do not stir it up). 
Swartz (2006) discusses this kind of order with Chinese reporters, including at 
CCTV, and was told: “Buyao bao, buyao chao means don’t sensationalize it. We should 
be objective. It doesn’t necessarily mean that you shouldn’t cover a certain event, but it 
stresses the importance of objective reporting. You should not focus on the sensational. If 
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you cover a small thing every day, then it’ll become a big issue” (Swartz, 2006, pp. 119-
120). 
When I asked at CCTV whether objectivity and sensationalism were the issues 
with such a directive, I was told: 
To me it’s quite clear, if someone from above said “This matter should follow the 
principle of ‘by yao bao, bu yao chao,’” that’s to me quite clear. No program 
should touch this topic, till this restriction has been lifted, or another similar event 
happens. The focus of this slogan is ‘by yao bao’. And if you ‘bao’ it, that means 
you ‘chao’ it, and you are stepping [over] the red line. 
Illustration 4:  Copy story CCTV-9, aired 1500 September 1, 2004 
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In the case of Beslan, according to staff, one concern of the CPD and SARFT 
were copy cat attacks in the PRC, especially as attacks on school children in the PRC 
were a hot topic in media and had been the subject of a number of stories in previous 
months: 
Like some of the other examples, like the kindergarten yesterday story, being 
stabbed by a doorkeeper and causing many children injured one died. Our first 
reaction, all of the media’s first reaction is to go there and cover that. We have all 
aired, this story has been the top story with pictures, with everything for almost 
half a day, and then there is a kind of demand, you know, from higher level that 
say this kind of story is not good. We should not do it. We should only do it when 
something real new happens, like another child is dying, or something really 
really important happen, otherwise we will low down the tone. I think their 
fearing is that they don’t want the international society, and wants the people in 
Beijing, may think that the city is unsafe, unstable, this may interfere, you know, 
the foreign investment and also raise out other people’s maybe their 
dissatisfaction towards the government. This maybe give them a hint to let more 
of such kind of things to happen. I think the government’s intention is good. But 
the way in dealing that is not very wise. 
Although there was sympathy on the copy cat issue, staff suggested that the CPD 
wanted to cover up attacks in the PRC, since they reflected badly on governance. Also 
noteworthy in management’s response below is the assumption that a similar editorial 
system operates in the United States as operates in the PRC: 
[Jirik] Okay, but yesterday [Beslan], but how did you feel at not being able to 
report, did you feel as a journalist that this was a good story. 
[management] It’s a story, the thing is how we cover it, okay. If we have this 
editorial policy that we perhaps shouldn’t at one moment, we shouldn’t put it into 
our news cast, or to put it as a top story, I can understand, and I think there is 
some considerations, and I think these considerations are not from, from a 
propaganda thing, but from a more consideration of the negative impact of this 
story. For example, if things happens like the kidnapping of school children, if we 
give extensive coverage, a lot, a lot, a lot, that might give some kind of clue or 
suggestion to a similar terrorist you know, elsewhere in the world. I think this 
happens in America also. After the 911, of course it’s a big thing, and then we 
cover it, and all the major networks in the US covered it. But after that I think 
they have their directives, I don’t know from where, but they have their directives 
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that we should not play the actual image of the bombing time and time again, and 
try to show this impact, and try to give this impact, try to give this always put this 
image in the minds of every American, and also in the mind of every terrorist, and 
then they can, I think, you know some considerations, perhaps are not necessarily 
inconsistent of the news value, but inconsistent of the overall well being of the 
whole society. I think that’s reasonable. But still, for example, if the images are 
too powerful, perhaps TV should not play it again and again, or should not carry it 
at the moment. But you can see it’s being carried on other news media, on the 
internet, but maybe after a while, and then, we are not trying to say that this is not 
happened. But we have some other ways, like some reactions, things like that. 
[anchor] I think the starting point is understandable. And I really agree with that, 
that if you show too many pictures of violence, you know, of people being 
beheaded, I mean there are good people, who feel disgusted about that, and there 
are people who might copy that, might learn from you know from the bad guys 
and do the same thing. So I agree with not putting too many of these kinds of 
images on TV. People will copy that, in the end. But, I would report it. But I 
wouldn’t show those graphic pictures. And, after all, news is about what 
happened. And if something substantial, you know, like twenty students were, 
you know, hurt, wounded or killed, you got to report that. I don’t think it is 
responsible, if you just say, you know, “Don’t say anything about that.” Because, 
this is one reason that people commit crime, they copy. But there are other things 
that make people commit crime. And those things are, need to be addressed, need 
to be known too. For instance, there are a lot of problems in the society, and just 
by not reporting them, does not make it better. So, you got to report the problems, 
but maybe not in a way, but not the details, no, in a different way. 
During my time at CCTV, I collected as many directives and instructions as 
possible from the computer system, where they were listed. The list is reproduced in 
Appendix 8, which includes every directive I found in the system between February 2004 
and November 2005.110 I do not know whether this list is complete or representative, 
given that directives were also issued in face-to-face meetings, by phone and by fax (as 
the case was with Beslan). The list on the computer was only those directives that were 
entered into it by different people with access to the system, from zhubians at CCTV-9 
through to people within CCTV acting on the authority of the CPD and SARFT. In 
                                                 
110 In the period of observation, February 2004 through January 2005, the list had eight directives. 
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addition, I do not know how the list was managed, so it is possible that directives were 
deleted. 
Most of the directives were ‘notices’ and appear to be internal to CCTV, the 
normal result of editorial work.111 Nevertheless the range of topics and prohibitions does 
give some insight into the editorial limits of news making in the PRC. The prohibition on 
showing the government in a bad light was obvious in directives banning coverage of a 
disgraced high-ranking Party member (#12, p. 573), and on collusion between the 
Chengdu Railway police and pick-pockets (#13, p. 574). Social stability was an evident 
issue in the prohibition on reporting the effect of rising grain prices on student food (#5, 
p. 570), and on reporting on the clash between Chinese workers and Russian police (#11, 
p. 573). Sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues were evident in directives about 
how to report on Tibetan Buddhism (#17, p. 575), sources for reporting on Hong Kong 
(#1, p. 569), and orders not to report on a protest at the Japanese embassy in Beijing (#4, 
p. 570) and rumors that former CPC General Secretary Zhao Ziyang had died (#8, 
p. 572). An attempt at spin control was evident in a ban on the Foreign Minister’s 
statement that the PRC has ruled out first use of nuclear weapons (#18, p. 576). 
To my mind, the two most interesting directives on the list concerned the 
reporting of Bird Flu, and evidence of the impact of commercialization on priorities at 
CCTV. In the case of Bird Flu, a SARFT directive (#22, p. 577) provided straight 
forward guidance about the need for accurate and socially responsible reporting on Bird 
Flu. However, within CCTV, the following directive (#19, p. 576) was issued: “关于禽
                                                 
111 It was also unclear to me, which directives were directed at CCTV-9, or whether directives targeted 
particular news channels. My rationale for believing any directive in the system applied to CCTV-9 
regardless of their source or particular target is that CCTV-9 did not have any dispensation from not 
reporting what any other news channel had been told not to report. So, a directive targeting any news 
channel would also apply to CCTV-9. However, it is quite possible that directives targeting CCTV-9 did 
not apply to other news channels at CCTV, since management made clear to staff that as a ‘wai xuan’ 
channel, CCTV-9 did not have the “media supervision” (watchdog) role that domestic news channels had. 
 285
流感的新闻，国外的咱跟着报，国内的少报。” (“Concerning Bird Flu news, if it’s 
overseas report it straight, if it’s domestic tone it down”). When I asked staff about the 
latter directive, they expressed shock and said something so irresponsible could not have 
come from the CPD. Given the furor over the SARS reporting scandal, it would seem the 
last thing the government needed was obfuscation over the situation with Bird Flu. The 
motivation for the CCTV directive remained unclear and was superseded by the SARFT 
directive, which was issued five days after the first directive and had the greater 
authority, calling for “accurate and appropriate” reporting, attention to expert analysis 
and concern to avoid social panic. 
In contrast to the call for socially responsible broadcasting about Bird Flu, a 
second directive, also presumably from within CCTV, suggested that commercialization 
might be undermining social responsibility at CCTV. The directive (#7, p. 571) was short 
and to the point. It was issued on October 10, 2004 and stated “蒙牛集团负面报道一概
不报” (“Absolutely no reporting on the negative report on the Mengniu Dairy Group”). 
There was speculation at CCTV-9 that the directive referred to a report in Beijing Ribao 
(Beijing Daily) the previous day that the Mengniu Dairy Group had failed a Beijing 
government spot check for bacteria in its iced popsicle products in the capital (Huang, 
2004). In itself the injunction might have been unremarkable. Perhaps it had been one 
store only. Perhaps the problem was in storage and not in production. In short, a 
responsible journalist would seek to clarify the source of the excessive bacteria before 
going public with a story, especially one that potentially involved risk to children. 
However, another explanation suggested was the Mengniu Group’s relationship 
with CCTV. The dairy was the broadcaster’s single biggest advertiser in 2004, buying 
310 million yuan (USD 37.6 million) worth of air time at the annual advertising auction 
in November 2003 (Chou Wiest, 2003). As a report on the toxic popsicles may have had 
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an adverse effect on CCTV’s biggest advertiser and hence its own revenue, channel 
management might have acted to prevent broadcasting the news.112  I was unable to 
ascertain the reason for the injunction. Without evidence of harm, it was a minor 
domestic story and of no merit for CCTV-9. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between CCTV and the Mengniu Group and the 
fact of the directive begged for further clarification, if only to clear CCTV of the 
suggestion of corporate malfeasance. Despite cynicism amongst staff about the directive, 
as far as I know no attempt was made to follow up to find out whether this was a story. 
This is not to suggest staff were not interested in the story, only that they had been 
gagged, a situation that irritated and at times angered them. 
On November 26, 2004, for example, the CPD faxed a one-line directive stating 
“Do not report on the incident at the school in Ruzhou, Henan.”113 The directive banned 
further reporting on what was one of the day’s biggest running stories after a man had 
stabbed to death eight sleeping teenage school boys in their dormitory the previous day. 
One staff member on duty later recalled their anger at the time: “You feel so frustrated. 
At that time, you feel like you really hate the government. You feel like you are covering 
up from the people.” 
This sense of frustration brings me to the core issue of control at CCTV-9. Rather 
than external agencies, or higher authorities within the channel exercising control over 
the broadcast, editorial control was primarily a function of self-control and the 
internalization of restraint through self-censorship, the result of socialization into the 
routines of news making, including professionalism understood as obeying management 
                                                 
112 I am indebted to a foreign colleague at CCTV-9 for drawing this directive and the background story to 
my attention. 
113 I saw this fax, but it not included in Appendix 8 because it was not on the computer system. 
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and ipso facto the censors and regulatory authorities, and concern over pay and 
conditions. 
Self-censorship 
Self-censorship was the norm at CCTV-9. Every person I interviewed, from 
management down to the interns, admitted to self-censorship in one form or another, and 
most of my respondents said self-censorship was a greater constraint on their work than 
censorship. 
[Jirik] Who censors your work? 
[staff] Well you have a self-censorship, because you have rules and principles that 
have been given to you by the publicity department, China’s ideological 
watchdog. 
[staff] For example we receive more, you know, orders from the above levels of 
administrators of the propaganda machine says this could be doing, and could be 
not. Their basic idea is to not to put bad images on China, and to say, to help 
China improve its images, and help China to get more money from the 
international community, get more support from the outside world. So, they 
thought that having some negative reports will not be contribution to that. So they 
will not allow us. The orders are much much more now [following the May 2004 
relaunch]… But this also makes a big problem for us, who really handle the news, 
because when they have more orders, many other people will be doubted what can 
do and what cannot be done. So the self-censorship must be improved. You know 
we have the censorship from above, but what is more invisible hand is self-
censorship… But who are the censors? Actually the censors are invisible. But it’s 
real, because whenever you really make mistakes, you will be removed from the 
position. 
[staff] I remember during the SARS period. Foreign reporters were criticizing 
Chinese reporters’ responsibilities. They said they kind of very sharp and said 
reporters don’t have the responsibilities to report how serious, and then make it, 
not supervising the government at least, and make the whole thing worsening. But 
what we argue is about, how can an individual reporter do anything, because in 
Western media you have law to protect the interests of reporters. But in China, we 
don’t have. Maybe if we really did something, maybe it could be an end to your 
career, to what you make a living. I mean you have to have this very practical 
thinking about that. 
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[Jirik] Do you practise self-censorthip? 
[staff] Yes. I think it’s kind of a must for people working here… I’m trying to, to 
make a balance between my own judgment and the news policy in China. 
[Jirik] In terms of control, do you see more control exercised through direct 
censorship, or self-censorship? 
[staff] Maybe self censorship more important, yeah, because we know what we 
been doing, this kind of thing. Yeah, we don’t need somebody to tell us not to do 
this, do that, not to do this kind of thing. 
Socialization into the routines of news making & pay and conditions 
From the above quotes, clearly self-censorship fed into the routines of news 
making. Staff were aware that their jobs and livelihood depended on avoiding criticism of 
their work. Every attempt to push the reporting envelope was weighed beforehand by the 
possible consequences of breaching an unseen, constantly shifting, yet very real line 
between the permissible and impermissible. 
In deciding just how far to go, writers and reporters were aware that the 
opportunities for media work rarely got any better than CCTV in the PRC for Chinese 
nationals who wanted to work for local as opposed to foreign media, as one reporter, who 
had been courted by foreign media, explained to me in turning down an offer. He wanted 
to make a difference and he could only do that working for domestic as opposed to 
foreign media. 
As a national level medium, CCTV had the authority to report nationwide and 
with relative impunity on events affecting all levels of the Party and government, except 
the central levels of the CPC and government. Should a journalist choose to leave CCTV, 
he or she had the opportunity to work for foreign media, or for lower-tier media, for 
example at the provincial or municipal level. Few chose to. The added money at foreign 
media was attractive to some. But for others commitment to the PRC’s media 
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development came first. Although Shanghai TV was seen as a possible alternative to 
CCTV-9, at the time it did not have an English-language channel. Other broadcasters 
simply could not compete with CCTV, and CCTV-9 attracted away from provincial and 
municipal broadcasters their best English-language talent. 
Even when CCTV and CCTV-9 were hit by a budget crisis in late 2004, few staff 
took the opportunity to leave. Beginning in October 2004, the government began an audit 
of CCTV. The audit scuttled the practice of salaries being topped up through what 
amounted to an expense reimbursement system that was used to double and in cases triple 
salaries. Before the audit, total salaries (including reimbursement) at CCTV-9 ranged 
from unpaid internships through to about 20,000 yuan (USD 2,400)114 a month for a 
senior zhubian. Most non-management salaries for established Chinese staffers fell in the 
6,000 to 10,000 yuan (USD 700 to USD 830) range per month. Foreign experts were paid 
8,990 (USD 1080) per month if they chose to live in a furnished apartment at a foreign 
experts’ compound at the Friendship Hotel paid for by CCTV, or 14,990 yuan (USD 
1800) per month if they chose to find their own accommodation.115 
The audit only affected Chinese salaries and cut them by as much as two-thirds. 
Staff were extremely bitter about the pay cuts, which brought their salaries more into line 
with the Beijing average, which in 2004 was 3,000 yuan per month in the state-owned 
media sector.116 
Despite sporadic attempts by management in the months following the audit to 
increase salaries, the situation had not improved by late 2005. Nevertheless, few staff 
chose to leave. Of those I spoke to who did, all said they were leaving as much for the 
                                                 
114 Exchange rate on the day of the interview. Figures in USD are all rounded to the nearest 10 dollars. 
115 Foreigners not employed as foreign experts were paid per show. The highest paid of the foreigners was 
a presenter, whose contract paid them 600 yuan per 40 minute taping session, about USD 110 per hour. 
116 Source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexeh.htm  
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chance to pursue other interests as for the money, having decided CCTV was not the right 
place for them to work. In no case did bitterness over the loss of salary segue into active 
sabotage of the workplace, although from writers up, respondents told me they were less 
inclined to do more than the minimum required to get the bulletins to air, that they felt 
cheated and that they had lost their enthusiasm for the work. On balance though, most 
staff who wanted to remain in journalism had nowhere else to go. 
EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND RESISTANCE 
From the above picture, the question of editorial responsibility, let alone 
resistance seems almost like a non-question. Given the scale of the external apparati of 
surveillance and control arrayed against CCTV as an institution and the deep imbrication 
of CCTV-9 in the Party/State’s ‘wai xuan’ system, how much editorial responsibility 
personnel had is open to question. And in this context, is the possibility of resistance even 
thinkable? 
Given the historical dual role of media makers as servants and critics of the power 
structure, staff at CCTV-9 had little incentive for the most part to report against the grain 
of the editorial agendas being set by CCTV-1 and the international news agencies. For 
the most part these agendas matched their own, to report in an accurate and timely 
fashion about domestic and international issues. However, the ‘wai xuan’ function of 
CCTV-9 meant that particular attention had to be paid in reporting the domestic and 
foreign policy story in a manner conducive to promoting the PRC’s image abroad. When 
that demand conflicted with the editorial priorities at CCTV-9, space opened up for 
resistance. The challenge was greatest for reporters (see Chapter 10: Reporters). 
However, even in the general news group resistance was possible. But it was an invisible 
form of resistance, which is best understood as a refusal. And it was all the more 
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powerful for being invisible, since it was also invisible to the censorial and regulatory 
authorities. 
Bentham’s panopticon is an appropriate metaphor for the context in which the 
editorial system at CCTV-9 operated. The Central Publicity Department was the invisible 
seat of surveillance which operated as an unseen but ever present psychological force 
instilling discipline in media makers. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) discusses 
the training of bodies associated with the discipline of the army that was introduced into 
an array of institutions – the school, the hospital, the prison – as a means of producing 
docile bodies that would govern themselves under the threat of perpetual surveillance 
exercised by the panopticon. The editorial system at CCTV-9 worked like an orrery (and 
we should not forget that Louis Althusser was Foucault’s teacher), producing docile 
media makers who could be relied on to make politically correct news, all by themselves, 
with a minimum of actual intervention. Except of course, as Foucault (1983) pointed out 
(and E. P. Thompson (1979) noted with respect to Althusser’s orrery) the efficiencies 
sought in the disciplines of the panopticon were not guaranteed. The system simply did 
not work in the way it was designed: 
After a while, after more than one century trying this disciplinary system, people 
noticed that it was not at all the most economical means, but a rather costly, and 
that there are much more efficient and discreet and implicit ways of forming and 
leading peoples than these disciplinary techniques. (Foucault, 1983) 
The disciplinary techniques failed because the bodies refused to be made docile. 
Foucault (Rabinow, 1984) discusses the failure of the 17th and 18th Century “police” state 
in France: 
It seems to me that at the very moment it becomes apparent that if one governed 
too much, one did not govern at all that one provoked results contrary to what one 
desired… that aside from torture and execution, which preclude any resistance, no 
matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always remains the possibility 
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of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings. (Rabinow, 1984, pp. 241-
242) 
Applied to the PRC, one begins to see how the power of the CPD functions and 
why it may be rather more limited than it might appear to be. Brady (2005b; 2006), for 
example, outlines an impressive apparatus of surveillance and control, including of the 
internet. But as a study conducted out of UC Davis suggests, censorship of the internet is 
more “erratic” than generally considered and that the PRC’s firewall that “tries to sanitize 
web browsing is much more porous than previously thought” (BBC, 2007). Importantly 
though, “[d]espite the failures of the blocking system, the researchers said the idea that 
web browsing was being overseen often acted as a spur to self-censorship” (BBC, 2007). 
Similarly at CCTV-9, censorship was far more erratic than might be expected 
from a body so powerful as the CPD, except when one considers how much media the 
department has to police, how thinly spread are its forces, and as a result, how much 
media is likely to go to air unobserved. 
Media makers at CCTV-9 were well aware that the likelihood of being observed 
was minimal, but the risks of putting to air something that could incur the wrath of the 
censor mitigated against it happening, should it be seen. This is the classic sense in which 
the panopticon is supposed to function. However, as Foucault (cited in Rabinow, 1984) 
himself noted, and Certeau (1984) would later make central to his criticism of the system, 
the panopticon was partial and inefficient. Too much could go unobserved. For the most 
part, the CPD has no way of knowing what is actually happening inside media in the 
PRC. It operates through observing content. What it cannot see is what does not go into 
content. And this is what I call ‘refusal,’ and at CCTV-9 it was a powerful form of 
resistance to oversight. 
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In my time at CCTV, the single best example of refusal was CCTV-9’s treatment 
of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Deng Xiaoping on August 22nd, 1904. As the 
leading architect of the post-Mao PRC, Deng is a revered figure, and in a state-controlled 
media system, lavish coverage was to be expected in late August 2004. Like other media 
(see below, Illustration 5 & Illustration 6), CCTV was told to feature the anniversary. But 
at CCTV-9, although tributes were paid to Deng, the general news department refused to 
embrace the obeisance, delegating the honor of coverage of the anniversary to the 
entertainment news program, Culture Express (see p. 272). The decision to downplay the 
anniversary was taken by the Editorial Board: 
[I]t’s better to do nothing, than do something… I can imagine that only a year, 
two year ago, if the anniversary of Deng Xiaoping, and we have orders to 
elaborate this date, to tell the world how much achievements Deng Xiaoping has 
helped China achieve, that we will do a series, many many angles, economic 
benefits, students out of school, but go back to school, and Deng Xiaoping’s you 
know theory. But this year … what we did is only a documentary. But for the 
news we didn’t do anything almost, because everyone knows to make an 
objective report, if we have conclusion of Deng Xiaoping, we must mention the 
Tiananmen Square incident… And we argued over what should we do if should 
cover. What does this specific date mean to an audience to a target audience of the 
western countries, what would be their reactions to say too much good words to 
Deng Xiaoping. But we just do some you know factual, and one or two must done 
self-produced stories, and only have the documentary ‘Who is Deng Xiaoping,’ 
blah, blah, blah… We are doing this. But we are not doing something as what 
maybe some of the officials expected to do. 
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Illustration 5: CRI (online) Tribute to Deng 
What does not exist cannot be measured, so I cannot make a case for how much 
resistance staff at CCTV-9 offered in the form of refusal. But the case of downplaying 
Deng’s anniversary was an excellent example of Certeau’s weapons of the weak, a tactic 
by which the strategies of political authority were evaded. 
In their discussion of Certeau, Pan & Lu (2003) note that professionalism is one 
of the tactics that PRC journalists use against the Party and government. As one staff 
member noted about the more egregious demands made by the external authorities, 
“They let [want] you to lie but because of China’s media improvement no media 
journalists wants to be a liar, neither Xinhua, China Radio International, or our TV 
station.” From my observation at CCTV-9, this kind of professionalism was becoming 
the norm. For all its powers of surveillance and control, the CPD was more limited than is 
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generally understood in its ability to act, especially against refusal, since inaction 
amounted to invisibility and as such evaded the all-seeing gaze of the panopticon. 
 
Illustration 6: People’s Daily (online) Tribute to Deng 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have outlined the editorial system at CCTV-9. As part of the 
Party/State’s ‘wai xuan’ system, CCTV-9 is imbricated into the hierarchy of governance 
within the PRC and plays a key role as an international mouthpiece for the Party/State. In 
keeping with the principle of democratic centralism a line can be drawn directly from a 
writer at CCTV-9 directly to the Politburo through twelve degrees of separation. The 
pressure not to make mistakes within this system is diffused through a series of editorial 
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checks and balances that ensure political mistakes do not enter the broadcast at any point 
of the production system. 
The bulk of the responsibility for getting the news to air falls on the directors and 
zhubians, although ultimate responsibility for any errors that do occur resides with the 
controller. Socialization into the routines of news production is functional to the 
normalization of self-censorship, which is further reinforced by concern over pay and 
conditions. Despite ubiquitous censorship from external agencies, self-censorship is the 
primary means on ensuring editorial guidelines are not breached by writers and reporters. 
Copy editors and political editors further refine the product although the former play a 
somewhat antagonistic role within the news productions system, even as they massage 
the final product into a shape appropriate for air. Although the conventions of television 
news have evolved in a manner that privileges the performance of anchors, they are 
almost irrelevant to the news production system, functioning primarily as ‘talking heads,’ 
who brand the channel for the public. In sum, CCTV-9 works on a loosely held leash, 
rarely straying beyond the permissible limits of reporting laid down by the CPD and 
SARFT, re-emphasized at weekly editorial meetings and internalized as the norms of 
daily working life. 
However, the normalization of self-censorship through the routinization of news 
production largely evacuates any immediate sense of the role of the censorial and 
regulatory authorities in day-to-day news making. Although staff understand and are 
aware of the control that external authorities have over their work, in their day-to-day 
jobs they do not experience this control as coercive because they are aware of its limits. 
The institutional forces shaping the story and the habitus of journalistic agency create a 
field in which hegemony rather than coercion better explains news production. Consent 
to domination is the unwritten contract that binds the workers of CCTV to their jobs. 
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But this contract is also a license that empowers journalists to push against those 
limits. As a result, the news making process remains fraught with tension as competing 
forces within the journalistic field work to shape its limits. Although the members of the 
reporting group at CCTV-9 were the most obvious agents in this constant struggle for 
control of the story (see Chapter 10), the bulk of the news was created by writers from 
third party sources. Their work was institutionalized in the monotony of 24-hour news 
production. On the surface, their contribution was unremarkable. But in the context of the 
goals the CPD has set for CCTV-9, even unremarkable work can have unintentionally 
subversive potential. Downplaying Deng’s birth anniversary was an example of refusal as 
a tactic of resistance that was exercised even within the general news group. 
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Chapter 9: Production 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the news editorial system within which 
CCTV-9 was imbricated and the system as it functioned within the channel. In this 
chapter, I want to move away from self-censorship, censorship and the pressure put on 
media by external agencies such as the CPD and SARFT to analyze everyday news 
production. 
The process of production was one of constantly and rhythmically moving stories 
through the different stages of news making to ensure a regular supply for each bulletin. 
The primary tasks of production were to make news and simultaneously reduce to a 
minimum the possibility of errors in the story making process, whether errors of content, 
narrative or production. As a result an extremely regimented news production system was 
in operation at CCTV-9, similar to the systems that operate at broadcasters like CNN-I 
and the BBC-WS. The less disruption there was to the news making system, the more 
efficiently it ran. 
In Chapter 7, I focused on the resistance to change that characterized the May 
2004, relaunch. In Chapter 8, I looked at editorial control and its negotiation. In this 
chapter, I focus on the continuity of the news production system before and after the May 
2004 relaunch, despite the shift to rolling news, a change that management achieved by 
putting news or news-related shows at the top of every hour. 
Despite the sense, evident from the previous chapter, that directors and zhubians 
in particular felt that they were working much harder, Figure 2 (p. 208) shows that the 
output of the general news team (Asian News (pre-relaunch), CCTV News, News 
Updates (post-relaunch), World Wide Watch) was almost the same pre- and post-
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relaunch. Again this suggests that despite the relaunch, continuity prevailed over change 
in the news production system. 
In this chapter, I begin with a brief summary of the role of continuity in news 
production in general. I then focus on production with an introduction that contextualizes 
production in terms of the audience and the impact conceptualization of the audience has 
on production. Following this, I address the issues of time and space in organizing 
production and the routinization of the production process at CCTV-9 through the use of 
repeat stories and limitations on source material. In the second half of the chapter, I look 
at the process of production of stories as they made their way through the production 
system, I outline flaws in the system, in particular its inability to deal with breaking news. 
Finally, I look at my own attempt to influence production at CCTV-9. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide an accurate as possible a picture of the general news production 
process. 
This chapter is the second of three that deal with elements of the research 
question: 
• How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? 
The intermediate question and subordinate questions this chapter addressed were 
as follows: 
o How did the production system at CCTV-9 work? 
 What was the role of continuity in news production? 
 What was the production system at CCTV-9? 
 How did news makers maximize efficiency in news production? 
 What were the key problems in the CCTV-9 news production 
system? 
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 What was my role at CCTV-9? 
THE ROLE OF CONTINUITY IN NEWS PRODUCTION 
Continuity is a staple of any successful news operation. A wealth of insights 
(Altheide, 1974; Benson & Neveu, 2005; Clausen, 2003; Epstein, 1973; Ericson, 
Baranek, & Chan, 1989; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Golding & Elliott, 
1979; Küng-Shankleman, 2000; Schlesinger, 1987; Soloski, 1989; Swartz, 2006; 
Tuchman, 1978 et al.) exists into news making in both commercialized and public service 
settings, many of which point to the role of continuity in institutional settings and the 
organization of news production as the sine qua non of an efficient newsroom. As 
Galtung & Ruge (1965) noted over four decades ago, news for the most part is not new, 
but olds (existing stories, repetition of themes, focus on the same narrow set of topics, 
repeated use of the same sources, etc.). Although a cultural understanding of news, such 
as that proposed by Carey (1989) and defended by Schudson (2005) in which news is a 
form of stabilizing and organizing reality and our place in it goes some way to explaining 
the thesis put forward by Galtung & Ruge, as an institution news is still defined by its 
ability to constantly appear fresh. Therefore, the paramount task facing any news 
organization is to ensure the stable and orderly processing of olds in a manner that 
constantly elides time so that the present moment is the only one that matters, and to 
stabilize, process and allocate efficiently an appropriate place in the construction of 
reality for any story, which, atypically, is new. 
Efficiency is achieved through the organization of news making, and 
organizational issues of news production cross borders. The characteristic features of 
output are common to all news programs: an anchor or anchors,117 a backdrop, a limited 
                                                 
117 Some news shows, including at CCTV-9, have introduced dual anchors in a bid to generate on air 
‘chemistry,’ which is how one consultant described a recommendation, subsequently taken up by 
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set of forms of stories from live shots to telephone interviews, studio guests, graphics, 
often animated nowadays. The same technologies built by an extremely small group of 
companies – Sony, Matushita (Panasonic), Avid, etc. – put to the same ends are deployed 
in every news organization worldwide. Variations on the same set of shots frame every 
bulletin – wide opening, close-up on the anchor, cut to opening story, etc. Politics, 
business, society (usually in the form of stars, including many ordinary people having 
fifteen minutes of Warholian fame, regardless of whether they want it), science and 
technology, sports and weather make up the rundown (or lineup, the running order of 
stories on a news show). 
Almost nothing out of the ordinary ever happens on the news, especially as news 
increasingly normalizes every form of extra-ordinary behavior or happening. After initial 
“shock and awe”, the horror of children being blown to bits in Iraq and hostages having 
their heads cut off seemed passé. After the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 laid 
waste to the region, misery became mise-en-scene as the focus of the story shifted from 
the victims to the reporters themselves. In the context-less flow of images that is 
television news, time stops, context is elided and history disappears. What the viewer 
sees is not some irruption into the banality of everyday life, but the extraordinary color 
and range of everyday life reduced to the banality of editorial norms and the production 
process. And for that process to work, above all it needs to be organized efficiently. 
Efficient organization is achieved through continuity: continuity of story choice 
and presentation, sources, and processing. Accordingly, one should expect to find similar 
news gathering and news making procedures at any news making site, regardless of 
whatever claims they make to editorial differences. From my previous work at CCTV, 
                                                                                                                                                 
management in 2004 to use dual anchors on Biz China. However, the ‘chemistry’ failed to materialize and 
Biz China would later revert to a single anchor format. 
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and its comparison with work at NBC and Reuters (see, Jirik, 2004) clearly this was the 
case at CCTV-9. Therefore, one has much to learn about the organization of CCTV-9 and 
the role of continuity within it from studying the extant literature on news systems, which 
are usually considered to be ideologically incommensurable with the PRC news system. 
Regardless of the formal relationship between media and the power structure, at the level 
of production, mainstream news systems worldwide display the same characteristics of 
serving power – attention to official sources and perceived ‘authorities,’ exclusion of 
dissident and dissenting voices, a narrow range of topics that rarely tracks away from a 
norm defined as the middle ground between the limits of what is considered political, 
economically and socially safe to broadcast. 
The employment and corporate issues, socialization into the norms of the 
workplace, and routinization of news production that enable and constrain continuity in 
the public service and commercial broadcast systems are well known (Fishman, 1980; 
Golding & Elliott, 1979; Schlesinger, 1987; Schudson, 1991 et al.). As I have noted 
elsewhere, the literature (He, 2000b; Pan, 2000) suggests similar enabling and 
constraining processes operate in China (Jirik, 2000). Television journalists from 
anywhere would have been familiar with key elements of CCTV-9’s newsroom, where 
constant deadline pressure drove round-the-clock conveyor-belt assembly of news (Jirik, 
2000). As I have stated elsewhere, my experience as an assistant desk editor at NBC 
(based in Moscow) and as a news producer at Reuters led me to the conclusion during my 
time at CCTV that, in terms of the organizational parameters of news making, the 
CCTV-9 newsroom differed little from newsrooms with which I was more familiar (Jirik, 
2004). 
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CONTINUITY IN PRC NEWS PRODUCTION 
The continuities associated with CCTV-9 are evident from a comparison of 
lineups from four different phases in the evolution of the channel. Table 12 (below) 
shows a comparison of programming from 2001, one year after the launch of CCTV-9, 
September 2002, May 2003 and May 2004, post-relaunch. Of the twenty-two programs 
broadcast in 2001, sixteen were on air in September 2002, seventeen in May 2003 and 
eleven in May 2004. Between 2001 and May 2004, six new shows – Nature & Science, 
Rediscovering China, Travelogue, World Insight, Up Close and Weather – had been 
introduced. Of these six, all but Up Close and Weather were on air by September 2002. 
As Chapter 7 emphasized, the May 2004 relaunch was intended to make a radical break 
with the existing structure and function of the channel. However, from the discussion to 
date and from Table 12, continuity has clearly been a key feature of the development of 
CCTV-9. 
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Apart from the discussion in Chapter 7, another key reason for continuity was the 
longevity of senior personnel at the channel, who considered even the Controller, who 
was appointed head of the English News department in 1998, an outsider. But perhaps the 
key cause of continuity at CCTV-9 was the organizational imperatives of a 24-hour 
Table 12: Comparison of programming (source: CCTV-9) 
2001 September 2002 May 2003 May 2004 
Around China Around China Around China Around China 
   Asia Today 
   Biz China 
Business Guide Business Guide Business Guide  
    
CCTV News CCTV News CCTV News CCTV News 
Centre Stage Centre Stage Centre Stage Centre Stage 
 China in the 20th Century   
China Re-Discovery    
China This Week China This Week China This Week China This Week 
China Today China Today China Today  
Chinese Civilization  Chinese Civilization Chinese Civilization 
Chinese Cooking    
Culture Express Culture Express Culture Express Culture Express 
Dialogue Dialogue Dialogue Dialogue 
Documentary Documentary Documentary Documentary 
Financial Report Financial Report Financial Report  
Financial Review Financial Review Financial Review  
Kung Fu    
Learning Chinese Learning Chinese Learning Chinese Learning Chinese 
Music Box Music Box   
 Nature & Science Nature & Science Nature & Science 
News Asia  News Asia  
 News Updates  News Updates 
 Rediscovering China Rediscovering China Rediscovering China 
Shanghai Today Shanghai Today Shanghai Today  
Sports Scene Sports Scene Sports Scene Sports Scene 
   Sports Weekend 
 Travelogue Travelogue Travelogue 
TV Guide    
   Up Close 
   Weather 
 World Insight World Insight World Insight 
World Wide Watch World Wide Watch World Wide Watch World Wide Watch 
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channel. Once the editorial and production systems were put in place with the launch of 
CCTV-9 in September 2000, any attempt to change them would have disrupted the 
existing news making processes. The zhubians and directors who were managing the day-
to-day activities of the newsroom were effectively servicing a news making machine that 
was running under its own momentum, only making minor adjustments to the lineup as 
each new bulletin approached. Given its mass and velocity, any attempt to change the 
speed and direction of this machine would require a colossal expenditure of energy. 
Allowing it to continue to run on its existing course was both safer and required far less 
effort. It was safer, because it was the system they knew. And it required far less effort to 
continue working in a manner with which they were familiar than risk learning a different 
way of doing the news, especially when few of them had any experience of rolling news 
operations. 
THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM AT CCTV-9 
The CCTV-9 news production system was highly regimented. On average every 
day writers, directors, producers, copy editors, political editors, anchors and a small team 
of reporters were responsible for filling 11.6 hours of news-related output pre-relaunch 
and 13.4 hours post-relaunch (see Figure 2, p. 208). 118  Post-relaunch, general news 
programming (CCTV News, News Updates, World Wide Watch) was broadcast live 
except for the 1300 CCTV News, which was a repeat of the 1200 bulletin. However, the 
1300 CCTV News could go live as needed. The general news teams were responsible for 
almost exactly the same amount of news each day pre- and post-relaunch, 5.5 hours and 
5.6 hours respectively (see Figure 2, p. 208). 
                                                 
118 From Figure 2, but discounting Dialogue and World Insight, which were Current Affairs. 
 306
The regimentation of the news production system was achieved through 
organization and routinization of work in the news room. Each day was divided into four 
six-hour blocks of programming (see Table 7, p. 204 & Table 8, p. 205). Each block was 
composed of almost the same elements, allowing for Features to cycle each program four 
times during the day. The specialist news programs and Current Affairs were a mix of 
some live programming during the day and repeat bulletins after midnight (Beijing Time) 
until the following morning. The regimentation of the news production system was 
maintained through a number of mechanisms: in particular, tight editorial oversight of the 
production teams, and routinization of newsroom practice. 
The shift structure, production teams & the issue of the audience 
The shift structure and make up of the production teams before and after the May 
2004 relaunch varied as management attempted to develop a system that would service 
the envisaged rolling service post-relaunch. Management experimented with two 
different structures of the production team. One was time based, the other was function 
based. 
The time-based system was the original. A production team was headed by a 
zhubian, who was responsible for a production team consisting of the zhubian, writers 
and director for fixed shows. That team would work the same shifts and take 
responsibility for the same shows throughout the week. With the advent of the rolling 
news service, management experimented with function-based teams, splitting off 
zhubians, directors and writers into different groups. Moreover, the rotation of staff was 
not synchronized, so the same zhubians, directors and writers could not be counted on to 
work together. 
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The attempt to shift to function-based production caused considerable confusion. 
The sense of team spirit that had developed under the old system was missed by staff at 
all levels, as they lost the sense of camaraderie that had been part of their experience of 
the work place. They felt they were simply coming to work and servicing the news, 
without taking any responsibility for their work. Moreover, the zhubians themselves were 
split over which system was more efficient. Some wanted a return to the team-based 
system. Others wanted to stick with the time-based system: 
[zhubian] I think [the Controller] has finally understood it is wrong to break the 
old teams into new teams, and he thinks, now he thinks it is correct to have, to 
give people a sense of responsibility, like you own the show, you’re not here as a 
part timer, to come in and write, and do the writing and do the scrolling of the 
news. I think he finally has some sense of giving people a sense of owning the 
show… [The] system now is that the daobo [director] is the daobo, and the writer 
is the writer, and I am writing for the day, and I’m off for the other days, and I 
don’t give a damn to the whole news, and everything, it’s out of my mind. 
[Jirik] But the idea was not accepted, basically because the producers rejected the 
idea? 
[zhubian] Yeah, I think you can say that, because we all think it’s not realistic, 
you cannot divide people like [the Controller] wants because there’s too small 
group, if you just divided those people, you cannot, we cannot make the news 
revolving like at present. 
However, in late 2004, due to general dissatisfaction among the news makers the 
function-based system was abandoned and production returned to the team-based system. 
Under both systems, the actual number of people required to make news did not change. 
The day was broken down into three shifts: early morning, daytime and evening with 
midnight to early morning operating on a skeleton shift. Depending on the shift, making 
the news would be a zhubian, a director, two to five writers depending on the time of day, 
one to three copy editors depending on the time of day, one to two political editors 
depending on the time of day and an anchor. 
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More staff were needed in the afternoon and evening to produce prime time 
programming, which was the bloc that ran from 1900 to 2230 Beijing time and included 
the day’s key editions of Asia Today (post-relaunch), Biz China, CCTV News, and 
World Wide Watch. These editions were key because they included the day’s top PRC 
news, foreign policy news, and news from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao that served 
the Party/State’s interests in line with the channel’s remit to be a ‘window on China.’ 
This bloc also included the start of the cycle of soft news (Culture Express, Sports 
Scene), Current Affairs and Feature programming, which was then repeated throughout 
the following 24-hours. 
The concept of prime time would normally be redundant in a rolling 24-hour 
news service. But CCTV-9’s dual status as a window on China and the world justified it. 
However, one of the unintended consequences of the dual function of CCTV-9 as a 
window on China and the world played into a parochialism that mitigated against staff 
developing a sense of servicing a global channel. Moreover, the dual window created a 
bifurcated audience. Attention to prime time meant news makers were focused on the 
audience in the PRC (primary Beijing from responses in interviews) and not abroad, 
although management would stress that the intended audience was primarily overseas. 
My interlocutors either contradicted one another or were frustrated at themselves 
and/or management for failing to clarify the issue of the audience: 
[executive producer] I would like to start a big discussion and debate on two very 
key questions. One is who is our real target audience. How can we compete with 
CNN, BBC, from what perspective, from what advantage, we can compete with 
CNN, BBC… 
[Jirik] In your opinion, who should be the real target audience? 
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[executive producer] I think two sides. One is foreigners in China... The second is 
what I really want to know is how much attractive and how much coverage, how 
much ratings are our audience outside China.  
[zhubian] That’s the problem…, because still I don’t know what’s the main 
audience of our channel, either the people in Beijing, the foreigners in Beijing, or 
the people abroad. So I don’t know in which way we can please them… I don’t 
think we have a clear idea, what, who are watching CCTV-9. I think that’s the 
biggest problem. 
[writer] [W]e, every day ask the question, what is my, what is the target audience 
is, because every time you write a story, you got to think to yourself what am I 
writing to, right? But for CCTV, never, none of this is so clear in our mind, who 
are the target audience… 
[Jirik] So you’re saying management has not told you who the audience is? 
[writer] I don’t think we are clear about that. Even the writers, or field reporters. 
Are we clear? … I cannot tell from the people working around me, or they say 
nothing, I don’t know, I think they should say our target should be, should be, but 
this is carried out vaguely… 
[Jirik] When you develop a story, do you have a target audience in mind? 
[reporter] Well, I think that answer relates to the general philosophy of CCTV-9. 
CCTV-9’s audience is targeted at people who, who speak English inside China, 
and those people, who, foreign people living in other parts of the world. But, I 
don’t see there is a market analysis of the target audience, so I don’t have a clear 
picture of where these people are. But just an idea that they are in North America, 
in Europe and in Singapore and some other parts of Asia. And most probably, the 
majority of those are still in mainland China. 
[zhubian] We used to target American audience, the intellectuals. But it seems 
from the results, from the feedback, emails, phone calls, it seems that domestic 
foreigners in China is an un-neglectable audience of CCTV-9. And I think where 
the market lies is this audience. Domestic foreigners. 
Not surprisingly, given the level of confusion over the imagined audience the 
news makers were attempting to address, in a manner similar to the phenomenon 
Schlesinger (1987) observed at the BBC where colleagues and management proved to be 
the primary target audience of news makers, the really relevant audience and the one 
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most immediately evident and accessible to staff at CCTV-9 was one’s colleagues and 
superiors. 
A zhubian brought this home to me when CCTV-9 reported on Jiang Zemin’s 
retirement from his last official post of power, that of Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) on September 1, 2004 (BBC, 2004). The resignation was officially 
made public on September 19, 2004 (BBC, 2004).119 However, when CCTV-9 reported 
on Jiang’s resignation, to my mind ‘the lead’ (the Jiang element) was buried at the bottom 
of an otherwise tedious report lacking any substance about the activities of the “fourth 
plenary session of the 16th CPC Central Committee,” which had accepted his resignation. 
So, I rewrote the story completely, moving Jiang’s resignation to the top of the story. 
Clearly frustrated with my action, the zhubian on duty refused to accept the changes, 
insisting on the original. I protested: “Look, the foreign audience…” And was cut off: 
“John, the audience for this story is [the Controller].” 
Interviews corroborated that writers and reporters were concerned to keep channel 
management satisfied, especially as the intended foreign audiences seemed so remote: 
[writer] Why we have a CCTV-9? … You know sometimes you know maybe 
they just want CCTV-9, we have a CCTV-9 because the top leaders want to have 
a CCTV-9. This kind of thing… So it really up to the people in the top … and for 
most of the time, I just feel is the only audience is the [Politburo member] Li 
Changchun or whatever, the government. It’s not just, like the really foreigners, or 
overseas, if we decide to launch, you know our program in say the [United] 
States, or whatever, they do not feel to consider the real audiences, it’s much 
more like a political goal, or political need to satisfy the central government. 
                                                 
119 The New York Times had published the information on September 7, which resulted in the arrest and 
imprisonment of NYT researcher, Zhao Yan, on charges of leaking state secrets. The charge was eventually 
dropped, but Zhao still served three years on conviction for a lesser, unrelated and likely trumped up charge 
of fraud (Kahn, 2004; Yardley & Kahn, 2006). He was released on September 15, 2007 (Yardley, 2007). 
That Zhao was so appallingly treated for an information leak within the Party/State system indicated in 
retrospect the sensitivity of the story at the time, as Jiang’s resignation was part of the power struggle 
between the former CPC General Secretary and PRC President, and Hu Jintao, who held both those posts at 
the time, and would subsequently assume the position of CMC Chairman as well. 
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Sometimes you do feel like that. I cannot say one hundred percent it is, but, 
culture here is people, they just say, have we satisfied [the Controller]. No. If [the 
Controller] says this, no, this is not correct, and this is correct, this is not correct. 
If [the Controller] make a call, everybody will be frightened, oh, the boss made a 
call to tell us to do this and do that. I think everybody is working for him. 
However, more seasoned personnel were concerned to balance attention to 
management with concern for the intended audience of foreigners, noting their pride as 
journalists was at stake: 
[anchor] Yeah, you have to impress those audience [foreigners]. But you have to 
always keep in mind that [the Controller] and [the Controller’s supervisor] they’re 
happy with it too. So this is difficult sometimes. But there is always a compromise 
where you can at least, you know, please both sides, without upsetting your own 
judgment. And I think that is not an impossible task. Otherwise it’s you know, I 
should not be working here. 
In other words, CCTV-9 was serving three audiences, not two. And of these 
audiences, the most important was not foreigners inside the PRC or abroad, but 
management. Whether the world was watching was less important than who was 
watching on any given evening in Beijing. Neither the internal dynamics of the channel 
nor its programming were conducive to developing a sense that CCTV-9 was reporting 
on the world, which is assumed to be the role of broadcasters like CNN-I and the 
BBC-WS (although I suspect that a critical cultural investigation of their output would 
find them as Western-centric as CCTV-9 is PRC-centric).120 
Routinization of news production 
Bracketing the issue of the audience, which functioned either to confuse or 
existed as an afterthought after attention was paid to the concerns of management, the 
                                                 
120 If one takes seriously (and I do) the thesis of Edward Said (1995) that Orientalism is a discursive frame 
that shapes what historical writing can say about the Levant, and one applies his thesis to journalism, 
understood as the first draft of history, as I do, then one is left with the almost impossible task of trying to 
empirically defend the assertion I have made here. I would have liked to have backed this assertion with 
comparative literature, but I cannot. The empirical work has not been done, even though critical cultural 
scholars such as Curran (2000b) and Downing (1996) have laid the ground work. 
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regimentation of the production teams was assured through management oversight, but 
institutionalized through internalization of the rhythms of production. These were 
reflected in the spatial and temporal organization of the news making process and the role 
of sources and their maximum utilization. In this section, I first look at the routinization 
of news production through the organization of time and space. I then discuss the role of 
sources and maximization of resources in news making and their relationship to the 
institutionalization of editorial oversight. 
Time and space in the routinization of news production 
The impact of time and space on news production and the operationalization of 
editorial control cannot be over-emphasized. I noted above (see p. 300) the early news 
ethnographies that pointed to the role of organization in news making in constructing a 
particular reality. Illustration 7 (below) from Schlesinger’s (1987) Putting Reality 
Together shows the BBC newsroom in the early 1970s and layout of the news desk 
(hereafter desk). Despite the passage of time, the BBC model is typical of newsroom 
layouts, which are dictated by the functions they perform. Those functions are a) the 
monitoring of potential news, b) the recognition of news (editing) b) the organization of 
the news gathering process (shooting, reporting, recording incoming transmission signals, 
etc.), c) liaison with news producers and program directors on appropriate content for 
news shows d) news production e) play-out. 
A news making operation is a time-dependent and precision process requiring a 
great degree of coordination between different sections and persons within the news 
department responsible for making the story. Illustration 7  (source: Schlesinger, 1987, p. 
55) shows the spatial arrangement necessary for timely news editing at the BBC. The 
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center-piece of the newsroom is the desk. 121  Sitting in a position where they can 
communicate not only among themselves, but easily with the rest of the newsroom, are 
the Editor of the Day, Senior Duty Editor, and the Studio Director, the three key editorial 
management positions for the BBC news. They are supported by the copy taster, news 
transmission assistant, stills assistant and a typist. Lastly, the newsreader is also included 
on the BBC desk. 
Keeping in mind that most news is planned and usually dealt with in the daily 
meetings, the role of a desk is primarily to shape daily output of already existing or 
‘diaried’ stories. When a story breaks outside of those already flagged for production, the 
desk decides whether it is strong enough to go into a bulletin, and if it is, the desk handles 
its early production (checking for existing material, assigning a reporter, etc.) as the story 
enters the production cycle. 
                                                 
121 In Schlesinger’s diagram, the newsroom has two desks, one for BBC-1, one for BBC-2. 
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Illustration 7: BBC Newsroom and desk 
CCTV-9 had a system that was similar in many respects to that of the BBC. The 
equivalent position to Editor of the Day was the zhubian. The director was something of a 
cross between the Senior Duty Editor and Studio Director. The emphasis on planning 
through daily and weekly meetings was similar, as was the stress on coordination. 
However, CCTV-9’s senior personnel were not physically organized around a desk and 
management’s attempt to introduce an Assignment Desk to begin to address this problem 
was derailed for reasons already discussed. Moreover, in a departure from the norm, news 
editorial at CCTV-9 was not centralized, but scattered throughout several parts of the 
CCTV building. 
In part this was the result of the history of the CCTV building, which is a multi-
storey edifice that was clearly designed before the efficiency of open plan offices for 
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news production was realized. Inside, the building is a rabbits’ warren of tiny offices, 
without the clustered production segments that are functional to news production. A 
centralized production space big enough for the needs of the channel was simply not 
available in the building. The structure of news editorial at CCTV-9 also reflected the 
evolution of the channel as it grew from its roots in the English News to become CCTV 
International (see p. 82). 
However, even when CCTV-9 was given the chance to re-model its newsroom 
with the May 2004 relaunch, the result again was a set of enclosures, this time with glass 
walls, rather than an open plan office that would have facilitated communication. Despite 
the refurbishment of the editorial space and the relocation of the general newsroom to the 
second floor adjacent to the studio and MCR (master control room, which controlled 
playout), CCTV-9 did not establish a centralized news editorial and processing system 
centered on a desk. Moreover, the separation of different elements of editorial on 
different floors was retained. Hence the spatial arrangement of the CCTV-9 editorial 





Illustration 8: Spatial representation of the CCTV-9 editorial system 
The disjointed character of the editorial and as a result the production system was 
further evident in the multiple roles some staff were called on to play. The Controller and 
Deputy Controllers nominally shared an office on the 19th floor, although the Deputy 
Controller (Head of News) preferred to work out of the offices of Asia Today, a specialist 
news program he had taken an interest in developing and was anchoring. However, his 
absence from the 19th floor and its direct line to the general newsroom frustrated the 
zhubians, who reported directly to him. The Head of News was a seasoned journalist and 
established anchor. But from the point of view of the zhubians, his key role should have 
been leadership of the general news. The Deputy Controller (Head of News) was in an 
8th Floor – Deputy Controller (Head of News) 
2nd Floor – zhubian 
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19th Floor - Controller 
2nd Floor – Newsroom 








impossible position. As one of the channel’s leading anchors, his expertise was valued at 
Asia Today, especially given the problem of finding Chinese whose English was good 
enough to anchor. However, from an editorial point of view, he was unable to be in more 
than one place at a time, and this created problems for the zhubians. 
Meanwhile, the zhubians had their own problems. They had an office adjacent to 
the newsroom, but it was separated from the newsroom by a corridor and glass partitions, 
rendering direct (eye-to-eye) communication between the zhubian and the director (and 
writers) impossible. The importance of face-to-face communication in news making 
should not be discounted, as an effective newsroom is one centered on efficient 
communication. In short, in an institution whose role is communication and that depends 
on communication, a general failure of communication was one of the most vexing 
problems for staff at every level at CCTV-9: 
[Jirik] Is the system you work in, do you find it efficient? 
[zhubian] I couldn’t say it’s efficient enough, because you know, I think now we 
have, each one have a specific duty about the work, but maybe there is some 
problem between the, I mean the communication different people of different 
positions… I think that’s the main problem, communication. 
[Jirik] Is the way we produce the news, in the newsroom, is it organized 
efficiently? 
[writer] No. 
[Jirik] What’s wrong with it? 
[writer] First, there should be improvements in the structure, and then there 
should be more training to the staff, and then there should be more effective 
communication, none, there should be unity, a unified spirit to lead the team as a 
news channel. 
Both before and after the May 2004 relaunch, staff raised with management the 
role of the spatial arrangement of the editorial operation for resolving time-related issues 
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of news making associated with coordination. Appendix 9 (p. 579) is an email and 
attachment I sent management in November 2004 in an attempt to revive the Assignment 
Desk, following its demise in the wake of the relaunch. However, by then, the 
government audit (see p. 289) of CCTV was underway, and issues concerning pay and 
conditions had pushed editorial development into the background. 
In the absence of a spatially centralized news editorial system, whether having 
one would have improved communication in the newsroom is a moot point. However, 
one result of the relaunch was a sense among the zhubians and directors that they were 
under more pressure. In the introduction to this chapter, I noted that the number of hours 
of on-air general news (Asian News (pre-relaunch), CCTV News, News Updates (post-
relaunch), WWW) was almost the same pre- and post-relaunch. Yet zhubians and 
directors I interviewed consistently complained of greater pressure: 
[Jirik] Did your work change after the relaunch? Do you work harder or less hard? 
[director] Harder, harder, yeah. 
[Jirik] How much harder? 
[director] I mean physically harder. 
[Jirik] And has your pay gone up? 
[director] definitely not. 
[Jirik] Has your pay gone down? 
[director] Yeah. 
[Jirik] Really, why? 
[director] Everybody got pay cut, I mean the total pay, yeah, I guess.  
[Jirik] Why? 
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[director] Because they won’t give the money, because you know the resource, we 
have the more program, more people and maybe the result is just divided you 
know evenly to other people. 
[Jirik] So, you’re working harder and getting paid less, how do you feel? 
[director] Of course, not happy. But that’s the way, you know the bottom line is 
you take it you leave it, and CCTV nobody invites you to work here, and if you 
go, just go. Nobody will say don’t go. This kind of thing. 
One explanation for the sense of increased work post-relaunch could have been 
frustration due to the cut in pay triggered by the audit. However, one aspect of the 
production process did change, which suggests another, at least partial, explanation. 
Before the relaunch, the news teams handled nine bulletins of news a day. After the 
relaunch, the teams handled fourteen bulletins a day, a 56% increase, although seven of 
the fourteen bulletins post-relaunch were fifteen minute News Updates. The increase in 
the number of bulletins decreased the down time between bulletins, from two hour breaks 
to one hour breaks in most cases, which may have increased the sense of pressure, even if 
the actual amount of news being produced hardly changed pre- and post-relaunch. 
Moreover, zhubians and directors, who had responsibility for monitoring potential news, 
recognizing news and oversight of the production process and play-out may have 
experienced the lack of down time more acutely than writers, who were essentially 
producing the same number of stories pre- and post-relaunch. 
Use of repeat stories & 3rd party sources 
Along with routinization through space and time, the second characteristic 
manner of ensuring the institutionalization of efficiency in the news making process was 
maximization of the use of resources, which was reflected in the use of repeat stories and 
use of third party source materials. 
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One manner in which the zhubians and directors controlled the constant deadline 
pressure and managed the workload on the writers and on themselves was to run repeat 
stories in successive bulletins, only updating and introducing a minimum of new stories. 
Given the lack of proactive news editing at CCTV-9 discussed in the previous chapter, I 
would characterize one of the key roles of the zhubian and director in charge of any 
particular bulletin as finding the exact balance between new stories and repeat stories to 
give each bulletin the ‘look’ and ‘feel’122 of newness, while reducing new stories to the 
minimum possible.123 However, given that a global broadcaster needs to cycle each story 
through successive bulletins to maximize the changing audience for any given story as 
the world turns, the practice of repeating stories was necessary.124 One of the skills of a 
good producer or zhubian was to determine just how strong a story was and therefore 
how long it should run before taking it out of the twenty-four hour news cycle.  
Along with the use of repeat stories, a second feature of the maximization of 
resources at CCTV-9 was heavy reliance on third party material for news. Although I 
discuss the consequences of this for the bulletin in Chapter 11: Content, I want to note 
here that observation and the survey of content indicated that little went into the news 
except stories from other channels within CCTV, primarily CCTV-1 and CCTV-4, and 
the international news agencies. The reporters’ group within CCTV-9 (see Chapter 10: 
Reporters) provided most of the remainder. 
In effect, CCTV News was primarily a translation service for existing CCTV 
news stories in Chinese and written from scripts provided by Reuters and APTN, who 
                                                 
122 The more a news editor internalized the templates and rhythms of news making, the more these 
characteristics of what Bourdieu would call the ‘journalistic field’ would appear as subjective 
characteristics of the mastery of news making. 
123 At one point, a director earned a certain notoriety within the channel for not updating or introducing a 
single new story during an overnight shift. Management either did not notice, or elected to let the incident 
pass without comment, as nothing was ever said to the director. 
124 For analysis and discussion of repeat stories, see Chapter 11: Content. 
 321
also provided natural sound video. A writer summed up this dependency: “[i]f If you are 
not a field reporter, you just translate the scripts from the Chinese channel, or not, or 
from the AP or Reuters, you have a quite limited ability to handle the pictures, to handle 
the information.” 
The heavy reliance on third party news on CCTV-9 was the result of historical 
conditions under which the channel developed (see p. 82). Despite the expansion of the 
channel, from a single 15-minute bulletin of news in 1986 to a 24-hour rolling service 
with news at the top of every hour in May 2004, it still remained a translation service for 
news produced elsewhere. CCTV-9 has historically and understandably focused its 
recruitment efforts on finding good English speakers. That situation has never changed at 
CCTV-9. If new staff recruited for their English skills develop into quality journalists, 
CCTV-9 considered that a bonus. In the meantime, the need remained for an editorial 
system that could be relied on to put politically correct news to air. Hence the continued 
reliance on sources like CCTV-1 and Xinhua for the general news service. Relying on 
CCTV-1 material was editorially sound and efficient. Moreover, in the absence of a 
professionalized journalistic corpus writing the news, politically reliable scripts were 
required, which CCTV-1 and Xinhua guaranteed. 
Internet use in the newsroom 
One addendum should be made concerning the limited range of sources on which 
CCTV-9 relied for its news. Although the internet is invisible in what goes to air, writers 
noted that it had become an increasingly important source of additional information for 
stories from CCTV, Xinhua or the agencies (and other sources) assigned by the director. 
This was in noticeable contrast to the situation I encountered at CCTV in 1999, when I 
wrote my MA Thesis. I wrote at the time, “[o]ne development worth noting is the 
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increasing use of the Internet as a news editing tool. Though this is still in its infancy at 
the English news.” At the time, I and the other copy editors at the English News would 
regularly check facts in stories against information available online. However we noticed 
that the Chinese staff were still reluctant to use the medium: 
[Jirik] The foreign experts use the Internet a lot. But the rest of the newsroom 
doesn’t seem to. Why? 
[senior management] The first reason is that they are not accustomed to it. And 
the second reason is that Xinhua is more official. They feel safe using Xinhua. 
When we use the Internet, we’re not so certain about the wires, whether they are 
usable or not. (Jirik, 2000) 
In contrast to reluctance in 1999, in 2004 the medium had become an 
indispensable newsroom tool from writers through to the zhubians: 
[Jirik] How do you know when there’s a breaking story. 
[zhubian] It depends on the internet and maybe CNN or BBC, or Xinhua agency. 
[Jirik] Do you use the Internet a lot? 
[zhubian] Yes. 
[Jirik] Why? 
[zhubian] The Internet is very powerful. It can give you different aspects of the 
issue, because you cannot understand everything. You know it’s very important, 
you can just get more information. 
[Jirik] How important is the internet for your work? 
[writer] Kind of very important. 
[Jirik] Why? 
[writer] Because our system is not first in time, and second, it’s not diverse, even 
‘lou tou’ [Reuters] we believe in ‘lou tou’ and we believe in AP [Associated 
Press], but I do find sometimes, especially AP, the story they feed, you can tell 
the writers at that time is not in the mood, or he may confuse himself… So this 
time you got to find out what is really going. That’s fastest in time, diverse. 
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[Jirik] When you’re writing, what are the chief sources that you use for your 
stories? 
[writer] Xinhua news agency, and other western AP, AFP, Reuters, CNN, BBC, 
but BBC not now. BBC has been censored, blocked on the internet. 
[Jirik] How important is the internet for your work? 
[writer] The internet is every day must for me, because without internet you don’t 
know, you have, you only have one source to write a story, it’s not, it’s not 
enough. 
Observation suggested however that for the staff at all levels the internet was a 
primary source of private information (email, browsing, etc.) and only a secondary source 
of information for news. They would go online to check facts or find additional data on a 
story assigned from one of the limited range of video sources, unless the story was strong 
enough to go to air without video as a ‘copy’ story. Perhaps for the zhubians, whose work 
I could not observe at close range over time, the internet had become a news editing tool. 
However, even if the internet indicated a breaking story that was strong enough to 
broadcast, no zhubian would run that story unless the online source was a recognized 
news source such as one of the international news agencies, or confirmed by Xinhua. 
Summary 
In this section, I have looked at time and space in the routinization of news 
production, the role of sources in news making and their relationship to the 
institutionalization of editorial oversight. Despite the increasing use of the internet as a 
secondary tool in news making, CCTV-9 relied on an extremely limited range of sources 
for its news, primarily CCTV for domestic and foreign policy stories and APTN and 
Reuters for foreign news, with Xinhua and the reporting group providing the bulk of the 
remainder. Most of the general news was produced in the newsroom by the general news 
teams. In the following section, I look at the actual process that went into making a story. 
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THE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Story selection 
In the production process, the first step was story selection. Story selection was 
typically the task of the zhubian, although the power of the director, due to their position 
at the center of the production process (see p. 268, p. 316) lent them inordinate authority 
in selecting stories, since they could slot stories into the line-up and only check with the 
zhubian after the fact. Bracketing this peculiarity of CCTV-9, most stories were self-
selecting in so far as they had to be drawn from the sources discussed above. The chief 
task of the zhubian and director was to choose from the available pool of primarily 
CCTV and agency material what material to air. 
Writing 
Writers would be assigned stories by the director and told whether to produce a 
‘copy,’ ‘take’ or ‘story.’ Unless it was a copy story, the source for domestic and foreign 
policy news would almost certainly be an existing story from CCTV, which came in the 
form of a packaged audio-visual narrative from a prior broadcast on another channel such 
as Xinwen Lianbo on CCTV-1 and required translation from the Chinese. If it was foreign 
news, the story was delivered by the agencies as a ‘loosely’125 edited natural sound 
package, accompanied by an English-language script. In the case of a copy story, a writer 
would be handed an existing story from CCTV1, Xinhua, the agencies, or occasionally 
another source such as China Daily and asked to write a single paragraph story. 
                                                 
125 The agencies deliver self-cover stories that are usually 2-4 minutes long. They are loosely edited with 
extra material in shots to give broadcasters some control over the re-editing process. However, a proportion 
of agency material is ‘up-picked’ from broadcasters, in which case the agencies, rather than run a voiced 
story, either up-pick a natural sound version of the story from the broadcaster or strip off the audio track if 
possible and replace it with generic audio from an audio library. The working practices of the agencies no 
less than those of the broadcaster give lie to the concept that television news is a recording rather than a 
construction of reality. 
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The task of writing was time constrained, but if a deadline was not looming was 
as easy or hard as the writer wanted it to be. One writer described the difference this way, 
which my observation of the newsroom did not confirm. I suspect had I interviewed the 
entire newsroom, each person might have considered themselves the hard working one: 
[writer] The truth is, people here, they are not motivated, they are not, they do not 
have enough incentive to work for good news. I say can’t all of them. But most of 
them. 
[Jirik] Why aren’t they motivated? 
[writer] I don’t know. 
[Jirik] Not enough money? Or is simply not clear what they’re meant to be doing. 
[writer] I don’t know, people just come here, work, to work, and then they go. But 
for me, I think, news, the devotion, the kind of what, the passion of devotion is 
really really important. But I can see very very few people around have this kind 
of passion or devotion. Just come here for the sake of, this is a job, and got to do it 
and go home, I have kids, I have a family, I have whatever things I need to do. 
The sense that news writing was ‘just a job’ for the majority of writers was only 
partially borne out by observation. If some had a lackadaisical attitude, most seemed 
committed to making the best news possible under the circumstances. But the 
circumstances varied. Restrictions on domestic and foreign policy news and reliance on 
the agencies in foreign news bred cynicism. My own attitude was one of ambivalence. I 
despised the censorship and was troubled by self-censorship (including my own), but I 
enjoyed the news making process. From management down, most of the Chinese staff 
seemed to have a similar attitude, a sense of trying to make the best of a far from perfect 
situation. 
Once a story had been given to them by the director, some writers combed the 
archives and internet for additional material. In many cases, this meant checking APTN 
versions of Reuters’ stories and Reuters’ versions of APTN stories. In the case of a 
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domestic or foreign policy story, a writer could go to the Reuters and AP wires (both of 
which were available in the newsroom) or the internet for background or additional 
information that might be missing from the CCTV-1 or Xinhua stories. Less experienced 
and less concerned writers (perhaps the cleverest and most cynical writers!) simply 
translated or transcribed the texts that had been given them, regardless of the content, 
which in the case of Xinwen Lianbo stories could be awful. In the case of stories that 
amounted to little more than ‘Party Publicity,’ writers would simply translate the Xinhua 
or CCTV-1 material, as much out of boredom as concern not to make a political mistake. 
In Appendix 10, I provide a single example of each of the forms of story noted 
above: copy, take video, story, chosen at random. The three stories are unremarkable, 
although I did make a note to myself on first reading the Hong Kong story during the 
coding process for content analysis that it was “stunningly patronizing”. Both the copy 
and the take story were translated from CCTV. The writer story is from Reuters. The 
copy story reiterates the PRC’s political oversight of Hong Kong. The take story is a soft 
foreign policy story that plays to humanitarian concerns. The writer story is about the 
attempt of the Palestinian Authority to have the International Court of Justice at The 
Hague declare illegal the wall Israel is building, part of which is in the occupied 
territories. 
Depending on the type of story and their own interest, a writer could spend as 
little time on a story as it took to translate a Xinhua paragraph for a copy story, or as long 
as time permitted. On a bulletin with few new stories a writer might be responsible for a 
single story. Depending on the number of staff on site, and on the number of new stories 
in a bulletin, a writer would typically handle one to three stories per bulletin. Once a 
writer had finished a story it was saved in the system and passed on to the copy editors. 
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Copy editing 
The copy editing process for each story typically took several minutes to perhaps 
twenty minutes at the most, although different copy editors worked at different speeds. 
Moreover, a well written or poorly written story could take much longer, as such stories 
would often involve negotiation with the writer and/or political editor. Figure 5 shows the 
relative productivity during August 2005 of the staff copy editors, including myself, 
which I measured using a scale I developed and describe in Appendix 11 (p. 594). The 
average copy editor dealt with 13.6 items per shift (regardless of type), or 1.9 items per 
hour. 
The large discrepancy in productivity between different copy editors led to minor 
problems in the newsrooms, with some tension among the copy editors and writers and 
reporters quietly vying for the attention of particular copy editors.126 The writing and 
copy editing process is illustrated in Appendix 12 (p. 597) which shows the editing 
process – writer, copy editor, political editor – on a single story. The story is Beslan, 
which was the subject of the temporary injunction on reporting (see p. 280) issued by 
SARFT on September 1, 2004 after the 1900 bulletin of World Wide Watch. The 
injunction was lifted mid-afternoon the following day after the PRC Foreign Ministry 
commented on the situation (see p. 281). Given the processing of agency video described 
above, an injunction on a foreign story with no obvious PRC angle was a rarity. So this 
script is a good example of an anomaly for CCTV-9, a foreign story that was shaped to 
show Chinese perspective. 
                                                 
126 The more productive copy editors were aware that they were doing more work than some of their peers, 
who were earning the same salary and benefits. Senior management joked that I was “not a good 
communist” for suggesting that something ought to be done to recognize the obviously different levels of 
skill, experience and productivity that separated the copy editors, who all had the same pay and conditions. 
I responded that on those grounds, none of the Chinese on staff were good communists given that their 
salary and conditions system was structured in terms of seniority, responsibility and skill. ‘Guanxi’ also 
appeared to play a role in the promotion system. 
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The script indicates at a number of levels the sensitivity of the story. The writer 
minimizes attention on the victims and the perpetrators, and instead focuses on the role 
the Russian government was playing in handling the crisis. The writer was working off 
an APTN script, but references Xinhua. The focus of the story became a visit to the scene 
by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The work of the copy editor did nothing to change 
the orientation of the story. The narrative was tightened, and the melodrama toned down 
with the words “… shadows didn’t seem to clear away” removed from the script. 
Political editing 
As already noted the primary task of the political editor was to prevent political 
mistakes going to air. On the Beslan story, in a nod to the professionalism of the copy 
editor, the political editor only made one change, to reference a Russian government 
source on the death toll, rather than Xinhua, suggesting the writer had been overly 
cautious in their treatment of the story. As for their role, as foreigners copy editors were 
often working blind when a story dealt with political nuances or Chinese language 
sources. In the following example (Illustration 9) of the work of the political editor, a 
Figure 5: Relative productivity of the copy editors at CCTV-9 














mistake by a copy editor is removed from a set of headlines, all of which copy editors 
were responsible for writing. 
In this case, the copy editor included the term ‘China’s’ in front of Panchen Lama. 
According to the copy editor, he was attempting to distinguish between the Panchen 
Lama chosen by the Dalai Lama, who is a non-person in the PRC, and the Panchen Lama 
installed by the Chinese government, to whom this story refers. However, unbeknownst 
to the copy editor, any reference in the PRC to the Dalai Lama’s choice of Panchen Lama 
is forbidden. Removing the word ‘China’s’ may appear to be a trivial change. But by so 
doing the political editor saved the copy editor and the channel from the possibility of 
criticism by removing any potential inference that the government-endorsed Panchen 
Lama is not the only one. Given the unlikelihood that the mistake would have been 
picked up by the censor (CPD), this level of attention to the possibility of putting to air 
politically incorrect news indicated the level of editorial caution and self-censorship that 
was at work at CCTV-9. From the PRC’s point of view, the political editor was simply 
correcting a mistake, since for the PRC government the Dalai Lama’s choice of Panchen 
Lama is not the Panchen Lama at all. 
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Illustration 9: Example of political editor correcting copy editor’s mistake (source: 
CCTV-9) 
Mistakes of this nature were rare, given the level of self-censorship among 
writers, reporters and copy editors. More typically, the political editors spent most of 
their time correcting factual and grammatical errors in the writers’ work that had been 
missed by the less experienced copy editors. Although the focus on spelling and 
grammar, except in on air graphics, may have seemed out of place in television news, the 
re-use of some of the scripts on CCTV-9’s website meant the work had to be done, even 
if only a small percentage of the scripts were published. However, it would have been 
more efficient to have a copy editor check the scripts for the internet. A more compelling 
explanation for the obsession with writing at CCTV-9 points to the backgrounds of most 
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of the staff, including the foreigners, few of whom had any formal training or experience 
of making television prior to working at CCTV-9. Most of the writers, copy editors and 
political editors were either uncomfortable or unfamiliar with the grammar and syntax of 
television narrative and the aesthetics of television news. As a result, they tended to focus 
on what they were more comfortable with, writing, but not writing to pictures (see 
below), which is the essence of making television news. 
Video editing 
In a departure from the norm in many broadcast newsrooms, the writers and 
reporters at CCTV-9 were responsible for their own video editing, which was the case 
even before the digitization of newsrooms in general, which is changing the practice of 
treating writing/reporting and video editing as two distinct tasks. At both NBC and 
Reuters when I was working there, video editing was a specialist’s task. Although this is 
changing in many cases with budgetary cuts and technological developments pushing 
more and more writers, producers and reporters worldwide to also learn how to edit 
video, in the pre-digital era video editing tended to be a separate and highly valued 
function within the news making system. 
In this regard, I believe the Chinese practice was in principle a good idea, since 
video editing is arguably the core task of making television news, since it is in the video 
editing process that the story is assembled. A writer/reporter who edited their own video 
would have control over the story in a manner exceeding that implied by the separation of 
writer/reporter and video editor. 127  Ironically however, few writers at CCTV-9 took 
advantage of their position, since, paradoxically, observation suggested that although 
                                                 
127 Strictly speaking, none of the ensemble of practices that go into a news story, from the work of the 
camera person through to the engineer who plays out the story, can be discounted in the news making 
process. But only after I learned to video edit at Reuters did I really begin to understand how television 
narrative works, although my skills were rudimentary compared to those of specialist video editors. 
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they were working in an audiovisual medium, they paid more attention to writing than to 
how a story looked and sounded. 
Few of the writers at CCTV-9 were skilled video editors. But for the most part, 
staff were not to blame. When I raised with management the issue of training staff to 
video edit, a Deputy Controller told me that he did not consider video important, so long 
as the viewer could hear what was being said. In short we were discussing not television 
but radio with pictures. That this particular manager had a radio background was only 
part of the problem. Because the writers were recruited for their English skills, primarily 
from English-language departments at universities, they too focused on what they were 
good at, rather than learning how to make television, which is a craft that combines visual 
elements, natural sound and the spoken word. As a result, video editing, which should 
have been the heart of the story making process, was approached with trepidation rather 
than confidence. 
I convinced management to let me teach basic video editing to intern writers. I 
focused on the interns, because most of the writers could not be spared down time. 
Moreover, a culture of helping one another out operated in the newsroom, and writers 
were constantly showing one another new insights they had discovered into Sobey.128 In 
my training, I attempted to teach the core skill of television making, the art of writing to 
pictures, with the simplest phrase: “never put in the script what is already in the pictures.” 
                                                 
128 CCTV-9 was integrated into CCTV’s non-linear digital news production system, Sobey, which was 
shared by the other news channels at CCTV. Sobey is a Chengdu-based technology company that develops 
and manufactures non-linear editing and integrated scripting and playout systems for broadcasters (Anon., 
2003a, 2005b). The Japanese media giant Sony has a stake in Sobey (Anon., 2003a). At the core of the 
video editing component of the Sobey system was hardware developed by Matrox, a Canadian company 
(Anon., 2004).  The international character of the suppliers of the infrastructure of the PRC’s broadcasting 
technology provides an ironic counterpoint to the control exercised over the editorial system. In contrast to 
the criticism companies such as Cisco Systems, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo have encountered for 
contributing to censorship of the internet in the PRC (Biggs, 2006), technology companies supplying 
broadcast media with equipment have escaped censure, perhaps because broadcast censorship is usually 
understood as a regulatory rather than a technical issue. 
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But I was hindered in an environment where the written and spoken word were accorded 
a greater weight than video in the news making process. 
Moreover, even when writers produced aesthetically pleasing packages, at times 
they would then be frustrated by copy editors and political editors, some of whom knew 
almost nothing about video editing, who would change scripts that writers had written to 
match specific pictures, resulting in packages where the video and textual narratives no 
longer synchronized. In a further sign of the lack of importance accorded video and a lack 
of understanding of television, at times the copy and political editors obsessed over 
nuances in scripts and grammatical and spelling errors that were invisible in voiced 
packages, while paying almost no attention to how their changes might affect the video 
narrative. 
Review 
The only part of the production process where any oversight over video was 
exercised was in the case of review, another task of the zhubian. As the person who was 
responsible for what went to air on their shift, each zhubian was tasked to review all 
video before it was broadcast. The zhubians had different attitudes to the writers, some 
being more sympathetic than others to poorly edited stories. Sometimes they would ask 
writers to redo elements, sometimes sections or in extreme cases, an entire edit. The 
zhubian would also pick out any politically incorrect imagery – for example a Taiwan 
flag that might have escaped the writer during the video editing process – and have it 
replaced with something neutral, rather than remove it, which would require the story to 
be re-voiced. Once a zhubian was satisfied with a story, the tape was passed to the 
director and slotted into the lineup for broadcast. 
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Summary 
Although the preceding section has focused on the minutiae of news making, I 
hope it has captured something of the process that went into turning source materials 
supplied by third parties into stories for broadcast, which constituted most of CCTV-9’s 
news production. The system was highly regimented, worked to a steady rhythm and 
went on around the clock. From interviews and observation, clearly most of the writers, 
copy editors and political editors had no knowledge of television prior to joining 
CCTV-9. In the processing of primarily third party materials for broadcast, video was 
seen as the least important element in comparison with the written and spoken word. In 
short, the news production process at CCTV-9 was not driven by visuals, the ‘strength of 
the pictures,’ but by the availability of third party video, and a focus on the written and 
spoken word that was out of place in television. 
THE FAILURE TO HANDLE BREAKING NEWS 
As already noted, without a desk to coordinate news monitoring and gathering at 
CCTV-9, zhubians were largely reduced to news editing from already available material. 
This was not a problem in dealing with the majority of news, the ‘olds,’ since the stories 
were already running and editorial would be aware of them from existing run downs or 
the stories would have been in the diary and arrangements would have been made to 
cover them. However, because of the history of the channel as a translation service, the 
news editing process was the reverse of what one would find at broadcasters such as the 
BBC-WS or CNN-I. There, the primary moment-to-moment news editing tools are the 
AP and Reuters wires or APTN and Reuters video feeds or live video if it is available 
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from their own sources or similar 24-hour news channels.129 Once a story is spotted on 
either the text or video wires, then the desks first check with available sources such as the 
agencies or partner broadcasters whether they will have the story, and if not organize 
access to the video from a third party, or send a crew out for self cover. 
In an appraisal in August 2004 of the channel’s development following the May 
2004 relaunch, News Corporation’s consultant praised CCTV-9’s ability to deliver 
scheduled stories: “during the past two years, and particularly since the War in Iraq, 
CCTV News has demonstrated a tremendous on-air capability in its coverage of 
important news stories (i.e., the 6-Way Party Talks, the Chinese space shot, etc.).” 
However, he also criticized the CCTV News for a lack of timeliness on breaking stories. 
Although the consultant offered a number of suggestions to solve this problem, 
observation of newsroom practice suggested to me that on breaking stories, reliance on 
existing video resulted in CCTV-9 being constantly ‘behind the story’ since the zhubians 
and directors would not pro-actively seek video after spotting a story on the wires, but 
reactively news edit stories after they had been delivered, whether sourced from CCTV or 
the agencies. 
Even with access to the full Xinhua, Reuters and AP wires130 in the newsroom, 
news editing from existing lineups of domestic news from CCTV-1 and from rundowns 
of Reuters and APTN feeds and scripts sent with the video feed was the norm. CCTV-9 
zhubians almost never contacted Reuters and APTN to chase video that would 
complement a wire story, whether on Xinhua, Reuters or AP. As a former Reuters 
                                                 
129 My experience at NBC and Reuters suggests to me that the text wires are almost always faster than 24-
hour video wires like CNN. Only when a camera is already in place, can a video story be delivered faster 
than a text story. 
130 The Reuters text wire was added to the newsroom computer system on March 23, 2004. The AP wire 
was added some time later. I do not have the date. 
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producer, a role which involved news editing and handling client requests for video, I 
found the practice at CCTV-9 of not chasing stories extremely frustrating. 
Whenever I was copy editing, I would constantly monitor the wires, a habit from 
my previous work. Whenever I spotted a story on the wire that I considered newsworthy 
but that was not on the bulletin, I would point it out to the director or zhubian on duty, 
and often these stories would then go onto the bulletin. But this was not the task of a copy 
editor. Although most of the zhubians welcomed my input, I also realized that I was 
causing them problems, by increasing their workload, if not by drawing attention to their 
own inability or failure to chase stories. Following is a typical entry from my diary: 
Sunday, July 4, 2004 
Copy editing. A quiet day. [X] was zhubian. Gave him a wire Reuters ran on 
China about heat wave killing 39 in Guangzhou, sourced from Beijing Youth 
Daily. China Daily ran it as a page one banner headline story on Monday [the 
following day]. We had it on the [Sunday] 2100 and 0000 bulletins. But I doubt, 
had I not handed it to him, we would have had it at all. Another case of what is 
wrong with our news editing system. 
Editing from the existing video was a structural feature of the news editing system 
that no amount of prodding from me to pay more attention to the wire could change. 
Probably the best example of how story selection failed in the case of breaking stories 
during the period I collected data was CCTV-9’s handling of the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
on December 26, 2004. 
I was scheduled to work as a copy editor that Sunday afternoon and had noticed 
the story on the internet early that morning while at home. When I arrived at work at 
4pm, I noticed that the rundown for the specialist news show Asia Today (at 2000, 
Beijing Time) had as the top story a foreign policy photo opportunity of President Hu 
Jintao meeting the chairman of the Kazakhstan Senate. The tsunami story was running 
second. However, by that time, Xinhua was already reporting at least one hundred and 
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fifty dead in Sri Lanka, and by 5pm it also had at least sixty dead in Indonesia. The 
Reuters wire was running at least one thousand dead in India and at least fifty-five dead 
in Thailand. In short, this was clearly a major breaking regional story, but the producer of 
Asia Today, the bulletin that focused on the region the tsunami had hit, was running it 
second after a foreign policy story of no discernible merit. 
I also noticed that World Wide Watch, which was handled by the general news 
department, was running the tsunami story at the top of its bulletin (1900). Following is 
my diary note: 
Sunday, December 26th, 2004 
When I arrived at work I checked the lineup to see that [X] was putting a Hu 
Jintao meeting top of Asia Today, when the region had been hit by a tsunami 
earlier in the day. I suggested to [Y], WWW zhubian, who had the tsunami top 
story, she ought say something to [X]. 
Failure to news edit the tsunami story developed into something of a fiasco at 
CCTV-9. The failure of the Asia Today producer to run the story at the top of the bulletin 
not only reflected a rule of thumb that stories about President Hu Jintao would top any 
bulletin in which they appeared,131 but more generally a failure to proactively news edit. 
The tsunami was ‘missed’ by the Asia Today producer because of a general tendency 
among the directors and zhubians of the general news and the producers of specialist 
news to ignore the wires and not pay attention to breaking and developing stories, for 
which video had not yet been delivered by CCTV-1, CCTV-4 or the agencies. 
Moreover, the news monitoring function of news editing associated with desking 
was weak at CCTV-9, since the May relaunch had failed to implement a fully functional 
                                                 
131 The zhubian who first broke this rule gleefully told me how good he felt the day he put Hu Jintao into 
the second half of a bulletin. Once it had been done once, some of the other zhubians began to arrange 
bulletin line-ups according to their sense of the merits of each story, and not according to the persons 
involved, unless directed ‘from above’ to put a particular story of no merit first. 
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Assignment Desk, which in part had been designed to boost news monitoring. Despite the 
obvious strength of the story from the wires, little video became available in the first 
hours of the tsunami, because it sometimes takes hours if not days to get camera people 
to breaking news sites and in this case the tsunami had wiped out so much technical 
infrastructure in the region that early pictures were difficult to deliver.132 As a result, at 
CCTV-9 what would be the biggest story of the year was ignored for most of the first 
day. 
My impression that CCTV-9 was missing a major story was borne out by 
developments that I noted in my diary, beginning on the following day: 
Monday, December 27th, 2004 
When I arrived at work, [Chinese staff] told me about a blow up in the morning, 
involving several senior people. Following is the thumbnail sketch: 
a) [OSC133 management] rings [Head of News] in the morning and tells him: 
i. I am disappointed with your channel. 
ii. You need to discuss among yourselves how you are going to handle these 
breaking stories. 
iii. If you don’t fix the problems, I don’t see a future for the channel. 
b) [Head of News] gets off the phone and blows off [OSC management’s] 
criticism, and does nothing to change the news. 
c) [OSC management] rings [Controller] (I assume this is after he watches the 
next bulletin) and blasts [him]. 
d) [Controller] rings [Head of News] and blasts him. 
e) Only then does [Head of News] show any interest in doing the story. 
                                                 
132 Once delivery began however, a number of factors such as the ‘whiteness’ of some victims led to a 
virtual deluge of imagery that has since prompted criticism for its partiality (Moeller, 2006). 
133 OSC – Overseas Service Center, which controlled CCTV-9. 
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However, in the ensuing days, the situation barely improved. Outside of general 
news, producers seemed more concerned with developing their ‘Year Ender’ specials, 
which would highlight the work their teams had done during the year than handle what 
already was clearly the biggest story of the year. On December 29, 2004, I wrote in my 
diary: “I noticed lot of work being done on the Year Enders, but no real attempt to do 
more than the minimum on the tsunami.” Even worse, as the extent of the loss of life and 
destruction to the region became evident, CCTV-9 began to report the story from the 
point of view of the PRC’s contribution to rescue and relief work – Chinese perspective – 
to my mind politicizing a tragedy that the PRC played only a small but valuable role in 
addressing. I was so concerned at this development in the coverage that I wrote senior 
management two emails (Appendix 13, p. 601), urging them to change the orientation of 
the coverage. In part the emails read: 
[The head of the foreign experts] sent the following to the foreign experts on 
Saturday, as part of a note that [Senior News Producer] asked him to send 
following the producers’ meeting on Saturday: 
“Since the crisis is so close to China and involves countries that are so 
geographically and politically interrelated to China in Asia, the Zhubians have 
also been asked to take extra special care regarding the Tsunami-related stories, 
staying vigilant and sensitive (including politically) to the crisis situation.” 
I [Jirik] honestly think we would serve the Chinese government, people, and our 
viewers best if we do not politicize this story. For example, on Saturday evening, 
Japan announced it would provide 500 million USD in aid, the single biggest 
donation by any country by far (the US is second with 350 million), raising the 
total of donations by over 25% from 1.36 to 1.86 billion dollars. However, when I 
suggested this was a significant new element to the aid story, I was asked whether 
it was on Xinhua. We did not report it on 2300, or Sunday 0000. Did Xinhua ever 
report it? And why do we have to wait? If Xinhua did not report it, then shame on 
Xinhua too. 
Finding the right balance between reporting the facts, and focusing on the Chinese 
angle -- what China is doing for victims -- is important to doing this story right. 
The fact is that China will do a lot, but it will not be able to do as much as some 
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other countries, regions, etc. That does not diminish China’s contribution in any 
way. BUT, if we are to report the Tsunami story accurately, we should be 
accurate about who is doing what, and what is happening where… 
Senior management replied to the first of the emails, stating “I fully agree with 
you. I’ve forwarded your email to all the producers.” However, after two more bulletins 
of coverage heavily focused on the PRC’s minor role in the rescue and relief work, I sent 
a second email reiterating that “IF you want people to respect China, the Chinese 
government, the Chinese people, and CCTV News on CCTV-9, then please, just do the 
news, the whole news, and nothing but the news.” My plea fell on deaf ears, as the 
coverage continued to focus on the minor Chinese angle. Only when a reporter finally 
arrived in Thailand on Friday January 8th (almost two weeks after the event), did CCTV-9 
begin to get the kind of coverage that one would expect from an international 
broadcaster.134 
Although it was only one story, failure to news edit the tsunami story highlighted 
a structural problem with the CCTV-9 editing system that resulted from the historical 
development of the channel as a translation service for third party materials. Although the 
heavy dependence on third party sources and the character of news as primarily the 
processing of ‘olds’ meant that the structural flaw in the editing system was not normally 
exposed, when it was exposed, management and staff were at a loss as to how to respond. 
Three days after the story broke, I wrote to the News Corp. consultant out of 
frustration: 
Hi [name]. I hope this finds you well. Happy New Year. When will you be back 
in Beijing? I don’t know whether you’ve been watching, but our Tsunami 
coverage has been terrible… As far as news goes, this is make it or break it as far 
                                                 
134 To be fair to CCTV-9, Moeller (2006) argues that the partiality of coverage was a general feature of 
broadcasts of the story, which focused on ‘national’ angles. As Gideon Levy observed in Israel’s Ha’aretz: 
“Anyone watching television in the West might think the tsunami struck Sweden or Switzerland.” (cited in 
Moeller, 2006, p. 178) 
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as I am concerned. I’ve watched them fail to news edit and cover breaking stories 
adequately for 18 months now, and as far as I’m concerned, enough is enough… 
Best Rgds. 
John. 
But despite the best efforts of senior management, who called an emergency 
meeting of the news producers on January 1, 2005 to discuss the failure of the coverage, 
and the work of the consultant to identify the problems and offer solutions, and Reuters, 
which made its staff available to do telephone interviews across the impacted region 
where CCTV could not afford to send its own reporters or access stringers’ coverage, in 
the absence of a desk the editorial system itself was not set up to deal with breaking 
stories. Following is how senior management described the problem in retrospect: 
Sometimes we are sort of clumsy, awkward in reporting on breaking news, like a 
tsunami, at the very beginning, we don’t realize, we didn’t realize that it’s so 
heavy loss. It’s simply like an earthquake story, ah, but bit by bit we realized that 
it, ah, great breaking news story. So we put more emphasis on the coverage. 
[Jirik] But to my mind, the New Year, I mean I watched I was there. Everybody 
was so preoccupied with doing the New Year programming they were ignoring 
the breaking news. It seemed to me not a question of not having the information. 
But they literally were not interested. They were much more interested in making 
sure those year-enders. 
[senior management] Yeah, they are occupied with the scheduled, the scheduled 
events, or scheduled mission. They pay little attention to the breaking news. 
That’s the aspects we have to improve in the near future. 
[Jirik] And how do you plan to do that? 
[senior management] Yes, we may reorganize the Assignment Desk, to make 
more newsworthy, to promote the newsworthiness among the staff, to improve the 
quality of the personnel at the Assignment Desk. 
But as already noted, the Assignment Desk never developed in the manner 
management had planned. As a result, CCTV-9 had no system for recognizing and 
chasing breaking stories. Story selection remained the result of reactive news editing, 
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which meant CCTV-9 handled scheduled and running stories well, but were slow to pick 
up on breaking stories. The tsunami story brought home to senior management 
shortcomings in the editorial system at CCTV-9. But it was helpless to address them as 
the structural problems were functional to the existing efficiency of the news editing 
system and process. Failure on a single story, given how little news is actually breaking 
news, meant that once the tsunami story began dropping down the CNN-I, BBC-WS 
bulletins, which I noted in my diary began around January 8, 2005, CCTV-9 could return 
to its familiar rhythms and style of work. 
MY ROLE IN PRODUCTION 
How much of a problem CCTV-9’s inability to handle breaking stories was is 
debatable. On the one hand, new stories made up only a small proportion of most 
broadcasts (see Figure 7, p. 407). On the other hand, as a former television news 
producer, I was extremely sensitive to the role breaking stories are assumed to have in the 
impression one has of a broadcaster, although I suspect analysis would not support that 
assumption.135 My former colleagues had a similar opinion as the following email from 
the Reuters operation in Sri Lanka at the time of the tsunami indicates: 
This sounds like the perfect opportunity to send a [CCTV-9] crew away [from 
Beijing] and do your own thing and use facilities whilst away. Particularly as this 
is a job that will continue to go for some time, so there is flexibility there to 
produce your own stylized content on the ground. Every other man and his dog is 
here, so why isn’t CCTV-9? You guys are after all trying to be a force in this 
business, so get out there and show that you are. If you want to talk further, give 
me a call. 
                                                 
135 At Reuters, we would always agonize over the effect that losing out to APTN on an exclusive or being 
slower on a story might have on clients’ perception of Reuters’ service, although over the long term, the 
two agencies seemed to even one another out. The competitive model that governs their practices forces 
Reuters and APTN to match every innovation the other agency comes up with. If either APTN or Reuters is 
forced out of the television news business at some point in the future, the cause is unlikely to be the 
superiority of the other agency’s coverage. 
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In general, staff at CCTV-9 believed they did not have the resources to compete 
with the likes of CNN-I and BBC-WS. But at the level of zhubian and director, there was 
little understanding of the role the agencies have historically played in making 
broadcasters appear to have a far larger news net than is the case. CCTV-9 subscribed to 
the same agency services that its competitors did, more so in fact as CCTV subscribed to 
both APTN and Reuters, which is not the norm for many broadcasters.136 Staff simply did 
not know how to utilize the channel’s relationship with the agencies to the best effect. 
While I was at CCTV-9, I worked with senior management and Reuters to attempt 
to improve the working relationship on both sides, something which both sides wanted to 
see. However, both sides had unrealistic expectations of the other. Over the course of 
2004 and into 2005, the two sides negotiated to try to come to a mutually beneficial 
relationship that would extend beyond Reuters’ traditional provision of video to a more 
inter-active relationship, such as many broadcasters enjoy with the agencies.137 Examples 
of that kind of relationship include almost daily telephone calls between the agencies and 
broadcasters and the sharing or trading off of information, video, personnel and facilities, 
especially on breaking stories, and under difficult circumstances in the field. 
A relationship of that kind would have benefited both CCTV-9 and Reuters, and 
could have been extended to APTN had it worked out, further expanding CCTV-9’s 
range. But the differences in expectation were too wide to bridge. For many reasons, 
                                                 
136 Agencies guard their subscriber lists, so the only way to measure who takes which agency is to survey 
the broadcasters. From personal experience, when I was at NBC (1991-2), NBC took Reuters only, while 
ABC subscribed exclusively to Worldwide Television News (later bought by AP to form APTN). CNN 
took both Reuters and APTN, but in August 2007 announced it was dropping Reuters. From my time at 
Reuters (1992-1999), my sense is that most broadcasters were realizing that the agencies provided similar 
enough services that they could afford to subscribe to only one without compromising their access to 
materials, although the occasional exclusive by one or the other agency would inevitably result in unhappy 
telephone calls. 
137 Personal experience in Moscow at NBC, which shared offices with Visnews (Reuters), and at Reuters, 
where I had daily contact with broadcasters across the Asian region, but rarely with CCTV. 
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including expectation and financial misunderstandings on both sides, the initiative failed. 
In part I blame myself. I was trusted by both sides to facilitate, but did not have enough 
understanding of what each was trying to achieve to successfully manage the 
relationship. 
In addition, I was coming under pressure at the time from within CCTV-9 from 
some of the Chinese staff and foreign experts, who, for a variety of reasons,138 opposed 
my work at the channel. Management had moved me from the copy editing pool to the 
Assignment Desk on February 2, 2004. As noted, I left the Assignment Desk once the 
extent of staff opposition to its functioning became evident to me. However, management 
asked me to continue working on training and production-related issues, while I returned 
to copy editing for my remaining shifts. Then in April 2005, management asked me to 
return to copy editing full time, effectively forcing me to abandon the training and 
production-related work I had been developing. 
Ironically, management told me of the change on the same day that the kind of 
production-related synergies I was seeking with third parties began to pay off, although in 
this particular instance, I take no credit for initiating the story. A very experienced 
Australian sports journalist and anchor, who had joined CCTV-9, had engineered a coup 
and managed to get an exclusive interview with world champion swimmer, Ian Thorpe, 
who was in Beijing for a promotional visit ahead of the 2008 Olympics. The journalist 
had asked me to produce the shoot. After the interview, Thorpe’s agent told me he would 
try to make available to CCTV-9 all of his talent who visited the PRC in the run-up to the 
Olympics. I believed that this interview promised to be the first of many. I later wrote in 
my diary about thinking how much I was beginning to enjoy working as a producer, my 
                                                 
138 The primary reason for misunderstandings about my work on both the Chinese and foreign side seemed 
to be a lack of communication between different sides, including from my side, about what management 
wanted me to do. 
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old role at Reuters, as I rode my bicycle back to the channel to do a training session with 
the interns after the Thorpe interview, which had taken most of the morning. 
Several hours later, I received an email from senior management that stated “Most 
of the foreigners are complaining” that I was not pulling my weight, and that I would be 
returning to copy editing full time. I cancelled the training sessions, my liaison work with 
Reuters, other production-related work with other entities keen to work more closely with 
CCTV-9, emailed Thorpe’s manager that I could not work with him, and emailed 
management indicating that I had made the necessary adjustments to my schedule to 
return to copy editing. Two of the three groups I had been training immediately 
petitioned management to have their sessions restored, to which management agreed. But 
the other initiatives ended. 
I believed then and I believe now at the time of writing that being pulled from 
work on production-related issues and on developing a better relationship between 
CCTV-9 and Reuters damaged CCTV-9’s development as an international broadcaster. 
Moreover, the decision to return me to copy editing full time felt to me like I had lost the 
confidence of management. 
In rejoining the copy editing group, I felt defeated. I had come to CCTV-9 to do 
field work for a PhD dissertation. Senior management had asked me to help develop the 
channel, especially through the May 2004 relaunch. I have already explained in the 
chapter on methodology how I believe participant observation can usefully become 
immersion. But with immersion also comes the risk of submersion and the danger of 
losing oneself in one’s subject. This is perhaps what had happened to me at CCTV-9. In 
addition, on reflection I realized that in my enthusiasm and frustration I had breached 
Mao’s dictum, outlined in the epigraph to this dissertation, on the appropriate role a 
foreigner in my position could play in the PRC. 
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In the months that followed, I maintained sporadic contact with Reuters in the 
hope the two sides would find some synergy, and continued to work with the reporters’ 
group and another production team I was training, the group responsible for World 
Insight, a weekly half-hour international current affairs program.139 But my focus shifted 
again to finishing my dissertation. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
Although my experience at CCTV-9 was unique, in so far as I was the first and at 
the time of writing (November 2007) only foreigner appointed, albeit informally, as a 
producer since every foreigner on a SAFEA140 contract at the time could only be hired as 
a ‘foreign expert’, most of my work was not in production, but an attempt to teach staff 
what I knew about making international news from my time at Reuters and prior to that, 
at NBC. To my mind, above all what CCTV lacked was not talented staff among the 
Chinese, which it had in abundance, but an understanding of how broadcasters like 
CNN-I and BBC-WS structure their news making operations to gain maximum efficiency 
from limited resources, and an editorial structure appropriate to a rolling news service. 
However, I was also aware that I was working against an entrenched culture of 
news making at CCTV-9, which mitigated against any substantive change to the status 
quo, since the irony of the situation was not that the news making system at CCTV-9 did 
not work, but rather that because it worked so well, few people saw any need for 
substantive change. The system was organized, efficient and effective. However, in the 
absence of an editorial structure centered on a desk that would have empowered the news 
                                                 
139 World Insight would go on that year (2005) to win a CCTV Outstanding Team Award (for a photograph 
of the team and the award, see, Appendix 14, p 607). 
140 State Administration of Foreign Expert Affairs 
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makers, the editorial system responded reactively to events rather than proactively. Each 
preceding bulletin set the format for each succeeding bulletin. In effect, the bulletin was a 
machine that zhubians, directors, writers, copy editors and political editors only tinkered 
with. 
The failure to news edit the tsunami story was only made worse by the attempt to 
inject “Chinese perspective” into a story that had no significant PRC angle, reducing 
CCTV-9’s coverage to the same ethnocentric representations of the event as analysis has 
uncovered in coverage by European broadcasters (Moeller, 2006), and I would hazard to 
suggest investigation would unearth in the coverage by other so-called ‘international’ 
channels like CNN-I and BBC-WS. However, the preponderance of planned and repeat 
stories on the news meant that failure to news edit a breaking story, regardless of its 
significance, had little consequence for the channel. Once the tsunami story began to slip 
down international bulletins, which happened in the second week of January 2005, then 
CCTV-9 was no longer glaringly ‘behind the story.’ 
If in Chapter 7 the passive resistance offered by staff to the institutional pressure 
of external agencies to shape the channel’s development was evident, and in Chapter 8, 
refusal was evident in the manner in which news makers retained some control over the 
production process at the level of editorial decision-making, in production the internal 
momentum of the channel was the strongest constraint on change. 
Since the reconfiguration of the English News in September 2000 as CCTV-9, the 
channel had evolved working practices appropriate to the channel’s heavy reliance on 
third party materials in both domestic and foreign policy, and foreign news. To meet the 
requirements of a 24-hour news channel, CCTV-9 also relied heavily on repeat 
programming organized into four six-hour blocs in order to reach a global audience. But 
clearly from the attitude of staff the audience that mattered was management, and who 
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was watching on any given evening in Beijing. In short, staff at CCTV-9 did not believe 
they were making news for a global audience, so much as producing a local service with 
its eye very much on a local audience. 
My own attempt to ‘internationalize’ CCTV-9 was to try to develop a better 
working relationship between CCTV-9 and Reuters. But as noted, the initiative failed. 
Not least, because of opposition I faced from within the channel, including from within 
the Editorial Board, where I was told at least one well-intentioned manager had suggested 
my attempt to improve the relationship between CCTV-9 and Reuters was a Trojan horse 
for infiltrating ‘imperialist media’ into the PRC. Given the channel’s almost complete 
reliance on ‘imperialist media’ for supplying their foreign news (see the following 
chapter), I found this claim both ironic and frustrating. However, it was a stark reminder 
of the mindset of some of my colleagues and of the ideological stakes at play in PRC 
media, especially in their ‘wai xuan’ role. 
My concerns were rather more mundane. From my previous experience and from 
extensive discussions with News Corporation’s consultant, who, as already noted (see 
p. 214) was an extremely experienced news producer, both of us could see that CCTV-9 
would not be able to function as a rolling news channel and compete with the likes of 
CNN-I and BBC-WS unless it developed a pro-active news editing system, based on an 
assignment desk as the heart of the news making operation. 
However, I was also well aware that if CCTV-9 was to establish a desk-driven 
editorial system, it might impact on the channel’s function as an element of the PRC’s 
‘wai xuan’ system. A desk would provide the channel with a pro-active rather than re-
active editing system, foregrounding the role of the zhubian in the production system, and 
bringing to the position the authority traditionally associated with the news editor’s role. 
Although CCTV-9 would continue to function as a translation service of third party 
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materials, the desk would have far greater control over the manner in which third party 
materials were selected and processed. In addition, despite the pressure from external 
agencies such as the CPD and SARFT, a strong desk at CCTV-9 would have provided the 
channel with a locus of responsibility for the broadcast that may have empowered news 
makers within the ‘wai xuan’ system. 
However, whether empowering the news makers in this manner would have 
facilitated or constrained the publicity function of the channel cannot be determined in 
advance. Perhaps in the case of a compliant zhubian on a pro-active desk the result would 
be even more reliable and aesthetically pleasing publicity for the Party/State. Moreover, 
the regulators and censors would retain the power to rein in the channel, should news 
makers begin to develop a sense of relative autonomy within the news making system. 
All that was guaranteed should CCTV-9 develop a strong desk would be an improvement 
in the quality of the editing system, without any guarantee as to what ends that system 
would be put. 
If bored acceptance of the role they played in what He Zhou (2000b) calls “Party 
Publicity Inc.” and a lack of training, which limited opportunities for advancement, at 
times fed staff disinterest in doing little more than the minimum necessary to keep the 
production process going, establishing clear leadership in the newsroom through a strong 
desking system could have been a first step to empowering the general news teams. That 
in itself would have been a step forward for editorial reform at CCTV-9, although the 
consequences could not have been predicted. 
Given the hybrid and multi-faceted character of the CCTV-9 news, evident in the 
mix of sources that went into the news making process, and the range of people involved 
in the construction of any given story, the product of the general new teams could not 
automatically be assigned to either straight news or ‘wai xuan.’ Even in the minutiae of 
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the production process, the roles of the copy and political editors in shaping the work of 
the writers could not be guaranteed to deliver a particular angle on any given story, 
although the Party line was guaranteed on the vast majority of domestic and foreign 
policy stories through reliance on CCTV-1 and Xinhua for the bulk of these stories. 
Limited as they were to largely working from third party sources, the agency of 
news makers was restricted in the production process. However, if the balance of force in 
the relationship between the strategies of the CPD and SARFT and the tactics of news 
makers left little space for maneuver, the reliance on third party sources in foreign news 
undermined the demand in the OSC blueprint to look at the world from a Chinese point 
of view. However, whether this undermined or bolstered the ‘wai xuan’ function of 
CCTV-9 is open to debate, since use of APTN and Reuters at CCTV-9 could only 
strengthen the channel’s claims as an international broadcaster, a central aim of the 
relaunch. 
Given the strong sense of social responsibility that is the norm for news makers in 
the PRC, despite the sense among writers that they were not so much reporters as 
transcribers and translators, the newsroom was the locus of a vibrant but frustrated 
journalistic culture. Although for some, news making was no doubt just a job, news 
workers at CCTV-9 seemed not so much cynical as frustrated at the limitations put on 
their work. For the most part these limitations were not the result of regulation or 
censorship, but the result of the production system itself, the never ending momentum of 
the 24-hour news cycle and the reliance on third party material. Given the time to reflect 
on their work, and given the opportunity to explore a story, my sense is they would have 
put a lot of the effort that went into simply getting the job done into doing the job in a 
manner that reflected a greater sense of journalistic agency. But it was only in the 
reporting group, the focus of the next chapter, that CCTV-9’s news makers could practice 
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their craft in a relatively unconstrained although objectively very constrained 
environment. 
Within the conjuncture of forces such as the CPD and SARFT that operated on 
the newsroom from without, and in the newsroom in everyday practice, particular news 
makers in the general news group had little relative autonomy. But collectively, the 
production process itself worked as a barrier to external interference in their work. 
Paradoxically, the heavy reliance on third party sources at CCTV-9 shielded the news 
making process from intervention, since that dependence was a result of the structural 
relationship between source materials and content, which could not change without 
massively expanding the reporting group with respect to domestic and foreign policy 
news, and ending dependency on the agencies in foreign news, which was unlikely. 
Although I have been concerned in this chapter to point out how little the 
production process changed as a result of the May, 2004 relaunch, the failure of 
management to push through a revamp of the editorial structure and the resultant inability 
of the system to deal with e.g. breaking news indicated that the existing correlation of 
forces empowered the general news teams within the journalistic field to not change, the 
logical solution to the impossibility of changing the structural relationship between 
source material and content. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have looked at the production process. I have looked at the role 
of continuity in news production and the manner in which continuity was institutionalized 
at CCTV-9 through the use of repeat stories and third party source materials. I have 
analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the production system at CCTV-9, especially 
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the tightly regimented news making process and the manner in which resources were put 
to maximum use on the plus side. 
The downside of the production system was a re-active rather than pro-active 
news editing system, which handled scheduled stories very well, but did not handle 
breaking stories well. Although breaking stories were only a small part of output, 
CCTV-9’s failure on the tsunami story exposed a serious flaw in the news editing system 
that management said it was concerned to fix. However failure to establish a desking 
system hampered management’s attempts at change. 
CCTV-9 had evolved as a translation service for third party material. After its 
launch as a 24-hour service in September 2000, reliance on third party materials became 
an entrenched feature of servicing the news making machine. CCTV-1 and Xinhua 
guaranteed politically correct domestic and foreign policy news. My attempts and those 
of senior management to build a better relationship with Reuters failed. The entrenched 
news making culture and the momentum that the channel had developed out of its launch 
as a 24-hour service could not so easily be changed. 
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Chapter 10: Reporters 
INTRODUCTION 
If in the previous three chapters a picture of a disciplined (in the double sense of 
the word) news making system has been evident, then in this chapter I want to show how 
discipline has its limits. One of the themes that I have threaded throughout this 
dissertation is an account, following Pan & Lu (2003), of how Certeau’s (1984) tactics of 
the weak play out with respect to the strategies of the strong, from reconfiguring the 
discourse of the power structure to refusal. A second theme has been that Chinese news 
makers have historically played a double role as agents and critics of the authorities. 
Today’s journalists inherited this double role from their precursors in the intellectual 
professions, who laid the foundations for journalism in the PRC in Imperial and 
Republican China. In this chapter, I use the work of the reporters at CCTV-9 to show 
how this double role played out in day-to-day work, in particular in the tactics they used 
to make stories that were professionally and personally satisfying, while meeting the 
requirements of the regulatory and censorial agencies. Following a broad introduction of 
the work of the reporters’ group, I show, by focusing on a single story, work that was 
typical of the best done at CCTV-9. 
I open the chapter with a general discussion of the work of the reporters’ group at 
CCTV-9. Following this, I look at a single story, HIV/AIDS in the PRC, and how one 
reporter handled this story. I have chosen the HIV/AIDS story as the focus of this chapter 
for two reasons. Firstly, channel management and staff acknowledged the story as both 
professionally accomplished and hard hitting, pushing the reporting envelope at CCTV-9 
as far as it would go short of breaching reporting guidelines. Secondly, I was heavily 
involved in developing the story for broadcast, once it had been shot by the reporter and 
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cameraman. As a result, from the point of view of understanding how news was made at 
CCTV-9, this was a good example of the process of hybridization that characterizes much 
production at the channel, although the extent of my involvement was atypical for 
‘foreign experts’ at CCTV-9. 
Of all the staff at CCTV-9, the reporters were the group whose work I cared for 
the most. Although I had the utmost respect for senior management, and many of the 
other staff from anchors to interns, I felt that the future of CCTV-9 as an international 
news channel depended far more on developing its reporting than on developing any 
other single aspect of the channel. Soon after joining CCTV-9 in mid-2003, I was tasked 
by senior management with training the reporting group. In this I had the full support of 
the head of the reporters’ group, an excellent journalist, who features in this chapter as 
the HIV/AIDS reports were his work and those of the cameraman with whom he worked. 
In discussing his conceptualization of the journalistic field, Bourdieu (2005a) 
insists on a focus on the field rather than journalists: 
[b]ecause so long as one talks about journalists, one is talking within a logic of 
personal responsibility: one is looking for people to blame, and on the other hand, 
one oscillates between the positive image that journalists continue to propagate 
(against all the evidence), with the theme of journalism as a countervailing force, 
a critical tool (no democracy without journalism), etc., and the opposing vision 
which sees journalism as a relay of a structure of oppression, etc. Journalists are 
set up as responsible, and, because the problem is posed in terms of responsibility, 
the visible agents become scapegoats, whereas if one talks in terms of a field one 
substitutes for these visible agents – who, in Plato’s metaphor, are the puppets 
whose strings have to be found – the structure of the journalistic field and the 
mechanisms that operate within it. (pp. 41-42) 
Although I agree with Bourdieu (2005a) in principle, by factoring in Certeau’s 
(1984) insistence on the irreducibility of particular acts in everyday life, the practice of 
journalism can be brought to life, without conflating agency with responsibility. 
Although the reporters were responsible for their work in the sense that they made the 
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stories associated with their names, by focusing on the full range of forces that enabled 
and constrained the making of AIDS Report, the deep imbrication of journalistic agency 
in the power structure and the negotiation of control with and within that structure is 
foregrounded. As a result responsibility clearly shifts from the individual to the field. 
In the discussion that follows, I make no apology for my partiality. Although I am 
constrained as an academic to provide an accurate as possible account of the work of the 
reporters’ group, I do not believe I should conceal my enthusiasm for their work. If 
CCTV-9 is to have a future as an international news channel, more than any other section 
it will be the work of the reporting group that stamps the channel with the authority it 
seeks. Only in its reporting of the domestic and foreign policy story can the channel set 
itself off from its competitors like CNN-I and BBC-WS, which do not have the privileged 
access to the PRC story that CCTV-9 enjoys. Moreover, in so far as the previous chapter 
has shown that in its reliance on the international news agencies on the foreign story 
CCTV-9 largely mirrors the world seen on its competitors, then its news makers only 
needs to learn how to handle breaking news in order to match the offerings seen on 
channels like CNN-I and BBC-WS. 
This chapter is the third of three that deal with elements of the research question: 
• How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? 
The intermediate question and subordinate questions this chapter addressed were 
as follows: 
o What did journalists at CCTV-9 do? 
 Who were the reporters? 
 What motivated their work? 
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 What tactics did they deploy in negotiating constraints on their 
work? 
 What does one story, the reporting of HIV/AIDS, tell about 
journalistic agency in the PRC? 
THE CCTV-9 REPORTERS’ GROUP 
Illustration 10: April 2004 publicity picture of the CCTV-9 Reporters’ Group 
Although the work of the reporters’ group constituted only a small part of the 
news output of CCTV-9, a situation I discuss in the following chapter, its formal 
importance to the channel outweighed its contribution measured only in proportion of 
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stories or minutes of air time, since its work was key to defining the character of the 
channel as a news channel. In the OSC blueprint for the May 2004 relaunch, 
management’s ambitions for the reporters’ group were detailed in the following manner: 
We must increase our authoritativeness. We must strengthen the current reporters’ 
team. On every major domestic or foreign story we must have a CCTV-9 reporter 
file from the scene in order to raise the professionalism and authoritativeness of 
the report. Whether it’s a national leader visiting abroad or a major international 
story like the Iraq war, or APEC summit etc., we must send our own reporters 
more often to do on-the-spot stories. CCTV-9’s reporters can go out. Whenever 
there is a major international story, having them on screen and hearing their 







However, the volume of the news produced by the reporters’ group actually fell 
(‘Self Cover’ in Figure 13, p. 415) after the May 2004 relaunch, perhaps reflecting the 
ambiguous situation of the group within the channel, now that it had successfully resisted 
the tenor of the OSC blueprint to function less as a general purpose broadcaster and more 
as a news channel. Given that the work of the reporters’ group did not concern most staff, 
the latter remained indifferent to the group’s meaning for the channel, despite the group’s 
alleged importance to ‘branding’ CCTV International as a news channel. That the 
reporters’ group at a news channel [author’s emphasis] had to struggle to stay noticed 
was indicative of the overall tension within the channel over access to and allocation of 
resources, both financial and human. Although senior management backed the group, the 
group itself was only a very small part of the channel, and suffered for not having strong 
support within the channel, outside of senior management. 
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During my time at CCTV-9, the reporters’ group was an independent unit within 
CCTV-9’s editorial structure. It supplied news to the general news (CCTV News, 
including News Updates post re-launch, and World Wide Watch). The specialist news 
shows were permitted to use the work of the reporters’ group if their producers wanted to. 
Of the specialist news groups, only Biz China was represented within the reporters’ 
group, with two reporters attached to the group. However, they were formally part of Biz 
China, not members of the reporters’ group. The other specialist news shows were able to 
send writers out to report stories, but they were not recognized within CCTV-9 as 
reporters, although they functioned as such. To be a member of the reporters’ group was 
a privilege actively sought by many of the writers, but awarded by the Controller with the 
consent of the head of the reporters’ group. 
The group was set up in 1997 and headed at the time by a senior staffer at the 
channel, who would go on to become head of current affairs and host of ‘Dialogue,’ a 
show similar in format and intention to programs like CNN’s Larry King Live and the 
BBC’s Hardtalk. 141  The other reporters to launch the group would later move into 
management or serve abroad as CCTV correspondents. From the roll call of those 
associated with the reporters’ group since its inception, the group was clearly central to 
the channel’s news making system. A further indication of the formal status of the 
reporters’ group within the overall structure of the channel was evident in its reporting 
line within the editorial system, as the head of the group reported directly to the 
Controller, rather than to the Deputy Controller (Head of News) (see Figure 4, p. 258). 
                                                 
141 Like other CCTV-9 programming, Dialogue functioned as part of the ‘wai xuan’ system, restricting the 
moderator’s ability to address contentious topics, except in a manner that did not bluntly question the Party 
and government’s position on the issue. However, this did not prevent the host from pushing the envelope 
whenever possible, although I personally found elements of his style as irritating as I find Larry King’s 
failure to ask tough questions boring. That having been said, the pro-China bias on Dialogue was at least 
understandable in the context of CCTV-9’s ‘wai xuan’ function, in contrast to the repugnant xenophobia of 
shows like The O’Reilly Factor on Fox in the United States. 
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At the time of the May 2004 relaunch, the head of the reporters’ group was an 
experienced correspondent, who had joined the channel in 1995 from Beijing Radio. I 
worked closely with the group at the request of management. My role consisted of 
attending weekly playback sessions where I would join the reporters in an examination of 
their previous week’s work,142 ghost writing and copy editing their stories as needed, and 
helping reporters develop their stories, whether through suggesting topics, or how to 
handle them, from pre-production through post-production. At the time of the relaunch in 
May 2004, the team had nine members, four women and five men. Bracketing the more 
experienced directors and zhubians, the reporters represented most of the cream of 
CCTV-9’s talent from within the general news department and worked extremely hard to 
deliver professional, hard hitting stories about the PRC.143 
Committed journalists 
The lot of the reporter in the PRC is not an easy one. I have already noted (see 
p. 132) the dangers associated with working as a journalist in the PRC. At CCTV-9, the 
‘wai xuan’ function of the channel restricted some of the types of coverage that the 
reporters were permitted to do. For example, SARFT and CCTV management forbade 
CCTV-9 from doing the kind of investigative reporting associated with, for example, 
Jiaodian Fangtan and Economic News Half Hour (see p. 128). But given their restricted 
remit, the CCTV-9 reporters were still concerned to be as hard hitting as possible. In this, 
they had the full support of channel management, although many topics had to be 
negotiated and the Controller would overrule the head of the reporters’ group if the topic 
                                                 
142 A former anchor from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), also attended the reporters’ 
playback sessions. 
143 I say “most of the cream” because during my time at CCTV-9, at least one general news writer and one 
director who had the talent to be a reporter told me they would not have accepted the offer even had it been 
made. Their attitude was the exception in the newsroom. 
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or the group’s handling of it was felt to be too contentious. Nevertheless, as I shall show 
below with the HIV/AIDS story, senior management were concerned to give the group as 
much support as possible in their bid to make CCTV-9 as strong a news channel as 
possible, including on the domestic story. 
Typical of the work of the reporters’ group was a series of stories the group 
devised to mark the May 2004 relaunch. The series was called ‘China’s Challenges.’ 
Twenty stories were planned of which sixteen were produced:144 
1. China launches war on drugs 
2. China to overhaul rural health system 
3. Unemployment dogs China 
4. Deserts drive farmers from land 
5. Gap widens between the poor and rich 
6. SOEs chained by social functions 
7. Urbanization threatens arable land 
8. Beijing handles water crisis 
9. Dancing with foreign wolves145 
10. Only-child generation grows up 
11. Farmers fight rural poverty 
12. Energy shortages plague enterprises 
13. China highlights work safety 
14. Beijing cars 
15. IPR protection: a long-term test for China 
16. China struggles to reform banks 
                                                 
144 Source: CCTV-9 working document and http://www.cctv.com/english/special/C12295/2/index.shtml.  
145 On the threat Chinese companies face from foreign competition. 
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Illustration 11:  Author’s annotated working list of stories for China’s Challenges 
(source: CCTV-9) 
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The reporters created the working list of planned stories (Illustration 11) without 
input from management. It showed what they considered some of the most pressing 
issues facing the PRC government, business and society. The series was praised by 
management and, according to management, by the audience: 
Comrade Li Changchun has outlined the “Three Stay in Touches” for external 
publicity [‘wai xuan’]: stay in touch with China’s reality; stay in touch with the 
foreign audiences’ demand for information; stay in touch with the habits of the 
foreign audiences. These are the guidelines for doing external publicity well. With 
respect to the foreign audiences’ expectation that “bad news is good news,” we 
should not attempt to avoid problems with the market economy or this or that 
problem. CCTV-9 must do more in the way of explanatory reports. The series 
‘China’s Challenges’ that aired after the relaunch was a relatively good example 
of balanced reporting. It addressed the successes and the shortcomings. Foreign 
audiences rated it highly. (Jiang & Liu, 2004, p. 55) 
As a measure of the quality of the series, at the annual CNN World Report 
Awards for the year 2004, ‘Beijing cars’ won Best Story in the economics category.146 
Although CCTV-9 had been a long-time contributor to CNN World Report, the channel 
had never won in any category at the awards before this story was honored. The 
HIV/AIDS stories I discuss below had originally been planned as a single story for 
‘China’s Challenges.’ But the reporter ended up doing a whole series of stories. One of 
them, ‘The Price of Blood’, was also entered into the 2004 CNN awards and was one of 
three stories nominated for the top prize in the ‘Best Ongoing Issue’ category. 
But it was not in the public recognition the group received for its work that its 
strength lay, since it received little public recognition. Because the group was only 
responsible for a small proportion of the total content of the channel (see the following 
chapter), its work often went un-noticed by group members’ colleagues, whose concerns 
                                                 
146 CNN World Report was launched in 1987. The program airs stories submitted from broadcasters around 
the world. The reports are not re-edited by CNN, but aired as they are received from the contributing 
channel (see http://www.cnn.com/CNN-I/Programs/world.report/). 
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were largely unrelated to the work of the reporters’ group. The real strength of the 
reporters’ group lay in their commitment to journalism as a socially responsible 
profession that demanded a high degree of professionalism and personal commitment to 
the story if it was to be done, despite the institutional forces such as the Central Publicity 
Department arrayed against journalism that would question the Party/State line in any 
way in the PRC. 
This attitude was evident in the manner in which the group approached their 
work. Fiercely independent within CCTV-9, they would discuss among themselves 
appropriate topics and themes for coverage and decide on an approach, before the Senior 
Producer would present it to senior management. The ‘China’s Challenges’ series was a 
typical result of this process. The reporters as a group were seeking to make an impact 
and a statement about what kind of channel they wanted CCTV-9 to be with the May 
2004 relaunch and with ‘China’s Challenges’ produced a set of stories that advanced that 
statement. 
Individually, the experience and skill levels of the journalists who made up the 
reporters’ group were mixed. Management wanted to expand the group, but writers who 
were promoted to reporter would be called on to develop superior writing and video 
editing skills to those they had already acquired, since now they would be producing the 
material themselves rather than fashioning stories from third party materials. In addition, 
CCTV-9 reporters worked as their own producers. So for writers newly promoted, 
becoming a reporter meant learning also how to produce, which meant learning how to 
develop stories and organize their production, from planning stories to arranging 
interviews and booking flights and hotel rooms for themselves and the cameraman.147 
                                                 
147 At the time of writing, CCTV-9 did not have any women working as camera operators. Until recent 
years this had been the case worldwide with mainstream media. However, the ‘macho’ associated with the 
masculinist concept of camerawork as ‘heavy work’ and a ‘man’s’ job lingers at CCTV. One of my first 
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The group took pride in seeing any one of their newer members make the transition from 
writer to reporter: 
[Head of the reporters’ group] [A] and [B] are two successful examples, and even 
today [X - Deputy Controller (Head of News)] do not believe that [A] and [B] are 
good reporters and will become good reporters. [X] just told me yesterday, [A] 
and [B] will never be potentially good reporters. And I say why, they are talented, 
do you see their reports recently… When I ask [X] can I take this one or that 
[writer to try out as a reporter], [X] says, actually no-one is qualified for your 
group. He says, who is qualified? 
In this case, the two writers concerned both developed as excellent reporters. 
Moreover, both of them developed exactly the kind of feistiness that makes a good 
reporter in the face of management opposition to stories which might impact negatively 
on the government and/or the channel. 
[A], for example, on November, 28, 2004 was dispatched to Shaanxi Province 
when news broke of a fire at the Chenjiashan coal mine that would eventually claim 166 
lives (BBC/Xinhua, 2004). He filed a story that night, for which I copy edited the piece to 
camera. However, I learned later that management had refused to air the story, saying it 
was “too graphic.” However, according to staff on duty the real problem was that [A] had 
implicated mine management in the disaster and local government too, since it was a 
state-owned enterprise. 
Rescued miners told the reporter that they had been forced back underground, 
despite the fact (later reported in e.g. China Daily, 2004a) that a fire had been already 
burning in the mine for almost a week: [Miner quoted in A’s script] “Fires have been 
burning up in the mine since the 23rd. The head of mine knew that, but still let the work 
continue.” The PRC’s print media would run this angle to the story on the following day 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggestions when I started working with the reporters’ group was that the cameramen use tripods for all 
their shooting whenever possible. The cameramen at the meeting were derisive, arguing (as I had heard and 
seen at NBC and Reuters in the past) that they could hold a shot steady without the aid of a tripod. Once 
they started shooting with tripods, the difference was immediately evident. 
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(China Daily, 2004a; Lim, 2004), but CCTV-9 management refused to lift the ban on 
[A]’s story, which closed with the observation: “[Miner] says there were almost 3000 
workers at the mine. Every one of them knew the fire would cause a gas explosion. All 
they got was a note telling them to continue working and to get rid of the danger 
themselves.” In the piece to camera that followed, the reporter concluded: “For some 
people, profit has more value than human life.” 
The following morning (Monday), I was again on duty when [A] rang in with an 
update on the original story. He was angry with CCTV-9 management for what staff in 
the newsroom were calling a cover-up. I helped him with the piece to camera for the 
second story. However, again, the zhubian refused to air the story. This time, I went to 
senior management and begged them to run the story, arguing that China Youth Daily148 
had already run the angle that management had ordered the miners to continue working, 
despite the fire underground. Senior management refused to budge. 
Frustrated I went home. That evening, I was watching the BBC-WS report on the 
accident, and the correspondent, almost quoting [A], finished with the words: “Profit is 
taking precedence over human life.” I wrote a note in my diary that the reporter had 
beaten the BBC by 24 hours on the story, had got it right, and that management had 
refused to air his report. 
[A] stayed at the mine, and his later stories were aired. The 1900 bulletin of 
World Wide Watch on November 29 had his account of the efforts of central, provincial 
and local government to deal with the disaster. Lost was the focus on the mine 
management and their apparent culpability in the disaster. 
                                                 
148 Source: Diary note. Reuters had run a wire story, citing China Youth Daily. 
 366
Although reporters, zhubians and management usually had enough respect for one 
another to negotiate most contentious issues, the case of the Chenjiashan mine disaster 
showed clearly the heavy hand of management, and the limits to which they were willing 
to accept criticism of the government. To my mind, [A] showed a great deal of courage 
and integrity in refusing to reshape his original story, doing instead a new story that was 
little more than a cynical exercise in pandering to the demands of management for a 
positive spin even on a tragedy. As a junior reporter, [A] was still learning the tactics of 
evading censorship. 
Only a month earlier, a more experienced reporter had been dispatched to Henan 
Province, where an explosion at a coal mine would kill 148 workers (Xinhua, 2004c). 
The reporter sent a powerful story focusing on the families of those who had lost family 
members in the blast. Again, the zhubian on duty refused to air the story, with the 
backing of management. However, in this case the reporter agreed to rework the story to 
focus on the government response and rescue efforts. It aired without losing some of the 
original focus on the victims’ families. Again the reporter was angry that management 
had forced him to tone down and change the focus of his original story. However, he 
knew that by refocusing on the government’s response to the disaster, he would be able to 
get most of what he wanted to air. 
Even so, the reporter faced censure when he returned to Beijing, and was publicly 
chastised for his original story with its focus on the families of victims of the tragedy. 
Dressing him down at the weekly channel-wide Tuesday meeting, senior management 
said: “You are a good reporter, but you have a responsibility.” When I spoke to the 
reporter, he reiterated that he felt the story of the families should have been told. 
 I later discussed the story and aftermath with senior management: 
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[Jirik] We have a breaking news story, the Zhengzhou mine disaster, [X] was 
sent, the story comes back. [The zhubian] censored it. 
[senior management] Uh-huh. 
[Jirik] And then my understanding was that you were also critical of his work at a 
Tuesday meeting. 
[senior management] It’s not a balanced report. That’s the only problem. It’s a 
purely one-sided story. If it is, we promote the balanced report, report in 
journalism. 
[Jirik] What do you mean by balanced? 
[senior management] The balanced when we have one coin with two sides. If you 
only report on one side, then it is imbalanced. You have to report on two sides of 
the same coin. That’s my idea of the balanced reporting system, journalism. 
[Jirik] Critics of the news system here in China would say, one side of that coin is 
that you simply must always repeat what the government says. 
[senior management] That’s why we have to be more internationalized, like our 
AIDS Report, like our Energy Crunch, like the China’s Challenges series, done by 
our reporting team. That’s the balanced reporting. 
Management’s definition of balanced reporting reflected the OSC blueprint for 
the May 2004 relaunch, which as already noted (p. 241) insisted that news “reflect the 
government’s position and point of view,” while simultaneously being “objective, 
impartial and balanced” (CCTV, 2003c). Although the spirit of the OSC blueprint is 
laudable for attempting to move beyond the one-sided focus on the negative that 
characterizes much news, mine disasters that kill 148 and then 166 workers have no 
upside. 
In insisting that such stories be framed in terms of government rescue and 
response efforts, management saw themselves as protecting the channel from the censors 
and regulatory authorities, even if the reporters saw them as agents of the censors and 
regulatory authorities. Both sides have a point. Keeping in mind the hard won inroads 
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media have made into reporting such stories in recent years (see p. 263), the framing of 
mine disasters as stories about government rescue and response efforts is an excellent 
example of the tactics media have developed for evading censure (see below, p. 372). 
Whenever the frequent mine accidents happen in the PRC (see below, p. 374, 
footnote 152), media usually report that the provincial governor and a plethora of 
subordinates have “rushed” to the disaster scene to coordinate rescue work. Only by 
framing the story in this way, can the reporter get the news out, without the CPD issuing 
a ban. Moreover, a story framed in this way still implies government culpability for not 
regulating the mining industry and protecting workers. In short, simply by reporting on 
industrial accidents reporters paint the government in a bad light, because so many of the 
accidents either happen in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or in poorly regulated 
industries that have broken away from the SOE system, or in unregulated and illegal 
industries, including within the mining sector.149 
Evident also in reporting disaster stories is an element of what Pan & Lu (2003) 
refer to as the manner in which reporters and media managers struggle for control of 
news discourse through different interpretations of terms such as ‘professionalism’. 
Whereas management tended to interpret ‘professionalism’ as the demand for news that 
reflected government opinion in the final analysis, reporters increasingly saw government 
opinion as only one necessary but not sufficient condition for an objective, impartial and 
balanced story. As they learned the routines of news making, the CCTV-9 reporters 
became adept at evading censorship, but they also saw themselves as the vanguard of 
experimentation with form in news reporting within the channel. And, as the case with 
                                                 
149 According to PRC state media, 6,027 workers died in mining accidents in 2004 (although AFP notes 
that independent estimates put the number at closer to 20,000) (AFP, 2005). Concern at the accident rate in 
the mining industry prompted the Central Government in 2005 to close 2,411 illegal and/or unsafe mines 
(out of some 34,000 total, calculated from the figures in the Xinhua story) (US State Dept., 2006; Xinhua, 
2005b). 
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[A] showed, at times they were unafraid to refuse to change a story even if it meant it 
would not air, when they personally felt they were being asked to tone down or cover up 
the core element. 
Occasionally their combativeness on a story would backfire. In August 2004, a 
writer trying out for the team was banned from further reporting after she shouted a 
question out to Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing apparently at an inappropriate moment. An 
irate subordinate of Li fired off an email (Illustration 12) to CCTV, which ended the 
young woman’s career as a reporter. 
I was suspicious that the foreign ministry would send an email in English to a 
generic channel address, rather than go through official channels. I also felt senior 
management were being heavy-handed, especially as she was only a junior and still 
learning. Thinking to ask for a reprieve for her, I asked senior management whether the 
email was genuine, as the woman in question had her critics (including me) within the 
channel, and I thought she might have become the target of a smear campaign. Senior 
management said the authenticity of the email was not in question and that the matter was 
closed. 
To my mind, a far more serious but not career-ending breach of reporting 
discipline occurred in February 2004 on the opening day of talks the PRC had arranged 
between the PRC, DPRK, South Korea, United States, Russia and Japan to try to end the 
DPRK’s nuclear program. A photo opportunity had been put on in the negotiating room 
ahead of the PRC’s formal opening of the talks. However, when the press was ushered 
out, a CCTV-9 reporter, who had sat down at an empty seat next to the DPRK delegation 
at the negotiating table, on impulse decided to stay, thinking he could use his cell phone 
to relay the opening statements to the newsroom. When I later asked him why he had 
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done this, he said it was the dream of every reporter to get the scoop: “You can’t imagine 
the feeling I had, being the only one there.” 
With the instant decision made, the talks opened with China’s delegate Wang Yi 
delivering China’s opening position. That lasted twenty minutes. Then just as the DPRK 
delegate was about to speak, a PRC foreign ministry official approached and asked the 
CCTV-9 reporter what was he doing there. The reporter was bustled out and briefly 
detained by security at the venue before CCTV representatives secured his release. 
According to CCTV-9 staff, CCTV’s president, accompanied by the head of the Overseas 
Service Center and the CCTV-9 controller, was forced to go to the foreign ministry and 
Illustration 12: Foreign Ministry fax criticizing CCTV-9 reporter 
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apologize for the alleged breach of protocol. But the reporter, who was a rising star, was 
given little more than a slap on the wrist, banned only from covering the foreign ministry. 
At CCTV, colleagues debated the reporter’s actions. As one zhubian noted: 
“Everyone knows about it. [X] is very famous”.” [Jirik] “Is this person considered a hero 
or a villain, inside CCTV?” [zhubian] “I think it’s kind of a mixed feeling.” Some lauded 
his daring. But the consensus was that he had gone too far by staying in the room, and 
hence potentially jeopardizing all press access to the talks. 
I recorded my own reaction in my diary: 
He does not seem to understand that reporters play by unwritten rules, and that to 
stay in the room breached an unwritten rule whereby the press, government 
relationship is managed. On the other hand, had he stayed, he may well have had 
a scoop. But was it a scoop worth the risk – not only to his own career and to 
CCTV-9 and CCTV, but also to the talks themselves. Given how touchy the 
DPRK is, had he in any [way] managed to get the report out and on air, or in 
print, it is unknown what the DPRK reaction might have been. But… it was [also] 
an excellent example of the new openness and boldness of the journalists in 
China. (Diary entry February 29, 2004) 
As a former television news producer I quietly applauded, since my own attitude 
was that you did whatever necessary, short of jeopardizing the safety of one’s colleagues, 
including that of the opposition, to not only get the story, but also beat the opposition. 
However, in the PRC, the opposition is not only the other press, but also the censors and 
regulatory authorities. Even as media compete amongst themselves, when facing the CPD 
and SARFT they present a loosely united front, and have developed a sophisticated 
arsenal of tactics with which to evade, confront or co-opt the authorities.150 The reporter’s 
gambit was seen as a breach of the trust implicit in the united front, and was therefore 
seen as an unacceptable ploy in the bid to win on the story. 
                                                 
150 I do not want to make too much of this sense of camaraderie, as my experience with NBC and Reuters 
showed that in difficult situations media workers worldwide tend to look out for one another, regardless of 
their professional and corporate affiliations. 
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Regardless of the defensibility or otherwise of his actions, it was the best example 
I saw in my time at CCTV-9 of the lengths to which reporters were willing to go to get 
the story, and at the same time push the reporting envelope. That the reporter got off with 
little more than a warning also indicates just how much leeway reporters were beginning 
to have within the news making system. At the same time, his treatment compared to that 
meted out to the junior reporter suggested that different standards were at work at 
CCTV-9 depending on the person involved when staff actions were put under the 
microscope. 
NEGOTIATING CENSORSHIP 
The arts of negotiating or evading censorship have become a mark of distinction 
within the reporting profession in the PRC. I have already noted (p. 128) Pan & Lu’s 
(2003) discussion of the tactics that producers at CCTV’s investigative shows Jiaodian 
Fangtan (‘Focus’) and Xinwen Diaocha (‘News Probe’) use to evade censorship. Tong 
Jingrong (2007) has also addressed this issue, discussing five tactics journalists use: 
1. Strategic choice of themes 
2. Political comment disguised as constructive criticism 
3. Writing between the lines, by allowing facts and objectivity to imply an unstated 
narrative 
4. Using quotations from sources acceptable to officials 
5. Obtaining interviews through journalists’ self-misrepresentation 
CCTV-9 reporters used the first four tactics, but not the fifth,151 which might have 
been considered unprofessional. With respect to the issue of misrepresentation, in defense 
of Tong’s (2007) informants, they were doing a type of investigative reporting that 
                                                 
151 Although that would not have been the case had the reporter managed to get out the six-party talks 
story, in effect masquerading as a member of the DPRK delegation. 
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CCTV-9 did not tackle. However misrepresentation of oneself as not a journalist is a 
tactic that I believe journalists should avoid. Perhaps I am splitting hairs, quietly 
applauding the CCTV-9 reporter’s actions on the DPRK talks, while agreeing that 
reporters should not misrepresent themselves. However, the failure in the case of the 
DPRK story was that of the PRC foreign ministry in not recognizing a reporter was still 
in the room. Perhaps tactical misrepresentation under certain circumstances is acceptable 
while misrepresentation as a strategy is unethical, although investigative reporting often 
deploys it. In the PRC, in Tong’s examples (2007), tactical misrepresentation points to 
the compromises reporters are forced to make to do their work in an extremely hostile 
and unforgiving environment. 
In terms of Tong’s (2007) other tactics, at CCTV-9 the focus on government 
response and rescue work at mine accidents was a good example of strategic choice of 
themes. Whereas [A] refused to change his story, the reporter sent to Henan Province was 
willing to shift his focus far enough away from the victims and their families to the 
government to get the story on air. I would argue that the commitment to socially 
responsible reporting in the PRC was typical of the second tactic, since reporters were 
often as concerned to make a point, which might mean taking a side on an issue, as they 
were with objectivity and balance, a position evident from interviews: 
[Jirik] So you see the role of the reporter, it’s not just to report, but to actually 
change? 
[Reporter] Yeah… I believe changing something, especially some you know, 
changing a bad thing, bad decision, that’s kind of a reporter’s responsibility. Yes, 
we are reporting the truth and the facts. But the way is sometimes is trying to 
educate people, and trying to promote the awareness, and trying to tell the 
government you know some of the decisions might be wrong. Or they have to 
reconsider. I don’t know how powerful it is. But at least that’s what I think. 
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That having been said, facts and objectivity can often imply an unstated narrative 
(Tong’s tactic #3). The case of the mine disasters again was a good example, since the 
frequency of mine accidents suggests serious safety issues within the PRC’s mining 
industry that have nothing to do with the inherent dangers of mining in general.152 
Reporters were aware that letting the facts speak for themselves would sometimes make 
the point, without the reporter showing their position on a story: 
[Jirik] The Chinese media are always being slammed in the West for not covering 
human rights, political issues, Hong Kong, Taiwan. Is this a fair criticism at all? 
[Reporter] I think by human rights issues we have a lot of stories, and we 
personalize it, and they will just narrow down, and it’s, I think it’s a story about 
human rights. But the difference is we just don’t stand out and say the Chinese 
government has a poor human rights record. It’s just the way of expressing 
differently, but how can you avoid human rights in every story, because it’s 
always about people. 
The fourth tactic is hardly unique to the PRC. As one school of media researchers 
in the United States (Glasser, 1992; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 1999; 
Schiller, 1992 et al.) consistently shows, privileging official voices as sources of 
information is characteristic of mainstream media and the journalistic profession. 
Tong (2007) does not cite Pan & Lu’s (2003) work on Certeau (Certeau, 1984). 
But her insights fit the patterns that Pan & Lu have identified. At CCTV-9, apart from 
those tactics already discussed, one of the chief ways of avoiding censorship was to beat 
the censors to the story. Typically it took the CPD or SARFT several hours to several 
days to issue a directive banning reporting on an event. Within this window, reporters had 
time to get a story to air if they were fast enough: 
If the media they think bad news they touch the government interest, the 
government may try to stop…. you know if some big events, big kind of disaster 
                                                 
152 Xinhua noted in 2004 that “the death rate for every 100 tonnes of coal produced in China was 100 times 
that of the United States” (Lim, 2004). 
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happen, that kind of disaster not natural disaster, maybe something because 
government authority they didn’t work very well, that kind of thing, they may try 
to make that kind of thing coverage low tune [key]. So, but, the media has for 
several, after several cases and experience, they realize the time difference is very 
important… We make use of time difference, because not like American 
government, they [US govt.] work very efficient, they feed news, they feed all 
information to the media very quick. But in China, not so quick, so between 
government action and the time between the events happen, there are about two or 
three days, so the media at that time, not any deadline, so they can do anything 
they want to do. 
CCTV-9’s reporters would deploy this tactic whenever possible. I have already 
discussed the directive that shut down reporting of a kindergarten attack (see p. 282) in 
Beijing in early August 2004, when a gatekeeper at the school slashed fifteen children, 
killing one. However, before the directive was issued, CCTV-9 had dispatched to the 
scene a reporter, who filed a story and follow up before the ban went into effect. I was so 
impressed by the speed with which the channel had moved, given the general failure to 
cover breaking stories in a timely fashion (see p. 334), that I sent the reporters’ group and 
senior management an email the following day, congratulating them on the coverage: 
Great work by [X] on the kindergarten attack. Excellent first piece with all the 
available elements. Excellent update, adding just a little bit extra to flesh out the 
story. In addition to his skill, [X]’s attitude to his work is a real credit to his 
professionalism. (source: email sent August 5, 2004) 
A second example of beating the censor was the CCTV-9 report on a protest by 
some fifty Chinese outside the Japanese embassy in Beijing in late March, 2004, after 
Japanese authorities earlier arrested seven Chinese activists who had landed on the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku153 Islands in the East China Sea. The protest was late at night, 
and senior management at CCTV were extremely reluctant to allow coverage, given the 
government’s prevarication on the issue of anti-Japanese protests.154 However, after four 
                                                 
153 The disputed region is called the Diaoyu islands in the PRC and Senkaku islands in Japan. 
154 The PRC government at times appears to turn a blind eye to if not actively foment anti-Japanese 
sentiment. At other times it attempts to curtail the protests. Experts see reason for concern. At the time of 
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appeals to senior management for permission to do the story, the reporters’ group was 
given the green light to cover the protest, and, as it turned out, were the only PRC media 
to video the demonstration.155 The report aired in the early hours of the morning and ran 
several times before a directive preventing further coverage was issued. A reporter later 
commented: 
[T]he government reaction is usually late. So, if we are quick enough, like the 
kindergarten story, like the protest at the Japanese embassy, we still can be aired 
and follow our principle [of professionalism]. So we are just like a turtle and 
rabbit’s competition: who is faster and who can win. Because, before the 
government’s demand comes, we have already aired. And nobody will blame me. 
Hitting line balls 
The various tactics of evading censorship in the PRC can be summarized by the 
term ‘hitting line balls’ (打擦边球 da ca bian qiu). The reference is to table tennis and the 
ability of a player to hit the edge of the table, a legitimate shot, but one which is almost 
impossible to return (Lee, 2004; Xiao, 2007). At CCTV-9, staff from senior management 
down were always seeking an edge and calculating exactly where the limit was on any 
particular story. The best table tennis player at CCTV-9 was reputed to be the Controller. 
But other managers, many of the zhubians and directors, the reporters’ group and some of 
the writers worked relentlessly on honing this skill, since a miscalculation on a story 
could have serious consequences, embarrassing the channel, even ending a career. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Japanese embassy protest, Alan Dupont, a senior fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in 
Sydney, noted about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute: “I don’t think it is the intention of either side to let these 
things get out of hand, but it does illustrate the potential for conflicts to arise and, if they are not carefully 
handled, to go wrong” (SCMP, 2004c). 
155 At the Monday reporters’ group meeting following the embassy protest, I later noted in my diary that 
“They were pleased by Friday night’s protest story by [X] outside the Japanese Embassy. I said it was fine. 
But why did we only do this protest and ignore other protests in China, such as the (alleged) evictions to 
make way for Olympic housing, and the unemployed in other cities. [The head of the reporters’ group] said 
the Diaoyu Islands protest was an international story. I suggested it bordered on propaganda.” 
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The art of hitting line balls is not new. Nor is it connected to any particularly new 
development in PRC media, especially their need to compete in a commercial 
environment following the beginning of a shift to a commercial revenue model in 1992 
and later developments, such as the introduction and expansion of the internet. As Xiao 
(2007) notes, the term was already in use in the mid-1980s, the “heyday of political 
reform,” when “Qin Benli (钦本力), chief editor of the avant-garde Shanghai newspaper 
World Economic Herald (shut down in March 1990), used this metaphor to describe the 
art of Chinese journalists gaming with the censors” (Xiao, 2007). 
Given the roots of modern Chinese journalism in the yellow press of the late 
imperial and early Republican periods, when Confucian-minded reformers and critics of 
the governments of the day grappled with the problem of both representing and speaking 
truth to power, which was later codified by Deng Xiaoping in the demand for to seek 
truth from facts yet still subjected media to Party diktat, small wonder that reporters in 
the PRC today are such fine table tennis players, given their ambiguous position as both 
servants and critics of political authority. 
However, the art of hitting line balls is not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. On 
the contrary, I would suggest that it is characteristic of reporting work in any context 
where the aims of reporters and media owners and regulators are at odds. I have referred 
(p. 132) to He Zhou’s (2000c, p. 600) discussion of “ideological dissonance” as a 
psychological hazard of the reporting profession in the PRC and my own sense that 
“ideological consonance” is the corollary, which explains why so many journalists in 
commercialized and public service media systems in the West are so comfortable with 
their role as mouthpieces of power (Jirik, 2004). In short, the art of hitting line balls is 
characteristic of socially responsible reporting, where ideological dissonance forces 
journalists to confront the contradictions of their position in a manner which remains 
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quite opaque to those who work in media systems where journalists have internalized the 
ideological norms and institutional rules that shape their work. 
Allowing for the universal character of hitting line balls as a function of the 
degree of constraint censorial, regulatory and institutional agencies such as ownership put 
on reporting, the case of the PRC is exemplary, given the conjuncture of political, 
economic and institutional forces enabling and constraining journalism. At CCTV-9, an 
excellent example of a line ball during the period of observation was a series on 
HIV/AIDS in Henan Province. The series was aired in the final week of May 2004 and 
first week of June. I was closely involved in ghost-writing and post-production of the 
stories, which as they developed proved to be less than a line ball and more of a whole 
match played on the edge of the permissible. 
REPORTING HIV/AIDS 
The issue of HIV/AIDS in the PRC has been a difficult story for media. PRC 
experts believe HIV entered the country in the late 1980s from the drug production region 
known as the ‘Golden Triangle’ through drug use in Yunnan Province, which borders 
Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar (Pang, 2007). But for years, the government denied the 
problem. The virus and disease were able to spread largely unchecked and gained a 
foothold in Henan Province in the 1990s primarily due to illegal and unregulated plasma 
buying schemes that targeted poor farmers and tainted transfusions in hospitals 
(Sanderson, 2007). Henan was not only at the center of the illegal plasma business, the 
province is also a major source of migrant labor. Once the disease was established in 
Henan, it quickly spread beyond the province, as HIV positive villagers went in search of 
work around the country (Haski, 2005a). 156 
                                                 
156 The role of migrant labor from Henan in spreading HIV was revealed to me in interviews. 
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Pierre Haski (2005b) has written extensively on the subject: 
Henan, a poor, rural and densely populated region of 100 million, has been 
hardest hit by the virus - the result of an infamous blood-trade scandal in the early 
1990s. Authorities encouraged Henan’s poor peasants to sell their blood to 
collecting stations for industrial use. Tragically, no precautions were taken, and 
tens of thousands - probably hundreds of thousands - of these peasants, who had 
never heard of AIDS, were infected with the deadly virus. (Haski, 2005a) 
The government moved to shut down the illegal side of the business in the mid-
1990s and regulate plasma collection. But in the villages of Henan an epidemic of HIV 
infections was already underway. Haski (2005b) points to the then governor of the 
province, Li Changchun, as culpable in what was known as the “blood farming” business. 
In 1990, Li Changchun had been sent to Henan as Deputy CPC Secretary and Vice-
Governor. In 1991, he was promoted to Governor and in 1992 made CPC Secretary, 
effectively putting him in charge of the province (China Vitae, 2007). In short, the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Henan developed under his watch. However, he was never held 
accountable (McDonald, 2005). Li continued his rise through the ranks of the Party and 
in 1997 was appointed to the Politburo, where he was put in charge of publicity (China 
Vitae, 2007). In that role one of his initiatives resulted in the May 2004 relaunch of 
CCTV-9 as CCTV International. 
Under his watch as publicity czar, critics note that a sophisticated system of stage 
managing media access to the HIV/AIDS villages in Henan has been developed 
(McDonald, 2005). One village, Wenlou, has been developed as a Potemkin village for 
the press and visiting dignitaries, while other affected villages are off limits. According to 
Haski, the stage-managed meetings between visitors, HIV patients and doctors in Wenlou 
are “all to protect one man,” Li Changchun (McDonald, 2005). In order to do any kind of 
credible reporting on HIV/AIDS in Henan, a journalist has to by-pass the system of 
control designed to keep the story off air. In addition, any reporter or correspondent who 
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does an HIV/AIDS story out of Henan does so knowing that a Politburo member with the 
attendant power associated with the position was responsible for the province when HIV 
was spreading unchecked. Nevertheless, that has not stopped reporters from doing the 
story, which, in its effects, points to a scandal and cover up far worse than the 
government’s attempt to cover up the SARS epidemic in 2003 (see. p. 271). 
CCTV-9’S HIV/AIDS SERIES 
The impetus for the HIV/AIDS series on CCTV-9 was personal. In previous 
years, beginning in 1997, the reporter had typically done a story for the CCTV English 
News and its successor, CCTV-9, on World AIDS Day, when the PRC showcases its 
fight against the disease: 
[F]or years, I’ve been focusing on this topic. And I think this is the exact topic we 
should follow. I decided. I make that decision. And when we want to do a series 
called China Challenges, one of the challenges is AIDS the Chinese government 
face. So I decided to do it myself. But instead of doing one general picture stories, 
of what is the statistics in China, and what is the government attitude towards it, I 
want to do some in-depth to see what is the real situation and problem of AIDS in 
China. So I decided to go to one of the worst hit areas, and one of the areas that 
has been hidden for years, that’s Henan. But when I arrived there, I found that 
there are so many stories to be covered. There is never ending task… I only 
stayed there for four days, but it turned out to be seven pieces after I came back. I 
talked to you and some other persons. So that is how the AIDS series became. 
[Jirik] How long have you been thinking about doing this story before you did it? 
[reporter] I’ve been thinking of going to the AIDS stricken village in Henan 
where the blood farming was extremely, you know, intense for a long time… I 
was the first the first person in CCTV English service to tackle that problem. And 
for every year… [the] government, starting in 1998, they started to arrange a 
program, and I was the person to cover, but the more I cover, the more I found 
problems exists. And the more I interview, the more problems in depth, the 
hidden problems appear. 
The reporter and cameraman spent a week in the region. In Henan, they visited 
the villages of Wenlou, Shuangmiao and Donghu and the provincial capital, Zhengzhou. 
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They also visited Lixiangtan Village in neighboring Shangdong Province for an element 
of one of the stories. Of the three HIV/AIDS stricken villages (Wenlou, Shuangmiao and 
Donghu), only Wenlou is readily accessible to visitors, if they use official channels to 
arrange their visit. However, in order to get a story untainted by government control, the 
reporting team did not alert local authorities of their intentions, relying instead on 
CCTV’s status as central (government) media to smooth the way: 
[Jirik] Did the local government know you went to Henan? 
[reporter] No, I didn’t inform them, 
[Jirik] So when you were actually there, did you have problems with local 
government? 
[reporter] They didn’t know it. And they don’t have any rights to control me, 
because I’m on a higher level. So in one part, I have the great advantage to change 
the situation and make a difference, using my own special status. 
[Jirik] When you say you’re on a higher level, is that because CCTV is… 
[reporter] Yeah, CCTV have a supreme level in China. 
Even so, they had problems, in particular in Donghu, where a group of village 
leaders attempted them to prevent them from leaving and threatened to confiscate or 
destroy their tapes. The reporter later recounted that it was largely the bravery of their 
driver and the villagers themselves, who wanted media to expose the situation, that 
resulted in their safe passage. 
They began their journey in Zhengzhou where they interviewed prominent 
HIV/AIDS activist and government critic, Gao Yaojie. Dr. Gao put them in contact with 
the network of AIDS activists in the affected villages. On day two they went to Wenlou 
and Donghu, where they interviewed HIV positive farmers and their families. On day 
three a villager smuggled them into Shuangmiao where they interviewed another AIDS 
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activist, who is also a doctor. That afternoon they returned to the provincial capital, 
Zhengzhou, where they interviewed local officials and arranged to visit an orphanage set 
up for children whose parents had died from AIDS. On Day four they visited the 
orphanage and then returned to Wenlou, this time with local officials, to get their side of 
the story. That evening, still fearing their tapes would be confiscated or destroyed, they 
boarded a train to neighboring Shandong Province, where they visited Lixiangtan village 
to visit a girl whose adoption there had been arranged by Dr. Gao after the girl’s parents 
both died of AIDS. 
After the reporter and cameraman returned to Beijing, the reporter and I watched 
and shot listed all the tapes. The following note from my diary shows my reaction to the 
material: “Wednesday, May 19, 2004. I spent the day working with [X] on his AIDS 
profiles. He has good material, enough for seven stories.” The reporter had originally 
planned four stories, but on review, he clearly had several more. That day, we decided to 
expand the series to seven stories, which went to air in the following order and on the 
following dates: 
1. Changes in Wenlou (May 29, 2004) – an overview of the situation in Henan, with 
a focus on Wenlou Village and government attempts being made there to deal 
with the AIDS crisis. 
2. AIDS orphans offered brighter future (May 30, 2004) – a visit to a government-
run Sunshine Family orphanage in Shangcai county (home to the villages of 
Wenlou, Donghu and Shuangmiao) for children who have lost both parents to 
AIDS. 
3. A tale of two sisters (May 31, 2004) – the story of two sisters, who have lost their 
parents to AIDS. One was adopted by farmers in Linxiangtan. The other stayed in 
Donghu to live with her grandfather and aunt, both of whom are HIV positive. 
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4. AIDS fighter Gao Yaojie (June 1, 2004) – a profile of Dr. Gao Yaojie. 
5. Patent sours AIDS cocktail (June 2, 2004) – a report on the problem the PRC 
faces in supplying an anti-AIDS cocktail to HIV positive patients because of 
foreign control of a patent for one of the key ingredients of the cocktail. 
6. Rural medicare for AIDS lacking (June 3, 2004) – a report on the parlous state of 
medical services in the AIDS-stricken region, despite the government’s attempt to 
improve the situation. 
7. The price of blood (June 4, 2004) – a report on the blood farming business, which 
triggered the AIDS epidemic in Henan. 
The reporter wrote all the first drafts of the scripts and video edited each of the 
stories. I copy edited all of the scripts. It would be meaningless to attempt to quantify 
who did how much for the series. The final stories were a mix of the work of the 
cameraman, the reporter (who also worked as producer and video editor), and myself in 
terms of post-production. In terms of overall conception and execution, the series was the 
work of the reporter, with the strong support of the cameraman, who was also extremely 
interested in the HIV/AIDS story. The extent of my involvement in AIDS Report was 
minimal compared to the work put in by the reporter and cameraman, but it was also 
atypically close and extensive for a ‘foreign expert’ at CCTV-9, given that most of our 
work was restricted to copy editing or anchoring. The extent of the rewriting I did was 
also unusual, even given my work with the reporters’ group. The reason being that the 
reporter had plenty of lead time to develop the stories in between gathering the materials 
in mid-May 2004 and the airing of the first story on May 29. I recorded my involvement 
in my diary: 
I worked with [X] on his AIDS stories on Tuesday (May 25) and Wednesday 
(May 26). I spent both days working in the reporters’ office on the 19th floor. By 
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the end of Wednesday we had 5 stories written. I did another (Gao Profile) on 
Saturday (May 29). And I have one to do on the need for a better handling of the 
AIDS medicines. 
On Tuesday, I wrote the “Changes of Wenlou,” “AIDS Orphans,” and “Tale of 
two sisters” stories that would open the mini-series. [X] had provided the basic 
outline for the first story, and a draft version of the latter two. With all three I 
stayed close to his ideas, changing little. Most interesting was skirting the issue of 
blaming officials directly, when most of the available information is an indictment 
of their behavior. 
Appendix 15 (p. 609) shows the processing of a single story, ‘Changes in 
Wenlou’, which opened the series on May 29. The first script is the first version of the 
story that the reporter developed. The second script is my copy edited version, which 
became the basis of the story. I had reformatted it as a television script. The third script 
shows the version of the story that was put into the computer scripting system and went 
to air. It differed only slightly from the copy edited version, with the only significant 
omission the dropping of a reference to a woman who had lost four sons to AIDS. That 
element was put aside for a later story. 
From conception to the final pre-air versions, senior management were not 
involved in production of AIDS Report. However, because of the sensitivity of the series, 
the stories were not put into the news processing system for the political editors to check. 
Rather, senior management took it upon themselves to review all of the stories. The 
reporter noted their reaction: 
They [senior management] don’t like it at all… See one after another, and say 
“this can’t be aired, that can’t be aired, that is too negative, that is not true, this is 
really bad, that is not good. The whole series idea is bad. Why do you want to do 
this. And I think this cannot help the government. This can make things worse.” 
But I persuaded them. I write letters to [the Controller ], I persuaded [him] a lot, 
and I even argued with [the Controller’s supervisor], which somebody else may 
think I’m too stupid. I argued with [him] and said “if this can’t be aired, I don’t 
think other things can be aired in the future. Because this particular moment, this 
is the balanced report. But after half year or one year when we go there, things 
will become worse, because after the incubation period, more and more people 
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will get to die.” [He] didn’t answer. I think he is a clever person. He knows 
everything. And he knows that I am right. But he doesn’t like it. But somebody 
has to take the responsibility. So finally [the Controller], to take this 
responsibility. So I still owe him a lot. Because changing a leader [with a different 
leader], this can never be aired. 
However, on the eve of the air date for the first report, senior management in fact 
rang the reporter and said the series had been cancelled. The reporter contacted me. I 
recorded the conversation in my diary: 
In the taxi, when [X] SMS’s me and tells me [senior management] has canned the 
AIDS series. I call [X]. He says [the Controller] must be getting pressure from 
above. He doesn’t elaborate. But I speculate to [my companions – both Western 
journalists] that it must be to do with a power struggle between [Politburo 
member] Li Changchun and [Vice Premier] Wu Yi, and may have something to 
do with the publication the previous day of the [Deputy Health Minister] Gao 
Qiang story about the new national crackdown on blood farming in China Daily 
[see below]. We [three foreigners in the taxi] all agree the Party, government and 
China [PRC] are a bunch of thugs and there is no hope for media reform. I don’t 
know whether any part of me doubted anything I was saying. Looking at what 
happened next, I wish I had said “I think it will all work out alright.” (Diary entry 
May 28, 2004) 
The following day, I was watching the midday news bulletin and right on 
schedule the first AIDS Report story went to air, ‘Changes in Wenlou’. Shortly after the 
reporter contacted me: 
[X] SMS’s me and tells me [the Controller] has had a “sleepless night” and woke 
up and said the series could go ahead. The first one – Changes in Wenlou – went 
to air at 1200, and was repeated in each bulletin. [X] said he thought [the 
Controller] was “very courageous.” Clearly then, there was no ‘order’ from 
above. It was pure self-censorship. (Diary entry: Saturday May 29, 2004) 
Over the next seven days, one report aired each day several times throughout the 
24-hour news cycle. The final story, ‘The Price of Blood’, aired on June 4. The irony of 
that date, the fifteenth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, had not been lost on 
management and according to the reporter contributed to the original decision to ban the 
series: 
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[Jirik] So, and the night before the series was going to start, you telephoned me 
and said [the Controller] had decided not to air it, and the next day he allowed it 
to air. What happened? 
[reporter] I think it is because, they always have meetings… I don’t know which 
level, but maybe the central government, Li Changchun’s level whatever. So 
every week, we have a meeting, and CCTV, look at the date, I think it’s around 
Tuesday… during this particular sensitive period, nothing too sensitive, criticizing 
the government should be aired, because they are afraid that people may be during 
this period, of moment, maybe unhappy. 
[Jirik] This is the Tiananmen? 
[reporter] I think so. But who make the decision not to be aired is [the Controller] 
again. So I think sometimes is the interpretation of the policies by different, 
because the central, Li Changchun didn’t know we have an AIDS report. He 
didn’t say that AIDS Report cannot be aired. Otherwise this cannot be aired at all. 
I think it is [senior management] who dare not to air it. 
[Jirik] But in the final event, they let every one go to air as you sent it. 
Because, I think that is the, in China, I think the reporters should learn the tricks 
of how to, putting out the information that they want to tell them, and also making 
balanced reports. Making something that makes some, you know, retreat, 
sacrifices. And this is how AIDS report can be successfully aired. If I do it my 
own way, the original way, without the help and the tricks, words, structure, I 
think this can never be aired. 
THE TACTICS OF GETTING AIDS REPORT TO AIR 
The most important tactic for getting the AIDS Report to air was one that has not 
so far been discussed: not getting caught. Had the reporter and cameraman not conducted 
most of their work in Henan away from the gaze of local officials, they would not have 
been able to gather the necessary materials to make the stories. Although it is unclear 
what would have happened had the CCTV-9 crew been detained when local village heads 
confronted them leaving Donghu, the villagers told them that a cameraperson the 
previous month had had their tapes destroyed. Harassment of media and AIDS activists is 
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common in the PRC (Haski, 2005a; Toy, 2006; Zissis, 2006). So the behavior of the 
CCTV-9 team was unsurprising. 
Once safely back in Beijing, developing the stories became a balancing act 
between what the reporter wanted to say, and what he felt could be said. I wrote in my 
diary of the decision-making process: 
[X] was unsure whether [senior management] would allow the series to air. I said 
let’s do the stories first and then once they’re done, show him and we would see 
his reaction. Already we were in trouble with the promo. [Senior management] 
viewed it and said there was too many shots of poor people, and nothing of the 
officials. I suggested they change it to include pictures of [Vice Premier and 
Health Minister] Wu Yi visiting the AIDS villages in December 2003. This the 
cameraman who went with [X] did. The promo was quite okay. As [X] noted, I 
have a genius for turning stories that are negative about the government into 
stories promoting the government. (Diary entry May 25, 2004) 
Within each story, calculations were made about the appropriate language, and 
how to handle the subjects, especially those we felt might be at risk from recrimination, 
such as the AIDS activists who had smuggled the crew into Donghu and Shuangmiao, 
and the doctors who had agreed to speak with us. However, the HIV positive villagers 
had been adamant at the time of filming that they wanted their faces shown. According to 
the reporter, they wanted audiences to see them and their plight: 
They welcome media. They secretly taking the reporters there. They even got 
connections, and I have received many calls from the victims. I asked them where 
did they get this number. They said they get it from the person I interviewed. So 
they have their communities I think. I think the victims, they like this. But on the 
other hand, some of my stories, maybe not my stories, but some of other reports 
may cause troubles for them too, because they have, for to be, you know, 
objective, we must not use their face and name. They don’t know how to protect 
them. I asked this should be aired you know. And they say “I don’t dare any 
punishment, because I’m going to die, what else should I fear. Just air me.” And 
they say very very tough things I didn’t use, because I can’t use. They say things 
with emotions but those are very very tough. I think this is also facts. But because 
of working for the government, I know I can’t use something. I can only make a 
balanced, on the one hand follow the professionalism of major news, on the other 
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hand I have to acknowledge I’m working for the national, for the government. So 
this is, this is the dilemma for being a Chinese journalist, for a government owned 
TV station. 
The balance between representing the subjects of the stories and representing the 
government was the most difficult problem the reporter faced. He aimed for a human 
focus in each of the stories, but was careful to include positive references to government 
action where it was warranted. We wanted the series to not only indicate the plight of the 
villagers but also the culpability of the government in creating the very situation they 
were now trying to control. I was also struggling with how far we could go: 
While writing the stories, I exercised self-censorship in the sense I was acutely 
aware of avoiding any direct reference to party and government complicity in the 
blood farming scandal. I also avoided overly negative constructions and loaded 
words like “AIDS devastated” etc. (Diary entry May 25, 2004) 
The structure of the entire series began with a piece (‘Changes in Wenlou’) that 
highlighted efforts the government was making to deal with AIDS by building 
infrastructure and support services in the affected villages. The reporter sent it to me for 
copy editing. I noted in my diary: “After I wrote the ‘Changes in Wenlou’ story, [X] went 
over it suggesting further modifications, and in cases the removal of references. He said 
there was no way [senior management] would pass it.” 
Government efforts were also highlighted in the second piece, which featured an 
orphanage for children who have lost both parents to AIDS. However, we realized after 
finishing the piece, that missing was any reference to the fact that the Sunshine Family 
orphanage, of which there are some twenty in Henan, were closed to children who 
themselves are HIV-positive, and are also closed to children with one or more living 
parents, even if they were HIV-positive or had AIDS and were in no condition to care for 
their children (Cai, 2005 and discussion with the reporter). On reflection, these were 
important elements both the reporter and I had missed: 
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[reporter] [Y]ou only said the only lack, that we should find the AIDS orphan 
with AIDS. But if we talk before, maybe I can find one, because those people the 
only fate is to die. I should find one. And I can find one. But I didn’t have this 
idea. So I regret a little bit, we didn’t talk a little bit earlier, or somebody who also 
from the Western parts. 
Nevertheless, as the series developed, we began to feel more confident about a 
narrative strategy that we believed would lead the viewer to conclude what we felt we 
could not say. Although that was perhaps little more than wishful thinking, it became the 
rationalization we used to justify what we were doing. Already in the third piece the 
discursive structure of the series was beginning to question the government’s care 
strategy. In ‘A tale of two sisters’, the reporter examined an alternate care strategy, which 
Dr. Gao Yaojie developed, of placing AIDS orphans in foster homes, or leaving them in 
the care of family and relatives even if the latter were HIV positive but capable of 
providing care, rather than institutionalizing the children who have lost their parents. 
Story #4 following that provided the back story for ‘A tale of two sisters’, profiling Dr. 
Gao and her struggle to legalize the adoption of children orphaned by AIDS. In ‘AIDS 
Fighter Gao Yaojie’, rather than suggest that orphanages are only part of the solution, the 
script used the tactic of allowing Gao’s struggle to expand the range of care options to 
speak for itself. Figure 6 shows that part of the script discussing the legalization of 
adoption of AIDS orphans. 
Figure 6: Script element for ‘AIDS fighter Gao Yaojie’ 
[Video: AIDS orphans] [Reporter] Currently, there is no law 
allowing people to adopt AIDS orphans, 
but that may change soon. 
[Video: close up government document 
legalizing adoption for AIDS orphans] 
[Reporter] This document is the first of its 
kind in China. It’s official approval for the 
adoption of AIDS orphans. Doctor Gao 
says it’s a breakthrough that vindicates her 
strategy. 
[Video: Wu Yi visiting Henan and meeting [Reporter] Behind the document is Health 
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Gao Yaojie] Minister and Vice Premier, Wu Yi. 
In December last year [2003], Wu Yi 
visited AIDS stricken villages in Henan. 
While she was there, she had a private, off 
camera meeting with Doctor Gao. The 
plight of AIDS orphans was central to their 
discussion. 
[Video: Gao Yaojie] [Soundbite: Gao Yaojie] Many couples 
want to adopt these children. Society can 
solve this problem, if the government has a 
good policy. All these letters prove this 
point. 
[Video: letters Gao has received] [Reporter] Gao Yaojie has received over 10 
thousand letters from people wanting to 
help her cause… 
 
The discursive construction of AIDS in Henan points not only to government 
culpability in triggering the epidemic, then indifference, but also to bungled government 
intervention, once the scale of the tragedy was known (Haski, 2005a). Watching the 
reporter’s raw video and listening to the victims’ stories, the latter problem was clear. 
Stories #5 and #6 focused on the medical care situation for HIV positive adults and those 
dying of AIDS in the stricken villages. ‘Patent sours AIDS cocktail’ looked at the 
problem the PRC is facing because of a patent that prevented the domestic production of 
a key component of the regime of drugs required to control HIV. The piece used the 
tactic of shifting the blame for the problem to third parties (in this case a foreign 
company, a typical target of PRC criticism when the government wants to deflect 
attention from its own actions or inaction). But then in a rebuke to the official care 
system, ‘Rural medicare for AIDS lacking’ visited the home of an HIV positive couple, 
where boxes of drugs distributed free at the local clinic were gathering dust. The clinic 
could not afford patient aftercare to check HIV positive villagers were taking their 
medicine correctly and sticking to the drug regime that had been prescribed. Here the 
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tactic was to let the images speak for themselves. The boxes of drugs gathering dust told 
the story of bungled intervention, without any comment from the reporter. Haski’s 
(2005a) work corroborates the observation the camera was making: 
Officially, the government has started distributing free antiretrovirals, the 
treatment that can stop the progress of the disease. The leadership has granted free 
education for children of AIDS patients and help for their communities. In reality, 
these treatments have been inadequate; a majority of patients rejected them 
because of side effects, while others have been trying all kinds of medicine, 
including experiments from Chinese army research centers. Many have opted 
against treatment altogether - and anxiously wait for their death. Worse, some 
were abandoned, like one man I met who was clearly developing the disease and 
who had been left waiting for a month for the results of his blood test. In dozens 
of interviews last year [2004], I did not meet a single patient who was correctly 
treated. (Haski, 2005a) 
However, it was only in the final story, which had the working title ‘The Price of 
Blood,’ that the reporter directly addressed the government’s culpability in the 
HIV/AIDS scandal, in particular for triggering the epidemic through its involvement (or 
lack of it) in the blood farming operations in Henan in the early 1990s.157 The problem 
we faced in developing the script was how to address the government’s culpability, 
without the accusation coming from the reporter. Originally, the reporter used an AIDS 
activist to tell the story with the following quote (original text): 
[Soundbite Chinese with English subtitles: AIDS Activist] In Henan, HIV spread 
not through illegal behavior, like drug and prostitution, but through blood 
donation. Unhygienic blood collection was also practiced in 23 provinces. But 
since blood collection in Henan was government-sponsored in the name to benefit 
the poor, the situation there is much [more] serious than other areas. 
                                                 
157 Although I am sympathetic to the argument that the market not the government was responsible for the 
‘blood money’ paid for plasma in Henan, where impoverished farmers were desperate to improve their 
earnings, as the regulator of the market, the government was ultimately responsible for the conditions under 
which the epidemic developed, even if the level of its direct involvement in the market remains unclear. 
Even if the government was attempting to ‘help’ the farmers by allowing the blood market to flourish, its 
indifference to their plight once the epidemic was underway and subsequent bungling of intervention and 
attempted cover up including the construction of Wenlou as a ‘model’ village, are beyond dispute. 
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I copy edited this, changing what would be a soundbite from the activist in 
Chinese with English subtitles that would read: 
[Soundbite Chinese with English subtitles: AIDS Activist] In Henan, HIV did not 
spread through practices like needle sharing and prostitution, but through 
unhygienic blood donations. This happens in many provinces. But in Henan local 
officials condoned the practice, making the problem worse. 
Apart from dropping the reference to twenty-three provinces, which I felt was 
redundant, I changed “government-sponsored” to “condoned,” since we were not clear 
how much of the blood farming was a government initiative and how much happened 
outside of any government supervision, as an effect of the market.  
However, we then concluded that I had taken the original quote too far away from 
the original to warrant inclusion any longer as a quote. We decided to drop the reference 
to government sponsorship or tacit approval from the quote. The new version was as 
follows: 
[Soundbite: AIDS Activist] In Henan, HIV did not spread through practices like 
needle sharing and prostitution, but through unhygienic blood donations.  
[Reporter: Voice over] Wan explains that this is a problem in many provinces. 
But in Henan, the dangers were little understood. Even officials could not imagine 
the consequences of their actions. 
But the problem now was that the narrative had so watered down the reference to 
government culpability that both the reporter and I felt we were no longer making the 
point that was at stake, that the government was largely responsible for the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Henan. Moreover, we had created the very problem we were hoping to avoid. 
The reporter was now making the claim that the government was culpable, even if the 
version we were using was so watered down to render the accusation almost unnoticeable 
(“Even officials could not imagine the consequences of their actions”). 
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The story was due to air in several days, and we were at a loss how to proceed. 
Then quite by chance, the PRC’s English language daily, China Daily, on May 28 
published a story that provided exactly the evidence we needed. The government had 
launched a nationwide campaign on May 27 to tackle unsafe blood collection and 
supplies. Executive Vice-Minister Gao Qiang of the Ministry of Health had attended the 
launch and had remarked on his shock at the extent of the problem of HIV transmission 
through blood transfusions. The relevant part of the China Daily article read as follows 
(Feng, 2004): 
Gao said in the early 1990s, poor governmental management of the blood market 
led to many infections among farmers, many of whom sold plasma to blood 
stations. 
Thousands of them have now become AIDS patients, and many of them are dying 
in many poverty-stricken areas of China. They are so pitiable, Gao said. 
Thanks to the fight against illegal blood stations in the late 1990s and restless 
efforts to strengthen blood management in recent years, the blood supply is now 
much safer, Gao said. (Feng, 2004) 
The China Daily reporter was using the tactic of acceptable sources, in this case a 
high-ranking government official. We decided to do exactly the same, and in order to 
further protect CCTV-9, use the exact words of the China Daily article, “poor 
governmental management of the blood market,” in order to add a second layer of 
insulation between ourselves and the incriminating statement. The version we finally 
settled on was as follows: 
[Soundbite: AIDS Activist] In Henan, HIV didn’t spread through practices like 
needle sharing and prostitution, but through unhygienic blood donations. It’s a 
problem in many provinces. 
[Reporter: Voice over] The central government has now launched a nationwide 
campaign to clean up the blood business. And since measures were stepped up in 
the late 1990s, Deputy Health Minister Gao Qiang says China’s blood supply has 
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become much safer. He blamed poor governmental management of the blood 
market for infections among farmers. 
Although the reporter found video of the press conference with pictures of Gao 
speaking, the video was shot from the back of the room using the camera’s inbuilt 
microphone. Ambient noise drowned out Gao’s voice. So we did not have the quotation 
used by China Daily. Nevertheless we had the video necessary to make the story work. 
Although the reporter would be making the accusation, he was citing a government 
official in the context of the government’s “nationwide campaign to clean up the blood 
business,” tactically placing the accusation below acknowledgement of government 
action on the issue. 
I have already mentioned the sensitivity of AIDS Report, its proximity to the 
fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen incident, and the decision and then its reversal by 
senior management to ban the entire series. So I should not have been surprised when 
‘The Price of Blood’ went to air several days later on June 4, only to discover on 
watching that missing was the reference to Gao Qiang citing the government’s 
mismanagement of the blood market. From my diary: 
The last of the AIDS reports went out. Somebody had taken “governmental” out 
of the line attributing the blame to the government. (Dairy entry June 4, 2004) 
I later discussed the omission with the reporter: 
[Jirik] When we were writing the stories, the very last story, you took out the 
word… 
[Reporter] “governmental” [laughs] Because we have already many stories, that is 
the last story. I do hope that we, being aired is the top priority. If one word or 
another been, especially irritating and can’t be aired. That is not worth it. The 
most important thing is to let the picture tell the story and let the major important 
issue. But if, maybe you think that the major issues was the poor governmental 
management. I think I thought twice, and I think I got the influence from [senior 
management], I regret it a lot, because [senior management], because the day 
when the story should be aired is especially sensitive moment, it’s the anniversary 
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of June 4th [1989 Tiananmen incident]. It’s happened to be the day. But the 
picture itself had people die. It has tombs and people wearing black, something. It 
sounds like a very, people may think I’m stupid you know. But [senior 
management] says “[X], this is the last piece. I hope it can be aired safely, don’t 
use anything that I may think is inappropriate.” So I think under his 
encouragement, or his persuasion, I changed that “governmental,” to let it pass 
safely. But it really works, I think with that word, [senior management] may never 
ever let it air. I really think so, so that is the only way to air it. 
In the final analysis, from my point of view, we had failed to say what was core to 
the story. But against that, the reporter had to weigh his future at the channel, and to keep 
the story in context. While it was a breakthrough for CCTV-9, as I shall show in the 
following chapter the kind of work for which the reporters’ group was responsible tended 
to sink without trace at CCTV-9. So can I blame him for failing to take a risk that bore no 
potential consequences for me and meant little in terms of the general tenor of news at the 
channel? 
Following the end of the series, the stories were posted to the CCTV website, and 
the reporter re-inserted the reference in the final story to Gao Qiang’s acknowledgement 
of government mishandling of the blood market. 158  Several prominent PRC media 
including Xinhua and People’s Daily picked up and ran one or more of the stories.159 As 
already noted, the final story, ‘Price of Blood’, was entered into the CNN World Report 
2005 annual awards and was one of three finalists in the Ongoing Issues category. I noted 
in my diary (May 31, 2004) a brief exchange: “[Senior management] asked me what I 
thought of the AIDS stories. I said I had put a lot of work into them and I thought they 
were good. He said “So do I”.” 
                                                 
158 Available at http://www.cctv.com/english/special/C12295/20040614/102104.shtml. 
159 See http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/May/96831.htm (CCTV) 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/01/eng20040601_144998.html (People’s Daily) 
 http://www.humanrights.cn/zt/AIDS/..%5CAIDS/200502005624142601.htm (Xinhua) 
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DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
AIDS Report showed the limits of pushing the reporting envelope at CCTV-9 in 
2004. Other stories done by several of the reporters were equally as hard hitting, so I am 
not suggesting that AIDS Report was exceptional. Rather it was typical of the best work 
the reporters’ group did. 
The series showed almost the full range of tactics reporters deploy in the PRC to 
get the story out. Apart from those tactics Tong discussed, the tactic of reporting a story 
before the CPD or SARFT can issue a directive banning further coverage was also typical 
of the work of the reporters’ group, although AIDS Report did not deploy this tactic, 
since AIDS is an ongoing topic, which cannot be reduced to a single story. 
The pressure journalists feel serving as both servants and critics of political 
authority was also evident in AIDS Report, as the reporter was constantly forced to frame 
what he felt was the truth in terms that would be acceptable to management, who were 
clearly uncomfortable with the stories, but still let them go to air. Critics of PRC media 
who simply call media mouthpieces of the Party and government ignore the constant 
tension associated with news making and the attempts journalists make to expand the 
reporting envelope. The series also pointed to the sense of social responsibility that 
journalists in the PRC consider a core professional criterion. Against the objectivist 
ontology that frames mainstream news practice in commercialized and public service 
broadcast systems in many countries, in the PRC, a journalist sees herself as not only 
telling a story, but also making a change. One core aim of news is to bring to the attention 
of government problems that need to be addressed. At best this is a peripheral aim of 
news making in most commercialized and public service broadcast systems, which 
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relegate ‘activist’ news making to the margins of news making in general, rather than 
pursue change as a core news value. 
My own involvement in what was one of the most controversial series of stories 
CCTV-9 did in 2004 shows that PRC media are not closed to external influence, but 
actually welcome input and support for their work, if it is offered in an appropriate 
manner. If one of my great failings at CCTV-9 was a tendency to dismiss my colleagues’ 
work when it conflicted with what I knew of news making from my own background and 
experience, in AIDS Report the journalist and I found a workable middle ground. In 
drawing attention to my role in the series, I am not attempting to foreground myself so 
much as suggest that if television is always a team game, production at CCTV-9, 
although no different from television news production in general, had the added element 
of the occasional heavy presence of a third party providing language advice and advice 
about how to frame and shape stories for an ideal audience which did not share the native 
language of the reporter. 
What the production of AIDS Report showed was the collective and hybrid 
character of news production at CCTV-9, the complex interplay of three persons 
(reporter, cameraman, copy editor), who worked together to generate a narrative that on 
screen privileged the role of the reporter. This is not to downplay in any way the work of 
the reporter, but rather to highlight the complexity of television news production at 
CCTV-9, which should give pause for thought about the kind of naïve claims critic of the 
Chinese media sometimes make about reporters functioning as little more than 
government and Party mouthpieces. 
Whether the final product was as good as we thought it was is another matter. I 
noted that our narrative strategy was to assume the audience would draw the ‘right’ 
conclusion from the stories, without the stories addressing directly the issue of 
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government culpability in the spread of HIV and AIDS in Henan Province. I have no 
evidence that that was the case. What we did was shift the responsibility for making 
meaning away from the stories to the audience. 
Although audiences do make meaning, the presumed ability of audiences to read 
between the lines in countries such as the PRC where censorship and self-censorship is 
the norm not the exception in news making does not ensure that the intentions of the 
reporter are what the audience reads into the story (for a discussion of the PRC audience 
reading between the lines, see Lull, 1991). Given the range of meanings audiences read 
into commercial and public service news in countries like the United States where self-
censorship without censorship is the norm, logic dictates that an even greater range of 
meanings will be read into stories by audiences in circumstances where the narrative 
structure often only alludes to rather than directly addresses the intentions of the news 
maker. That audiences in the PRC are suspicious about news content in no way 
guarantees that they will guess what the journalist’s intentions are on any given story. 
In addition, although we said we were concerned to protect our sources, consistent 
harassment of AIDS activists in Henan meant that people with whom we worked were in 
constant danger. Whether AIDS Report contributed to that danger in any way is not 
known. However, in July 2004, a little over a month after the series aired, a group of 
AIDS activists in Henan was taken into custody during an AIDS conference on a range of 
apparently trumped up charges ranging from disturbing public order to theft (SCMP, 
2004b). Those detained included the HIV-positive activist who smuggled the reporter and 
cameraman into Shuangmiao Village. 
Finally, even if local governments in Henan appeared to be making an effort to 
address the AIDS situation in 2004, more recent reports suggest that they have all but 
given up, including in Wenlou, and that more corrupt elements are seeking only to profit 
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from the situation. In early 2006, China Daily (2006b) reported on an emerging 
corruption scandal centered on HIV/AIDS funding to Wenlou Village (The China Daily 
article is cited in Black and White Cat, 2007). China Daily cited Dr. Gao Yaojie: 
I have not been to Wenlou village for half a year… You go and tell your friends 
and readers not to donate money or material to Wenlou village. This is just a PR 
project to deceive the public. They even dare to deceive Premier Wen Jiabao [who 
visited Wenlou in February 2005]. It does not matter how much you donate. This 
is a ‘black hole’ and an inscrutablee [sic] trap. There are quite a few more ‘black 
holes’ in Henan like this one. (China Daily, 2006b) 
Ahead of Premier Wen’s second visit in November 2007, HIV/AIDS activist Hu 
Jia (2007) blogged about the villagers’ concerns ahead of the visit: 
Over the last three days, a number of villagers in Wenlou have sent me e-
messages, saying they are uneasy about Premier Wen’s visit. This is in marked 
contrast to the anticipation and excitement before Premier Wen’s last visit. Nearly 
three years have passed and things have got even worse there. Wenlou is just a 
stage for government departments to display false achievements to the outside 
world, and one often takes over where the other left off. (Cited on Black and 
White Cat, 2007) 
Shortly after he posted these comments, police on December 27, 2007 arrested Hu 
Jia on charges of “subversion against the state” (Chan, 2007). Hu’s trial on March 18, 
2008 lasted three hours. On April 3, Hu was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison 
for “incitement to subvert state power” (AFP, 2008).160 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have addressed the work of the reporters’ group. I have argued 
that the reporters’ group provided a best case example of the news making that could be 
done at CCTV-9. Using a range of tactics to evade censorship, the CCTV-9 reporters 
worked hard to provide a small number of professionally accomplished stories. Following 
                                                 
160 The charges against Hu related to articles he posted on the Internet about human rights issues and 
speaking to foreign reporters. However, his crime appears to have been to speak out against human rights 
abuses in the PRC ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
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the May 2004 relaunch, the reporters developed the series China’s Challenges, which 
focused on what the group considered the most urgent problems facing the state. In AIDS 
Report, a single reporter developed seven stories on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Henan 
Province. Both series were praised by senior management, even if in the case of AIDS 
Report, they almost cancelled the series for fear of the potential for trouble should 
SARFT, the CPD or even the Politburo take exception to the stories, since Politburo 
member Li Changchun, whose name does not appear in the series, was responsible for the 
May 2004 relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International and was governor of Henan 
during the blood farming scandal that triggered the HIV and AIDS epidemic in the 
province. 
The production of the HIV/AIDS story was a paradigm example of Pan’s (2000) 
and Pan & Lu’s (2003) account of the manner in which reporters evade the strategies of 
the power structure to tell a different story than would be the case were they simply 
mouthpieces of Party and government. Despite the concern of senior management that 
the series “cannot help the government,” the reporter changed just enough in the stories 
to get them to air. On display in the manner in which the HIV/AIDS story was handled 
was the long history of journalism in the PRC: social responsibility, the demand to speak 
truth to power, even at great personal risk, a complex calculation of possibilities as to 
exactly where the limit to the story could be found. 
The complex conjuncture of forces that enable and constrain the journalistic field 
was also on display. Each calculation about the story was made in the context of a range 
of pressures, from the possibility of pushing too far on an issue in which a Politburo 
member had a stake to the problem of the final and most critical story airing on the 15th 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident. But in the final analysis, the habitus that is 
distinctive of Chinese journalism asserted itself against the threat of provoking the 
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authorities. The urge to speak truth to power was evident not only in the series, but in 
management’s decision to let the series go to air. 
Evident in both China’s Challenges and AIDS Report was the core news value 
that distinguishes journalism in the PRC from mainstream media in commercialized and 
public service systems in countries such as the United States and Australia. Beyond a 
concern for balance and objectivity, PRC reporters take seriously the social responsibility 
associated with news making and strive to identify and inform the government of 
problems that need to be addressed, even as they struggle with the dual role of both 
serving and critiquing political authority. The multiple pressures on journalists in the 
PRC results in what He Zhou (2000c) has called ‘ideological dissonance,’ which forces 
them to confront the government they serve in a manner quite different from the service 
journalists render politics and business in commercial and public service broadcast 
systems where what I have called ‘ideological consonance’ is the norm. 
How effective was the work of the reporters’ group at CCTV-9 is difficult to 
gauge. Although the OSC blueprint and attitude of senior management suggested that 
they believed that CCTV International could only compete with the likes of CNN-I and 
BBC-WS as a news channel if a strong reporters’ group was at the core of the channel, 
the fact was that the work of the reporters’ group tended to disappear, merged as it was 
within the work of the general news group, itself only one production group vying for the 
audience’s attention. 
In Chapter 7, I discussed the manner in which entrenched interests within the 
channel derailed the plans of SARFT and senior management to change CCTV-9 from 
being a general purpose broadcast channel into a news channel. Not surprisingly, despite 
the best efforts of senior management to provide the reporters’ group with the support it 
needed to develop as the core of the news channel CCTV International was intended to 
 402
be, by the time the relaunch was over, clearly CCTV-9 had not changed direction, and the 
work of the reporters’ group, despite series like China’s Challenges and AIDS Report, 
would remain marginal rather than central to the overall development of the channel. 
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Chapter 11: Content 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I discussed the work of the reporters’ group, which 
management championed as a model for the type of journalism that CCTV International 
should pursue if its aspiration to become a globally competitive news channel was to be 
achieved. However, I also noted that stories by reporters only amounted to a fairly small 
volume of news stories or air time, which was further diluted in the overall context of the 
channel when feature programming was taken into account (see p. 207, Figure 1). 
Moreover, in earlier chapters, I have suggested that the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV 
International in May 2004 did not follow the plan laid out in the OSC blueprint. As a 
result, the revamped channel was more of a continuation with its past than a break, which 
is what the OSC blueprint called for. In this chapter, I continue with the comparative 
analysis of the channel pre- and post-relaunch. I look at content. Specifically, I look at 
general news content to see what was on the news and what this says about what kind of 
channel CCTV-9 is and how the news was made. 
The explanation of the content sample and decision to code the rundowns for the 
1200 and 2400 news bulletins and the stories from the 1200 bulletin was given in Chapter 
6: Methodology. The coding sheets are provided in Appendix 2 and samples of the 
coding of the bulletin rundowns and scripts are provided in Appendix 3. In this chapter, I 
begin with an explanation of the bulletin as a whole and what it said about the news. 
Following this, I look at the scripts and what they say about the news and about the 
choices available to news makers in the news making process. Given the heavy reliance 
on CCTV for domestic and foreign policy news and APTN and Reuters for international 
news (see p. 319), not surprisingly the rundowns and scripts pointed to the highly 
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constrained and regimented news making process analyzed in Chapter 8: Editorial and 
Chapter 9: Production, which allowed little space for the kind of experimentation that 
was evident in the best of the reporters’ stories. 
What was clear from surveying content was that, as participant observation and 
interviews had showed, continuity as much as change characterized the relaunch of 
CCTV-9 as CCTV International. Of more interest however with respect to content was 
the range and distribution of topics that news addressed, the voices in stories, the 
geographic dispersal of stories and their orientation. 
In a country as vast and diverse as the PRC, one would expect a wide range of 
datelines and a richness of content that would do justice to the myriad peoples and 
cultures of the PRC (including Hong Kong and Macao) and Taiwan. However, this was 
not the case. Rather, what the survey of content showed was a narrow range of topics and 
datelines and a predominance of official voices. In this chapter, I discuss why so 
restricted a news was the only news possible. 
The research question this chapter addressed was as follows: 
• With the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International in May 2004, over time 
what evidence of change emerged? 
The intermediate and subordinate questions were as follows: 
o What was the content of CCTV-9 pre- and post-relaunch? 
 What was the content of the bulletins and scripts? 
 What was the orientation of the news? 
 What topics predominated? 
 What places were in the news? 
 Who was referred to and who spoke in the news? 
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o What did the survey of content over time indicate about the manner in 
which the May 2004 relaunch was operationalized? 
 What did content say about the editorial process at CCTV-9? 
 What did content say about the production process as CCTV-9? 
 What did content say about the work of the reporters’ group at 
CCTV-9? 
 What did content contribute to the triangulation of data? 
THE NEWS BULLETIN 
I have already noted (see p. 251) that the OSC blueprint called the CCTV News 
the “flagship” news program of the channel, providing Chinese perspective on domestic 
and international stories. Clearly senior management were relatively happy with the 
bulletin since little attention was paid to general news in the May 2004 relaunch, 
especially compared to the internal struggle over feature programming (see p. 211 & 
p. 215) and concern for specialist news and new news-oriented programs evident from 
the OSC blueprint of planned programs, most of which did not come to fruition (see 
p. 217). The only noteworthy change made to the general news bulletin was its 
re-positioning at the top of every hour with the shift to a rolling news service and the 
increase in the number of bulletins, although the actual weekly duration of general news 
only increased slightly, given that several of the new bulletins were fifteen minutes News 
Updates (see Figure 2, p. 208). 
What I want to note first about the CCTV News is that the term ‘news bulletin’ 
does not adequately describe what actually went to air during the half hour of the news or 
fifteen minutes of a News Update, just as to describe CCTV International as a rolling 
news service ignores how much of the programming was not news, but features, 
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entertainment programming and documentaries (see Figure 1, p. 207). What went to air 
during a news bulletin was in face a mixture of elements that together were designed to 
create the impression of news. But like its competitors such as BBC-WS and CNN-I that 
it sought to emulate, CCTV-9 had evolved as a hybrid between news stories and ‘filler,’ 
elements of a bulletin that either did not substantively add to the information provided in 
the stories or represented content for which the news staff were not responsible. 
Filler 
Filler is extremely important for news production, because the more of it, the less 
news actually has to be made, relieving pressure on the news making system as a whole. 
In the conveyor belt construction of reality that characterizes news making, filler is an 
indispensable element. At CCTV-9 filler took two forms: repeat stories, and non-news 
filler. 
Repeat Stories 
I have already discussed the key strategy CCTV-9 used to reduce the amount of 
news that had to be made, the use of repeat stories (see p. 319). On the one hand, strictly 
speaking repeat stories are not filler since a global news service must repeat certain 
stories to ensure that its audiences, which change as the world turns, have every chance 
of seeing those stories that have ‘legs,’ a subjective measure news editors use to 
determine how long a story should ‘run’ (i.e. remain in the news cycle). On the other 
hand, because they functioned as filler, repeat stories (stories that would continue to run) 
were a boon for news makers.161 This is evident from Figure 7 (see below), which shows 
the proportion of new and repeat programming pre- and post-relaunch. 
                                                 
161 The usual practice at a broadcaster, especially a news channel, would be to constantly update stories 
that have legs. However, this practice was carried out only in a haphazard fashion at CCTV-9, with 
directors tending not to update stories, if they could avoid doing so. 
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The efficiency of the news production system is evident from Figure 7, with 
repeat programming playing an important role in filling the bulletin. Repeats are also far 
more evident at midnight than midday. The midnight bulletin came at the end of the 
evening shift. It was staffed by a three-quarter team162 and prompted little interest from 
producers and directors responsible for updating the news, especially in the absence of 
management, the primary target audience (see p. 310). Midnight also followed the prime 
time CCTV News bulletin, which aired at 2200 pre-relaunch and 2100 post-relaunch. 
Those bulletins were fully staffed, closely watched by management, and had a far higher 
proportion of new stories than did the midnight bulletin.163 
                                                 
162 The midday news team was bigger than the overnight team but not as big as the prime time team, which 
handled bulletins beginning with the 1700 CCTV News. 
163 According to staff, the 2200 (post-relaunch) and 2100 (pre-relaunch) CCTV News were considered the 
key bulletins of the day, since they carried the core news from that day’s Xinwen Lianbo, the national 
nightly news on CCTV-1, which aired at 1900. As a result, management closely watched these bulletins, 
which reduced the likelihood of a mistake going to air. 
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The concept of the midnight bulletin being down time reflected in Figure 7 further 
reinforces my earlier observation (see p. 308) that news production had not switched 
away from a focus on prime time post-relaunch, due to the peculiarity of CCTV-9 
operating as a window on both China and the world. However, although midnight Beijing 
might be dead time for news out of the PRC, at that time in Europe it ranged from mid- 
evening in Moscow through to early evening in London. In New York it was midday. 
Had CCTV International been true to its slogan, the news teams would have been 
working hard at midnight Beijing time to provide audiences worldwide with Chinese 
perspective on stories out of Europe, the Middle East and Africa while looking ahead to 
the day’s developments in the Americas. Figure 7 suggests this was not the case. 
Non-news Filler 
Bracketing repeat stories and treating them as part of the news in recognition of 
the changing audience, non-news filler is that part of the bulletin that was either produced 
outside of the newsroom or provided little to no information that was not carried in the 
news itself. Figure 8 shows the bulletin pre- and post-relaunch broken down into its 
constituent parts, with filler consistently making up a little over twenty percent by 
duration of the bulletin, further evidence of the continuity of the channel pre- and post-
relaunch. 
Given that the proportion of news to filler stayed almost the same regardless of 
the bulletin time and regardless of whether the bulletin was pre- or post-relaunch, an 
index of non-news filler across all four bulletins for which rundowns were collected can 
be calculated for the following attributes: 
a. Opening & closing credits 
b. Headlines & reminders of the headlines towards the end of the bulletin 
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c. Promotional spots for other programs 
d. Anchor’s sign off at the end of the bulletin 
e. Weather 
 
Figure 9 shows this index of filler. I included headlines in filler since they 
repeated what was already in the bulletin. The weather was supplied by a production 
house and was a review of the previous day’s weather more than a forecast. The use of a 
pie chart to represent filler graphically shows how much of the news was non-news filler, 
almost a quarter, on average six-and-a-half minutes for which the news staff effectively 




Figure 8: Proportion of news to filler, 1200 & 2400 News 
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Stories & 2-ways Filler
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Figure 9: Percentage of news & filler pre- and post-relaunch, 1200 & 2400 News 
All filler 
If repeat stories are factored into the above index, then the picture in (Figure 10) 
emerges for all forms of filler, leaving about a fifth of the bulletin for new news stories. 






























Finally, if the anchor’s introduction to each story is treated as filler and factored 
into the index, then the picture in Figure 11 emerges. I see this as a valid move, since I 
consider as filler any time an anchor appears on the news since this is time lost to the 
possibility of providing visual information. Showing what is lost to news by including the 
anchor as filler and combining this with how little of any bulletin is actually visually 
oriented new information indicates what a news bulletin at CCTV-9 actually consisted of, 
about fifteen percent of visually relevant new news, and the rest, one or another form of 
filler.164 In other words, only about four-and-a-half minutes of any 1200 or 2400 news 
bulletin on average pre- and post relaunch was new, visually oriented news. The rest was 
either a repeat of previous news, the anchor on screen and talking, or some other form of 
filler. 
                                                 
164 CCTV-9 is typical here. The same analysis could be made of any broadcast news and would probably 
find similar results. In fact, the waste of news time lost to advertising in commercial systems would 
probably even further reduce the news on commercial services compared to that provided by public service 
broadcasters. At the time of data collection CCTV-9 did not have commercials, which were first introduced 
in January 2005. 
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That the anchor was on average on screen for some twenty-six percent (almost 
eight minutes) of each thirty-minute bulletin (reading headlines, story introductions or 
signing off) indicates on the one hand the responsibility that went with the position. On 
the other hand it was time lost to visually compelling information and the prominence of 
the anchor within the bulletin contributed to the ‘representational’ capital I have already 
discussed (see p. 259) that was associated with the role, over and against its irrelevance to 
the news making process. 
The News 
Acknowledging my somewhat idiosyncratic attitude to the role of news anchors in 
general and accepting for the sake of discussion that the introduction to each story was 
relevant since it did impart information even if that information was not visual, then what 
else can the rundowns tell us about the news bulletin at CCTV-9? 














Anchor visible (includes repeat stories)
New stories with visuals (anchor not visible)
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Types of stories 
The channel produced four types of stories: copy, take, (writer or reporter) stories 
and 2-ways (see p. 180 for definitions). The proportion by duration of the four types of 
stories at CCTV-9 is shown in Figure 12. The same general pattern observed throughout 
the dissertation of continuity rather than change characterizing CCTV-9 pre- and post-
relaunch is again obvious, although the midnight bulletin pre-relaunch did show a slight 
preference for stories at the expense of takes. Post-relaunch, the midnight bulletin fell 
into line with the midday bulletins. Most of the news (copy stories, take stories and writer 
stories) was made by the writers and foreign experts. The reporters contributed the 
remainder, including all the 2-ways, providing just over twenty percent or almost five 
minutes of news per bulletin for the four bulletins coded.165 However, from Figure 12 the 
contribution to the bulletin from the reporters actually fell post-relaunch, belying the 
rhetoric of management about the importance of strengthening the reporting group for the 
development of the channel. 
                                                 
165 That five minutes included repeats. 
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Sources 
The division of labor within the bulletin reflected the sources available for making 
the news (Figure 13, below).166 Self cover, for example, matched the value of the 2-ways 
and reporter stories combined in Figure 12. The sources of the writer stories, takes and 
copy stories shown in Figure 12 were primarily the international news agencies and 
CCTV (see Figure 13). 
From Figure 13, the single biggest source of the news was Reuters and APTN, 
contributing about a third of the news overall (Figure 14). Their contribution stayed 
                                                 
166 The high proportion of ‘unknown’ in both Figures could suggest an analytical problem. An ‘unknown’ 
resulted in the coding when writers and reporters did not list their story sources, a requirement of the 
production process but one that was routinely ignored.  However, during observation, I could detect no 
pattern in the failure to list story sources, and I have concluded that the ‘unknowns’ can be ignored for the 
sake of analysis. However, I have drawn only the most tentative of conclusions from the above data, as I 
must acknowledge that beyond observation, I have no evidence that the distribution of the ‘unknowns’ 
according to source, were it known, might not deliver different results to those shown here. 

































roughly the same pre- and post-relaunch. CCTV (channels 1 & 4)167 and the Reporting 
Group supplied about the same amount of news. Combined they supplied slightly more 
pre-relaunch compared to post-relaunch and somewhat more than the agencies (see 
Figure 14). As noted, the proportion supplied by the Reporting Group fell after the 
relaunch, with the gap in the bulletin being filled primarily by CCTV stories, of which 
the proportion increased after the relaunch. The other sources combined provided only a 
very small proportion of the bulletin.  
Within the twenty-four hour news cycle, the decrease in agency stories and 
proportionate increase in CCTV and self cover pre- and post-relaunch when comparing 
the 1200 and 2400 bulletin reflected the shift in focus as the world turned. The midnight 
bulletin was largely a repeat of the prime time CCTV News, which was the bulletin 
                                                 
167 Observation indicated CCTV-1 was used far more than CCTV-4. However, writers rarely distinguished 
between the two in their scripts. Hence that information was not available from the rundowns. 
Figure 13: Proportion of news by source, 1200 & 2400 News 

































* Mixed - a story that combined international news agency sources and PRC sources 
 416
immediately before the midnight bulletin. Prime time focused heavily on PRC news. 
During the night and early morning in Beijing, the news was happening elsewhere, and 
the primary source of new stories was from outside of the PRC, hence the greater 
proportion of agency stories pre-relaunch compared to post-relaunch. 
Apart from the shifting relationship between different sources, what is striking 
about the sources is their general paucity. Observation showed no other significant 
sources of news than CCTV, Xinhua, the international agencies, and self cover. Figure 13 
bears out that observation. For a country as large and diverse as the PRC, CCTV-9 drew 
on a surprisingly small pool of resources for its news. In large part this practice reflected 
the channel’s evolution as a translation service for Xinwen Lianbo, adding the 
international news agencies when they became available and building a reporting team as 
the channel developed. However the bulletin hardly reflected a channel, whose 
aspirations were to take on the like of BBC-WS and CCN-I at their own game. 
In the OSC blueprint, management pointed to CCTV-9’s comparative advantage 
over foreign broadcasters in reporting the ‘China story.’ But CCTV-9 did not take 








advantage of this comparative advantage to the degree one might have expected. On the 
one hand, because CCTV-9’s parent, CCTV, had its own correspondents in major cities 
and relationships with broadcasters around the PRC on which it could draw for news, 
CCTV-9 was able to cover the whole of the country without moving from Beijing. On the 
other hand, as the channel became more sophisticated in its coverage and self cover 
developed as an important source of news, CCTV-9 failed to expand its domestic news 
net and develop relationships with broadcasters, who might have supplied stories 
independently of CCTV’s Chinese-language network of correspondents. 
Senior management explained to me that the general shortage of English-speaking 
Chinese reporters outside Beijing was the primary problem. What management could not 
explain was that if this was the problem, why CCTV-9 did not seek to place its own 
reporters in at least two or three of the country’s major cities on a permanent or semi-
permanent basis. Despite plans to expand coverage with the May 2004 relaunch, the 
immediate effect of the relaunch was for the news ‘net’ to shrink as Shanghai TV, which 
had been supplying a daily bloc of Shanghai-centric information, withdrew its services 
(see p. 208). A reporter or stringer in for example major cities or industrial hubs such 
Guangzhou, Chengdu or Shanghai at the very least would have vastly expanded the 
possibilities for self cover from cities and surrounding regions other than Beijing. 
That management was seriously contemplating at least the attempt to expand the 
news net was evident from a trip a manager took to seek out partners inside the PRC. But 
none were found. As a result, CCTV-9 carried on with its traditional reliance on CCTV’s 
Chinese-language news sources, and the relaunch failed to deliver a bulletin that moved 
towards shedding its dependence on third party sources for the news. 
As for CCTV-9’s heavy reliance on the international news agencies, if the viewer 
was denied much in the way of news about the PRC that was not supplied by CCTV’s 
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Chinese-languages services, outside of the country the opposite was the case. CCTV had 
fourteen overseas correspondents in 2004 (ABU, 2004), more than any of the US 
networks at the time.168 Moreover, many of those foreign correspondents were former 
CCTV-9 staff. But with three exceptions during the period of participant observation, 
they did next to nothing for CCTV-9. 
This time senior management explained that the foreign correspondents were too 
busy supplying the Chinese-language news. However, other staff suggested that overseas 
posting were seen as a ‘junket’169 and that once a correspondent went abroad he or she 
was concerned to not work for nothing, as CCTV’s overseas correspondents were under 
no contractual obligation to service CCTV-9. Despite this, the Sydney, Hong Kong170 and 
London based correspondents occasionally found time to do a story for CCTV-9, usually 
when requested, but in the case of the Sydney correspondent, of his own initiative. 
Nevertheless, without a contractual obligation, CCTV-9 benefited little from CCTV’s 
impressive overseas network of bureaus. Almost all of the channel’s news from abroad 
was supplied by APTN or Reuters. 
Summary 
The CCTV News bulletin was primarily filler if repeat stories are counted as 
filler. Accepting that this is not a valid move, given the rolling character of the CCTV 
News, what analysis of the bulletin rundowns shows is that the news had not shed its 
dependence on third party sources, including inside the PRC. 
                                                 
168 In 2005, both CBS and NBC had eleven foreign bureaux. In 2004, ABC had six (PEJ, 2006). 
169 In television news parlance, a junket is an assignment that is more of a holiday than work. 
170 Hong Kong was considered an ‘overseas’ postings by CCTV. 
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THE SCRIPTS 
In order to understand how CCTV-9 used news sources and how they shaped the 
bulletin, I now look at the scripts. In the following discussion, I limit myself to story 
orientation (whether it was a domestic, foreign policy or foreign story), what places were 
in the news, who was spoken about (both people and institutions), and who spoke. As 
noted (see p. 177), the sample of news coded was the scripts from the 1200 News, pre- 
and post-relaunch. The aim of the analysis is not to infer what the news might have meant 
to an audience. Rather, I want to show how the choices available to news makers shaped 
the news. 
Orientation 
Orientation has a particular relevance for news in the context of CCTV-9’s role in 
the PRC’s ‘wai xuan’ system. Domestic and foreign policy stories were required to 
reflect the Party’s and government’s point of view, or at least not contradict the Party’s 
and Government’s point of view. As the CCTV-9 Controller noted ahead of the May 
2004 relaunch, “We are taking great efforts to minimise the tone of propaganda, to 
balance our reports, and to be objective. But we definitely won’t be reporting as much 
negative domestic news as the western media” (Cui, 2004). 
As for foreign news, the OSC blueprint called for CCTV-9 post-relaunch to also 
look at the wider world from a Chinese perspective. In its public pronouncements, 
management at the channel was concerned to repeat this claim. In April 2004, the 
Controller stated that one goal of CCTV-9 was “to voice a Chinese perspective on world 
affairs and to break the western voice’s monopoly on the news. Our opinions on the 
world are quite different from those of CNN and the BBC” (Cui, 2004). 
Despite this claim, what observation of the news writing process showed was that 
the norm at the channel was, like at CNN and the BBC (see below), to use Reuters and 
 420
APTN material as it was delivered, unless told otherwise. In short, management’s claim 
that CCTV-9 provided Chinese perspective on world events was not supported, unless a 
story involved Chinese interests. This observation reflects Chang & Chen’s (1998) 
finding a decade earlier that conformity to the ‘Party line’ in news in the PRC was 
distinctly different depending on the relationship of the story to PRC interests and that 
“systematic typification” in the manner in which Galtung and Ruge (Galtung & Ruge, 
1965, cited in Chang, Tsan-Kuo, & Chen, Yanru, 1998) used the term characterized 
foreign news at CCTV-9. I have addressed elsewhere this and the conundrum news 
makers at CCTV-9 faced in their reliance on the agencies: 
How do you feel about using so much agency video? 
I don’t think it is a good thing. I don’t like it. But you have no choice. You have 
to use it. I’m not saying I don’t like agency video. I think it’s great. I think they 
make every effort to get excellent shots. I just want some news from other parts of 
the world. (Jirik, 2004, p. 138) 
When agency material did touch on a foreign story that had a PRC angle – such as 
the current Darfur situation in Sudan, where Beijing is perceived to exert influence 
through its support for the Sudanese government and business interests, primarily oil, in 
the region – management would remind writers to rework agency material or discard it in 
favor of a source such as CCTV-1 or Xinhua to ensure the news reflected Beijing’s 
position on the issue. On occasion, such as the Beslan incident already discussed (see 
p. 280), SARFT or the CPD would issue an interim suspension or ban on reporting a 
foreign story although it had no obvious PRC angle. 
For the most part reliance on APTN and Reuters as story source materials was 
little different at CCTV-9 as it is at any broadcaster or international news channel, 
including CNN-I and the BBC-WS, which rely heavily on agency material to cover gaps 
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in their news nets, even if they rework those stories to include elements of self cover, or 
include agency elements in a story that is by-lined with a broadcaster’s sign-off.171 
Figure 15 shows story orientation on CCTV-9. Figure 16 is a mirror of Figure 15 
but with sources factored in. Bracketing the potential problem with ‘unknown’ sources, 
the data indicated a strong correlation between source and story orientation both pre- and 
post-relaunch. On domestic and foreign policy stories, CCTV-9 relied almost exclusively 
                                                 
171 Personal experience from working at NBC and Reuters. To what extent the agencies set the agenda at 
broadcasters is debatable. In contrast to the situation at CCTV-9, Clausen (2003) describes a culture of re-
working agency material at NHK, Japan’s public service broadcaster. However, as Boyd-Barrett (1980; 
1998) has argued, dependency on the international news agencies goes beyond the manner in which their 
materials are used to issues about the role of the agency wires in setting the agenda for broadcast news 
editors. The relationships between broadcasters and agencies also change in line with economic and 
editorial imperatives. In August 2007, CNN announced it was dropping Reuters to focus on developing its 
own content. But it retained AP and APTN (Kaplan, 2007). During my time at Reuters, I felt both agencies 
were so similar that I could not understand why any broadcaster would take both (Reuters Asia monitored 
APTN’s output from the former’s regional base in Singapore, where I was part of Reuters’ television team 
from 1997-1999). Even in so competitive a commercialized television environments as the United States, 
the networks tend to subscribe to only one of the agencies at any given time. 





























on Self Cover and CCTV, although in foreign policy stories, some use is made of agency 
material. In foreign stories, agency coverage was the norm.172 
Again, the continuity of the bulletin pre- and post-relaunch is evident in the 
comparison, not only of the ratio of stories by orientation, but also in the source of those 
stories. From the limited range of sources on which CCTV-9 was able to draw for its 
stories, one can understand how editorial oversight was institutionalized in the production 
process. On domestic and foreign policy stories, the use of CCTV stories from Chinese-
language channels such as CCTV-1 and CCTV-4 shored up the Party line.173  Strict 
oversight on those stories was required only when the agencies were used. On the foreign 
story, so long as PRC interests were not at stake, the use of agency material was not an 
issue, producing “systematic typification” (Chang & Chen, 2000). The system was 
extremely efficient, producing news that would satisfy the regulatory and censorial 
authorities, with a minimum of editorial oversight. 
                                                 
172 One problem with this correlation is that the agencies were restricted in their coverage of the PRC and 
relied heavily on purchasing material from sources such as CCTV for their global subscriber base. So PRC 
had little incentive to use agency stories on domestic stories. Moreover, the agencies tended to focus on 
negative stories within the PRC, whereas CCTV-9 was concerned to put a positive spin on the story.  
173 CCTV-1 guaranteed the Party line. Its news was carefully monitored. However, as the incident with the 
Beslan ticker suggested (see p. 275), CCTV-4 had a degree of editorial autonomy that meant its work could 
not be guaranteed to deliver the Party line, although CCTV-9 staff considered it a reliable source. 
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Topic 
Given the heavy reliance of CCTV’s Chinese-language sources for domestic and 
foreign policy news and “systematic typification” in the foreign news, one would expect 
topic, the sense of what a story is about, to reflect the sources on which the news was 
based, given the conveyor belt character of the production process in so far as the writers 
were concerned. From observation as I have already noted in previous chapters, on the 
domestic and foreign policy story writers had almost no autonomy in the production 
process, translating Chinese-language scripts and re-editing from the video associated 
with those scripts. On the foreign story, they worked almost exclusively from the video 
and scripts Reuters and APTN supplied, rarely supplementing the original footage and 
narrative with supplementary materials. In other words, CCTV-1 (the primary source of 
Chinese language stories) was setting the news agenda for domestic and foreign policy 
news on CCTV-9. And the international news agencies were setting the agenda in foreign 
news. 























































































Figure 17 shows the distribution of topics on the CCTV-9 1200 News. Clearly the 
bulletin was extremely ‘hard’,174 with security issues (military & state security, WMD, 
terrorism, war, conflict, etc.) and political economy175 dominating the bulletin. Moreover, 
CCTV-9 did not shy away from disasters and crime, which together with security and 
political economy accounted for most of the news. Using my own ‘sense’ of how a news 
producer would look at the topic categories, I derived indices to measure ‘hardness’ and 
‘softness’ according to the distribution of categories shown in Table 13. The proportion 
                                                 
174 Hardness is an intuitive measure developed through internalization of the norms of news making that 
news makers use to describe one dimension of the qualities they attribute to a story. When I worked as a 
television news producer, terms like ‘softie’ were thrown around the newsroom to distinguish a story from 
hard news, which was rarely referred to as such, since hard stories were the norm and therefore treated as 
‘the news’. When Reuters’ producers put together bulletins for wholesale distribution, we were always 
concerned to include in the mix, if possible, cultural stories, sports, ‘funnies,’ etc., the type of news that 
runs towards the bottom of a bulletin. 
175 The combination of politics and economics into a single category, political economy, concealed what 
appeared to be a significant shift from politically to economically oriented stories post-relaunch. Post-
relaunch, politically oriented stories decreased eight percent from twenty-five to seventeen percent, while 
economically oriented stories increased from nine to nineteen percent. I had no ready explanation for this 
shift. 
Figure 17: Distribution of topics, pre- & post-relaunch, 1200 News 















of hardness to softness in the news is shown in Figure 18. As has been the case elsewhere 
to this point, continuity characterized the news pre- and post-relaunch in terms of both 
topics and the proportion of hard to soft stories. 
Given the ‘wai xuan’ function of the CCTV-9 news, one might expect domestic 
and foreign policy news to be somewhat ‘softer’ than foreign news, but not so soft as to 
be an evident whitewash of events inside the PRC. Although a subtle difference is 
evident (see Figure 19) in the orientation of the 1200 News depending on its orientation, 
with a nice symmetry as the orientation shifts from domestic through foreign policy to 
Hard categories Soft categories 
Crime & Disaster  Culture 
Political Economy History 
Security Nature & Science 
 Society 
Table 13: Distribution of categories into hard & soft news, 1200 News 

























foreign news, only comparative analysis with bulletins from other news systems would 
indicate whether the CCTV-9 news is any kinder to the PRC than for example ABC, CBS 
or NBC might be to the United States. 
“Systematic typification” has shown that news systems portray the domestic scene 
in a more homely fashion, while seeing foreign stories through frames that exoticize the 
‘other’ and portray foreign countries in terms of governing elites, security issues, coups 
and earthquakes (Thussu, 1996, p. 80). Although the critique developed by Galtung & 
Ruge (1965) was originally designed to show how the developed world portrayed the 
developing world, CCTV-9 would seem to apply a similar inside to outside 
defamiliarization of the ‘other’ that one would expect in US news. Moreover, despite the 
relative ‘hardness’ of the foreign news on CCTV-9, the evidence of the 1200 News also 
suggests that CCTV-9 does take a ‘hard’ look at the PRC as well, despite the system of 
regulatory and censorial controls. Although observation and management statements 
made clear that the news could not criticize the government, as noted in the discussion of 
the reporters’ work, indirect criticism is leveled at the government through the focus on 
issues such as disease and disasters. 
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In light of the above discussion, evident from Figure 19 is one interesting trend, a 
noticeable softening of domestic and foreign policy news pre- and post-relaunch. Given 
the frustration of some of my interlocutors on the issue of increasing regulatory and 
censorial pressure after the relaunch (see p. 94), and the ambiguity of the demands in the 
OSC blueprint that the channel be both an international news channel while emphasizing 
the official point of view in stories (see p. 241), then this evident softening might be an 
indicator that SARFT and the CPD were increasingly active post-relaunch in influencing 
the editorial process. Perhaps the regulators and censors have begun to crack down at 
CCTV-9 on the kind of indirect criticism of the government in PRC media which a range 
of writers have commented on (Pan, 2000, 2005; Tong, 2007), and which I noted in Hu 
Jintao’s May 2005 declaration of ‘smokeless war’ on ‘liberal elements’ (p. 94). But as I 
have been arguing throughout this dissertation, pressure from external agencies and 
institutions on the news making process is likely to be reconfigured and redirected in the 
tactics of resistance that also characterize news making in the PRC. 
Place 
Given the orientation of the news, distribution of topics, reliance on CCTV’s 
Mandarin-language sources in domestic and foreign policy news and international news 
agencies in foreign news, one would expect “systematic typification” to also characterize 
places in the news, although “typification” here needs to be thought through Beijing as 
the center. Using the coding categories of city, province (state) and country in the news, I 
constructed an index of regions in the news according to my experience at Reuters of 
how a news producer internalizes a geography of international relations that distributes 
cities, provinces and countries according to political economic and cultural divisions that 
 428
function as a rule of thumb for news making.176 The regions were as follows: Africa, 
Central America, Latin America, North America, Asia (other), Central Asia, Northeast 
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China (PRC & Taiwan), Middle East, Europe, Oceania, 
Russia, Other (in space, at sea, etc.). 
Clearly no single definition accounts for this delineation. Russia for example 
functions as an anomaly in the global news system, not quite part of Asia, not quite part 
of Europe, although it spans both Asia and Europe. The category of other included the 
continent of Antarctica, the Arctic, space and locations at sea. To make clear what 
countries (including by definition provinces (states) and cities) were associated with 
which regions, I have included a complete breakdown of countries (entities) in the news 
by region in Appendix 16 (p. 619). Counting each region once per story for any mention 
of a city, province (state) or country associated with a region in a story, regardless of the 
number of mentions per story, Figure 20 shows the distribution of regions in the news. 
As is to be expected, China dominated the news. The predominance of the Middle 
East is in part explained by the US (and its allies) wars against Iraq and Afghanistan 
(treated as part of the Middle East here, given that the two wars are the common thread). 
Similarly, North America is highly visible since it has been counted for every mention of 
the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, despite “systematic typification” 
certain regularities point to PRC interests in particular parts of the world. For example, 
the predominance of Northeast Asia pre-relaunch was associated with Beijing-sponsored 
‘six-party’ talks on the Democratic Republic of Korea’s nuclear program. Russia’s 
prominence in the news indicates Beijing’s particular concern to develop good relations, 
especially in the context of a potential ally in the region on issues that Beijing and 
                                                 
176 I used the CIA World Factbook as a starting point for developing the index of regions (see Appendix 
16, p. 619). 
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Moscow share common ground on in opposition to Europe and the United States. Given 
the heavy reliance on the international news agencies in foreign news, not surprisingly 
the developing world outside of Asia, i.e. Africa and Latin America, play a minor role in 
the CCTV News. 
Nevertheless, if the sub-regions shown in Figure 20 are collapsed to give regions 
as a whole, a somewhat different picture emerges. In Figure 21 Asia, excluding China, is 
presented as a single region and Central and Latin America are combined, giving more of 
Figure 20: Regions in the news, 1200 News 
























a sense of a Beijing-centric bulletin with a strong flavor of Asia. At the same time, the 
wars in the Middle East and the developed world remain highly visible. In short, CCTV-9 
positions the PRC at the center of an Asian sphere of influence and focuses on the 
developed world (the United States and Europe), both its successes and failures, to the 
exclusion of much of the rest of the world. The relative visibility of Africa despite the 
expectations of “systematic typification” most likely indicate Africa’s increasing interest 
to the PRC as a source of raw materials and destination for aid and investment. For the 
most part though, the bulletin presented an image of the world heavily skewed to the 
developed world and its overseas interests in the Middle East. 
This is perhaps not the world one would expect from a news service that claims to 
provide a different picture of the world to that available on video retailers such as the 
BBC-WS and CNN-I. Rather it is a picture of Beijing as one center sharing center stage 
Figure 21: Regions in the news, with sub-regions combined into full regions 
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with other centers in the United States and Europe. Whether a different picture would 
have emerged had CCTV-9 not relied almost exclusively on the international news 
agencies for its foreign news is a moot point. But what is clear is that allowing for a 
Beijing-centered bulletin, the CCTV-9 news did not offer Chinese perspective and that as 
a window on the world, it differed little from its competitors in the likes of BBC-WS and 
CNN-I. Not surprisingly and especially given the dependence of CCTV-9 on the 
international news agencies for foreign stories, the developing world was of lesser 
consequence in the news. 
Comparing the stories pre- and post-relaunch, again the general emphasis of the 
news does not vary, although particular regions are more or less in the news over time as 
the story shifts. However, the flexibility of the news in this sense takes place within a 
broader framework that privileges Asia and the developed world to the exclusion of the 
developing world outside Asia. The spike in news from Central and Latin America post-
relaunch does not seem to have a ready explanation. No senior PRC leader visited during 
the time. The stories associated with the region were primarily of regional interest and 
focused on security and disasters. I would expect that longer term that spike would 
dissolve. 
Inside the PRC, the Beijing-centric character of the news is just as pronounced. 
Figure 22 shows the distribution of the PRC’s major administrative units (provinces, 
municipalities, autonomous regions and special administrative regions) in the news.177 
The distribution of places in the news pre- and post-relaunch is discernibly similar. 
                                                 
177 For the sake of simplifying analysis, I have treated as equivalent the PRC administrative units which are 
roughly equivalent to a state in the United States. The PRC consists of twenty-two provinces, five 
autonomous regions, four municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the special 
administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao. The twenty-two provinces are Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, 
Guangdong, Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Zhejiang; the five autonomous regions 
 432
The only obvious change is in the greater visibility of Shanghai in the news post-
relaunch. Pre-relaunch, Shanghai TV had supplied a daily bloc of news to CCTV-9 that 
aired during prime time. Post-relaunch, CCTV-9 dropped the bloc of news from 
Shanghai. The most likely explanation for the increase in news Shanghai post-relaunch 
was the need to include Shanghai in the CCTV News, given that the bloc of news about 
the city was no longer available. The increase in news from Shanghai post-relaunch in the 
news was matched by a drop in news from Beijing. Even so, Beijing remained the focus 
of the news. 
                                                                                                                                                 
are Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet; the four municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin. 
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Accepting that Beijing should predominate in news that is the voice of the Party 
and Central Government, the asymmetry in place in the news is striking nevertheless. 
Given that the PRC is home to 1.3 billion people, three major and mutually unintelligible 
Figure 22: PRC major administrative units in the news, 1200 News 





































dialects (Mandarin, Shanghai dialect and Cantonese) and a myriad cultures and lesser 
dialects (many of them also mutually unintelligible), and given that the economic 
powerhouses that have driven the PRC’s development in recent decades are situated 
primarily in Guangdong Province, the Yangtze River basin, especially in and around 
Shanghai, on the eastern seaboard, and in many large cities and towns inland, the CCTV 
News was a pale reflection of the country as a whole. The location of the reporters’ team 
exclusively in Beijing only accentuated this imbalance, as reporters’ stories also had a 
predominantly Beijing focus. 
Persons & institutions in the news 
The focus on Beijing and the ‘hardness’ of the news in general is reflected in the 
persons and institutions in the news. Official persons and institutions dominate. Figure 23 
shows the distribution of categories of person and institution referred to for all three news 
Figure 23: Persons & institutions referred to in the news, 1200 News 




















orientations: domestic, foreign policy and foreign. Figure 24 shows who speaks for the 
same categories. 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Discussion 
The function of this chapter has been to triangulate the observation based data. 
The argument I have been making in this dissertation is that a case study of CCTV-9 
during the period of its relaunch as a rolling news service in May 2004 reveals that little 
changed as a result of the relaunch, although a cosmetic makeover of sets and on air 
graphics allowed management to make the case for more change than what I observed as 
part of the team that designed the relaunch. The survey of content presented in this 
chapter confirms that observation. 
The symmetry pre- and post-relaunch evident in this chapter in much of the news 
would have been striking in light of the claims of change, were it not evident from 
Figure 24: Who speaks in the news, 1200 News 




















observation that management had been in no position to make the changes suggested in 
the OSC blueprint. On the one hand, the external agencies such as Xinhua and China 
Radio International with whom CCTV-9 had hoped to forge a closer working 
relationship in line with SARFT’s demands to that effect, declined to play the role 
envisaged for them in the OSC blueprint. On the other hand, internal opposition to the 
relaunch prevented any substantive changes to either the editorial structure of the channel 
or its production practices. As a result, the survey of content presented above confirms 
what I observed, that continuity rather than change characterized the development of 
CCTV-9 pre- and post-relaunch. 
A second thread that I have been weaving through this dissertation has been the 
highly structured character of the conveyor-belt driven news making process. In this 
CCTV-9 differed little from other international broadcasters such as BBC-WS and 
CNN-I, which CCTV-9 sought to emulate. Nevertheless, some particularities of news 
making at CCTV-9 are worth noting. 
Firstly, the heavy reliance on the international news agencies for foreign news, 
despite CCTV large and expanding network of overseas bureaus, undermined 
management’s claim that CCTV-9 offered a different perspective on the world than did 
its global competitors. What this chapter coupled with observation of how agency 
material was handled shows is that the foreign news agenda at CCTV-9 was set by 
Reuters and APTN, since CCTV-9 effectively had no incentive to access foreign news 
other than that supplied by the agencies on their 24-hour feeds. Despite a plethora of in-
house agreements with broadcasters around the world, and membership of the Asia-
Pacific Broadcasting Union, CCTV-9 relied almost exclusively on the two international 
news agencies for its foreign news. The situation was not surprising, especially in the 
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absence of an Assignment Desk that could have handled the requests for coverage outside 
of that provided by the agencies. 
Secondly, and as a direct corollary of the role of the agencies in news making at 
CCTV-9, the claim that CCTV International would be a “window on the world” and not 
simply a “window on China” seems to be a defensible claim, only defensible in a manner 
other than that which management intended. Compared to the viewer of network news in 
the United States for example, the viewer of CCTV-9 would seem to be presented with a 
broader and richer picture of the world than is available domestically in the United States. 
For example, research done in the United States at about the same time I was 
collecting data for this dissertation concluded that ABC, CBS, and NBC, offered “mere 
driblets of international news” (Anon., 2005c). Although the methodology used in that 
study prevents direct comparison with my findings here, the fact that about fifty percent 
of the CCTV News pre- and post-relaunch was foreign news suggests that a comparison 
using the same methodology would show that compared to US audiences, domestic 
audiences of CCTV-9 were offered a surfeit of foreign news. As for CCTV-9’s global 
audience, again given the dependency on the international news agencies for foreign 
news, I have no reason not to suggest that CCTV-9 presented a picture of the world 
outside China that was any different than that available on channels such as BBC-WS and 
CNN-I. 
Thirdly, the claim that CCTV-9 was a “window on China” is problematic. The 
survey of content showed such a restricted a range of places, voices and institutions in the 
news that I can only conclude that CCTV-9 offered not so much a window on China, as a 
window on Beijing. Nevertheless, without comparative analysis with its global 
competitors, I have no reason to think that CCTV-9’s coverage of the PRC was any less 
attenuated than that of its competitors, or that its coverage of the PRC was any worse (or 
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better) than that of CNN of the United States or the BBC of the UK. Decades of media 
research have consistently shown that official voices and institutions of power (political, 
military, economic and judiciary) dominate news in public service and commercial 
television news in the United States and the United Kingdom. So the assumption that the 
mouthpiece function CCTV-9 plays within the PRC’s ‘wai xuan’ system should not be 
automatically translated into distrust of the CCTV-9 News, unless one is willing to 
subject other news systems to a similar critique. What is needed is comparative analysis 
of different media systems globally, taking as its starting point not the ideology of the 
political economy in which each media system is embedded, nor the regulatory 
framework that enables and constrains news making, but content and the manner in 
which particular stories are handled. 
I am not suggesting here that CCTV-9 cannot be improved. On the contrary, I 
believe radical improvement is required if CCTV-9 is to achieve its goal “to make 
CCTV-9 in a real sense an international news channel” (see p. 88). But I also believe 
radical improvement is needed in commercial and public service systems if they are to 
escape the charge made by the likes of Herman & Chomsky (1988), McChesney (1999) 
and Schiller (1992) that they serve as mouthpieces for power despite revenue and 
regulatory structures that formally guarantee such systems editorial autonomy from 
political control. 
Finally, what this chapter suggests is that CCTV-9 has failed to provide the 
support for its reporters that, in my opinion, will play an important role in determining in 
the long term whether the channel succeeds in breaking out of the trend of its evolution as 
a translation service for third party sources. News makers at CCTV-9 have mastered the 
formulaic procedures associated with news making in general, and in this specific 
instance with turning material from the agencies and CCTV’s Mandarin language 
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channels into news. But without an editorial system that empowers the zhubians as 
masters of the bulletin, without a desk that controls the news rather than the news making 
machine being in control of the news makers, who merely tinker with it, and without an 
expanded domestic and international network of reporters and stringers that shifts the 
channel more towards producing its own news, which will brand the channel’s identity, 
CCTV-9 will continue to function for the most part as a Beijing-centric barometer of 
local developments and a fairly reliable indicator of what the Party and government want 
to say about China at any given time and want the world to see. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have surveyed content. The survey consisted of an analysis of 
two sets of data, a set of rundowns for two bulletins, the 1200 and 2400 News, and an 
analysis of the scripts associated with the 1200 News. The aim of the chapter was to 
provide empirical evidence of the outcomes of the production process, and relate those 
outcomes as content back to the production process. As triangulation, the survey of 
content supported the evidence presented from other data sources in previous chapters. 
The analysis of rundowns showed a high degree of symmetry between the 
bulletins pre- and post-relaunch. The analysis of scripts indicated that the news remains a 
translation service for third party sources characterized by “systematic typification” and a 
focus on power centers and official voices. No significant change in content was evident 
in the bulletins pre- and post-relaunch, suggesting little support for management claims 
that the relaunch ushered in a new era at CCTV-9 with the introduction of a rolling news 
service and shift in focus away from being “window on China,” to becoming a “window 
on China and the world.” 
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Chapter 12: Conclusion 
The picture of the news presented in the previous chapter contrasted sharply with 
the work of the reporters’ group analyzed in Chapter 10. In content a picture of the close 
relationship between source material and stories emerged that largely reduced CCTV-9 to 
the images available from third party sources. Despite the concern for their work that 
characterized the attitude of the reporters’ group, their sense of commitment to making 
news that branded CCTV-9 with an identifiable image was lost in the dependency on 
third party sources that characterized the bulletin. 
The tension between those two types of news making was as evident in the 
production process as it was in content. The failure of the May 2004 relaunch to change 
the news in any significant way was mirrored in the failure to develop an editorial system 
based on an empowered Assignment Desk that might have boosted the agency of news 
makers, and ipso facto that of the reporters’ group, against the existing system of 
servicing a news making machine that was powered by third party sources. In this 
concluding chapter, I analyze that tension in terms of the significance of my findings for 
the literature about globalization, the history of television, the habitus of the journalist 
and theories of journalism that were surveyed in the pre-data chapters. Finally I offer a 
tentative theory of possible futures for CCTV-9. But first I summarize the data-driven 
grounds of the analysis which led to the theory.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The relaunch 
Chapter 7: The relaunch found that rather than a radical transformation of the 
channel, the May 3, 2004 relaunch focused on mise-en-scene and that the revamped 
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channel bore little resemblance to the OSC blueprint. However, my analysis suggested 
that rather than a failure to carry out instructions ‘from above,’ management successfully 
reconfigured the discourse on the relaunch, winning SARFT’s praise for the outcome, 
while retaining the existing channel in an almost unchanged form. Using Pan & Lu’s 
(2003) and Pan’s (2005) deployment of Certeau (1984) and Bourdieu’s (2005a) concept 
of field, I showed how management reconfigured the discourse on change to present the 
status quo as a transformation. 
Paradoxically resistance to change empowered the news making process in a 
situation where the demands for change and their emphasis on publicity within the news 
making system conflicted with the professional priorities of the news makers. The 
success of the latter in resisting change showed how much agency news makers have in 
negotiating change, even when the field in which they work is embedded in political 
economic, regulatory and censorial contexts that much of the literature treats as first and 
final determinants in media reform. Against any easy assumption about the prerogatives 
of the Party/State, the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International showed how much 
latitude media managers have in interpreting instructions and implementing reform. On 
display also were the tactics with which the weaker party confronted the power structure 
in an uneven but definitely not one-sided struggle. 
In terms of the first research question – How do media institutions such as CCTV 
negotiate their overall relationship with the Party and government? – the process of the 
CCTV-9 relaunch clearly showed that media have a great deal of agency in implementing 
reform and that power is negotiated and cannot be assumed in the PRC. That conclusion 
was reinforced in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 which addressed the second broad research 
question: How did news makers at CCTV-9 negotiate control over news making in their 
day to day work? 
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Editorial 
Chapter 8: Editorial showed how external control played out at CCTV-9, 
especially in the context of the channel’s role in the PRC’s ‘wai xuan’ system. Despite 
CCTV-9’s imbrication in a top-down hierarchy of editorial control that originated in the 
Politburo, channel management and news makers from the Controller down had much of 
the final say in what went to air. Socialization into the norms of news production was 
functional to the normalization of self-censorship that ensured reproduction of the Party 
line in the news, without intervention from the Party or the government. CCTV-9 worked 
on a loosely held but unbreakable leash, rarely straying into territory that would cause 
problems with the CPD or SARFT. 
The evacuation of the censorial and regulatory authorities from much of the day-
to-day news making process meant also that hegemony rather than coercion characterized 
reproduction of the Party line in news production. Consent to domination was an 
unwritten contract that bound news makers to their jobs. However, this contract was also 
a license that empowered journalists to push against those bonds. As a result, the news 
making process was open to forms of resistance that were largely invisible to external 
agencies of censorship and regulation that sought to shape the story. In particular refusal 
as evident in the example of CCTV-9 limiting its coverage of the 100th anniversary of the 
birth of Deng Xiaoping to enough not to draw attention to its lack of coverage was an 
outstanding but not atypical example of unremarkable work that had subversive potential. 
Production 
The quotidian news making process as a form of resistance internal to the channel 
was evident in the highly structured and efficient new production system, especially its 
reliance on the use of third party source materials. The very lack of control news makers 
had over the news meant that whatever control the censorial and regulatory authorities 
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had over news makers could not easily be translated into control of content. The 
downside of the lack of control news makers had over the news was that a re-active rather 
than pro-active news editing system operated at CCTV-9. Although breaking stories were 
only a small part of output, the channel’s failure on the tsunami story exposed a serious 
flaw in the news editing system that management said it was concerned to fix. However 
failure to establish a desking system hampered management’s attempts at change. My 
attempts and those of senior management to build a better relationship with external 
agencies such as Reuters also failed. The entrenched news making culture and the 
momentum that the channel had developed out of its launch as a 24-hour comprehensive 
service in September 2000 was not changed with the May 2004 relaunch of CCTV-9 as 
CCTV International as a rolling news channel. 
Reporters 
If any one area of the work at CCTV-9 should be singled out for emphasis in the 
relaunch and as an example of the negotiation of control, it was the work of the reporters’ 
group, given management’s insistence on their work as a model, typified by the series 
‘China’s Challenges,’ and AIDS Report for development of the channel. Moreover, the 
best of their work as shown in the stories about HIV/AIDS showed how the reporters had 
developed a discourse on professionalism that shifted the balance between balance and 
objectivity in news making and the Party line more towards the former. This was true, 
even if tactics deployed in resistance to their mouthpiece function ensured that while the 
Party line was muted, it was not silenced, undermining any easy way for the censorial 
and regulatory authorities to identity and act against resistance to the dominant hegemony 
in the news making process. 
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Production of the HIV/AIDS series was a paradigm example of Pan’s (2000) and 
Pan & Lu’s (2003) account of the manner in which reporters evade the strategies of the 
CPD and SARFT and appropriate the dominant discourse, in this case on 
professionalism, to tell a different story. Despite the concerns of senior management, the 
reporter changed only enough in the stories to get them to air. On display in the manner 
in which the HIV/AIDS story was handled was the long history of journalism in the PRC: 
social responsibility and the demand – embedded in what I have tentatively called a 
‘Confucian habitus’ – to speak truth to power, even at great personal risk, reflecting the 
complex calculation of possibilities as to exactly where the limit to any particular story 
could be found that the best of the reporters exercised in their everyday work. 
Evident in both China’s Challenges and AIDS Report was the core news value, 
social responsibility, which distinguishes journalism in the PRC from mainstream media 
in commercialized media systems in countries such as the United States. Beyond a 
concern for balance and objectivity, CCTV-9’s reporters took seriously their role as 
advocates for change and strove to identify and inform the Party and government of 
problems that they believed needed to be addressed. 
Nevertheless, as the survey of content showed, however effective the work of the 
reporters’ group, it tended to be overshadowed by the overall reliance of the general news 
on third party sources, and the continuation of the channel as a comprehensive channel 
with a balance of news, features, entertainment, art and educational programming, rather 
than its transformation into a rolling news channel. The injunction in the OSC blueprint 
on anything not news related associated with the plan to relaunch CCTV-9 as a rolling 
news service was reconfigured in negotiation of the relaunch to ensure the opposite 
outcome of what originally had been intended. 
 445
Content 
Chapter 11: Content provided empirical evidence of the link between the first two 
research questions and the third: With the relaunch of CCTV-9 as CCTV International in 
May 2004, over time what evidence of change emerged? Content confirmed what 
participant observation, interviews and documents had shown: despite a huge expenditure 
of money, effort and time, and great changes to elements of the mise en scene at 
CCTV-9, in what the audience saw, the ‘stuff’ of television, almost nothing changed with 
the May 2004 relaunch. 
The survey of content showed a high degree of symmetry in the bulletins pre- and 
post-relaunch. Scripts confirmed what observation suggested, that the CCTV-9 news 
remained a translation service for third party sources, resulting in “systematic 
typification” and a focus on power centers and official voices, despite management’s 
insistence on self cover as the starting point for re-branding CCTV-9 as an international 
news channel characterized by Chinese perspective. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS FOR THE LITERATURE 
The data that was the core of this dissertation was only the starting point for an 
analysis of its significance in the context of the “going out” project of which CCTV 
International is a core component, and the latter’s role in the PRC’s ‘wai xuan’ system. In 
order to understand the importance of the development of CCTV-9 despite my findings 
that the May 2004 relaunch was characterized above all by continuity rather than change 




What my discussion of the meaning of globalization for the PRC and its 
reconfiguration as a ‘going out’ project suggests is that to understand media reform in the 
PRC, PRC media must themselves, in their specificity, be if not a starting point, then a 
central focus of analysis. Like globalization theory itself, too much analysis of media in 
the PRC takes as its starting point media systems embedded in other political, economic, 
social and cultural contexts and proceeds by way of identification of the PRC media 
system as not of a type. As a result, this kind of analysis, embedded in particular in 
assumptions about the alleged relationship between commercialization and media 
freedom, suggests PRC media must be reconfigured in line with norms that have no 
relationship to the specific development of media in the PRC. In contrast, this dissertation 
has taken as its starting point the practices of news makers at CCTV-9 and shown how 
those practices are part of the long history of media reform in Imperial and Republican 
China and the PRC. 
Just as reconfiguration of globalization theory to center Beijing, where 
appropriate, would show how much the current configuration of the global political 
economic and cultural economy are the result of Beijing’s ‘going out’ project which 
Deng Xiaoping triggered with the ‘four modernizations’ in 1978, so reconfiguration of 
media theory with respect to the PRC should show that the current configuration of media 
is a continuation of a long debate over the role of media in reform in general. 
That role was associated with the rise of domestic news systems as reformers and 
then revolutionaries appropriated Euro-centric discourses about the nation and 
reconfigured them to justify first defense of the empire and then its overthrow. The 
adoption and adaptation of this discourse on modernization was characterized by 
hybridization as both the condition and process of China’s globalization. From a Chinese 
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perspective globalization involved local ideas, technologies, institutions and products that 
enabled the rise of the West. Centuries later these forces, taken up and reconfigured by 
European imperial powers, returned. China’s modern globalization begins in the mid-19th 
century with the appropriation and reconfiguration of Social Darwinian ideas of history, 
race and the nation-state to resist Western encroachment and Japanese invasion. The civil 
war and communist victory in 1949 marked the end of a 100-year period that is best 
understood as an epistemic break in the Foucauldean sense that changed China and the 
Chinese to the extent that the Chinese appropriated and adapted the discourses they 
utilized in the long struggle to liberate the country and give birth to the nation. 
What characterizes the PRC’s globalization after 1978 is the intensification and 
expansion of economic development, strengthening of nationalist sentiment, and 
reconfiguration of the state, as the Party relies less on coercion and more on consent to 
buttress its rule. What the future holds is unclear. What is clear is that globalization has 
not dissolved national boundaries and political borders. Rather, in recent years the 
opposition between socialism and capitalism has given way to a revived nationalism and 
identity politics. 
Rather than accounting for the PRC’s reform and opening as an effect of Western-
centric globalization, the PRC’s globalization is better understood as a dynamic process 
of external impact and internal projection, both a coming in and a going out. In the 
cultural sphere this is characterized by the launch of a channel such as CCTV-9, which 
draws heavily on the international news agencies, yet represents engagement with the 
world on the PRC’s terms, a project that has characterized the development of television 
in the PRC from the outset. 
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Television 
The launch of CCTV International was less an initiative than an evolution in line 
with the development of television within the PRC. The launch of CCTV International 
echoed the quest for international recognition that drove the original launch of television 
in 1958. The call for the transformation of CCTV-9 amounted to the continuation of the 
debate about the role of media in development and governance that has characterized 
television since its inception in the PRC.  
The development of CCTV International corresponds to the historical demands 
put on television to serve as an instrument of the Party and government. The Party/State 
has called for CCTV International to become in a real sense an international news 
channel with Chinese perspective. Against an objectivist news ontology, which would 
rule out this possibility a priori, the hybrid media model developing in the PRC draws no 
necessary distinction between news and external publicity or ‘wai xuan.’ 
The commercialization of television in the PRC was sponsored by the Party/State 
and the Party/State has been its prime beneficiary. With the launch of CCTV 
International, the Party/State is seeking to extend its voice further into the international 
arena. However, it cannot do so without the support of program makers and in the case of 
television news, journalists. 
Journalism 
The field of journalism in the PRC is rife with contradictions as the different 
forces that shape television – political, economic, technological, institutional and cultural 
– struggle for control of the space of its development. Within this space, journalism 
occupies a powerful niche. What the history of the development of television journalism 
in the PRC shows is how close the practitioners of today are to their predecessors, 
especially in their role as the inheritors of the intellectual vocation, an instrument of the 
 449
power structure charged with speaking truth to power. Journalists at CCTV-9 are 
following in the footsteps of the journalists of the late Imperial and early Republican 
periods as well as in the footsteps of communist media, torn between the mass line 
politics of Mao Zedong and the statist pragmatics of Deng Xiaoping. 
From the analysis of the work of the newsroom and journalists at CCTV-9, clearly 
news makers balanced social responsibility and professionalism understood as serving the 
people with their mouthpiece function and professionalism understood as serving the 
Party and government. Analysts have warned against binaries and the dichotomous 
framing of the problem for media reform in the PRC as a false choice when presented as 
an either/or choice between Party/State and market. I would add that framing the role of 
journalism as either speaking on behalf of the power structure or speaking truth to power 
is equally a false choice, given that journalists are not outside power but part of the power 
system. Within this system they play a role both as a transmission mechanism for 
information and, in their role as advocates for change, as a crucial feedback mechanism 
for the Party and government. 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF NEWS IN THE PRC & THE FUTURE OF CCTV-9 
Social theory of media reform in the PRC operates primarily at the structural and 
institutional level of media reform. In contrast to these foci, my focus has been on media 
practice as a form of agency that brings pressure to bear on the contexts of its own 
development. 
The chapters on editorial, production and the work of the reporters’ group showed 
how Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony, understood as the process by which 
institutions such as the CPD and SARFT exercise control over the news making process, 
can usefully be strengthened by deploying Certeau’s (1984) understanding of how 
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institutional change is negotiated through the everyday practices of social agents 
embedded within institutions. As a macro-level concept, hegemony provides a framework 
for understanding the corporate relationship developing between the Party/State and 
media in the PRC. As a micro-level concept, the ‘art of resistance’ showed how social 
agents negotiate with the power structure. 
The role of management in re-negotiating the OSC blueprint for the May 2004 
relaunch was a paradigm case of reconfiguring the discourse of the Party/State to ends 
opposite to those which the authorities originally intended. Similarly in the work of the 
newsroom in refusal to do certain stories and in the work of the reporters in series such as 
‘China’s Challenges’ and ‘AIDS Report’, the tactics of the weak were on full display. 
Nevertheless, what participant observation, interviews and Chapter 11: Content 
also showed was the high degree of congruency between the bulletin and the interests of 
the Party/State. Most of the domestic and foreign policy news was translated from 
sources such as CCTV-1 that guaranteed the Party line. The predominance of Beijing as 
the locus of the domestic news and the predominance of officials as sources of 
information and references in the news left little space for the kind of work associated 
with the reporters’ group that would push the reporting envelope. 
At the same time, the foreign news was characterized by “systematic 
typification,” portraying the world in terms with which an international audience would 
be familiar. Although this not the Chinese perspective that was called for in the OSC 
blueprint, such an outcome hardly presented any kind of threat to the power structure. As 
a result, caution must be exercised in order to not overstate the level of resistance 
associated with the everyday practices of news making in the PRC. 
If the work of Pan (2005) and Pan & Lu (2003) is groundbreaking for drawing 
attention to the manner in which news makers have agency in the media reform process, 
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their emphasis on the work of Certeau (1984) to the exclusion of what Certeau (1984) 
himself excludes – the structural sociology of Bourdieu (1977) and the analysis of power 
associated with Foucault (1977) – suggests that the structural dimension of political 
economic and regulatory power can be usefully reintroduced into the analysis, if 
Certeau’s (1984) move is unwarranted. 
I am not suggesting here that Certeau (1984) is wrong. Rather, I am suggesting 
that his critique of Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1977) which focuses on the concepts 
of habitus and surveillance relies on a correlation between the arts of resistance as 
practiced by those alienated from the prevailing power system and the minutiae of 
everyday life associated with acts that escape the discursive frameworks that legitimize 
and are recursively legitimized by sociology and the power structure. However, unlike 
Certeau’s (1984) examples, which can be thought of as a focus on the ‘remainder’ – what 
is left out after sociology and an analysis of the power structure have accounted for 
habitus in the structuration of the field and discipline in surveillance – the example of 
journalists in the PRC cannot be ‘remaindered.’ Journalists are not alienated from the 
power structure and outside of its discursive frameworks, but are central to their 
constitution and upkeep. 
In other words, in so far as the journalistic field is part of the power system in the 
PRC, the move that Certeau (1984) makes to bracket off certain types of practices from 
those associated with the works of Bourdieu and Foucault cannot be made with respect to 
PRC media. Pan’s (2000) and Pan & Lu’s (2003) work is an extremely productive move 
for introducing the Certeauian problematic into the analysis of PRC media. But the work 
of Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1977) cannot be so easily bracketed off as it is in the 
case of the work of Certeau (1984), without an attendant loss of an understanding of the 
limits of resistance. 
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In short, what I am proposing is that to account for media reform in the PRC, 
Certeau (1984), as Pan & Lu (2003) have suggested, is a necessary first step in extending 
institutional analysis beyond the political economy of media reform. But Certeau (1984) 
alone is not enough, since a focus on bounded innovation and resistance risks the charge 
of media-centrism and of overstating the degree of agency associated with news makers, 
even if the power structure is re-introduced as a boundary condition, but almost as an 
afterthought. What is required is a reconceptualization of the relationship of the work of 
Certeau (1984) to that of Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1977) in cases where the agents 
are not residual to the concerns of the operation of power, but central, as is the case with 
journalists in the PRC who are both instruments and critics of power. 
Put simply, journalists in the PRC are not somehow outside of the journalistic 
field, or not subject to the surveillance and discipline of the power structure as the case 
would be for Certeau’s (1984) analysis to apply as Certeau (1984) applies it in his 
analysis of what is outside of Bourdieu’s (1977) and Foucault’s (1977) analyses. On the 
contrary, the journalistic field is deeply imbricated in the power structure as both subject 
and object of surveillance and control. Therefore any account of resistance and bounded 
innovation in PRC media reform must also account for the structuration of the 
journalistic field and the discipline and control the power system exercises over and 
within that field. 
In the case of CCTV-9, the OSC blueprint functioned as a synthesis of the 
structuration of the field. It crystallized the political economic, technological, regulatory, 
censorial and institutional forces that shape media reform in the PRC. At the same time it 
also functioned as a symbol of discipline and control that the authorities exercised over 
and within that field, or did not exercise as the case may be. But crucially here the failure 
of CCTV-9 to carry out the original intention of the OSC blueprint was only possible 
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through the discursive reconfiguration of the role of CCTV-9 within the power system, 
and not as a residual element of it. As a result control was contested, contained and co-
opted from within by agents who are too deeply imbricated in the power structure for 
Certeau’s (1984) examples to suffice. 
It would be too easy to simply say that CCTV-9 duped the CPD and SARFT, 
although this is what a cursory look at the situation might suggest. On reflection however, 
in so far as the journalistic field is part of the power system, duping the CPD and SARFT 
would mean the system was duping itself. But the survey of content in this dissertation 
indicated the opposite. Whatever resistance news makers at CCTV-9 offered within the 
power structure, the news very much reflected a set of narratives that reinforced the 
dominant hegemony of the Party/State rather than contested it. Nevertheless, in so far as 
the journalistic field is part of the power system, each act of resistance, however 
negligible in and of itself, necessarily affected the overall balance of power. This is how 
hegemony is contested and this is how change happens from within. 
What might be the future for CCTV-9? Zhao Yuezhi (1998) has noted that the 
television news system in the PRC is closer, at least editorially, to a public service system 
than it is to the commercial systems with which it is so often contrasted, especially in the 
context of the shift to media commercialization beginning in the late 1970s. As a result, 
caught between Party/State and commercial power, news makers in the PRC are 
increasingly subject to the discipline of both the Party line and the bottom line, as Zhao 
(1998) put it. 
Constrained by this double bind, a range of analysts have written of the problems 
journalists face. He Zhou (2000b) writes of the erosion of professional ethics as the 
market opens up space for personal enrichment, even as the Party and State engage in a 
tug of war over control of media. He (2000c) also writes of journalists’ “ideological 
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dissonance” when they are forced to act against their personal and professional ethical 
systems, resulting in strategies for reducing dissonance that typically involve a 
compromise with one’s convictions about one’s work as a vocation. He further suggests 
that most journalists feel a strong sense of dissonance, and that the strategy of pushing the 
envelope is the most prevalent in trying to bring professional and private belief systems 
into line (He, 2000c, pp. 606, 609). 
Zhao (1998) has written of endemic corruption corroding the media system in the 
PRC as a result of the introduction of the market. Zhao notes that corruption is “not just a 
few individuals but an institutional and occupational phenomenon involving the majority 
of journalists and the majority of media organizations from the smallest to the very 
pinnacle of the Party’s propaganda apparatus” (Zhao, 1998, p. 72).  
Pan (2000) writes of improvisation in journalistic routines as an important 
element in understanding how journalists navigate the chaos associated with media 
reform as an ongoing project. He defines improvisation as “the ways in which journalists 
design, implement, and justify their non-routine journalistic practices that function to 
weaken, circumvent, and erode the hegemony of the commandist system associated with 
the Communist ideology” (Pan, 2000, p. 73). 
The picture here is one of journalists struggling to cope with the demands of both 
Party/State and market, not to mention the audience. Weighed down by multiple 
obligations, they struggle to cope with the arbitrary diktat of the Party/State, the siren 
song of the market and the prospects of a career dashed on the rocks of corruption. Not 
surprisingly, when threatened, they protect themselves by working to rule, hiding their 
true feelings and retreating into a private realm where they can protect their consciences 
from personal conflict with the demands of their professional lives. 
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However, what is missing from this picture and what I hope this dissertation has 
provided is some sense of the pride many journalists have in their work, their sense of 
mission and purpose and the professionalism they bring to their work. Most importantly, 
as this dissertation has shown, they are not cowed by the CPD and SARFT, as one might 
suspect from reading the literature. Rather, as the evidence I have presented suggests, 
they negotiate the hazards of their profession not with timidity, but with a cautious 
confidence. 
The problem with PRC media studies is not what is said. Rather, it is what is not 
said. Almost invariably, whenever a piece of research about media in the PRC is 
presented, the implied norm against which that medium is measured and usually found 
wanting is an ideal typical press model, which implies the Western press model. But a 
veritable industry (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 1999; Mosco, 1996; 
Murdock, 1990; Schiller, 1992 et al.) tells us that the Western press model is deeply 
ideological. Not only are the norms of accuracy, balance and objectivity ideologies that 
do not bear out in practice, but the political economy of the Western press works to mask 
the class character of journalism and the deep commitment mainstream media have to 
buttressing rather than questioning the balance of power within the system, even if the 
abuse of power occasionally is brought to light. 
Constituted as a fourth estate, the Western press is a pillar of the power system, 
and works to defend, stabilize and reproduce that system. In this sense the Western press 
and media in the PRC are barely distinguishable. Both speak for the power structure and 
are deeply invested in both maintaining and contesting their position within the dominant 
hegemony, without attempting to overthrow that hegemony. Yet, because so little of the 
research on media systems is comparative, dominating the academic imagination is an 
unbridgeable gulf between the Western and PRC media systems based on different forms 
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of ownership, regulation and control, and the allegedly different goals of the media 
systems as such – the one that allegedly checks and balances power, the other that 
functions only as a mouthpiece for power. As a result, too little attention is paid to the 
remarkable similarities between the two media systems that do exist, side by side with the 
contrasts. 
Not only are the PRC’s media, including increasingly news media, responsive to 
the market, but journalists universally are constituted as agents of the power system, and 
in a deeply conflicted relationship with the power structure in so far as their watchdog 
role demands that they speak truth to power. And although analysts concur that in the 
case of the PRC, the principle problem for media reform is the Party/State, the answer is 
not necessarily in shifting control of media from the Party/State to the market, nor is it in 
further de-regulation of the media market. Rather, I would argue that the best possible 
future for the PRC’s television news system is in a re-structuring of the regulatory 
regime. 
If in the West, laws and the norms of professionalism protect journalists, in the 
PRC, journalists work without legal protection, either from intervention into their work 
by the Party/State, or from the diktat of the market. In so dangerous a situation, what 
drove journalists at CCTV-9 to act as they did was their habitus, the cultural roots of the 
profession in the traditional relationship of the intellectual to the power structure and the 
deep sense of social justice that characterized the practice of journalism in Imperial and 
Republican China and continues to characterize news making in the PRC. 
What makes CCTV different from arguably the world’s most democratic 
mainstream television systems, the public service broadcasting systems, is not the issue 
of the market and state, ownership and control. Rather, it is the editorial autonomy and 
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employment security that provides public service broadcast journalists with protection 
from the diktat of both the state and the market. 
The literature recognizes the quality of broadcasters such as the BBC, CBC 
Canada, NHK Japan, ARD Germany, ABC Australia, etc. CCTV could join the ranks of 
broadcasters such as these, but only if regulations are enacted that both protect it from the 
worst excesses of the market, which since 1978 has been eroding its autonomy, while 
also protecting its news divisions from the arbitrary intervention of the Party/State into 
their work. 
Currently, the PRC has no legislation that directly addresses the role of 
journalists. Rather, news work is governed by regulations and directives. Should the PRC 
enact a press law, then one would hope it will protect journalists from both the 
Party/State and the market. The issue of a press law was on the table in the mid-1980s. 
Tiananmen put an end to that project. However, the socially progressive wing of the 
Party/State and its supporters in the academy and in media, including at CCTV, continue 
to nurture hopes for a democratizing press law. 
Zhao (1998) argues that the best possible future for the PRC is one where the 
gains of both formal and substantive democracy are protected: 
In the West, where democracy in the narrow sense has been achieved, democratic 
forces are struggling for a broadened definition of sustainable democracy with a 
focus on equality while fighting against the deterioration of existing democratic 
institutions and various anti-liberal democratic backlashes. In China, democratic 
forces should struggle to achieve democracy in the narrow sense while at the 
same time guarding against losing the progressive gains of the socialist revolution 
and whatever has been achieved in the name of a broad definition of democracy. 
(p. 190) 
To this end, Marxists, both reformists, notwithstanding Lee’s (2000a) assessment 
that they have been reduced to “exile, dissent and irrelevance” (p. 564), and radicals 
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associated with the PRC’s New Left, have been struggling inside the PRC since the 
1980s, and losing the battle, to develop a media system appropriate both to the gains of 
the revolution, and in opposition to the commercial logic of an unfettered market in 
media, including news media, which has destroyed the relative autonomy of journalists in 
media systems such as that of the United States, where news media operate without 
appropriate protection from ratings as the primary criterion by which success is 
measured. 
Against the success of state-protected public service media in many liberal and 
social democracies, measuring news and entertainment by the same yardstick historically 
prevented public service television from developing in the United States. The PRC has 
the seeds of a public service broadcast system in CCTV. But the commercial logic of the 
market will destroy its further development, unless laws are enacted that protect it. But 
those or complementary laws must also protect journalists from the intervention of the 
Party/State, if television news is to develop more as a public service than as a Party/State 
service. 
Therefore the core issue for media reform and media democratization in the PRC 
is neither the issue of the Party/State, nor the issue of the market. Rather it is the issue of 
media regulation and the appropriate relationship between Party/State, market, and media 
as determined by law. The fate and future of CCTV-9 depends on such laws. Meanwhile, 
news makers will continue to push the envelope where possible in the minutiae of 
everyday news making and continue their largely invisible work changing media from 
within and expanding what journalists can do in the PRC. 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Despite the difficulty of reading Certeau (1984) back through Bourdieu (1977) 
and Foucault (1977) in terms that account for change from within, one has only to 
imagine the role of news makers in the PRC in terms similar to those that frame the work 
of journalists within public service media systems in capitalist democracies to understand 
how journalists can be both servants and critics of power. Nobody questions the right of 
BBC journalists, for example, as public servants to question the actions of the British 
government. Although journalists in the PRC operate without the protection of a charter 
that legitimizes their actions, their habitus is that of professionalized news makers, 
instruments of power concerned to speak truth to power. That they operate without a 
charter that legitimizes their actions only makes them the braver journalists for the risks 
they take on a daily basis. Describing this practice as the art of hitting line balls does not 
do justice to the very real stakes for which media are playing in the PRC. 
After spending over two years at CCTV-9 between mid-2003 and late 2005, I 
came away convinced of the courage and professionalism of many of my Chinese 
colleagues, from senior management to interns. However, the control that the survey of 
content provided for the observation, interview and data related elements of this 
dissertation indicated that the ‘wai xuan’ function of CCTV-9 predominated in the 
domestic and foreign policy news even if the foreign news was characterized by 
“systematic typification.” 
I have argued that social responsibility and activism have characterized the 
history of journalism in Imperial and Republican China and the PRC as much as its 
mouthpiece role. However, if the Party/State has been the greatest constraint on socially 
responsible and activist journalism in recent decades, today progressive journalism is 
increasingly under threat from the market. Given the emerging class character of the 
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journalistic field in the PRC, not surprisingly, journalists see social responsibility 
increasingly in terms of defending the same middle class interests that the Party/State is 
increasingly associated with through its development of the market as a primary site of 
legitimation. If the interests of media and the Party/State continue to converge on the 
issue of the market, then the ‘ideological dissonance’ that characterizes the conflicted 
attitude journalists have to their double function as instruments and critics of power could 
well morph into the ‘ideological consonance’ that characterizes the relationship between 
journalists and the power structure in capitalist democracies. In this context ‘wai xuan’ is 
likely to increasingly take on the character of nationalism associated with the rise of a 
bourgeoisie in earlier transitions to capitalism, with the full support of media. 
As a result, regardless of the future development of media in the PRC, the ‘wai 
xuan’ function of CCTV-9 would not only not appear to be under no threat in the 
foreseeable future, but the kind of nationalist sentiment that underpins media systems, 
whether public service or commercial, in capitalist democracies is likely to become more 
evident at CCTV-9, where, for want of a better term, ‘statist nationalism’ now prevails. 
Whether that brings CCTV-9 closer into line with its competitors such as BBC-WS and 
CNN-I, which it seeks to emulate, only comparative analysis will tell. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In order to position CCTV-9 within the expanding field of 24-hour global English 
language channels, comparative analysis is required. However, if we are to find out what 
channels like CCTV-9 do, then the starting point cannot be ideology and the attempt to 
delegitimize or legitimize one news system or another in terms of its alleged news values 
and the political, economic, cultural and institutional contexts within which each is 
embedded. Rather I would suggest that a better starting point for fruitful comparative 
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analysis would be to look at how particular news systems handle particular topics. 
Compare for example CCTV-9’s handling of the HIV/AIDS story with that of another 
global broadcaster on the same story or a similar story in a different setting. Another 
example: during the final phase of writing up this dissertation, the controversy over Tibet 
and its relationship with the PRC exploded around the Beijing 2008 Olympics torch 
relay. How different media such as CCTV-9, CNN-I and the BBC-WS handled this story 
would make an interesting case study. 
In addition to the need for comparative analysis, continued research on the 
development of CCTV-9 would be functional to taking the pulse of the ‘going out’ 
project and the state of the ‘wai xuan’ system. For example, I have barely touched on the 
political economy of CCTV-9, although political economy has been one of the core 
framworks for analysis. At the time of doing the research, the channel was financed by 
CCTV and sanctioned by SARFT. As a result, CCTV-9 was not subject to the discipline 
of the market that is increasingly the norm in PRC media. However, if that situation were 
to change for CCTV-9, then research on the impact of the market on the channel would 
surely provide insight into the manner in which the channel then negotiates the tension 
between its ‘wai xuan’ and commercial functions. 
I noted in the introduction that I did not deal with the question of bureaucracy and 
the possibility of bureaucratic inertia as an explanation for the failure of the relaunch to 
deliver on the OSC blueprint. CCTV-9 was a completely bureaucratized institution. As a 
result, every decision made within the channel was in one sense the result of bureaucracy. 
Moreover, no other decision making process existed, such as submitting the channel to 
the test of the market. So, to argue that elements of the relaunch failed because of 
bureaucratic inertia would be to have no answer for elements of the relaunch that 
succeeded, such as construction of the new studio, sets, newsroom, etc. From my time at 
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the channel, what was clear was that nothing in the nature of the decision-making process 
itself at CCTV-9 could account for what elements of the relaunch failed or succeeded, 
since the same decision making process was used throughout. However, were the channel 
to be subjected to the test of the market, or to an independent evaluation by experts on 
bureaucracy, then grounds would exist for testing the efficiency or otherwise of the 
bureaucratic structure at CCTV-9. 
In addition, I have not attempted to unpack the unwieldy formulation Party/State, 
which represents the twin bureaucratic structures of the Party and government and nexus 
of policy, regulation, ownership and administration to which CCTV-9 is subject. The 
concept was originally formulated in the literature to recognize the deep imbrication of 
the Party in the State, given the presence of Party cells in every state institution and the 
formal subordination of the government to the Party. However, while the concept has 
provided an analytic shorthand that has served media studies well in the past, as 
contradictions between policy, regulation, ownership and administration grow with 
continued marketization of the overall political economy, a point is fast approaching, if it 
has not been reached already, when analysts can no longer afford to conflate the two. 
For example, one of my interlocutors at CCTV-9 was explicit that the Party had 
less say at CCTV than is generally assumed because the broadcaster is production-
oriented and program-driven, with the overarching imperative, endorsed by the Party, to 
make money. However, given CCTV-9’s role in the ‘wai xuan’ system and given that the 
channel was not subject to the market in the manner in which CCTV as its parent 
broadcaster is exposed, the particular problems facing CCTV were not a consideration for 
the particular focus of this dissertation. However, I would suggest that as a general rule, 
any research into the political economy of media development in the PRC should account 
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for the different interests at stake, including the increasingly different interests of the 
Party and State. 
Finally, my time at CCTV-9 convinced me of the efficacy of Pan’s (2005)  and 
Pan & Lu’s (2003) insights into resistance and bounded innovation in PRC media reform. 
Even without accepting my argument for recognition of the continued importance of 
Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1977) in the PRC context for understanding media 
reform, Pan’s (2005) and Pan & Lu’s (2003) work should be developed to show how 
media change from within. Insights such as theirs allow analysis of PRC media reform to 
proceed from the internal dynamics of reform, rather than from the assumptions of 
inappropriate theoretical models based on the alleged relationship between media 
marketization and press and media freedom that have prevailed in the field for far too 
long. These models have ill-served analysis of commercial and public service media 
systems in the countries where they were developed. They have even less place in any 
attempt to understand what journalists in the PRC do. 
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Appendix 1: Sample interview questions 
Illustration 13: Sample interview questions for staff (Template 1) 
A) Filing data 
1. Date: 
2. Number: 




B) Personal details 
6. How long have you been at CCTV-9? 
7. Why did you decide to work for CCTV-9? 
8. What is your educational background? 
9. What did you do before you joined CCTV-9? 
C) Work-related information & attitudes to work 
10. What is your title? 
11. What is your salary? 
12. What is your attitude to your salary? 
13. How would you describe working conditions at CCTV-9? 
14. If what ways if any did the May 2004 relaunch affect your pay and or 
conditions at CCTV-9? 
15. What problems, if any, do you see in the way CCTV selects personnel for 
promotion? 
16. What are relations like among the Chinese staff at CCTV-9? 
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17. What are relations like between the Chinese and foreign staff at CCTV-9? 
18. Do you enjoy working at CCTV-9? 
19. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
20. What have been the personal highlights of your time here? 
21. What is most important for you in your job? 
22. What is the easiest part of your job? 
23. What is the hardest part of your job? 
D) May 2004 Relaunch 
24. What would you characterize as major changes at CCTV-9 since you 
joined the channel? 
25. How would you characterize the relaunch of CCTV-9 on May 3, 2004? 
26. How has the relaunch affected your work, if at all? 
27. How has it affected the work of the reporting team as a whole? 
28. Is China’s media reforming? 
29. Examples? [follow up to previous question] 
30. What does the term “China’s CNN” mean to you? 
31. Why should CCTV-9 compete with e.g. CNN International or BBC World 
Service? 
32. Can CCTV-9 compete with CNN-I, BBC-WS? 
33. Why [follow up to previous question] 
E) The work of the reporter [substitute appropriate job category] 
34. Are you happy with the types of stories CCTV-9 does? 
35. Why [follow up to previous question] 
36. Do you specialize in particular kinds of stories? 
37. What was your favorite story you did this year? 
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38. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
39. What kinds of stories do you believe CCTV-9 should do? 
40. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
41. Do you have a target audience in mind when you are doing a story? 
42. Whom? [follow up to previous question] 
43. What is the role of the Internet in your work? 
44. How do you define professionalism in your work? 
45. How would you characterize the standard of professionalism within your 
team? 
46. Who are the top 3 people in your team and why? 
47. Is teamwork important at CCTV-9? 
48. Why [follow up to previous question] 
49. Is it possible to survive at CCTV-9 if you are not a team player? 
50. What are the biggest challenges facing your team in the future? 
51. Can the team meet those challenges? 
52. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
53. What changes would you like to see at CCTV-9 in the range of stories you 
can cover? 
54. What makes a good news story? 
55. Are all the stories we run good stories? 
56. Why [follow up to previous question] 
57. What do ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’ mean to you? 
58. Are these qualities in news important to you? 
59. Are they important for CCTV-9? 
60. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
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61. Is it possible to talk about Chinese news values? 
62. Examples [if answer was ‘yes’ to previous question] 
63. If you can compare Chinese to Western news, what do you think are the 
similarities and differences? 
64. What does “Chinese perspective” mean to you? 
65. What do you think of the way non-Chinese reporters report about China? 
66. How would you compare the work of non-Chinese journalists reporting on 
China, with the work of CCTV-9? 
67. What is your attitude to the foreigners working at CCTV-9? [or Chinese if 
asked of a ‘foreign expert’] 
F) Editorial policy 
68. Who decides what stories to cover for CCTV-9? 
69. When a major story breaks, who decides how it will be handled? 
70. Do you get ‘directives’ telling you what to cover? 
71. Examples? [follow up to previous question] 
72. How big is your role in choosing which stories will go on air? 
73. Do you wish we could air a broader range of stories? 
74. Examples? [follow up to previous question] 
75. Do you wish we could report more sides of the story? 
76. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
77. Does CCTV-9 tell the true story about China? 
78. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
79. Do you ever feel ashamed about what you are doing in your work? 
80. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
81. Is CCTV-9 biased? 
 468
82. Examples? [if ‘yes’ to previous question] 
83. Is western news biased? 
84. Examples? [if ‘yes’ to previous question] 
G) Attitude to Party & Government and their relationship to CCTV-9 
85. How do you see the relationship between the Party, the government and 
media? 
86. How do you feel about that relationship? 
87. What does it mean to say news is the “mouthpiece” of the CPC and/or the 
Government? 
88. Does this characterize the role of CCTV-9? 
89. How? 
90. Should this be the role of CCTV-9? 
91. What should be the role of CCTV-9? 
92. Is CCTV-9 fulfilling that role? 
93. Can the audience trust the news from CCTV-9? 
94. Why [follow up to previous question] 
95. Is the Western perception fair, that the CCP and government ultimately 
determine the content of news in the PRC? 
96. Why? [follow up previous question] 
97. What do you feel about the current Party leadership who oversea media? 
[Interviewees were prompted with the names Li Changchun (Politburo 
member in charge of publicity) and Liu Yunshan (head of the CPD) if they 
were unable to answer this question.] 
98. How (if at all) has the Party/Government media relationship changed from 
the time of Jiang Zemin as CPC General Secretary, when the CPD head 
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was Ding Guangen? [Li Changchun was Politburo member in charge of 
publicity under both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.] 
99. Are you a Party member? 
100. How does being a Party member affect your approach to your work? 
H) Censorship & control 
101. Is the news at CCTV-9 censored? 
102. How do the censors work? [if an interviewee answered ‘yes’ to the 
previous question] 
103. Can you give examples when censors intervened in the news-making 
process? 
104. How much self censorship do you practice? 
105. Are you afraid of doing certain stories? 
106. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
107. Why do we ignore stories like the 15th anniversary [in 2004] of the 
Tiananmen incident? 
108. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao issues: Who decides how we shall report 
them? 
109. How do you know how to report them? [issues relating to Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Macao] 
110. Chinese media are often criticized in the west for ignoring: human rights 
stories, political stories about e.g. Hong Kong and Taiwan, etc. What 
reaction do you have to this criticism? 
111. How does the Party and Government exercise control over CCTV-9? 
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112. Can you provide examples of the control mechanisms? [Interviewees were 
prompted with terms like a) directives b) weekly meeting if they had not 
answer to this question] 
113. Is most control proactive? Before? Or retroactive? After? 
114. Is punishment part of the control system? 
115. Have you ever put something in the news which caused you or the news 
team problems? If so what? 
116. Which is the bigger problem: censorship or self-censorship? 
I) End questions 
117. What did you think of this interview? 
118. What did I leave out that I should have discussed? 
119. Did you feel my questions were biased? 
120. How would you have conducted this interview to remove bias? [if answer 
was ‘yes’ to previous question] 
121. Is there anything you would like to add? 
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Illustration 14: Sample interview questions for senior management (Template 2) 
A) Filing data 
1. Date: 
2. Number: 
3. Job category: manager 
4. Gender: 
5. Age: 
B) Personal details 
6. How long have you been at CCTV-9? 
7. Why did you decide to work for CCTV-9? 
8. What is your educational background? 
9. What did you do before you joined CCTV-9? 
C) Work-related information & attitudes to work 
10. What is your title? 
11. What is your salary? 
12. What is your attitude to your salary? 
13. How would you describe working conditions at CCTV-9? 
14. If what ways if any did the May 2004 relaunch affect your pay and or 
conditions at CCTV-9? 
15. What problems, if any, do you see in the way CCTV selects personnel for 
promotion? 
16. What are relations like among the Chinese staff at CCTV-9? 
17. What are relations like between the Chinese and foreign staff at CCTV-9? 
18. Do you enjoy working at CCTV-9? 
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19. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
20. What have been the personal highlights of your time here? 
21. What is most important for you in your job? 
22. What is the easiest part of your job? 
23. What is the hardest part of your job? 
D) May 2004 Relaunch 
24. What would you characterize as major changes at CCTV-9 since you 
joined the channel? 
25. How would you characterize the relaunch of CCTV-9 on May 3, 2004? 
26. Who ordered the relaunch? 
27. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
28. What was your role in the relaunch? 
29. What was the role of the relaunch committee? 
30. Looking back, was the relaunch successful? 
31. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
32. How would you do the relaunch differently if you could? 
33. Who designed the new sets for the relaunch? 
34. Did they have any support, or was it their work alone? 
35. Who designed the new graphics for the relaunch 
36. Did they have any support, or was it their work alone? 
37. What does the term “China’s CNN” mean to you? 
38. Who first used the term and in what context? 
E) About CCTV-9 
39. What is the role of CCTV-9 in the ‘waixuan’ [overseas publicity] system? 
40. What kinds of stories do you believe CCTV-9 should do? 
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41. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
42. Do you ever feel ashamed about what you are doing in your work? 
43. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
44. Who are the CCTV-9 target audience? 
45. What is the role of the Internet in the newsroom? 
46. How do you define professionalism at CCTV-9? 
47. How would you characterize the standard of professionalism at CCTV-9? 
48. Who are the top 3 personnel at CCTV-9 and why? 
49. Is teamwork important at CCTV-9? 
50. Why [follow up to previous question] 
51. What is the role of guanxi at CCTV-9? 
52. How would you characterize the role of the foreigners working at 
CCTV-9? 
53. What is the role of the outside consultants to CCTV-9? 
54. What are the biggest challenges facing CCTV-9 in the future? 
55. Can the channel meet those challenges? 
56. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
57. What changes would you like to see at CCTV-9 in the range of stories you 
can cover? 
58. What makes a good news story? 
59. Are all the stories we run good stories? 
60. Which ones are not and why not? [follow up to previous question] 
61. What do ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’ mean to you? 
62. Are these qualities in news important to you, and to CCTV-9? 
63. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
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64. Is it possible to talk about Chinese news values? 
65. Examples [if answer was ‘yes’ to previous question] 
66. If you can compare Chinese to Western news, what do you think are the 
similarities and differences? 
67. What does “Chinese perspective” mean to you? 
68. What do you think of the way non-Chinese reporters report about China? 
69. How would you compare the work of non-Chinese journalists reporting on 
China, with the way CCTV-9 reports on China? 
F) Editorial policy 
70. Who decides what stories to cover for CCTV-9? 
71. Who decides which stories will go to air, after they are covered? 
72. When a major story breaks, who decides how it will be handled? 
73. Do you get ‘directives’ telling you what to cover? 
74. Examples? [follow up to previous question] 
75. How big is your role in choosing which stories will go on air? 
76. Do you wish you could report a broader range of stories? 
77. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
78. Do you wish you could report more sides of the story? 
79. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
80. Does CCTV-9 tell the true story about China? 
81. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
82. Is CCTV-9 biased? 
83. Examples? [if ‘yes’ to previous question] 
84. Is western news biased? 
85. Examples? [if ‘yes’ to previous question] 
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G) Attitude to Party & Government and their relationship to CCTV-9 
86. How do you see the relationship between the Party, the government and 
media? 
87. How do you feel about that relationship? 
88. What does it mean to say news is the mouthpiece of the CPC and/or 
Government? 
89. Does this characterize the role of CCTV-9? 
90. How? 
91. Should this be the role of CCTV-9? 
92. What should be the role of CCTV-9? 
93. Is CCTV-9 fulfilling that role? 
94. Can the audience trust the news from CCTV-9? 
95. Why [follow up to previous question] 
96. Is the Western perception fair, that the CCP and government ultimately 
determine the content of news in the PRC? 
97. Is this a good thing? Bad thing? [follow up previous question] 
98. What do you feel about the current Party leadership who oversea media? 
[Interviewees were prompted with the names Li Changchun (Politburo 
member in charge of publicity) and Liu Yunshan (head of the CPD) if they 
were unable to answer this question.] 
99. How (if at all) has the Party/Government media relationship changed from 
the time of Jiang Zemin as CPC General Secretary, when the CPD head 
was Ding Guangen? [Li Changchun was Politburo member in charge of 
publicity under both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.] 
100. Are you a Party member? 
 476
101. How does being a Party member affect your approach to your work? 
H) Censorship & control 
102. Is the news at CCTV-9 censored? 
103. Why? [follow up to previous question] 
104. Why do we ignore stories like the 15th anniversary [2004] of the 
Tiananmen incident? 
105. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao issues: Who decides how we shall report 
them? 
106. Chinese media are often criticized in the west for ignoring: human rights 
stories, political stories about e.g. Hong Kong and Taiwan, etc. What 
reaction do you have to this criticism? 
107. How does the Party and Government exercise control over CCTV-9? 
108. Can you provide examples of the control mechanisms? [Interviewees were 
prompted with terms like a) directives b) weekly meeting if they had not 
answer to this question] 
109. Is most control proactive? Before? Or retroactive? After? 
110. Is punishment part of the control system? 
111. Which is the bigger problem: censorship or self-censorship? 
112. Examples? [follow up to previous question] 
I) End questions 
113. What did you think of this interview? 
114. What did I leave out that I should have discussed? 
115. Did you feel my questions were biased? 
116. How would you have conducted this interview to remove bias? [if answer 
was ‘yes’ to previous question] 
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117. Is there anything you would you would like to add? 
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Appendix 2: Content coding sheets 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS #1: RUNDOWN 
Rundown coding sheet 
 
Number:  a) Coded element b) Coding 
(fill in or circle one) 
[A] Date  
[B] Bulletin 1200 / 2400 
[C] Bulletin length  
[D] Duration anchor on screen 
& speaking ** 
 
[E] Duration anchor not on 
screen but speaking ** 
 
[F] Duration story not voiced 
by anchor  
 
 Story duration ***  
[G] Run  a) first run 
b) repeat 
[H] Dept. **** a) News 
b) Asia Today 
b) Biz China 
c) Culture Express 
d) Sports 
e) World Insight 
f) Other 
[I] Source  
 
a) CCTV 1 or 4 
b) Reporter 
c) Xinhua 
d) Reuters / AP 





[J] Type  a) copy 
b) take 
c) story (writer) 
d) story (reporter) 
e) 2-way 
f) filler ****** 
 479
*  For a sample of the coding of a rundown and a story, see Appendix 3. 
**  Whether the choice was [D] and [E] depended on [J]. 
***  Story duration was derived by adding [D] and/or [E] & [F]. 
****  [H] (Responsible or Production) Dept. was determined by the writer, whose name 
or initials was on the rundown. 
***** Mixed: a mix of PRC and international news agency (AP and/or Reuters) sources 
****** Filler: open and closing credits; headlines; recap of headlines; promotional spots 
for other shows; anchor signoff; weather (advertisements were not included, as 
CCTV-9 did not start running advertisements until January, 2005). 
 
The definitions of the coded elements were as follows: 
[A] Date (date of bulletin) – transcribed from Rundown 
[B] Bulletin (whether 1200 or 2400) – transcribed from Rundown 
[C] Bulletin length (total duration of bulletin) – transcribed from Rundown and 
checked against the totals derived by adding D and/or E, F. 
[D] Duration anchor on screen & speaking (that component of the bulletin when 
the anchor is visible) – transcribed from Rundown 
[E] Duration anchor not on screen but speaking (typically in a ‘take’ story, which 
is voiced by the anchor, but shows video or graphics while the anchor’s voice 
is only heard) – transcribed from Rundown 
[F] Duration story not voiced by anchor (This is that part of the story voiced by 
the writer, foreign expert, reporter, etc., usually preceded by an introduction 
voiced by the anchor, with the anchor visible on screen. Typically this is 
thought of as “the story.” However, I treat the anchor’s introduction as part of 
the story.) – calculated from Rundown 
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[G] Run (Run was defined as whether it was the first time a story ran, or whether 
it was repeated from an earlier bulletin) – transcribed from Rundown 
[H] Dept. (defined as the news department responsible for the story, whether that 
department produced the story) – determined by writer and transcribed from 
Rundown 
[I] Source (the audio visual and/or textual source from which the writer/reporter 
made the story) – transcribed from Rundown 
[J] Type (of story: copy, take, story, etc.) – transcribed from Rundown 
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UNIT OF ANALYSIS #2: SCRIPT 
1) Topic coding sheet 
Story Number: 
 
Circle 1 Category Definition 
1 CRIME Crime (against the person or property, excluding war crimes and 
crimes against the state or between states, which go under 
SECURITY or WAR HISTORY) 
2 CULTURE Culture, Education & Sport Related 
3 DISASTER Accident, Disaster (man-made & natural), Disease, Drought, 
Flood & Bad Weather Related (excluding environmental 
protection and preparations for floods & droughts) 
4 ECONOMICS Agriculture, Business, Economics, Finance, Food Safety, 
Industry & Trade related (excluding employment issues, which 
go under SOCIAL) 
5 NATURE & 
SCIENCE 
Nature, Science, Environment & Technology (including 
environmental protection and preparations for floods & 
droughts. However, once a flood or drought happens it goes in 
DISASTER) 
6 POLITICS Politics, Governance, Foreign Policy (between non-PRC states, 
but excluding trade issues which go under ECONOMICS & 
Iraq-or Israel/Palestine issues, which go under SECURITY) 
7 SECURITY Conflict, Military, Nuclear Proliferation, Security (such as 
NATO, SCO), Terrorism, War & WMD related (post 1980: Start 
of Iran Iraq war) 
8 SOCIETY Employment, Health (treatment NOT DISEASE), Medical & 
Social Security Related 
9 WAR 
HISTORY 
Historical War Related (pre-1980: Start of Iran Iraq war) (inc. 
War Anniversaries, Compensation claims, etc.) 
10 OTHER Any topic which does not fit the above categories 
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2) Referred to & who speaks coding sheet 
Story Number: 
 
 Category Definition No. Unique 
Mentions 
1 BUSINESS Business, company (including multinationals), state-
owned enterprise related and managers, finance 
 
2 EXPERTS Analysts, academics, experts, academic institutions  
3 INTL ORGN & 
NGO 
International organizations (UN, WTO, Arab League, 
EU, Red Cross, etc., all NGOs) 
 
4 MEDIA Any media (regardless of relationship to state)  
5 MILITARY Military, police, security services  
6 OFFICIAL Any form of official (political, administrative at any 
level, including executive, legislative, judicial); include 
formal opposition such as political parties; include 
former politicians, regardless of current function; 
(excludes all forms of MILITARY; excludes all 
MEDIA; exclude any EXPERT; exclude any form of 
OPPOSITION not recognized by the state it opposes; 
exclude any protest (put in OPPOSITION) 
 
7 OPPOSITION Terrorists, insurgents, militants, suicide bombers, 
opposition rebels, protestors, criminals (of any kind), 
prisoners (not hostages, which are VICTIM) 
 
8 VICTIM Any person(s) injured or killed in any situation 
(accident, disaster, conflict, protest, sick from disease, 
etc.); any victim(s) of any crime 
 
9 WORKER Any form of work including farming, manufacturing, 
cultural, sporting, legal, medical, etc. (excluding 
EXPERT and MEDIA work) 
 
10 OTHER Anybody who does not fit above categories (e.g. people, 
persons, ethnicities, tourists, visitors, religious devotees, 
families (including of VICTIMs), sources, witnesses, 
etc. 
 
Original referred to & who speaks categories 
The above ten categories were derived through redistribution of the following 
fifty-nine:  
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1. CENTRAL LEVEL POLITICAL/GOVERNMENT 
2. PROVINCIAL/STATE LEVEL POLITICAL/GOVERNMENT 
3. LOCAL LEVEL POLITICAL/GOVERNMENT 
4. MILITARY 
5. MANAGER/BUSINESS 




10. SPORTSMAN/SPORT RELATED 
11. MEDIA 
12. WHITE COLLAR 
13. VICTIMS - DEAD 
14. INSUGENTS/TERRORISTS/SUICIDE BOMBERS/MILITANTS 
15. CRITICS OF GOVT 
16. MULTINATIONALS 





22. EU OBSERVERS 




26. RELIGIOUS DEVOTEES 
27. DIPLOMATS 
28. RELIGIOUS LEADERS/OFFICIALS/INSTITUTIONS 
29. ETHNICITIES 




34. MEDICAL RELATED 
35. FORMER POLITICIAN/ADMINISTRATION 
36. WITNESS 
37. INJURED/ILL/VICTIMS ALIVE/HOSTAGES 
38. CN PROV GOVT 
39. SOE/SOE-related 
40. AUDIENCE/SUPPORTERS/FANS 
41. CULTURE RELATED 
42. EMERGENCY PERSONNEL 
43. OFFICIALS OF ANY TYPE WHO ARE LOWER DOWN THAN 
CENTRAL GOVT, BUT NOT ASSOCIATED WITH PROVISIONAL OR 
LOCAL GOVT 
44. INDUSTRY RELATED 
45. CUSTOMERS 
46. MISSIONARY 
47. MIGRANT WORKERS 






53. MIGRANT WORKERS 
54. ACTIVIST/RIGHTS PROPONENTS 
55. INVESTORS/SHAREHOLDERS 
56. HUMANITARIAN RELATED 
57. DELEGATES 
58. PRISONERS 
59. TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE FORCES 
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Illustration 15: Screenshot of Excel spreadsheet used to analyze coding 
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Appendix 3: Samples of rundown and script coded 
The illustration on p. 488 shows the first page of the bulletin rundown for Feb. 1, 
2004, 1200 News, the first set of scripts coded. The illustration on p. 489 shows a sample 
of a coded script. In both the rundown and script, the names and/or initials of all persons 
who worked at CCTV-9 have been blacked out. For an understanding of the coding keys, 
please refer to Appendix 2. 
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Illustration 17:  Sample script coded ‘Muslim Festival’ from February 1, 2004, 1200 
CCTV News 
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Appendix 4: Inter-coder reliability sample 
1200 CCTV NEWS PRE-RELAUNCH (SET 1) 
Copy Story 
Copy 1: (SUPER) IRAQ WMD 
(SLUG) UN to resume weapons inspection in Iraq 
(LEAD IN) The lengthy weapons inspection process in Iraq looks likely to 
resume soon. UN arms inspectors have said they’re ready to continue their mission 
anytime the UN Security Council gives them the green light. The UN Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, has submitted a report to the 
Security Council, specifying its ongoing work. Attached to the report is a compendium of 
Iraq’s past proscribed weapons program. UNMOVIC is urging the Security Council to set 
a timeframe to discuss its future role, adding that delays would hamper its work. (OUT) 
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Take Stories 
Take 1: (SUPER) LANTERN FESTIVAL 
(SLUG) Chinese people prepare for Lantern Festival 
(LEAD IN) The popular Lantern festival in China is celebrated on the 15th day of 
the first lunar month to mark the closing of Chinese New Year festivities. Though this 
year’s Lantern Festival is still 3 days away, people across the country have already got 
into the spirit of things. 
(TAKE VIDEO) As a wish for peace and prosperity for the coming year, colorful 
and lively lanterns shows are being held everywhere across the nation. In Shanghai, and 
the city of Jining, in east China’s Shandong Province, visitors can enjoy a huge variety of 
fancy lanterns. In Lianping of south China’s Guangdong province, as well as fancy 
lanterns, calligraphic works, paper cuttings, folk paintings and many other traditional 
Hakka arts and crafts are also being presented. (OUT) 
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Take 2: (SUPER) UN SC PRESIDENCY 
(SLUG) UN Security Council to focus on Africa 
(LEAD IN) Wars in Africa will command the attention of the United Nations 
Security Council this month. But the 15-member body will also closely track events in 
Iraq and the Middle East. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The comments come from China’s permanent representative to 
the UN Wang Guangya, who is the UN Security Council president for February. Wang 
promises fluid communication between Security Council members. 
(BITE ID) WANG GUANGYA China’s permanent representative to the UN 
(SOUNDBITE) (E) “I have invited you today, ... a presidency as accessible as 
possible.” (OUT) 
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Take 3: (SUPER) TRAFFIC ACCIDENT 
(SLUG) Traffic accident kills two Chinese in Jordan 
(LEAD IN) Now to Jordon ... where two Chinese workers have been killed and 18 
others injured in a traffic accident in the southern part of the country. 
(TAKE MAP) Among the 18 injured women, six are in critical condition. The 
accident occurred on Wednesday. The twenty Chinese women were heading back to their 
residence in a commuter bus after finishing work at a clothes factory. Authorities say a 
freight truck ran into the bus, killing the driver and two Chinese women on the spot. The 
injured were sent to a nearby hospital for emergency treatment. (OUT) 
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Take 4: (SUPER) TRADE DISPUTE 
(SLUG) China urges Russia to end seizures of Chinese goods 
(LEAD IN) In other news ... China is urging Russia to stop the confiscation of 
goods from Chinese businesspeople in Moscow that have been accused by the Russian 
Interior Ministry of tariff evasion. The situation began escalating last Tuesday, and came 
to a head on Friday. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The Chinese Embassy in Moscow issued a statement calling for 
the protection of Chinese business people’s interests in Russia on Saturday. The Chinese 
Embassy urged Russia to deal with the issue within a legal framework. And Russia has 
been asked not to sell or auction any of the confiscated goods wantonly. Chinese 
diplomats say most of the goods confiscated by the Russian Interior Ministry in recent 
days had already been approved by Russian customs authorities to enter the country. 
(OUT) 
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Take 5: (SUPER) NEW BOTANICAL GARDEN 
(SLUG) Beijing to expand on State Botanical Garden 
(LEAD IN) And finally ... Beijing’s Botanical Garden, situated at the foot of 
Fragrance Hill in the western suburbs of the capital, is perhaps the local residents’ 
number one choice for weekend excursions. The garden will soon be expanded and 
upgraded into a state-level research center, offering even more sites of interest for 
visitors. 
(TAKE VIDEO) More than two million visitors come to the Beijing Botanical 
Gardens every year. They are seeking a closer view of the garden’s rich collection of sub-
tropical plants, as well as a pleasant natural landscape to enjoy. But less well known is 
another botanical garden to the south of the more familiar wonderland. This less 
frequented garden is the home of the research center for the Botany Institute of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences. The two gardens will be incorporated into a larger state-level 
botanical research base. Regulators say the whole expansion project will take up to 16 
years to complete. But Beijing residents and overseas visitors will definitely see the 
garden take on a new look by the time Beijing hosts the 2008 Olympic Games. (OUT) 
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Take 6: (SUPER) AIRFARE REFORM 
(SLUG) More flexibility for China’s airfares 
(LEAD IN) China’s National Development and Reform Commission released a 
Domestic Airfare Price Reform Plan Thursday...aimed at addressing the needs of a 
changing aviation market. 
(TAKE VIDEO) Domestic airlines can adjust their airfares according to market 
conditions and targets the impending competition from foreign companies. Prices must be 
no higher than 25 percent and no lower than 45 percent of the guideline. Airlines should 
submit their price adjustment applications to the Civil Aviation Administration of China 
and the reform commission for approval, instead of automatically offering unauthorized 
discounts. (OUT) 
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Writer & Reporter Stories 
Story 1: (SUPER) BIRD FLU IN ASIA 
(SLUG) Asian countries step up bird flu prevention 
(LEAD IN) Bird flu continues to spread in many South East Asian countries, and 
as yet unaffected areas are going to great lengths to keep their own poultry industries and 
populations free of the disease. [WRITER] has a look at the situation as it stands. 
(VOICE OVER) According to the latest official statistics, released on Saturday, 
four more Thai provinces have been declared as bird flu control zones, raising the 
number of affected provinces to 33. Meanwhile, Thailand’s Health Ministry announced 
another two suspected bird flu infected patients. The number of suspected bird flu 
patients in the country is now 14, while confirmed cases stayed level at three as of Friday. 
In Vietnam, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai urged all bird flu-hit cities and provinces in 
the country to kill poultry rapidly and ban the transport and trade of fowls. So far, bird flu 
has hit 44 out of 64 provinces in Vietnam. In Indonesia, to cope with the fast spreading 
disease, the government has quickly adopted anti-bird flu measures and called for all 
nationals to act against the disease. The Japanese government, meanwhile, has decided to 
establish a suspected case reporting system. Though Singapore, Myanmar and Malaysia 
still remain clear of the disease, they all have taken precautions to keep the virus from 
crossing their borders. The World Health Organization called on affected countries to 
speed up poultry culls in bird flu hit areas, and stressed the importance of compensating 
farmers who suffer financially from the loss of their flocks. The organization, at the same 
time, appealed to the international community to provide financial assistance to disease 
stricken countries to ensure the disease is kept well under control. [WRITER], CCTV. 
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Story 2: (SUPER) FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 
(SLUG) China issues rules on financial derivatives 
(LEAD IN) Welcome back. And in economic news, China’s Banking Regulatory 
Commission today released new rules on the operation of financial derivatives. They are 
the country’s first specialized regulations governing financial derivatives. [WRITER] has 
more. 
(VOICE OVER) The rules will take effect this March and stipulates accessing 
requirements for a financial institution to operate such products. Financial derivatives 
include futures, options, and forward exchange transactions. 
(BITE ID) LI FUAN, Dept. Deputy Director China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
(SOUNDBITE) (CH) “Financial derivatives carry high risks. The move aims 
mainly to tighten the risk control in the sector. “ 
(VOICE OVER) Currently, stipulations concerning financial derivatives are 
scattered in the financial industry. Some analysts say that less control will worsen further 
the high-risk market of financial derivatives. [WRITER], CCTV. 
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Story 3: (SUPER) SIX-PARTY TALKS 
(SLUG) China calls for all out efforts on DPRK talks 
(LEAD IN) The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister has called on all parties 
concerned to make unremitting efforts to keep the six-party talks going, despite the 
difficulties which may arise. [DIRECTOR] has the story. 
(VOICE OVER) Dai Bingguo said dialogue is the best way to resolve the DPRK 
nuclear issue. He said all parties involved are aware that this is a complicated issue which 
will take a long time to solve. He encouraged all parties involved and the international 
community to be patient and hold reasonable and practical expectations. 
(BITE ID) DAI BINGGUO Chinese Vice Foreign Minister 
(SOUNDBITE) (CH) “As long as all parties involved make unremitting efforts, 
we are hopeful that the issue can be solved peacefully through dialogue.” 
(VOICE OVER) Dai Bingguo said that since the first round of six-way talks, 
China has maintained close contact and consultation with the parties involved to keep the 
dialogue process going. He said all sides had put in a great deal of effort to make the 
second round of talks a success. He said they had demonstrated an open attitude and were 
willing to include any relevant issues. The six countries have already started exchanging 
ideas on possible discussion topics. Dai Bingguo said he thinks the second round of talks 
could achieve substantial progress. The first round of six-party talks on the DPRK 
nuclear issue was held in Beijing on August 27th and closed on August 29th. 
[DIRECTOR], CCTV. 
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Story 4: (SUPER) BUNGALOW FIRE 
(SLUG) Bungalow fire kills 39 in Zhejiang 
(LEAD IN) In another deadly blaze in China ... at least 39 people were killed and 
4 others injured in a fire that suddenly engulfed a makeshift bungalow on Sunday 
afternoon. The fire occurred not far from Haining City in east China’s Zhejiang Province. 
Preliminary investigation shows that all of the victims are women. The oldest was 84. 
[Foreign Expert] has more. 
(VOICE OVER) The straw-made bungalow in Wufeng village was used by local 
elders to worship. Dozens of villagers were worshipping inside the makeshift building 
when the fire broke out. It took only half an hour to put out the blaze. But even 30 
minutes was too late for those inside. Some local witnesses said the seniors from the 
villagers caught in the blaze has usually burned sacrificial offerings during their 
worshipping activities. Negligence may have led to the fire that swept through the 
bungalow. But the exact cause of the accident is still under investigation. The fire caught 
the eastern province by surprise. The provincial government quickly dispatched a task 
force to the village, responsible for the rescue work, as well as the follow-up 
investigation. The governor of Zhejiang Province, Lu Zushan, is heading the task force. 
The four injured in the blaze have all been hospitalized. Doctors say they are all in stable 
condition, and are out of life-threatening danger. [Foreign Expert], CCTV. 
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Story 5: (SUPER) MUSLIM FESTIVAL 
(SLUG) Muslims celebrate Kurban Bayami 
(LEAD IN) Returning to our earlier story… although the tragedy in Saudi Arabia 
has overshadowed the climax of the Hajj, Muslims worldwide on Sunday began 
celebrating the Kurban Bayami. It’s also called the Festival of Sacrifice and goes for the 
next three days. Here in China, Muslims celebrated at a feast organized by China’s 
Islamic Association in the capital Beijing. Our reporter [REPORTER] was there, and has 
the following story. 
(VOICE OVER) The Kurban Bayami began on Sunday. Over a billion Muslims 
worldwide will celebrate over the next three days. Here, diplomats from 30 Arab and 
Muslim countries gather at a hotel in Beijing. The feast is the biggest celebration on the 
Islamic calendar. The feast begins with a prayer. They call for peace and goodwill 
amongst all people, and for an end to war, especially in Islamic countries affected by 
conflict. 
(BITE ID) CHEN GUANGYUAN, Chairman China Islamic Association 
(SOUNDBITE) (C) “This festival honors Allah. We pray for peace throughout the 
world, and among all people. And we pray for happiness for all mankind.” 
(BITE ID) DR. FEREYDOUN VERDINEJAD, Ambassador Embassy of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
(SOUNDBITE) (E) “We are as Muslim want from Allah and pray for them that 
freedom and peace and security for all people inside Palestine and Islam countries. We 
hope to have peaceful relation and peaceful life for them.” 
(VOICE OVER) According to tradition, Kurban is celebrated 70 days after the 
end of the Moslem fast in the holy month of Ramadan. Kurban takes place on the tenth 
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day of the 12th month in the Islamic calendar. It coincides with the pilgrimage to Islam’s 
holiest shrines, and the end of the Hajj in Saudi Arabia. This year, the China Islamic 
Association arranged for over 4,000 pilgrims to make the trip to Mecca. 
(STAND UP ID) [REPORTER] Beijing 
(STAND UP) “The Arab name of the holiday has some connection with the 
legend about Abraham’s offering. Abraham, whom Moslems consider to be the first 
monotheism preacher, was ready to offer his son Ismail in sacrifice. However, at the last 
moment the angel replaced Ismail by a sacrificial animal, and the holiday was thus 
established to commemorate this.” 
(VOICE OVER) According to tradition, the festival begins with prayer, and the 
slaughter of an animal in memory of Abraham’s sacrifice. After this, Muslims worldwide 
enjoy a day of eating and entertainment. Dance... Song... and traditional sports are all part 
of the celebration. [REPORTER], CCTV. 
 503
1200 CCTV NEWS POST-RELAUNCH 
Copy story 
Copy 1: [NO SUPER] 
(SLUG) EU drops Chinese import ban 
(LEAD IN) The European Union has formally announced the lifting of a ban on 
selected exports of China’s animal by-products. The banned goods include shrimp, 
honey, royal jelly, rabbit meat and fresh-water fish. It was imposed back in January 2002 
after traces of veterinary medicines were found in some exports to Europe. But poultry is 
still forbidden due to the outbreak of bird flu in Asia. EU representatives said the ban was 
lifted after China demonstrated significant improvements in food hygiene standards. In 
the future, goods will be checked and certified in China to make sure they comply with 
EU standards before being exported. (OUT) 
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Take Stories 
Take 1: (SUPER) WORLD COURT RULING 
(SLUG) Israeli FM: Israel won’t accept ruling 
(LEAD IN) Israel’s foreign minister Silvan Shalom says his government won’t 
accept next month’s ruling by the World Court on the legality of its West Bank 
separation barrier. 
(TAKE VIDEO) Following talks at the White House on Friday with US National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Shalom pressed for US support to block any UN 
action against the Jewish state. He believes America, amongst others, will oppose any 
UN resolution. The International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, will 
render its judgment in a public hearing on July 9. (OUT) 
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Take 2: (SUPER) AFGHAN HOSPITAL 
(SLUG) Death toll in hospital collapse reaches 8 
(LEAD IN) Still in Afghanistan, the death toll from a hospital collapse in Kabul 
has risen to eight after the discovery of six more bodies. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The main wing of the Jamhuriat hospital suddenly caved in 
during construction on Monday afternoon. The project was assisted by China, and two 
Chinese workers were injured in the accident. More than 40 Afghans were buried in the 
wreckage, and about half of them have been rescued from the ruins. No patients or 
hospital staff were on-site at the time. NATO peacekeeping soldiers sealed the area on 
Monday evening to allow rescuers to clear the ruins and continue searching for survivors. 
(OUT) 
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Take 3: (SUPER) IRAQ HOSTAGES 
(SLUG) Militants kill 2 Pakistani hostages 
(LEAD IN) Pakistan has denounced the killing of two of its nationals by militants 
in Iraq as a crime against humanity and Islam. The Foreign Ministry says the killings 
have devastated the families of the victims and the nation. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The comment came after the pan-Arab television station Al-
Jazeera reported receiving a video in which militants in Iraq say they have killed two 
Pakistani contractors who disappeared last week. Their Iraqi driver was released. 
Pakistan had identified the two men as workers for the Kuwaiti branch of the Saudi 
group, Al Tamimi. (OUT) 
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Take 4: (SUPER) China’s retail sales boost 
(LEAD IN) To the economy now, and the Chinese commodity market ran 
smoothly in the first half of 2004, recording its highest growth since 1997.This is 
according to a report issued by the Ministry of Commerce on Wednesday. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The country’s annual retail sales are expected to exceed 605 
billion US dollars this year, up more than 10.5 percent year-on-year. In the first six 
months of the year, retail sales reached 305 billion US dollars, an increase of almost 13 
percent year on year. The catering industry witnessed more than 24 percent growth in 
sales in the first six months, hitting 41 billion US dollars. The report predicted that sales 
of raw materials and production machinery will exceed the 12 hundred billion US dollar 
mark this year, that’s up over 15 percent year-on-year, and prices are expected to rise by 
about 8 percent. (OUT) 
(GRAPHIC) Graphic: China’s Retail Sector 2004 Annual retail sales: expected to 
exceed US$605 bln up 10.5% y-o-y H1 retail sales: US$305 bln up 12.8% y-o-y H1 
Catering industry sales: US$41 bln up 24.5% y-o-y Sales of raw materials and production 
equipment expected to exceed US$1,200 bln, up 15% y-o-y. Prices expected to increase 
by 8% Source: Ministry of Commerce 
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Take 5: (SUPER) MEDICAL TRIALS 
(SLUG) China works on revised SARS treatment 
(LEAD IN) Severe acute respiratory syndrome or SARS may have been contained 
since its last outbreak on the Chinese mainland four months ago, but China hasn’t relaxed 
its vigilance. SARS expert Zhong Nanshan announced that the country is working to 
revise its SARS treatment. 
(TAKE VIDEO) According to Zhong, 36 people have already undergone medical 
trials. Out of 18 subjects who received smaller doses, none have exhibited any side 
effects so far. Zhong says more revisions will be made to make the treatment more 
practical. The revised version of the plan is expected to be finalized this month. (OUT) 
 509
Take 6: (SUPER) LAW-MAKERS EXCHANGE 
(SLUG) US Senator delegation visits Beijing 
(LEAD IN) Hello and welcome to this edition of CCTV news. I’m [Anchor]. A 
delegation of US Senators is in China on an 8-day visit to activate an exchange 
mechanism between the two countries’ law-making bodies. China’s top legislator Wu 
Bangguo received the delegation Monday. He reviewed the status of Sino-US relations 
and reiterated China’s stance on the Taiwan issue and Hong Kong’s political reform. 
(TAKE VIDEO) Wu said the mechanism is beneficial to enhancing ties between 
the two law-making bodies. He stressed that the Taiwan question is the most sensitive 
issue in Sino-US relations, and that China would never tolerate Taiwan independence. 
Wu Bangguo expressed the hope that the US side would observe the three Sino-US joint 
communiqués, and stop sending what he called “wrong signals” to Taiwan’s 
independence forces. Wu also made remarks about Hong Kong’s ongoing political 
reform. He said the NPC Standing Committee’s interpretation of the region’s rules of 
suffrage were consistent with China’s Constitution and the Basic Law. The US delegation 
is led by Ted Stevens, acting president of the US Senate. He said the US side highly 
values the formal start-up of the exchange mechanism between the two bodies. He also 
reiterated Washington’s adherence to the one-China policy. (OUT) 
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Writer & Reporter Stories 
Story 1: (SUPER) RURAL SHORTFALL 
(SLUG) Land acquisition hurts grain harvest 
(LEAD IN) Grain production in China has dwindled to a record low. The 
unregulated acquisition of rural land has helped lead a worrying decline, creating a major 
headache for the government. As [REPORTER] finds out, the country’s top legislators 
are considering a report from an inspection team just returned from the countryside. 
(VOICE OVER) China’s farmland has been cut by well over six million hectares, 
reaching a record low. And grain production decreased by ten billion kilograms. The 
figure was reported to the NPC Standing Committee by its vice chairman Sheng Huaren. 
He has just returned from an inspection tour of 15 provinces. He said that requisition of 
farmland for non-agricultural purposes is rampant. Efforts to curb the trend are underway. 
(BITE ID) SHENG HUAREN, Vice Chairman NPC Standing Committee 
(SOUNDBITE) (C) “ In recent months, governments at various levels have halted 
the rapid increase of the establishment of development zones. Some 3763 planned 
development zones were cancelled, returning more than 1600 square kilometres of land. “ 
(VOICE OVER) He suggested tougher control on official approval of land use. 
As for grain production, he said that farmers’ enthusiasm is slowly picking up due to 
more government subsidies. This year, the central government will boost agricultural 
spending by 30 billion yuan. However, this cannot make up the widening gap between 
grain demand and supply due to land losses and inefficient financial aid. 
(BITE ID) SHENG HUAREN, Vice Chairman NPC Standing Committee 
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(SOUNDBITE) (C) “ There are many problems concerning financial aid to the 
farmers. The most prominent one is insufficient loans. This has become a major factor 
hampering economic development in rural areas.” 
(VOICE OVER) In some areas, financial institutions are reluctant to give loans to 
farmers due to lack of agriculture insurance. Sheng Huaren said the problems are 
imposing great challenges, especially for a country with a rural population of 768 million. 
[REPORTER], CCTV. 
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Story 2: (SUPER) SADDAM IN COURT 
(SLUG) Saddam calls his hearing “theater” 
(LEAD IN) Welcome to CCTV News. I’m [Anchor] in Beijing. Sports news 
coming up later in the program. But we begin in Iraq, where reaction by Iraqis to their 
former president’s appearance in court has ranged from relief, to scorn and anger. 
Saddam Hussein faces seven charges that may lead to formal indictment for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide. But he’s rejected all accusations - instead, 
pointing the finger of blame at US President W. Bush, who he calls the “real criminal”. 
Meanwhile, the US military has released several new photographs, detailing Saddam’s 
arrival and departure from the court hearing. [WRITER] has the details. 
(VOICE OVER) Saddam arrived handcuffed and in chains at a courtroom at 
Camp Victory that was once one of his own palaces. But although being deposed and 
captive, the former Iraqi President showed he hasn’t lost his defiance. In Thursday’s 
hearing, Saddam declared himself the “President of Iraq” and rejected all the charges. He 
called the whole hearing “theater”. Saddam then pointed the finger at US President 
George W. Bush, describing him as the “real criminal”, whose forces invaded Iraq 15 
months ago. 67-year-old Saddam appeared thinner, with a trimmed beard that had mostly 
turned grey. The pictures are the first footage of the ousted Iraqi leader since he was 
captured in December. Meanwhile, hundreds of Iraqis, mainly Sunni, took to the streets 
in Samarra, north of Baghdad, in support of their former President. They protested the 
trial as “ridiculous”. And they’re also angry that the single judge in the court was named 
by the US-led coalition. Elsewhere in Baghdad, residents expressed mixed feelings after 
watching the hearing on television. 
(BITE ID) Baghdad Resident 
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(SOUNDBITE) (Arabic) “We don’t accept this! The Iraqi President is our 
favorite President. he has been in power for 36 years! There was security and stability 
during his rule.” 
(BITE ID) Baghdad Resident 
(SOUNDBITE) (Arabic) “This is what we wanted! We wanted this court! 
Saddam Hussein deserves the ultimate verdict because what he did to the Iraqis is not 
small thing, and the evidence is there with the mass graves.” 
(VOICE OVER) The hearing came three days after the US handed sovereignty to 
an interim Iraqi government. The former Iraqi leader is no longer a prisoner of war and 
has been transferred from US to Iraqi legal custody. He is still held by US troops, and his 
trial is not expected till 2005. [WRITER], CCTV. 
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Story 3: (SUPER) PARTY NOMINATIONS 
(SLUG) Democrats to nominate candidates 
(LEAD IN) With US elections less than a hundred days away, the Democratic 
Party opened its national convention in Boston on Monday to formally nominate its 
presidential and vice presidential candidates. In his speech to the opening session, former 
Vice President Al Gore called for a united party to put Senator John Kerry in the White 
House. [DIRECTOR] takes a closer look. 
(VOICE OVER) The four-day convention is mainly a promotion show by 
Democrats, who aim to help American voters get to know senators John Kerry and John 
Edwards - both expected to be officially nominated on Wednesday. Party leaders are 
stressing unity and the need to topple Republican President George W. Bush. Al Gore 
reminded Democrats of Bush’s victory in the disputed Florida election in 2000, and 
mobilized them to help Democrat candidates score a victory in the November elections. 
(BITE ID) AL GORE Fmr. US Vice-President 
(SOUNDBITE) (E) “For those of you who felt disappointed or angry with the 
outcome in 2000, I want you to remember all of those feelings, but then I want you to do 
with them what I have done, focus them fully and completely on putting John Kerry and 
Jon Edwards in the White House in 2004 so we can have a new direction in America.” 
(VOICE OVER) To gain support from undecided voters, Democrat leaders 
highlighted Kerry’s proposals to create jobs, provide affordable health care and rebuild 
foreign alliances. They also attacked Bush’s record in boosting the economy or protecting 
Americans from terrorist threats. Democrats are using the Boston gathering to showcase 
the life of the decorated Vietnam War veteran, which they hope will polish his credentials 
as a decisive leader and soften the image of a sometimes wooden campaigner. A recent 
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public opinion poll shows Kerry with 47 percent of public support and Bush at 46 
percent. Media projections expect the Democrats’ convention to bring a five to seven 
percent boost in support for Kerry. [DIRECTOR], CCTV. 
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Story 4: (SUPER) SINO-ROK EXCHANGE 
(SLUG) Chinese youth wrap up visit to ROK 
(LEAD IN) Two hundred young Chinese have completed a ten-day visit to South 
Korea aimed at promoting understanding and harmony between the youth of the two 
countries. They say their knowledge of Korean culture and society has greatly improved 
after the visit. [WRITER] has this story. 
(VOICE OVER) During their stay in South Korea, the Chinese young guests paid 
a visit to several major cities of the country and had a look around some of its renowned 
enterprises. But what they valued most was the opportunity to mingle with their Korean 
counterparts. 
(BITE ID) Member of Chinese Youth Delegation 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “Throughout our visit here, young South Korean 
friends were in our company. What impressed me most was their hospitality and 
remarkable professionalism, reflected by their perfect organization of the whole event.” 
(VOICE OVER) The two governments are planning more activities to further 
enhance exchanges between the younger generations. 
(BITE ID) HU WEI Head of Chinese Youth Delegation 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “We have agreed to set up an inter-governmental 
director-level consulting mechanism to strengthen and broaden exchanges between the 
youths of the two countries. “ 
(VOICE OVER) According to the plan agreed by both governments, another three 
hundred Chinese young people will be able to visit South Korea later this year. 
[WRITER], CCTV. 
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Story 5: (SUPER) MIGRANT WORKERS 
(SLUG) Gov’t urged to protect migrant workers 
(LEAD IN) Tight restrictions once made it nearly impossible for Chinese people 
to move around their country. But the opening-up policy in the past two decades has led 
to more and more people from rural areas flowing into big cities looking for jobs. What 
prospects do these farm-workers face in the highly competitive environment? On World 
Population Day, our reporter [REPORTER] seeks the answers. 
(VOICE OVER) This is one of the largest job markets in downtown Beijing. 
Everyday, hundreds of migrant workers gather here to look for jobs. They come from all 
parts of China. Many bring all their belongings so that they can go to work the moment 
they get picked up by an employer. 18-year old Zhang Fangzhou is one of them. 
(BITE ID) ZHANG FANGZHOU Migrant Worker 
(SOUNDBITE) (CH) “I’m from Gansu Province. I didn’t finish middle school. I 
came to Beijing because it’s the capital and I think there will be lots of chances here. I 
want to broaden my view and earn more money.” 
(VOICE OVER) Zhang is not the only one looking for a better life. Of the 200 
million surplus farmers in China, over half have fled to big cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai. They usually end up being waiters, chefs, courier boys, drivers and 
construction workers. However, a lack of education and personal connections make these 
workers vulnerable to unfair treatment. 
(BITE ID) Migrant Worker 
(SOUNDBITE) (C) “Yesterday, when I was looking for a job, a local man came 
and kicked me. I don’t know why, but I dare not say anything. A month ago, I worked on 
a construction site for 6 days. But the sub-contractor ran away and didn’t pay me. I asked 
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the boss, and he said it was none of his business. Then I went to the local labor 
authorities, and they said you have to first file a complaint to the court and wait, so I gave 
up.” 
(VOICE OVER) Experts say the government should do more to help these 
people. 
(BITE ID) DUAN CHENGRONG, Prof. China Renmin University 
(SOUNDBITE) “Millions of migrant workers are competing for jobs in cities. 
They cannot say no to unfair treatment if they still want the job. We cannot expect 
migrant workers to fight for themselves. It is the government’s responsibility to supervise 
the job market, monitor employers and offer legal protection to these less advantaged 
workers.” 
(VOICE OVER) But at present, many employers pay less to migrant workers than 
to local workers doing the same job. Most migrant workers are not covered by any kind 
of insurance. The day they get fired is the day they lose everything in the city. 
(STAND UP ID) [REPORTER] CCTV reporter 
(STAND UP) “In the search for a better life, these migrant workers travel 
thousands of kilometers from their hometowns for jobs. As China presses ahead with its 
modernization drive, more and more rural farmers are coming to cities, searching for 
opportunities. But how these farmers are integrated into urban life, and how their 
interests and rights are protected, will significantly impact the stability and prosperity of 
modern China.” [REPORTER], CCTV. 
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1200 CCTV NEWS PRE-RELAUNCH (SET 2) 
Copy Story 
Copy 1:(SUPER) PRELUDE TO NEW TALKS 
(SLUG) Seoul, Pyongyang agree to military talks 
(LEAD IN) The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea have agreed to hold military talks at the earliest possible date. The talks aim to 
ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. But the exact date and site of the talks have not 
been reached yet. The ROK Yonhap News Agency is reporting that delegations from 
both sides have clinched a six-point agreement after overnight negotiations in Seoul. This 
comes during the 13th Inter-Korean Ministerial Meeting on Friday. The two sides also 
agreed to make the February 25th six-way talks on nuclear issue productive, and to solve 
the issue peacefully. (OUT) 
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Take Stories 
Take 1: (SUPER) FLU CONTROLLABLE 
(SLUG) Chinese govt. confident of bird flu controls 
(LEAD IN) Hello, and welcome to CCTV News. I’m [ANCHOR], in Beijing. 
Chinese President Hu Jintao, who is in Cairo on a state visit, has stated his government’s 
confidence in authorities’ ability to control bird flu. He made the remarks while meeting 
media on Saturday in Cairo. 
(TAKE GRAPHICS) Hu Jintao says the government has taken a series of 
measures to control the bird flu in China. He stressed the government has the capability 
to solve the problem and prevent transfer from animals to persons. He promised that the 
government will to do its utmost to protect people’s health. (OUT) 
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Take 2: [NO SUPER] 
(SLUG) Kremlin says its anti-war stance is vindicated 
(LEAD IN) Observing all the criticisms being fired at the suspected intelligence 
failure by the US and British governments, Russia says its opposition to war in Iraq is 
vindicated. A senior Russian diplomat added that the work weapons inspectors have 
accomplished so far in Iraq only contributes to the justification of his country’s anti-war 
stance. 
(TAKE SOUND-BITE) 
(BITE ID) YURI FEDOTOV Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
(SOUNDBITE) (Russian) “The conclusions that the ISG has come to are the same 
that UNMOVIC came to before the start of the war. It is therefore a justification of the 
position Russia takes now and took before the war, that we should solve the problem by 
means of inspection and not go down the road of war.” (OUT) 
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Take 3: (SUPER) AL-SISTANI 
(SLUG) Iraq’s top cleric reportedly survives assassination attempt 
(LEAD IN) In Iraq now ... there have been conflicting reports on an assassination 
attempt involving one of the country’s most powerful Shiite Muslim clerics, Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. 
(TAKE VIDEO) (File in) Arab media reported the assassination attempt on al-
Sistani. But details on the alleged incident varied widely. The Arabic TV station Al-
Jazeera has reported that unidentified gunmen fired on the Ayatollah on Thursday 
morning. However, the bodyguards of al-Sistani and Iraq’s interim Governing Council 
have denied there was such an attempt on his life. Meanwhile, al-Sistani’s associates 
have described him as being in good health. (FILE OUT) 
The US-led coalition also said they had no information about an attack on al-
Sistani. Al-Sistani is arguably Iraq’s top Shiite cleric -- and one of the top three fighting 
for leadership of Shiite power in post-Saddam Iraq. (OUT) 
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Take 4: (SUPER) COCKLE DEATHS 
(SLUG) Death toll of cockle hunters in England rises to 19 
(LEAD IN) In England, another body, whose identity remains unconfirmed, was 
found on Friday off the country’s northwest coast, bringing the death toll of shell hunters 
to 19. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The number of the dead cockle pickers, who were caught by 
racing tides on Thursday night, is feared to further increase as the tide at Morecombe Bay 
retreats and rescue operations continue. All the victims are thought to be Chinese - 16 
men and 2 women. Another 14 survivors have been rescued or have walked to safety and 
are gathered at a local community center. Chinese Deputy Consul General in Manchester, 
Wu Yangyu, told China’s Xinhua News Agency that none of the survivors, bar one 
female Chinese student, have passports or any other valid documents. Morecombe Bay, is 
notoriously dangerous for its fast rising tides and quick sands. (OUT) 
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Take 5: (SUPER) EU-CHINA 
(SLUG) Second stage of EU support for China’s WTO accession 
(LEAD IN) The second stage of the Program For European Union Support For 
China’s Accession To the World Trade Organization starts on Sunday. The program is 
designed to specifically help China fulfill its commitments to the global trade body. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The program is supported by a 20 million euro fund, jointly paid 
by the European Union and China. China’s Ministry of Commerce will be responsible for 
the implementation of the program which includes projects in helping China’s reform its 
customs and import and export systems. It will also help the Chinese government draft 
WTO-related regulations, and send officers and business representatives for training in 
Europe. The EU ambassador in China said the second stage of the program will be more 
focused on substantive projects. (OUT) 
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Take 6: (SUPER) SPACE PLANS 
(SLUG) China to launch Probe No. 2 into orbit 
(LEAD IN) China plans to send the second of the “Double Star” satellites, known 
as Probe No. 2, into orbit in July this year. The announcement comes after Probe No.1 
celebrated its sixty-third day in orbit. 
(TAKE VIDEO) Chief Engineer of the programme Zhang Yongwei said all the 
instruments for the satellite have been installed on the launch platform. Probe No.2 will 
orbit the North and South poles and explore, as yet, unmapped areas of the Earth’s 
magnetic field. The two probes are part of China’s “Double Star” joint space programme 
with the European Space Agency. Sino-European space co-operation made a huge leap 
forward last year, with the launch of the first of their two scientific satellites. (OUT) 
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Writer & Reporter Stories 
Story 1: (SUPER) REBUILD LIBERIA 
(SLUG) UN holds donors conference on Liberia’s reconstruction 
(LEAD IN) Now to New York ... where a two-day donors conference to address 
Liberia’s reconstruction needs has opened at the United Nations. The gathering got 
underway on Thursday with technical discussions. The UN and the US are asking rich 
nations for nearly 500 million US dollars to put Liberia firmly on road to peace, after 
nearly two decades of civil war. [DIRECTOR] has the story. 
(VOICE OVER) Bringing together a record number of participants on the issue, 
delegates are seeking to find ways to help Liberia in its fragile transition from relief to 
recovery. And participants are calling for the process to be expedited. 
(BITE ID) MARK MALLOCH BROWN, Chairman Donors Conference on 
Internal Reconstruction of Liberia 
(SOUNDBITE) (E) “It’s clear that the next time that we have to respond to 
emerging transition situations, resources need to be delivered much sooner.” 
(VOICE OVER) This aim is much needed for Liberia. The west African nation 
has suffered 14 years of conflict and has been trying to rebuild itself after President 
Charles Taylor’s exile in August. Taylor’s departure has cleared the way for a power-
sharing deal between the government and rebels. But the obstacles to this arrangement 
are still formidable since Liberia’s main rebel movement has now splintered. Disarming 
the soldiers and integrating them back into society has been raised as potential solutions. 
(BITE ID) ANDREW NATSIOS, US Administrator Donors Conference on 
Internal Reconstruction of Liberia 
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(SOUNDBITE) (E) “ Reintegration is a complex process, without a clear 
conclusion. At best, reintegration programs merge into successful community 
construction. “ 
(VOICE OVER) But the integration programs will come with a big price. A new 
joint assessment by the World Bank and the UN estimates some 488 million US dollars 
are needed to meet Liberia’s most urgent needs over the next two years. [DIRECTOR], 
CCTV. 
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Story 2: (SUPER) INTELLIGENCE REPORT 
(SLUG) Bush forms commission to investigate Iraq intelligence 
(LEAD IN) US President George W. Bush has established a bi-partisan 
commission to investigate failures in intelligence used to justify the Iraq war. It will 
report back in March of 2005. But US Secretary of State Colin Powell said the 
government will not apologize for the alleged intelligence failures. [WRITER] has the 
story. 
(BITE ID) GEORGE W. BUSH US President 
(SOUNDBITE) “Today, by executive order, I am creating an independent 
commission, chaired by Governor and former Senator Chuck Robb, Judge Laurence 
Silberman, to look at American intelligence capabilities, especially our intelligence about 
weapons of mass destruction.” 
(VOICE OVER) Bush said his government is determined to ensure American 
intelligence is “as accurate as possible for every challenge in the future”. Bush is 
scrambling to limit the political fallout from former chief US weapons inspector David 
Kay’s revelations that almost all the pre-war intelligence about Iraq’s alleged 
unconventional weapons was wrong. Colin Powell joined the president in defending his 
government’s case against Iraq. 
(BITE ID) COLIN POWELL US Secretary of State 
(SOUNDBITE) “I don’t think any apologies are necessary. As director Tenet said 
yesterday, when he prepared the intelligence estimate that was presented to the American 
Congress in the fall of 2002, it represented a solid body of advice, a solid body of 
information that had been collected by analysts and other sources... “ 
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(VOICE OVER) The US president gave the commission until the end of March, 
2005, to report back, meaning the results of the investigation will not be known until after 
the November election. [WRITER], CCTV 
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Story 3: (SUPER) NPC PREVIEW 
(SLUG) Wen Jiabao to deliver first gov’t work report 
(LEAD IN) In two days, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will deliver his annual 
government work report to the National People’s Congress. This will be his first since 
stepping into China’s top government post one year ago. The Chinese leader is expected 
to use the occasion to highlight the new government’s efforts to address the daily 
concerns of ordinary people. [WRITER] has more on the story. 
(VOICE OVER) For the past twelve months, the new generation of Chinese 
leaders have impressed observers with unprecedented care for the well-being citizens. 
(BITE ID) NORMAN BOTTORF APTN China 
(SOUNDBITE) (English) “ It was a difficult year for the leaders. In general, I 
think they handled very well.” 
(VOICE OVER) The difficult year began when the SARS outbreak erupted. 
Government officials spared no efforts to fight the SARS virus, making public safety the 
top priority. Meanwhile, migrant workers’ rights were highlighted as the State Council 
abolished the unpopular system of detention and repatriation. Addressing the plight of 
farmers, the government helped secure back pay from local employers. And in a change 
of attitude toward AIDS, the premier shook hands with AIDS patients. The past year also 
saw the new government’s firm determination to tackle an old problem - corruption. A 
total of thirteen ministerial and provincial-level officials were punished for graft and 
bribery. Commenting on the new government’s image, this Beijing resident says it’s 
practical and transparent. And this one says she’s impressed by the government’s populist 
approach to the life of ordinary people. [WRITER], CCTV 
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Story 4: (SUPER) SALON DU LIVRE 
(SLUG) Chinese books honored at major French fair 
(LEAD IN) France’s most important book fair has kicked off in the capital. The 
annual “Salon du Livre” is known as much for the number and diversity of the exhibits, 
as for its great success with the public. Each year, the salon focuses on a different 
country. This year, it’s China. Here’s [ZHUBIAN] with the details. 
(VOICE OVER) Chinese representatives attending the fair have brought with 
them about two thousand Chinese titles, selected from books published in the country 
over recent years. Among those selected, 70 have been translated into French and will be 
published in France with donations from China. The books fall into three categories -- 
“Old China, Colorful China and Modern China” -- and are expected to give French 
readers a comprehensive look at Chinese culture. China’s ambassador to France spoke 
highly of the book fair and thanked France for inviting China to be this year’s focus. 
(BITE ID) ZHAO JINJUN Chinese Ambassador to France 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “It’s a significant literary gathering in France. This is 
the first time China has been chosen as the country of honor. It’s also the first time 
Chinese literature has been made the theme of the great event. So it’s really a great honor 
for us.” 
(VOICE OVER) French President Jacques Chirac also attended the event. He 
showed great interest in the Chinese exhibits. Along with senior officials from China’s 
General Administration of Press and Publication and the Chinese ambassador to France, 
Chirac unveiled the Chinese books that will soon be published in his country. China’s 
participation in the salon is part of the cultural activities of the “China Culture Year” in 
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France. It is expected to pave the way for Chinese books to enter the mainstream in 
France as well as other European countries. [ZHUBIAN], CCTV 
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Story 5: (SUPER) SEMICONDUCTOR 
(SLUG) China to consult with US on semiconductor tax 
(LEAD IN) Officials said Friday that China has agreed to consult with the United 
States over the alleged “discriminatory” value-added tax on imported semiconducter 
chips. The US filed case with the World Trade Organization on March 18th, charging that 
China is using its tax code to unfairly treat American semiconductor makers. [FOREIGN 
EXPERT] has more. 
(VOICE OVER) China levies a 17 percent value-added tax on imported chips. 
Domestic producers also are subject to the tax but qualify for rebates of as much as 14 
percent. Some US manufacturers claim this is discriminatory to foreign firms. Last 
Thursday, the US administration called China’s tax policy on chips “discriminative” to 
US chip manufacturers, and requested consultation with China at the WTO. China 
communicated with the US side via its delegation at the World Trade Organization. The 
two sides will decide detailed arrangements of the consultation after negotiation. 
Meanwhile, commenting on the case, WTO chief spokesman Keith Rockwell said China 
is a good member of the WTO, and this dispute would not have any negative effect on 
China’s good standing as a member. He said the close attention being paid to this case is 
simply because it’s the first time China has been charged since its entry to the WTO in 
2001. Mr Rockwell said that with China ranking fifth on exports and sixth on imports in 
the world, it is not very surprising that China will have to face some trade disputes. He 
added that WTO members with similar trading volumes have faced charges like this on 
several occasions. The US, for example, has been charged 81 times, the European Union 
48 times, and Japan 13 times. [FOREIGN EXPERT], CCTV 
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1200 CCTV NEWS POST-RELAUNCH (SET 2) 
Copy Story 
Copy 1: [NO SUPER] 
(SLUG) Iraq welcomes new resolution 
(LEAD IN) Iraq has welcomed the unanimous adoption of the new resolution. 
Iraq’s representative told the UN Security Council that the presence of US-led forces 
relies on the request of the Iraqi government. Iraq also said it welcomed the assistance of 
any government willing to help with its reconstruction. (OUT) 
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Take Stories 
Take 1: (SUPER) HEAVY RAIN 
(SLUG) Heavy rains raise river levels 
(LEAD IN) Heavy rains may have brought a welcome end to high temperatures, 
but experts warn they’ve also swollen the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers to dangerously 
high levels. 
(TAKE VIDEO) In the southwestern city of Chongqing, water levels in the 
Yangtze have risen to their highest this year. The local government has started its early-
warning system, with 24-hour monitoring of major reservoirs and areas at risk of mud-
rock flows. The high-water season has also been declared on the Yellow River, where 
flood-control authorities are carefully managing key dams like the Xiaolangdi Project. 
(OUT) 
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Take 2: (SUPER) CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
(SLUG) Chemical weapons found in Iraq 
(LEAD IN) Meanwhile, Polish troops in Iraq have found artillery shells 
containing a deadly nerve agent. A spokesman said 17 Grad rockets and two mortar 
shells contained cyclosarin with US tests confirming that at least some testing positive for 
sarin gas. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The threat of weapons of mass destruction possessed by Saddam 
Hussein’s now toppled regime was the main justification used by Washington and its 
allies to go to war last year. But US-led occupying forces were only able to uncover a 
small amount of banned weaponry... until this Polish find. The army said they were most 
probably left-over from the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war. Iraq has admitted it produced 
cyclosarin munitions in the 1980s to fight Iran, but under UN resolutions was committed 
to destroying stocks and ceasing production after the 1991 Gulf War. (OUT) 
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Take 3: (SUPER) ATTACK THREAT 
(SLUG) Militants threaten Muslim nations (LEAD IN) In related news... An 
Islamist militant group has threatened to attack Muslim countries that agree to Saudi 
Arabia’s proposal to send troops to Iraq. 
(TAKE VIDEO) The statement was posted on a website Thursday. The identity of 
the organization hasn’t been verified, but it’s believed to have a similar name to one al-
Qaeda-linked group - the Islamic Tawhid - which, last week, threatened Italy and 
Australia if they refused to withdraw troops currently in Iraq. (OUT) 
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Take 4: [NO SUPER] 
(SLUG) Chinese, US presidents discuss Taiwan 
(LEAD IN) Hello and welcome to the news on CCTV International. I’m 
[ANCHOR] in Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao has spoken to US counterpart, 
George W. Bush, to discuss Sino-US relations and the Taiwan question. 
(TAKE VIDEO) In a phone call, Hu reiterated China’s position to never allow 
Taiwan’s independence, expressing hopes to solve the problem peacefully. Bush 
emphasized that a strong and prosperous China would be beneficial to bilateral relations, 
which the US is working to maintain. He said he understands China’s stance on Taiwan, 
pledging Washington’s continued commitment to the One China policy. (OUT) 
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Take 5: (SUPER) IRAN NUCLEAR 
(LEAD IN) Iran has resumed building centrifuges that Washington says are 
intended to enrich uranium to a weapons-grade level for use in atomic warheads. Iran’s 
decision backtracks from a pledge made in October to the European Union’s “big three” 
member states -- Britain, France and Germany -- to suspend all uranium enrichment-
related activities. 
(TAKE SOUNDBITE) 
(BITE ID) KAMAL KHARAZZI Iranian Foreign Minister 
(SOUNDBITE) (Farsi) “Based on our agreements in October, we have accepted 
suspending uranium enrichment and we are continuing that suspension based on our 
definition. We have not restarted enrichment. But we are not committed to our agreement 
in Brussels in October on halting building centrifuge parts because the three big 
European countries have failed to meet their commitments toward us. We said we could 
resume making centrifuges. We started building centrifuge parts at our factory after we 
took the decision.” (OUT) 
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Take 6: (SUPER) Beijing raises water prices 
(LEAD IN) The Beijing Municipal Government will again raise prices for water 
for industrial, urban and environmental purposes, while leaving prices for water used in 
agriculture unchanged. The new pricing system will come into effect on August the First. 
(TAKE VIDEO) Households in Beijing will have to pay an additional 0.8 yuan 
for every cubic meter of water used, that’s a 27-percent above current prices. The 
increase is 1.2 yuan for industrial consumers. Coupled with the pricing reform is a 
restrictive quota for corporate users. The price hike will only affect urban areas of 
Beijing, with the old system remaining unchanged in rural zones. (OUT) 
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Writer & Reporter Stories 
Story 1: (SUPER) IRAQ RESOLUTION 
(SLUG) Unanimous approval for revised resolution 
(LEAD IN) Following weeks of negotiations, the UN Security Council has 
unanimously endorsed a “sovereign interim government” in Iraq, and the formal transfer 
of sovereignty at the end of June. [WRITER] has more. 
(VOICE OVER) France and Germany dropped their objections after the 
resolution included a last-minute compromise giving Iraqi leaders control over the 
activities of their own troops and a say on “sensitive offensive operations” by the 
multinational force - such as the controversial siege of Fallujah. But the measure stops 
short of granting the Iraqis a veto over major US-led military operations. It authorizes the 
US-led multinational force to remain in Iraq to help ensure security but gives the Iraqi 
government the right to ask the force to leave at any time. Meantime the Iraqi forces will 
operate under the authority of the interim government and will ultimately assume 
responsibility for maintaining stability in Iraq. The resolution also gives a timetable for 
the formation of an elected Iraqi transitional government by December 31, 2005. The 
unanimous endorsement was warmly received by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
(BITE ID) KOFI ANNAN UN Secretary General 
(SOUNDBITE) English “ I believe it is a genuine expression of the will of the 
international community led by the Security Council to come together again after last 
year’s divisions and to help the Iraqi people take charge of their own political destiny.” 
(VOICE OVER) The resolution is expected to help patch up the deep divisions on 
Iraq, prompted by the US-led invasion which was opposed by major European nations 
and many other countries. [WRITER], CCTV 
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Story 2: (SLUG) Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
(LEAD IN) As the third round of six-party talks comes under world scrutiny, 
fresh discussion of nuclear non-proliferation has emerged once again. [ANCHOR] takes a 
closer look at the broader issue at stake. 
(VOICE OVER) (File in) Non-proliferation is an important part of international 
weaponry control and disarmament. It was initiated by the US-led developed countries. 
Its main target is the so-called axis of evil nations. In 1995, a US defense report targeted 
weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat to the US. The Bush administration 
further stressed the importance of non-proliferation. After 9/11,counter-proliferation and 
terrorism became the two pillars of US foreign policy. In December 2002, the White 
House announced the well-known policy of preemptive attacks to prevent nuclear 
proliferation. In 2003, US president George W. Bush advocated that all countries should 
join to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. 
(File out) 
(VOICE OVER) China published a white paper on non-proliferation policy and 
measures in 2003. China believes the purpose of non-proliferation is to safeguard world 
peace and promote common development. But the goal should be achieved through 
peaceful means. [ANCHOR] CCTV. 
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Story 3: (SUPER) CAR MARKET 
(SLUG) Auto market encounters cold winter 
(LEAD IN) After a two-year boom, China’s automobile market unexpectedly 
stalled in the second quarter of 2004. The soaring rise in car sales over the past two years 
has gone down from over 60 percent to less than 30 percent. Though various efforts have 
been made to revitalize the market, including massive price cuts, it seems consumers are 
still reluctant to commit to buying. Our reporter [REPORTER] takes a close look at 
what’s happening in the market, and the reasons behind it. 
(VOICE OVER) 37 degrees centigrade on a mid-summer’s day in Beijing. It’s the 
hottest time of the year in the capital. But Yayuncun automobile market, the largest in the 
city, is experiencing a cold winter, with no more than a dozen would-be car buyers 
browsing around inside. 
(BITE ID) LAO MA Beijing citizen 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “I’m just taking a look. Cars are already much cheaper. 
but...I’m just taking a look.” 
(VOICE OVER) Thousands of cars are quietly waiting in the complex for their 
new owners. And with few clients to attend to, the sales people are waiting even more 
quietly. Bulletins with announcement of price-cuts can be seen almost everywhere in the 
market. This young couple were the only customers to try a new car in the first hour after 
the market opened. 
(BITE ID) MA YI Car buyer 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “I can see the market is very quiet. The price is very 
low as well. But I am still not very sure if I should spend my money. I think most people 
would rather spend less money on a cheap car like this, not those luxury ones.” 
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(VOICE OVER) Figures from the State Information Center show that stocks of 
passenger cars manufactured in China in May reached over one million, the result of 
manufacturers’ overly optimistic expectations for this year’s market. 
(BITE ID) QIE XIAOGANG, Director Yayuncun Automobile Market 
Information Center 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “The market has been deteriorating since April, and 
now it has reached its lowest point. Yayuncun is a typical example in Beijing. According 
to our survey in ten other big cities, their situation is almost as bad.” 
(VOICE OVER) Just one month ago, the Beijing Car Expo seemed to have 
opened a new world for locals. And flexible controls on import permits led to the 
appearance of more cut-price foreign cars in China. But all these have failed to boost the 
market. Car dealers say that’s because people who are able to own cars have already 
managed to get what they want in the last two years. But economists have a different 
view. First, the macro-adjustment policy drawn up earlier this year seems to be working. 
Fixed asset investments have been limited. Overheated industries such as real estate and 
metallurgy have been reined in. Secondly, bank loans are proving difficult to obtain for 
would-be car buyers. Banks are becoming highly cautious in funding car buyers, as many 
of them have problems in paying their mortgage. And finally, consumers are waiting for 
the quota on imported cars to be removed next year. 
(BITE ID) XU ZIMING, Deputy Director State Information Center 
(SOUNDBITE) (Chinese) “Consumers are no longer as anxious as they were a 
few years ago. The situation may be a little better later this year if consumers recognize 
that there is much space for price cutting. But one thing is for sure, the car market has 
become a complete buyer’s market.” 
(STAND UP ID) [REPORTER] CCTV, Beijing 
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(STAND UP) Experts also admit that despite the stalling market, a large number 
of potential buyers still exists. Next week, top analysts will gather in Beijing to try and 
figure what will happen in the second half of the year. But no matter what the future 
holds, in a buyer’s market, manufacturers and dealers will have to take more of their 
clients’ interests into consideration. [REPORTER], CCTV. 
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Story 4: (SUPER) MOURNING CHILE 
(SLUG) Chile to re-evaluate embassy security 
(LEAD IN) Chile plans to revise security measures at its embassies overseas 
following Tuesday’s hostage crisis in Costa Rica, in which three Chilean diplomats were 
killed. Both countries have announced several days of mourning to remember the victims. 
[FOREIGN EXPERT] has more. 
(VOICE OVER) At a memorial service on Wednesday, Chilean President Ricardo 
Lagos said that security measures in each of the country’s embassies are being evaluated. 
He added that what happened was an isolated crisis, and not related to Costa Rica’s 
security policy. 
(BITE ID) RICARDO LAGOS Chilean President 
(SOUNDBITE) (Spanish) “These have been difficult hours for the country. The 
Chilean Embassy is part of our territory, it’s our home. But unfortunately, a tragic event 
took place there and as I said to the president of Costa Rica who called me, this event 
does not reflect on his country. Costa Rica is a tranquil country, and what happened is 
that a person lost control of his mental facilities.” 
(VOICE OVER) On Tuesday, a 54-year-old police officer who was in charge of 
the Chilean embassy security for more than 5 years took nine embassy employees 
hostage after learning he would be transferred. When police stormed the embassy 
building, he shot and killed three hostages before turning the gun on himself. Costa Rican 
police are facing growing criticism for their handling of the crisis. Critics say they should 
have continued negotiations with the policeman. The Chilean government has promised 
to pay for the victims’ family members to go claim their loved ones’ bodies. [FOREIGN 
EXPERT], CCTV 
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Story 5: (SUPER) AIRLINES COMPETE 
(SLUG) Foreign airlines vie for Chinese 
(LEAD IN) To business ... Chinese travelers with a yearning for seeing the sights 
of Europe will soon have more options. Beginning in September, many more Chinese 
citizens will be able to take trips to Europe. And the new vacation packages are attracting 
many foreign airline companies to compete for Chinese customers. Meanwhile, prices for 
European travel from China have been dropping lower and lower. [WRITER] has the 
details. 
(VOICE OVER) The power of China’s nearly 1.4 billion people has been making 
waves in the international business arena. The latest craze -- new travel opportunities for 
Chinese in Europe, has been creating a lot of buzz in the industry. Foreign airlines began 
competing for travelers one month before European access was opened. Royal Dutch 
Airlines struck first, promoting the first European package for Chinese customers. The 
package includes round-trip air tickets and hotel accommodations. Tourists can choose to 
stay in any one of several hundred hotels in 22 countries. 
(BITE ID) ZHANG PENG, Manager KLM Royal Dutch Airlines China office 
(SOUNDBITE) (C) “If tourists want to go to the Netherlands and then to France, 
we will give them a free air ticket from Amsterdam to Paris. And our prices for hotels are 
much cheaper compared to domestic airline companies. “ 
(VOICE OVER) Travelers hope packages such as this will usher in an 
unstoppable wave. Lufthansa Airlines charges prices of about 6330 yuan, that’s less than 
800 US dollars, for round trip tickets between China and Europe. But air flight prices by 
Chinese airlines for similar routes are higher, around 8000 yuan, or some 1000 US 
dollars. [WRITER] CCTV 
 548
Appendix 5: Test for inter-coder reliability 
 Topic Referred to Who speaks 
Story # M N1 N2 Result M N1 N2 Result M N1 N2 Result 
1 1 1 1  2 3 2  0 0 0  
2 1 1 1  2 3 2  0 0 0  
3 1 1 1  2 2 2  0 0 0  
4 1 1 1  4 4 4  0 0 0  
5 1 1 1  7 7 7  0 0 0  
6 1 1 1  3 7 5  0 0 0  
7 1 1 1  4 5 4  0 0 0  
8 0 1 1  10 10 15  0 0 0  
9 1 1 1  1 3 3  1 1 1  
10 0 1 1  3 4 4  1 1 1  
11 1 1 1  6 7 7  0 0 0  
12 1 1 1  7 11 8  1 2 2  
13 0 1 1  2 2 3  0 0 0  
14 0 1 1  4 6 5  0 0 0  
15 1 1 1  3 5 8  0 0 0  
16 1 1 1  9 9 10  0 0 0  
17 1 1 1  2 2 2  0 0 0  
18 1 1 1  2 4 3  0 0 0  
19 1 1 1  7 7 8  0 0 0  
20 1 1 1  4 4 9  1 1 1  
21 1 1 1  5 7 9  2 2 2  
22 1 1 1  10 10 11  1 1 1  
23 0 1 1  3 5 6  0 2 2  
24 0 1 1  17 19 18  2 2 3  
 18 24 24 0.75 119 146 155 0.79 9 12 13 0.72 
 
Holsti (1969 p. 140) formula: Reliability = 2M / (N1+N2) 
M = Number of coding decisions agreed on 
N1 = Number of coding decisions by Coder A 
N2 = Number of coding decisions by Coder B 
 
Test results: 
Topic = 0.75 
Referred to = 0.79 
Who speaks = 0.72 
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Appendix 6: IRB Consent Forms 
IRB # 2003-05-0026  
Informed Consent to Participate in Research 
The University of Texas at Austin 
I am asking you to take part in a research study of the news production process at 
CCTV-9, Beijing, PRC. This form provides you with information about the study. As the 
Principal Investigator, I shall describe this study to you and answer all of your questions. 
Please read the information below and ask questions about anything you don’t understand 
before deciding whether to take part. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can 
refuse to participate without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise 
entitled. 
Title of Research Study: News production at CCTV-9 and the globalization of 
China Central Television 
Principal Investigators: 
John Jirik, Ph.D. student 
Radio-Television-Film Dept., The University of Texas at Austin 
Tel. +1 (512) 471 4071 (Austin, TX, USA) 
Tel. +86 (0) 10 6849 8888 x63641 (Beijing, China) 
Professor Nikhil Sinha, Ph.D. 
Radio-Television-Film Dept., The University of Texas at Austin 
Tel. +1 (512) 475 9162. 
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The purpose of this research is to study the news production process at CCTV-9. 
As part of this study, about 20 media theorists, media managers, and media workers at 
CCTV-9 are being interviewed. 
I shall interview you now for an initial period of a maximum of 90 minutes. With 
your consent, I may ask for your further participation in the interview process at a later 
date. In this interview, I shall ask you questions about CCTV-9, and if appropriate, how 
you came to work here, and what has been your experience at CCTV-9. I may also ask 
you to comment on news and media developments in the People’s Republic of China, and 
how they relate to you and your work at CCTV-9. Any future interview will cover similar 
issues, in a manner to clarify questions I may have about the news production process at 
CCTV-9. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is little to no risk to you in taking part in this 
study. My primary concern is your confidentiality. Without your consent, you will not be 
identified by name in this research. If you wish me not to use your name in this study, 
please tell me now. 
Your privacy and the confidentiality of your research records will be protected by 
the following means: 
(a) The interview will be audio taped on a 90-minute audio cassette 
(b) The cassette will be numbered. No information identifying you will be visible 
on the cassette 
(c) The cassette will be kept in a secure place in my possession 
(d) As the principal investigator, I am only person who will listen to the recording 
(e) Unless you want me to return the cassette to you after I have transcribed it, I 
shall destroy the cassette immediately after I have transcribed it. 
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(f) The transcription of the recording will be numbered. Your name will not be 
put on the transcription 
During the interview, you may skip any question I ask if you do not wish to 
answer it. 
It will not cost you anything to take part in this study. 
You will not receive compensation for taking part in this study. 
The potential benefit to you or others taking part in this research is an improved 
understanding of the news production process at CCTV-9. 
Taking part in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to be in the 
study, and your refusal will not influence current or future relationships with The 
University of Texas at Austin and or CCTV-9. 
If you wish to stop taking part in this research, you may end this interview at any 
time, and withdraw your consent to all or part of its use. Throughout the study, I shall 
notify you of new information that may become available and that might affect your 
decision to remain in the study. I can be contacted in Beijing at +1 (0) 10 6849 8888 
x63641. 
In addition, if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, 
please contact Clarke A. Burnham, Ph.D., Chair, The University of Texas at Austin 
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects, +1 (512) 232 4383. 
Authorized persons from The University of Texas at Austin and the Institutional 
Review Board have the legal right to review your research records and will protect the 
confidentiality of those records to the extent permitted by law. Your research records will 
not be released without your consent unless required by law or a court order. 
If the results of this research are published or presented at scientific meetings, 
your identity will not be disclosed without your consent. 
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The researchers will not benefit from your participation in this study. 
If you wish to discuss any of the information above or have any questions about 
this interview and my research, please ask me now. 
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John Jirik, 博士生 
广播-电视-电影系，德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校 
电话：+86 (0) 10 6849 8888 x63641 






























如果您出于任何原因希望停止参与本研究课题，请致电：John Jirik +86 (0) 





















Appendix 7: CCTV-9 programs 
The following lists are taken verbatim from CCTV-9 promotional materials. List 
1 is a description of CCTV-9 programs prior to the May 3, 2004 relaunch. List 2 is a 
description of CCTV-9 programs after the relaunch. The only changes I have made to the 
lists are to organize them by production section, and in alphabetical order within each 
production section. 
LIST 1: CCTV-9 PROGRAMS BEFORE THE MAY 3, 2004 RELAUNCH 
News: 
• BIZ CHINA highlights the latest financial activities and market trends in China 
and how the Chinese economy interacts with global trade and finance. It is a 
specialist’s account of one of the world’s fastest developing economies. With BIZ 
CHINA, we mean business. 
• BUSINESS GUIDE is a program designed for those who want to do business in 
China. The 30-minute program introduces policies and regulations of the Chinese 
government on the economy as well as the investment environment in various 
parts of the country. It is a guide on where and how to invest in China. 
• CCTV NEWS is the channel’s news flagship. It is designed to update viewers on 
all the latest events happening in China and major international news. The 30-
minute show is compiled from a number of different sources: domestic and 
international reports by CCTV’s own news crews, local TV stations around 
China, other news organizations in the country as well as international news 
agencies. 
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• CHINA THIS WEEK is a weekly review of the main news over the past seven 
days. It is intended for people who have missed most or part of the news and want 
an overview of the news stories in the past week. 
• CULTURE EXPRESS is a daily magazine of news and information about China’s 
cultural scene. It showcases the colorful and diverse culture of modern China. The 
arts, fashion, changing lifestyle, CULTURE EXPRESS covers it all. Everyday on 
CCTV-9, CULTURE EXPRESS gives viewers a Chinese culture extravaganza.  
• FINANCIAL REVIEW is another program to serve the business people both in 
China and overseas. The half-hour show looks at movements on China’s financial 
markets. There are also interviews with financial analysts who give their take on 
market development and trends. 
• NEWS ASIA is dedicated to reporting the news in Asia. The 15-minute program 
keeps viewers abreast of what’s happening throughout this diverse continent. 
NEWS ASIA is comprehensive coverage of Asia by the people who know Asia 
best. 
• SPORTS SCENE updates viewers on the action on the sports arena. Everyday, it 
wraps up all the athletic events in China and throughout the world. It is where 
sports fans can catch up on their favorite games and players.  
• WORLD WIDE WATCH is a 30-minute international news program. It is how 
the world is looked at through Chinese eyes. By reporting major events happening 
around the globe, the program strives to give viewers a broader picture of the 
world today. It also offers a Chinese perspective on world events and issues 




• DIALOGE178 is a daily 30-minute talk show. It brings the movers and shakers, 
celebrities and specialists into the studio to express their opinions on current 
affairs and hot topics. It is a dialogue of different opinions and a public forum of 
free debates. 
• WORLD INSIGHT is a weekly program designed to give viewers insightful 
analysis on major international events and issues. It not only reviews historic 
moments and recaps the images that shape our world today, but also goes behind 
the stories, digs deep to what causes them and analyzes their potential impact.  
 
Features: 
• AROUND CHINA is a feature program showcasing the history, culture, 
landscapes and people of this vast country. It focuses on the everyday lives of 
ordinary people. It is a collaboration of CCTV-9 and hundreds of local TV 
stations in China.  
• CENTER STAGE  is a daily half-hour entertainment magazine show. It serves as 
a stage for the colorful Chinese performing arts. It not only showcases stage 
performances on stage, but also tells what’s happening off stage. CENTER 
STAGE is a platform for authentic Chinese arts.  
• CHINA TODAY is a weekly 30-minute program, documenting political reform 
and social evolution in a changing China. It offers a more in-depth look at major 
events and issues in the country. CHINA TODAY presents not only an ancient 
culture but also a country on the move.  
                                                 
178  I have left in spelling and grammatical errors as they occur in the originals, which were copy edited by 
one of the team of native English speakers employed by CCTV-9. 
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• CHINESE CIVILIZATION is a five minute short film slot introducing China’s 
enduring civilization. It helps viewers to better understand China’s history and 
culture.  
• DOCUMENTARY is a 30-minute program which broadcasts CCTV’s best-
produced documentaries. It records the historic events in China and relives some 
of the greatest moments in history.  
• NATURE AND SCIENCE is a report on the latest scientific achievements in 
China. It also deciphers the mysteries and laws in the fascinating natural world. 
NATURE AND SCIENCE helps discover the harmonious relationships between 
humanity and the environment. 
• REDISCOVERING CHINA gives a fresh look at China through non-Chinese 
eyes. Hosted by native English speakers, the program shows how they look at and 
understand what is happening in the country. It is a different account by people 
who are often fascinated by this ancient yet modern nation.  
• TRAVELOGUE takes viewers on a journey to some of the country’s best 
destinations. China’s sights and sounds come alive as our hosts guide you through 
the country’s diverse and beautiful landscapes, rich culture and history as well as 
hospitable people.  
 
Production House: 
• LEARN TO SPEAK CHINESE is the only educational program on CCTV-9. It is 
aimed at satisfying the increasing international demand for learning the Chinese 
language. LEARN TO SPEAK CHINESE is key to understanding the Chinese 
culture. 
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• SHANGHAI TODAY is a 15-minute program of news and information about 
China’s financial center and economic power house of Shanghai. It is produced 
by Shanghai TV and packaged by CCTV-9. 
 
LIST 2: CCTV-I PROGRAMS AFTER THE MAY 3, 2004 RELAUNCH 
News: 
• ASIA TODAY debuted on CCTV International on May 3, 2004. This 30-minute 
program airs three times a day and aims to keep viewers updated on news 
concerning Asia. Asia Today presents a comprehensive look at important issues 
on the continent in a manner that is objective and reflective of all perspectives. 
Information is useless without understanding, and understanding is what Asia 
Today provides. Joined by our CCTV correspondents based around the world, we 
report on Asia from the perspective of Asians. 
Not just events of the moment, but issues that affect our lives. 
Not just headlines, but the bottom line. 
Not just a perspective from a distance, but insights from the inside. 
• BIZ CHINA replaced Financial Report and has become CCTV International’s 
flagship business news program. Broadcast live from Beijing, Biz China delivers 
news, opinions and analysis six times a day, everyday. 
Biz China is made up of three significant components. First, up-to-date domestic 
and international financial and corporate news. Second, Biz China exclusive 
interviews featuring the insights, opinions, and forecasts of business insiders on 
the state of the economy, business trends, and industry analysis. And finally, our 
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Market Analysts provide a recap on the activities taking place in the financial 
markets around the world. 
If you want to witness China’s dramatic economic growth first hand, understand 
China’s business and industrial policies, and keep your finger firmly on the pulse 
of business trends in this dynamic environment, watch Biz China. 
• CCTV NEWS179 updates viewers on major events taking place around the world 
with an emphasis on events happening in China. Apart from being a bulletin of 
the latest world news, CCTV News is the prime source of information on the 
world’s most dynamic economy. CCTV International’s reporters cover China 
with timely, accurate and objective reports. 
CCTV news provides a first hand look at the news shaping China and the world. 
• CHINA THIS WEEK is a magazine show that offers an insightful summary on 
the stories of the past seven days. As part of CCTV International’s relaunch in 
May 3, 2004, China This Week has been given a fresh look with new content and 
a new format. 
Among the additions within the program is “Voices This Week” where viewers 
can listen to the headliners behind the headlines discussing issues relating to the 
Chinese mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. That’s not all. “People This 
Week” features top figures from the world of politics, sports, business and 
entertainment. China This Week’s focus remains “Top Story This Week” 
complimented by “In Brief This Week”. These two segments give the viewer a 
chance to catch up on all the essential China events the viewer may have missed 
                                                 
179  News Updates were produced by the CCTV News teams 
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during the week. And finally, with an eye on the future, experts offer their 
opinions on the issues that will shape the news of tomorrow. 
• CULTURE EXPRESS: The new and improved Culture Express is dedicated to 
giving viewers updated reports on Chinese cultural news and events. Each of the 
seven segments deals with a particular aspect of Chinese culture. 
“24/7” is a roundup review of the latest cultural NEWS; 
“Chopsticks” takes the viewer on a culinary odyssey around the country in search 
of Chinese DELICACIES; 
“The List” takes a look at the lives of outstanding PEOPLE in the arts; 
“China Cool” is the biggest attraction of our weekend programs and provides a 
stage to showcase Chinese traditional art forms and ethnic culture; and two newly 
established segments, “Spotlight” and “Celebrity Interview”, add a new star-
studded dimension to our program. 
In addition to being a melting pot of the traditional and the modern, as well as a 
bridge between the East and the West, Culture Express is also a trend-setter. 
• SPORTS SCENE is a daily 15-minute sports news program on CCTV 
International. The program brings a roundup of major sports stories taking place 
in China and around the world with a focus on domestic sporting events. 
Every Sunday, there is a 30-minute special edition of Sports Scene 180  (on 
Sundays, the program broadcast time begins 15 minutes earlier than weekday 
broadcasts). 
In addition to the latest sporting news, the weekend edition of Sports Scene 
includes a recap of the past week’s main stories and a profile of one of China’s 
                                                 
180 Sports Weekend 
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Olympic champions. With the Olympic Games coming to Beijing, China in 2008, 
Sports Scene will be playing an even more important role in keeping the world 
abreast of Olympic Games related developments in Beijing and China’s 
contributions to the world of sports. 
• WORLD WIDE WATCH is a 30-mintue program dedicated to reporting major 
international news and events. It is a daily roundup of world news with a Chinese 
perspective. Intended to give the viewer a balanced picture of today’s world, 
World Wide Watch is compiled from the rich resources of CCTV and other 
international agencies such as Reuters, AP and AVN. 
Twice a day, World Wide Watch not only covers major world events and issues, 
but also provides in-depth reports, background stories and expert analysis. In 
addition, the program gives extensive coverage on what’s happening in the 
developing world. 
World Wide Watch is CCTV International’s effort to add yet another source of 
information to the international information flow. 
 
Current Affairs: 
• DIALOGUE is one of the most acclaimed and influential programs on CCTV 
International. This 30 minute current affairs news magazine is an authoritative 
talk show designed to inform and educate viewers worldwide and influence 
decision makers in governments, businesses and academia. 
Dialogue provides fair and comprehensive analysis of current affairs within the 
framework of cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary comparisons. Chinese and 
foreign guests openly express their opinions on issues making headlines in China 
 564
and around the world. Through frank discussions, and sometimes heated debates, 
viewers are encouraged to reach their own conclusions. 
The knowledge, expertise, insight and candor of Dialogue’s guests are a 
significant component of the program. A sample of our guests include former 
U.S. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton; former U.N. Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali, the President of Yale University, Richard Levin; and 
world renowned Chinese film maker, Chen Kaige. 
The intelligence, sharp wit and depth of our anchors make up the other 
indispensable elements of Dialogue. Our Anchors are always willing and ready to 
ask the tough questions that are on the minds of our viewers. 
• WORLD INSIGHT is your first choice for in-depth stories about an emerging 
China and global change. Featuring analysis from leading scholars, World Insight 
brings you the story behind the news. For timely, thoughtful and provocative 
analysis of international affairs. 
World Insight is a must watch program for the intelligent viewer. Aimed at policy 
makers, business people and academics inside and outside China, World Insight 
aims to inform audience from a Chinese point of view. 
Focusing on major global events and Chinese foreign affairs, World Insight is an 
indispensable tool for people serious about China. 
 
Features: 
• AROUND CHINA is a television magazine program jointly produced by CCTV 
International and local TV stations across China. Around China introduces the 
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people, culture and economic development of various regions and ethnic minority 
groups of China to the world. 
Around China offers viewers glimpses of the beautiful scenery and rich cultural 
heritage of China, as well as the ever-changing lifestyle of the Chinese people as 
we embark onto the 21st century. 
• CENTRE STAGE is a 30 minute entertainment program that broadcasts every 
Saturday and Sunday on CCTV International. Centre Stage regards its target 
audience as art aficionados of the world and performing arts fans at home in 
China. The content of Centre Stage is composed of a wide range of performing 
arts, including Chinese folk songs, dance, opera, popular music, and the latest 
trends in the performing arts scene in China. 
Through years of research and experience, the team at Centre Stage has made 
successive changes to the program. The result is a unique style that combines 
visual appeal with informative content presented by hosts with rich personal 
understandings of the Chinese culture. Consequently, Centre Stage has been an 
exceptionally popular program since 1995. 
• CHINESE CIVILIZATION is a vivid presentation of the highlights of Chinese 
culture throughout her 5,000-year history. We bring to life the historical 
celebrities, historical sites, folk arts, literature, education, science and technology 
of mankind’s most enduring civilization. 
Chinese Civilization is an informative window on the nation aimed at overseas 
audiences. Short, though comprehensive in scope, each episode of Chinese 
Civilization is a finely made mini documentary, offering audiences a unique 
visual feast as well as information on almost all aspects of China’s cultural history 
in an accessible way. 
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Chinese Civilization is a five-minute program shown every weekday on CCTV 
International. 
• DOCUMENTARY: Shown daily on CCTV International, Documentary is a 30-
minute program that showcases the very best of Chinese documentaries. These 
documentaries provide a faithful record of the extraordinary undertakings by the 
Chinese people as we entered the contemporary era, with an emphasis on the 
period of reform that began in the late 70s. 
Presenting true stories of the lives, feelings, and ambitions of the Chinese people, 
Documentary consistently reveals the human values behind the stories which are 
readily accessible and comprehensible to viewers from other cultures. Containing 
both individual and serial programs, Documentary strives to select the finest 
documentaries on purely cinematic criteria: good storytelling, visual quality and 
professional production standards. While enabling the audience to appreciate the 
aesthetics of the documentary as an art form, Documentary is also a cultural 
experience that encourages viewers to ponder about the real stories taking place in 
China everyday. 
• NATURE AND SCIENCE is a report on the latest scientific achievements in 
China. It also deciphers the mysteries and laws in the fascinating natural world. 
NATURE AND SCIENCE helps discover the harmonious relationships between 
humanity and the environment.181 
• REDISCOVERING CHINA first aired five years ago and covers topics such as 
Chinese history, culture, and the everyday life of Chinese people. The main 
attraction of this show lies in the fact that China is seen from the perspective of a 
                                                 
181 The post-relaunch promotional material I used for this list did not include a description for Nature & 
Science, only the name and a photograph of the host, [name]. I have repeated the description in List 2 from 
List 1. 
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foreigner. Our hosts come to China from countries around the world and bring 
with them a diverse background bounded by love for China. 
In the last two years, Rediscovering China programs have received many awards. 
Recently, Rediscovering China featured a 24-part series on the Western China 
Development Project which won first prize for feature programs from CCTV. 
• TRAVELOGUE is a 30-minute travel show that brings incredible adventures to 
viewers at home in China and abroad. On each edition of Travelogue, acting as 
both tour guide and traveler, Liu Changying, Xiaolan, Yanling and Chenlei draw 
on their intimate knowledge of China to reveal the country’s enduring attractions. 
They go a long way to bring China’s people and places closer to you. 
Right now, Travelogue is the only English television travel show in China. 
• UP-CLOSE presents an entertaining yet thought provoking look into the lives of 
the extraordinary people you want to know as we march into the 21st century. 
Every Sunday, this 45-minute program features intimate conversations with 
distinguished guests. Up-Close focuses on their remarkable life stories, 
challenges, passions, failures and triumphs. These prominent guests are influential 
politicians, bold entrepreneurs, compassionate philanthropists, enlightened 
educators and glamorous celebrities. Regardless of age and nationality, whether 
male or female, all Up-Close guests share one common quality – they all have an 
inspirational and unforgettable story to share. 
The format and production scale of Up-Close is unparalleled at CCTV 
International. Up-Close is the only program at CCTV international to incorporate 
a live studio audience. Studio audience members are active contributors to the 
program through their interactions with the guest and host of Up-Close. 
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The host of Up-Close is Liu Feifei (Christina Lau). Born in China and raised in 
America, Liu Feifei is a true product of her cross-cultural upbringing. Her sharp 
wit and intellectual curiosity, together with her thoughtful nature and casual style, 
bring viewers worldwide the amazing stories behind fascinating People. 
 
Production House: 
• LEARN TO SPEAK CHINESE, a 15-minute program on CCTV International, is 
China’s only language teaching series broadcast worldwide. Starting from the 
early 90’s, seven series of Learn to Speak Chinese have been made, including 
Hello Beijing, International Business Chinese, Chinese 400, Kindergarten 
Chinese, After School Chinese and Communicate in Chinese. 
These programs not only aroused great interest among viewers to learn Chinese, 
but also popularized knowledge about the Chinese economy, culture, and tourism. 
Learn to Speak Chinese continues to playing an active role in helping the world 
learn more about China. Currently, the production team is busy preparing a new 
series to be titled “Travel in Chinese”. 
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Appendix 8: List of instructions and directives 




Guidelines for reporting on Hong Kong 
Only use government information and information ratified by the Hong Kong 
government when reporting on Hong Kong. Do not use information from any 
other source. 
 
2. 2004-04-26 (18) 
中华慈善总会主办的北京至西藏慈善宣传万里行 
中华慈善总会主办的北京至西藏慈善宣传万里行活动各栏新闻一律不发 
The China Charity Federation sponsored Beijing to Tibet charity publicity 
campaign. 
No news programs are to report on the China Charity Federation sponsored 
Beijing to Tibet charity publicity campaign. 
 
[The CCF is a non-governmental organization. Hence its activities draw attention 








There is a temporary injunction on reporting on the case of the lost jewelry in 
Shanghai, and on related police information. 
Do not show the Henan melon farmers. 
 
[The Shanghai jewelry story relates to the theft of about US 1 million dollars 
worth of jewelry on May 13, 2004 at the 44th Shanghai International Jewelry Fair 
(China Daily, 2004b).] 
 
4. 2004-07-09 (25) 
外交部通知 
任何档新闻不得播发有关部分民众到日本驻华使馆抗议之事。 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Notice 
No news is to broadcast anything about the protest at the Japanese Embassy. 
 
[Several dozen Chinese on July 9 2004 protested outside the Japanese Embassy in 
Beijing over Japanese exploration for oil in a disputed section of the East China 
sea (China Daily, 2004c).] 
 




Central directive: Concerning the story that “rising grain prices cause rising 
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student canteen prices” don’t stir things up. 
 






Oct 8, 19:20 telephone notice from the Chief Editor’s office, SARFT: Concerning 
the 55th anniversary of PRC, DPRK diplomatic relations, news reports must be 
appropriate: a summary report of the two country’s leaders exchange of 





Absolutely no reporting on the negative report on the Mengniu Diary Group 
Absolutely no reporting on the negative report on the Mengniu Diary Group 
 
[On October 8, 2004, the Mengniu Diary Group failed a Beijing government spot 
check for bacteria in its popsicle products in Beijing. Mengniu in 2004 was 
CCTV’s single biggest advertiser, buying 310 million yuan (USD 37.6 million) 
worth of air time at the annual advertising auction in November 2003 (Chou 









The latest notice from the CPD News Dept.: Concerning the incorrect reports by 
foreign media that “Zhao Ziyang has died,” the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
has answered reporters’ questions and clarified the matter. No domestic media 
(including internet portals, subsidiary publications) without exception are to 
report this story. 
 






Do not be fooled: 
Notice from the directors: Tomorrow is April Fool’s Day. Domestic and 









Order from Li Ting [Director, CCTV News Center]: The internal Xinhua Chinese 
special wire draft service can be used must be verified before use. This only 
concerns the overseas services. Domestic services in general should not use. 
 





Only Xinhua and People’s Daily can report on the clash between the Russian 
police and Chinese workers. No television station, channel or program is to report 
it. This is an official Ministry of Foreign Affairs notice. 
 
[On May 11, Russian police and Chinese construction workers clashed during a 
visa check in Irkutsk, Siberia (Interfax, 2005).] 
 







Notice from the leadership. On Chongqing Municipal Party Committee Member 
and Head of Publicity Dept., Zhang Zonghai, being found guilty of bribery in his 







Notice from the director: No news at all is to report on the story about collusion 
between the Chengdu Railway Station police and petty thieves. 
 




Central Director Wang notice: Today there is a temporary injunction on reporting 
on the Central State organs conservation activities. 
 







Top level directive 
Directive from above, July 6 “8am early news”, “News Half Hour” and all 30 
minute morning bulletins must repeat “Hu Jintao attends the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization Member Country Heads of State Meeting” (length 8 
minutes, 45 seconds). If there is a new dispatch concerning the president, put the 
latest information at the top of the bulletin, right after that run this piece. Don’t 
forget! 
 





Notice received from higher authorities: The video on Hu Jintao congratulating 
Ma Ying-jeou on his election [as Chairman of the Guomindang Party (KMT) in 
Taiwan], the 8am broadcast, take out the synopsis on Li Ruiying, insert a picture 







“The Tibetan Buddhist Grand Ordination Ceremony conducted in Hong Kong” 
broadcast on the evening news on the 17th can be shown in part on the 2200 
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broadcast. The remainder is not to be broadcast. Anybody disobeying this will be 
sacked!!! 
 





Do not air!! China rules out first use of nuclear weapons 
Xinhua notice: 
No programs are to use today’s Xinhua story “Li Zhaoxing stresses China no first 
use of nuclear weapons”!!! 
[The PRC’s Foreign Minister was apparently attempting to calm the waters after 
Zhu Chenghu, a major-general of the People’s Liberation Army and a professor at 
the PRC’s National Defense University, said the PRC might “respond with 
nuclear weapons” if attacked by the United States in any conflict over Taiwan and 
were prepared “for the destruction of all the cities east of Xi’an” in such a war 
(Yeh, 2005).] 
 
19. 2005-10-26 (32) 
关于禽流感的新闻，国外的咱跟着报，国内的少报。 









Basic idea: On the visit of Hu Jintao to the DPRK and Vietnam, this channel must 
fully cover the story, amply and in detail, do not leave anything out. 
 




CPD News Dept. Notice 
Do not report on the recent passage by the Seoul City Assembly of a draft 
resolution abolishing the “Islands Treaty.” 
Si Tao conveys Zhao Tai’s directive: Do not report on the challenge of Darwinian 
Theory by ethnic Chinese expert Xu Jinghua. 
 








SARFT General Editor’s Office 
Key notes on reporting Bird Flu: 
Reports must be accurate and appropriate. It is important to take the lead, 
disseminate knowledge, support the development of industry. Overall, lower the 
temperature, keep things under control, do not over do it. Do not put the [bird flu] 
stories at the top of the hour or as lead stories. Use science to popularize the issue. 
Any expert invited onto a talk show must be approved by the Agriculture and 
Health Ministries. Do not speculate about the possible future development of Bird 
Flu. Avoid causing social panic. 
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Dear [xxx], [xxx] 
Attached is a document outlining how to develop a News Desk which integrates the 
Assignment Desk into the news gathering and production operation, and gives the 
Assignment Desk the place in the News Desk and news operation envisaged by [News 
Corp. consultant] in his notes to [Controller] (to the best of my understanding). 
Best Rgds. 
John. 
CCTV-9 NEWS DESK 
INTRODUCTION 
The News Desk is the heart of the news operation. 
Currently, what we have at CCTV-9 is a strong news production system, a strong 
reporting team, but weak coordination of news gathering with production. 
The starting point to building the News Desk is to recognize that a) news 
gathering, and b) news production are separate but integrated parts of the news operation. 
On the news gathering side of the operation are the Reporting Group (led by 
[xxx]), and the Assignment Desk (led by [xxx]). 
On the news production side is [xxx]’s operation: CCTV News, WWW, CultX, 
Sports, BizChina, Asia Today, all of which are overseen by Producers, who report to the 
Senior Producer. 
The News Desk is the meeting point of these two structures. It is the place where 
a) news gathering, and b) news production meet. The News Desk is responsible for 
coordinating news gathering & news production, so that the needs of the shows and their 
producers are met. The CCTV News and WWW Producers are part of the News Desk. 
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The structure I lay out below recognizes 2 principles of news production at 
CCTV-9: 
a) A centralized and face-to-face structure is necessary for efficiency in news 
production of CCTV News and WWW. The News Desk is the nerve center of the news 
operation, coordinating news gathering, and news production of CCTV News and 
WWW, which are produced in 3 time blocs by 3 teams, each responsible to a Producer 
(currently called Chief Editor). 
b) A de-centralized production system is most efficient for producing news and 
Current Affairs programming other than CCTV News and WWW. This modular structure 
gives shows producers the autonomy they need to build cohesive news teams, responsible 
just for their own shows: CultX, Sports, BizChina, Asia Today, Current Affairs 
(Dialogue, World Insight, Up Close, China This Week). 
Finally, as China’s national and international English language broadcaster 
CCTV-9 has special responsibilities and characteristics. Therefore, the structure and 
functions of a News Desk cannot be imported from existing news organizations without 
some modification. But the key principle needs to be recognized: news operations 
require a nerve center, and that center is the News Desk. In what follows, I lay out a 
structure for a News Desk for CCTV-9, based on the principles of News Desks 
worldwide, but keeping in mind the special character of CCTV-9. 
COMPONENTS OF THE NEWS DESK 
Senior Producer’s Desk ([xxx]) 
[Deputy News Director] oversees news production and reports directly to [name] 
(New Director, CCTV-9) 
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Producer’s Desk 
The CCTV News and WWW Producers oversee production of CCTV News and 
WWW, and report to [Deputy News Director]. 
Assignment Desk 
The Assignment Desk has a range of news gathering and coordination functions. 
Its head is [xxx], who reports to [xxx]. The AD is the component currently not integrated 
into the desk. Below, I focus on the Assignment Desk as the missing component of the 
News Desk. 
Once the Assignment Desk is integrated into the News Desk, a cohesive, face-to-
face news gathering and news production coordination desk will exist at CCTV-9. 
THE ASSIGNMENT DESK (AD) 
“… great emphasis at CCTV International will be given to the worldwide 
“assignment desk” which must be created. This assignment desk will serve as the “heart” 
of CCTV International…” (source: News Corp. consultant in a note to the CCTV-9 
Controller) 
“The assignment desk is the nerve center of your newsroom. If it works well, 
things go smoothly. If not... Assignment editors are managers, and not just of 
information. They need to know how to manage people as well…” (source: 
http://www.newslab.org/resources/dothedesk.htm) 
“Assignment editors are the air traffic controllers of a newsroom. There is no 
glamour, no face time. But without them, newsrooms would certainly stumble…” 
(source: http://asoundidea.com/personal/OnAssignment.html) 
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“The assignment desk is also the place where story ideas come first, to be 
organized and arranged in calendars before each morning news meeting.” (source: 
http://www.wzzm13.com/news4.html) 
Functions of the Assignment Desk 
1) Long and short term story planning 
Short term story planning (news editing) 
The AD is responsible for ongoing news editing. It must be ‘on top’ of the news, 
24 hours a day, both domestically and internationally. The AD monitors all news sources 
and reports breaking and developing stories to the Reporting Group and Senior Producer 
(News), and Producers (CCTV News, WWW). 
(Show producers other than CCTV News and WWW are responsible for their 
own short term news planning. However, the AD must keep abreast of what all news 
shows are planning. And the AD can advise on stories it becomes aware of as part of its 
day-to-day responsibilities to CCTV News and WWW). 
The AD is also responsible for monitoring alerts and directives from within 
CCTV and from SARFT on news policy, and alerting producers to any information that 
affects their shows. 
Long term story planning (forward planning) 
The Planning Editor on the AD is responsible for recognizing future news events, 
and alerting the Reporting Group, and/or coordinating with the AD, Reporting Group and 
Senior Producer (News) the logistics of covering large scale and live events. 
(Show producers other than CCTV News and WWW are responsible for their 
own long term news planning. BUT the Planning Editor and AD must be aware of the 
long term plans of all news and Current Affairs shows, and can advise any news or 
 583
Current Affairs show on stories they become aware of as part of their responsibility to 
CCTV News and WWW). 
(The Reporting Group also develops its own stories, as part of forward planning. 
The AD keeps a log of these stories for production purposes.) 
2) Tracking sources & material 
The AD must liaise with the Reporting Group and keep track of all sources and 
source material for CCTV-9 both domestically and internationally. 
The AD must know where crews are. 
The AD must work to obtain coverage from third parties (other CCTV sections, 
other TV channels in China, overseas sources, APTN, Reuters, etc.) for CCTV News and 
WWW.  
The AD can provide limited assistance to shows other than CCTV News, WWW 
to track down guests, interviews, coverage, etc. But this task is primarily that of the show 
producers. 
3) Technical coordination 
The AD coordinates all technical efforts required to transmit material to and from 
Beijing,  
domestically and internationally. 
Structure of the AD component of the News Desk 
Personnel 
Head of the Assignment Desk & Planning Editor 
The Head of the Assignment Desk is a Senior Producer ([xxx]). She oversees the 
work of the desk and is at the same level as the Senior Producer, News ([xxx]), and 
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Senior Producer, Reporting Group ([xxx]). All three Senior Producers report to [xxx] 
(News Director). [xxx] is also Planning Editor, responsible for long term story planning. 
The importance of this position cannot be overstated. As [News Corp. consultant] notes: 
“The key is the futures editor. The key is that you have someone thinking about 
tomorrow. Because when you have someone thinking about tomorrow, you all of a 
sudden start to transform your news organization from a broadcasting one to a gathering 
one” (personal communication to the author). 
Duty News Editor (DNE) 
The Duty News Editors ([xxx] et al) are the absolute heart and soul of the 
rolling news operation at CCTV-9. Sometimes called ‘Assignment Editors,’ they have 
to become the one-stop shop for the entire news operation, aware of what news is 
happening, what is about to happen, and on top of all the logistics of coverage, so that the 
producers’ needs are served for CCTV News and WWW. In addition, the DNEs have a 
secondary responsibility to coordinate with other news shows and provide limited support 
to their operations. 
Producer (ad hoc position) 
For the purpose of getting the AD running, an ad-hoc position should be created 
that Jirik will fill. He will work with the AD personnel, the Senior Producers (News, 
Reporting Group), and Producers (CCTV News, WWW) to get the News Desk 
functioning. Once the News Desk is running, this position will be abolished, or converted 
to a second DNE position. 
NEWS DESK HORIZONTAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER SECTIONS 
The primary responsibility of the News Desk is to news, and the primary 
responsibility of the Assignment Desk within the News Desk is to CCTV News and 
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WWW. However the News Desk is also the heart of CCTV-9. Why is this? Because, if 
CCTV-9 is to be a news channel, and not a broadcaster, priority in editorial and 
production must go to the news. If this is the direction the channel takes, the News Desk 
will have the authority, backed by the News Director, to make alterations to the broadcast 
schedule for worthy breaking and developing stories, live events, pressers, etc. 
In addition to its responsibilities to news, the Assignment Desk also has a special 
responsibility to coordinate with Current Affairs programming (Dialogue, World Insight, 
China This Week, Up Close) to ensure both news and Current Affairs are on the same 
page, sharing resources and communicating with one another at all times. 
NEWS DESK RELATIONS WITH MANAGEMENT 
The News Desk heads ([xxx] – News, [xxx] – AD) report to [xxx], who reports to 
[Controller]. 
THE LOCATION AND LAYOUT OF THE NEWS DESK 
Location 
“Location, location, location. The News Desk should be in a central location in 
the newsroom, so everyone can hear and see what’s going on. KCRA in Sacramento 
recently removed a glass wall that separated the desk from producers.” (source: 
http://www.newslab.org/resources/desktips.htm) 
This is exactly the challenge facing CCTV-9, to bring the News Desk together, 
and make it visible to the production staff. 
In order to be visible, the CCTV-9 News Desk should be in an open space. The 
best space available is the space currently occupied by the Producers’ (Chief Editors’) 
office and the Sobey technicians’ office. The walls between the corridor to these two 
offices and the wall dividing them should be removed (assuming they are not load 
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bearing walls) to make space to create the News Desk and make the News Desk visible to 
the Newsroom. 
Whether CCTV-9 can create a successful News Desk depends largely on the 
location, and creating a cohesive and face-to-face news gathering, coordination and 
production space. 
Layout 
The News Desk itself should be six large desks arranged back to back in the 
layout below: 
Basic features: 
1) Each of the six desks should have: 
a) an Internet access computer 
b) a Sobey editing computer 
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c) a phone (with International lines on all if possible) 
d) the Sobey computer system will also support a channel wide intranet, which 
will be created as part of the creation of the News Desk. The CCTV-9 intranet will 
become the most important information sharing space in the channel 
e) the monitors need to be flat screen and the boxes able to fit beneath the desks 
f) choosing the right desks is very important. 
2) The ‘spare’ desk could be a second DNE position (M-F daytime) for a news 
researcher/editor or it could give the Producers a desk to work at during their handover. If 
it really is ‘spare,’ it will provide a space for the Controller, News Director, directors, 
writers, reporters, etc. to visit and discuss News Desk issues with the desk. It will also 
provide an extra work station for big story days. And it will be a place for the Assignment 
Desk technical coordinator to sit when necessary. 
3) The left wall has small flat monitors. Beneath the monitors are cupboards for 
newspaper, magazines, etc. On top of the cupboard are the fax and printer, dictionaries 
etc. 
4) The back wall has small flat monitors – CCTV, APTN, Reuters, BBC, etc. and 
a large white board. Above the monitors and white board is a row of clocks – Beijing 
Time, GMT, Delhi, New York, London, Cairo, Santiago, etc. 
5) The Sobey technicians will keep two desks backing onto the wall with the 
sound booth behind it. The current third desk on that wall, and right hand desk will 
become the monitoring station for the CCTV News and WWW Producer to check tapes, 
etc. 
6) We should also consider whether to cut the glass wall between the newsroom 
and corridor to waist height to facilitate communication. 
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NEWS DESK SCHEDULE 
The News Desk schedule recognizes that: 
a) most news is planned 
b) the focus of CCTV news gathering should be China stories first. 
c) that most China stories happen during the working week 
d) that for planning purposes daytimes, weekdays are the busiest times for getting 
access to news makers in China. 
e) the evening and midnight DNEs will be responsible for liaising with European 
and American entities. 
Senior Producer: [xxx] (M-F daytime) 
Head of the Assignment Desk: [xxx] (M-F daytime) 
DNEs: 4 DNEs are needed to provide a 24 x 7 x 365 rotation (except for 0000 – 0800 
Saturday, which is ‘dead time.’). 
DNE Rotation 
 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
0800 a a a a a a a 
1600 c c c d d d d 
0000 b b b b b Empty c 
        
0800 b b b b b b b 
1600 d d d a a a a 
0000 c c c c c Empty d 
        
0800 c c c c c c c 
1600 a a a b b b b 
0000 d d d d d Empty a 
        
0800 d d d d d d d 
1600 b b b c c c c 
0000 a a a a a Empty b 
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CCTV News, WWW Producers (TBA) (24 x 7 x 365 rotation) 
Ad hoc Producer: Jirik (M-F daytime) 
WHAT THE NEWS DESK DOES NOT DO 
a) The CCTV News and WWW producer are part of the News Desk. Apart from 
these two shows, the News Desk does not do news planning and news editing for any 
news shows. It is up to the producers of CultX, Sports, BizChina to news edit and 
produce these shows. The News Desk can alert producers of other shows to stories, but is 
not responsible for missed stories. 
b) The CCTV News and WWW Producer does not screen tapes for any show 
except CCTV News and WWW. All tape screening prior to airing for other shows is done 
by the producers of those shows. 
c) The News Desk does not do the work of the producers of Current Affairs. The 
News Desk does coordinate with Current Affairs (Dialogue, World Insight, China This 
Week, Up Close) to provide some support as needed. 
d) The News Desk does not micro-manage the work of the Reporting Group. The 
key to the success of the Reporting Group is the balance between autonomy to develop 
their own stories, and responsibility to the AD and Senior Producer (News) to do stories 
suggested by the latter with the agreement of the Senior Producer (Reporting Group) 
FINAL NOTES ON BUILDING A BETTER NEWS DESK 
(Adapted from ‘Six Tips for a Better Assignment Desk by Deborah Potter & 
http://www.newslab.org/articles/deskbuild.htm) 
1. Find the right people 
Desk people have to be experienced people, who are journalists first. 
2. Give the desk authority 
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To meet the challenges of the desk, Desk Editors (the generic term for anybody 
who works on the News Desk) need both management support and the authority to act 
quickly. This suggests a newsroom structure in which the Head of the Assignment Desk 
([name]) and Senior Producer (News) are equal second in the table of organization, right 
behind the News Director ([name]). This tells everyone in the newsroom that the desk is 
about making decisions, not just relaying them. 
Once the hierarchy is established, the News Director needs to let the desk do its 
job. “The hardest thing for me to do as a news director when there’s breaking news going 
on is to step back and leave the desk alone,” says KHWB-TV, Houston, News Director 
Joe Nolan. To thrive on the desk, he says, you need a tough hide. You also need people 
skills. That means treating everyone with respect, and establishing a mutual sense of 
trust. Desk Editors without that kind of background can pick it up on the job, with 
management support.  
3. Encourage communication 
A News Desk that communicates early, often, and with everyone stands the best 
chance of success.  
4. Make the News Desk accessible 
The physical layout of the newsroom can help or hinder communication. Bill 
Carey, news director at WXYZ-TV in Detroit, likes having the News Desk in the center 
of the newsroom so everyone can see and hear what’s going on. “I like it when they stand 
up and shout,” he says. 
5. Think ahead 
A good News Desk is always ahead of the story, proactive and never simply 
reacting. 
6. Don’t micro-manage. 
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The News Director does not do the job of the News Desk. And the News Desk 
does not do the work of the newsroom (directors, writers, copy editors, political editors), 
other news sections and Current Affairs. 
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Appendix 10: Examples of story types 
Example of copy story 
Date aired: August 2, 2004 
[slug] HK gov’t clarifies political position 
[lead in] (COPY) Welcome back. The Hong Kong S-A-R government says any 
debate about the region’s political system, including the method of choosing the chief 
executive and the Legislative Council, should be confined to the framework of the Basic 
Law of Hong Kong. An S-A-R government spokesman said on Sunday, that under the 
Basic Law, the SAR has a high degree of autonomy and enjoys executive, legislative and 
independent judicial power. He said the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress has the right to interpret the Basic Law. And added Hong Kong has no right to 
decide on any changes to its political system. The spokesman said the NPC makes 
decisions in line with Hong Kong’s reality and for the benefit of the region’s people. 
 
Example of take story 
Date aired: July 28, 2004 
[slug] Chinese boat rescues Senegal sailors 
[lead in] A Chinese fishing boat has rescued the crew of a Senegal cargo vessel 
that went down in the sea near Gambia on Monday, carrying 970 tons of cement. (TAKE 
MAP) All 13 sailors on board were rescued by a passing Chinese fishing boat, belonging 
to the Nantong distant water fishery company. The Senegal Marine Economy Ministry 




Example of writer story 
Date aired: February 1, 2004 
[super] MIDEAST WALL 
[slug] Palestinians urge UN court to rule on barrier 
[lead in] The Palestinian Authority says it has submitted a formal affidavit to the 
International Court of Justice supporting its right to rule on the legality of a huge barrier 
Israel is building in the West Bank. This comes in the face of Israeli, US, and British 
opposition to such hearings at The Hague-based UN court. [Writer] has the details. 
[voice over] After every Palestinian suicide bombing, the wall that Israel is 
building to seal itself off from the West Bank grows more popular with its leaders. But 
Palestinians say the barrier is an Apartheid Wall designed to seal a permanent hold on 
land Israel has occupied since the 1967 Middle East war. 
[super] NABIL ABU RDAINAH Senior Advisor to Yasser Arafat 
[Sound bite] [English] “According to the law and according to the laws, and the 
international law ,this is an illegal action and we urge the court and we urge all the 
countries to do all their best in order to protect the Palestinians’ rights and to protect 
Palestinians’ land.” 
[voice over] The tribunal in The Hague will begin deliberations late this month in 
response to a UN General Assembly request to rule whether Israel is legally obliged to 
tear down the barrier. The court has authorized the Arab League to take part in the 
proceedings in support of the Palestinians. But America, Israel’s closest ally, filed its 
argument on Friday saying the World Court is not the proper forum to decide the legality 
of the barrier. London also has handed a statement protesting a hearing on the barrier held 
without Israel’s agreement. [Writer], CCTV. 
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Appendix 11: Copy editor productivity 
To develop the index of copy editor productivity, I used the shifts worked in 
August 2005 by all the copy editors who were on foreign expert contracts and attached to 
the newsroom. Using rundowns of all the bulletins handled by those foreign experts that 
month, including during shifts worked in other news sections such as Culture Express, 
Sports Scene and Biz China, I counted how many of each type of bulletin element each 
copy editor had handled during the month. 
Because the different bulletin elements were of different lengths, each element 
was weighted according to a scale developed by calculating from the scripts used for the 
survey of content what each element was worth with a copy story arbitrarily weighted at 
one as a reference point, since a copy story was the shortest story form. 
The relative weighting of different elements was derived by developing an 
average duration for the different elements used in the survey of content. However, I only 
had durations from the survey of content for the following general news elements: 
headlines, copy, take and (writer or reporter) stories. All other elements were given a 
weighting in terms of general news elements (for which I had accurate average durations) 
that were approximately of equal length. I estimated length by counting lines of script in 
most cases, and by timing stories in the case of World Insight and a series of 30 minute 
feature stories the foreign experts were copy editing at the time). Although using 
approximations introduced an element of arbitrariness into development of the index, the 
relatively small percentage of elements (9%) that I did not have accurate average 
durations for compared to those for which I did (91%) gave me confidence that any 
distortion was relatively minor. 
The following table shows the index components and their relative weighting: 
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Section Bulletin element Average duration 
(mm:ss) 
Relative weighting 
General News Breaking news  as for Story (3.65) 
 Coming up next  as for Copy (1.00) 
 Copy 00.30 1.00 
 Headlines 00.29 0.95 
 Studio interview 
questions 
 2.00 * 
 Lead out  as for Copy (1.00) 
 News bar  as for Story (3.65) 
 News in brief  as for Story (3.65) 
 Promo  as for Copy (1.00) 
 Story (writer or reporter) 01.51 3.65 
 Take 00.46 1.52 
    
Biz China BC Markets  as for Story (3.65) 
 BC Story  as for story (3.65) 
 BC Take  as for Take (1.52) 
    
China This Week CTW Headlines  as for Headlines (0.95) 
 CTW Story  as for Story (3.65) 
    
China Today CT News in brief  as for Story (3.65) 
 CT Story  as for Story (3.65) 
 CT Take  as for Take (1.52) 
    
Culture Express CE Countdown  as for Story (3.65) 
 CE Culture briefs  as for Story (3.65) 
 CE Style Watch  as for Story (3.65) 
 CE The List  as for Story (3.65) 
 CE Spotlight  as for Story (3.65) 
 CE 24/7  as for Story (3.65) 
    
Dialogue DL Story  as for Story (3.65) 
    
Sports Scene SS Sports briefs  as for Story (3.65) 
    
    
World Insight WI Headlines  as for headlines (0.95) 
 WI Story 8.00 ** 15.82 
    
Special Feature Story 24.00 *** 48.00 
Table 14: Weighting of stories used for copy editor comparison 
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* Studio interviews usually had three questions. I estimated their relative weight to 
be somewhat more than a ‘take’ story and somewhat less than a story. However as 
interview questions comprised less than 1 percent of the total story elements, 
whatever miscalculation is factored into a relative weighting of 2.00 is unlikely to 
distort the overall picture to any great degree. 
** I copy edited World Insight almost exclusively. Each 30 minute bulletin had three 
stories. Six minutes was reserved for filler, including the headlines. 
***  Each feature story was for a half hour bulletin. I calculated 24.00 minutes with six 
minutes of filler and rounded the relative weighting to 48.00 with reference to a 
World Insight story at one third the length. Again, like studio interview questions, 
the feature stories were an almost negligible proportion of the overall workload. 
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Appendix 12: Illustration of the copy editing process 














Appendix 13: Tsunami emails 
Email 1: From John Jirik to CCTV-9 Senior Management 
Sent: December 31, 2004, 23:04 
To: [Senior Producer, News], [Deputy Controller, Head of News] 
Subject: News Bar, sensitivity of stories 
Cc: [Senior management][Outside consultant] 
Pro: [X], [Y] 
Cc: [Senior management][Outside consultant] 
Ex: Jirik 
Three things: 
a) I suggest you consider reviving the news bar on all newscasts while the special 
focus on the tsunami continues. This will allow you to report headlines on the stories, we 
will be otherwise missing. As one TV critic in the US pointed out on the weekend (he 
was talking about blanket US coverage of the tsunami), over 100,000 civilians died in 
Iraq in 2004, but not much of their story got into the news with the focus on US military 
operations and insurgent attacks. So, even with a focus on the tsunami, using the news 
bar to cover other stories might help to provide balanced coverage. 
b) [Head of the Foreign Experts] sent the following to the foreign experts on 
Saturday, as part of a note that [Senior Producer, News] asked him to send following the 
producers’ meeting on Saturday: 
“Since the crisis is so close to China and involves countries that are so 
geographically and politically interrelated to China in Asia, the Zhubians have  also been 
asked to take extra special care regarding the Tsunami-related stories, staying vigilant 
and sensitive (including politically) to the crisis situation.” 
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I honestly think we would serve the Chinese government, people, and our viewers 
best if we do not politicize this story. For example, on Saturday evening, Japan 
announced it would provide 500 million USD in aid, the single biggest donation by any 
country by far (the US is second with 350 million), raising the total of donations by over 
25% from 1.36 to 1.86 billion dollars. However, when I suggested this was a significant 
new element to the aid story, I was asked whether it was on Xinhua. We did not report it 
on 2300, or Sunday 0000. Did Xinhua ever report it? And why do we have to wait? If 
Xinhua did not report it, then shame on Xinhua too. 
Finding the right balance between reporting the facts, and focusing on the Chinese 
angle -- what China is doing for victims -- is important to doing this story right. The fact 
is that China will do a lot, but it will not be able to do as much as some other countries, 
regions, etc. That does not diminish China’s contribution in any way. BUT, if we are to 
report the Tsunami story accurately, we should be accurate about who is doing what, and 
what is happening where. 
c) Even a week after the disaster, we are still competing inside the channel, and 
little sense of coordinated coverage is emerging. For example, last week, when I alerted 
World Wide Watch that Asia Today had a phoner, and that they should talk to Asia 
Today about doing it for WWW and repeating it on Asia Today, I was later told Asia 
Today was unhappy that they did not have the phoner exclusive. 
On Saturday, I recommended to [senior management] that whenever you have a 
good phoner, whether from your own correspondent, a stringer, official, Reuters, etc. try 
to use it at least twice. And if it is for WWW, then it should be repeated on Asia Today 
and 2100. This is normal practise for BBC, CNN. And, it does not diminish the impact of 
the phoner to repeat it. 
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In addition, I spoke with [senior management] on Saturday about the phoners, and 
we agreed they should not be repeated ‘as live.’ I.e. They should be repeated with a lead-
in that makes clear it is recorded. We did this with [A]’s Reuters phoner that he gave 
[anchor] Saturday on WWW and repeated it on 2100, using [anchor]’s voice as is. It 
made it easier to edit, and worked very well. [zhubian] or [director] can show you the 
video and how it worked. Please see the story for a model lead in and lead out (for some 
reason the lead out was not read out on air). 
On the issue of CCTV-9 programs competing with one another. I suggest you 
seriously think about how to limit this to how and where it is appropriate. It is great that 
producers are wanting to do their best for their show, but it must not be at the expense of 
the channel as a whole. The channel will be stronger for developing synergies, and 
cooperating internally, sharing resources and shows helping one another out. Competition 
is healthy, to a degree, but when it is dysfunctional to the overall development of the 




Email 2: From CCTV-9 Senior Management in response to my email. I have only 
included here the first few lines of the reply, which included the original email (above) 
verbatim in its entirety and was sent to the news management team and head of features. 
From: [Senior management] 
Date: Jan 01, 2005, 07:06:17 PM 
To: John Jirik; [Deputy Controller, Head of News]; [zhubian], [zhubian], [Deputy 
Controller, Head of Features], [Chief Chinese anchors], [zhubian], [zhubian] 
Subject: Re: News Bar, sensitivity of stories 
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Hi John, 
I fully agree with you. I’ve forwarded your email to all the producers. We can re-
impose the News Bar today. 
[Senior management] 
--- John Jirik <john@jirik.com> wrote: 
> Pro: [X], [Y] 
> Cc: [Senior management][Outside consultant] 
> Ex: Jirik 
>  
> Three things… 
 
Email 3: my response after watching two more bulletins. 
Sent: January 1, 2005, 21:51 
To: [Senior management], [Head of the Assignment Desk], [Senior Producer, 
News], [Deputy Controller, Head of News] 
Subject: CCTV News Mon 0000 
Cc: [Outside consultant] 
Bcc: [Head of the Foreign Experts] 
As a ‘loyal’ viewer of CCTV-9, at this point I am kind of confused.  
I’ve just watched two more news bulletins, and the news is coming across to me 
not as news, but as a kind of ‘China promotion.’ 
I said WWW Dec 2 was a credit to all, but CCTV News is falling far short of 
what viewers should be able to expect. 
The tsunami story is about the countries, and peoples affected. One element of 
this story is China’s contribution to the aid effort: the facts - 60 million USD + several 
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emergency teams. 60 mln USD is 3% of the total. As a foreigner -- the target audience for 
this channel -- I would like to know where the other 97% is coming from, what other 
countries are doing, etc. The bulk of the emergency work is being handled by local 
agencies, international agencies like the UN and Red Cross. The United States is 
supplying aircraft, other countries are supplying all kinds of aid, material and personnel. I 
would like to know about all this, so that I can put in context China’s valuable 
contribution. 
AVN, and the video agencies APTN and Reuters are pouring out material. Where 
is this material? Where is the story -- the incredible international relief effort, and the real 
situation on the ground? 
CCTV-9 is not doing anybody a service by putting out a kind of news that distorts 
the picture -- by including some facts but ignoring many others -- in the interests of 
promoting China. Any person in a tsunami-affected area, who sees our news would 
probably be saddened at the self promotion China is doing, via CCTV-9, and probably 
angry that China is using this tragedy to promote itself. To my mind, we will lose viewers 
and friends in the Asian region, not gain them, with this kind of coverage. Outside the 
affected area, I think viewers are probably just watching and scratching their heads in a 
kind of sad bemusement. 
I said in my email to [senior management] yesterday, I honestly think we would 
best serve the Chinese government, people, and our viewers if we do not politicize this 
story. Most of what I saw on CCTV News on Dec. 2 at 2100 and Dec. 3 at 0000 was 
nothing but the politicization of this story. IF you want people to respect China, the 
Chinese government, the Chinese people, and CCTV News on CCTV-9, then please, just 






Appendix 14: World Insight team & 2005 award 
Illustration 18: World Insight on the web, 
showing the anchor and the production 
team.182
                                                 
182 Source: http://english.cctv.com/program/WorldInsightold/01/index.shtml. Accessed February 28, 2006. 
 
 608
Illustration 19: 2005 CCTV 
Outstanding Team Award for World 
Insight183 
 
                                                 
183 Source: http://english.cctv.com/program/worldinsight/20060309/100690.shtml. Accessed February 28, 2006. 
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Appendix 15: AIDS Report 
Script #1: Submitted by the reporter for copy editing (reproduced here as 
submitted) 
Super: Changes of Wenlou--- two sides of one coin 
Lead-in: In recent years, Wenlou village, of Shangcai county in central China’s 
Henan Province has hit headlines of worldwide media. The village has AIDS patients in 
nearly every household. Since early this year, changes are taking place in the village as 
the government is sending work team  there to help the fight against the disease. In our 
first story of AIDS REPORT, our reporter [name] brings you the latest changes in the 
village, and finds out that villagers are hoping the government dose more to help them.   
Voice-over:  
This is Wenlou in the past,  
and this is Wenlou today. 
At the entrance of the village, HIV/AIDS patients are organized to practice 
dancing. Officials say this activity can help them rebuild confidence of life. The Chinese 
government set the goal to build Five basic infrastructure project to every AIDS affected 
village in Henan. They include: one paved road, a well, a school, a clinic and an 
orphanage. Wenlou village also build one cultural entertainment house and headquarters 
for the village committee. One village head released that these infrastructure costs some 
ten million yuan.  
SUPER: WU XIULI 
       Villager, Wenlou 
SOUNDBITES(c): “I like these changes, and happy to see the new roads and 
clinics in the village.” (01-16-58-4) 
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SUPER: Villager, Wenlou 
Soundbites: (C): “It’s good to led officials live with us, otherwise who will build 
these new buildings for us ?” (01:00:36-3) 
Voice-over:  
One key person to help all these changes is Chen ‘Ruijin, a 55 year old official 
from the provincial health bureau. Chen Ruijin has been staying in the village and be 
neighbors of HIV/AIDS sufferers for the past three months. Most of his time was spent in 
strengthening infrastructure to fight the disease. He is among one of the 76 government 
officials from central Henan Province to have been dispatched to work in the most 
seriously affected villages three months ago.  
Chen’s top pride was the enlargement of village clinic. He says that his function 
was to make it a reality and supervise free medial treatment to AIDS carriers in Wenlou. 
SUEPR: CHEN RUIJIN 
       Former Provincial Health Official 
Soundbites(C): “ These infrastructure has played key role to increase villagers’ 
desire for a better life. “ (00:56:37-3) 
Voice-over:   
Chen said he knows AIDS sufferers pains better now, their problems had long 
been ignored. So he is trying to help them.  
But not all of the villagers are satisfied with the changes. Some are asking for 
more.  
(Picture: One villager came up to quarrel with Chen Ruijin….) 
This lady may be an extreme case, but she is not alone in her desperation. 
Behind the beautiful picture of the village are the unpleasant images. Most 
villagers are still living in dilapidated houses, their pocket is as empty as before.  
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Cheng Yansheng and her wife Wei Pan are both HIV patients. Five years ago, 
Cheng began to show symptom of the disease. Today, their income solely depends on 
farming. But with poor health, live is difficult for them.  
SUPER: CHENG YANGSHENG 
       Villager, Wenlou 
Soundbite: “If they give money to us, we will spend it quickly. They should help 
us in farming. “ 
(01:30:07-3) 
VOICE-OVER: 
This old lady said she lost all of her four sons in three years. All of them died of 
AIDS because of blood contraindication.  
SUPER: Villager 
SOUNDBITE: “ There are too many poor villagers here, I’m being 
neglected.”(01:36:51-3) 
VOICE-OVER:  
Villagers say county officials once told them in April that those with full-blown 
AIDS would get 300 yuan a month to buy medicine, and the less seriously ill would get 
100 yuan. But none of the villagers we interviewed have received any money.  What 
they’ve got was only 50 yuan funding from the government last year, and a bunch of 
flour.  
The provincial government said that it has earmarked over 30(80?) million yuan, 
or some 3.6(9.6) million US dollars, to finance building of the facilities. Villagers say 
building roads and expanding clinics are good, but what they need most is to improve 
their lives.  
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36- year old Meng Jieshi says the clinics in the village is vital, but it’s waste of 
money to build such a nice headquarters for the village committee. What they need most 
is the direct financial assistance to their lives. 
SUPER : MENG JIESHI 
        Villager 
SOUNDBITE: “Nothing changes here. There are so many AIDS patients, so we 
have to rely on ourselves. Only the government can not help, and we don’t have 
guarantee for our livelihood. 
(01:37:45) 
Voice-over: 
He hopes the officials can help to establish a business in the village that can 
accommodate all patients, and let them work and make a living by their own hands. Only 
giving money can not solve their problem.  
In Central China, there are many other villages, that their AIDS situation is as 
serious as Wenlou, but they have not received as much funding as Wenlou dose. 
Stand-up: “ To she its reputation as a notorious AIDS village, officials in Wenlou 
are trying to recreate it as a pioneer in the fight against AIDS. But villagers here continue 




Script #2 Copy edited version of Script #1 
 




WENLOU CHANGE OF 
FOCUS SHOT 
This is Wenlou, a village in Henan Province that has come 
to symbolize China’s struggle with AIDS. 
GVs VILLAGE SHOTS One way or another, the disease has affected every family 
here. 
MEDIUM VARIOUS OF 
VILLAGERS 
Many people are HIV positive. Some have lost family 
members. All of them have lost friends. 
WIDESHOT OF CHEN, 
OR SHOTS FROM 
WCH’S TAPE 
Recognizing the extent of the tragedy, in 2003 the 
provincial government sent 76 officials to the worst affected 
areas. 
MEDIUM OR CLOSEUP 
OF CHEN 
Chen Ruijin was one of them. He is now responsible for 
overseeing AIDS related projects in the village.  
CLINIC, HOPEFULLY 
WITH CHEN 
Under Chen’s direction, a new clinic has been built. 
SUPER (CHEN RUIJIN) SUPER: CHEN RUIJIN 
Former Provincial Health Official 
BITE (CHEN) 
(00:56:37-3) 
“Infrastructure projects like this are playing a key role in 
increasing the desire of the villagers for a better life.” 
CLINIC SHOTS //  The provincial government set itself the goal of providing 
each AIDS affected village in Henan with five basic needs: 
a paved road, a well, a school, an orphanage and a clinic. 
SCHOOL 
CONSTRUCTION 
Construction of the school is well underway. Local officials 
say the government could spend as much as a million 
dollars renovating the village. 
DANCING ON STREET This brand new road used to be a dirt track. On the day we 
visited, the villagers were celebrating the opening of the 
new clinic. 
DANCING Most of these young women are HIV positive. But now 
many feel they have been given a new lease on life. 
  
SUPER (WU XIULI) SUPER: WU XIULI 
(01-16-58-4) “I like these changes, and happy to see the new roads and 
clinics in the village.” 
SUPER (VILLAGER) SUPER: VILLAGER 
(01:00:36-3) “It’s good to have the officials here. Otherwise, who will 





But not everyone is happy.  
NATSOT ARGUMENT NATSOT 
ARGUMENT SHOTS This woman argues with Chen, telling him as an official you 
have to take better care of them. They are arguing over the 
new houses and who should get them first. 
 It’s not an easy choice. The village is extremely poor, and 
much work still needs to be done. 
 Cheng Yansheng and his wife Wei Pan are both HIV 
positive. They caught the disease selling blood in the 1990s. 
 Now they are growing weaker. But they have no-one to help 
them on the land. 
 It’s a common story here. This old woman lost all four sons 
to AIDS, all from blood farming.  
 Villagers agree that the new clinic and other projects are 
necessary. But they feel more could be done.  
SUPER: MENG JIESHI SUPER: MENG JIESHI 
(01:37:45) “There are so many AIDS patients, that we have only 
ourselves to rely on.” 
 Meng Jieshi believes the next step for Wenlou should be a 
business, something the villagers feel is their own, a way 
forward that will help them better help themselves. 
 The government has allocated 10 million dollars to fight 
AIDS in Henan. But the changes in Wenlou can only be the 
beginning. 
SUPER: [name] SUPER: [name of reporter] 
STANDUP “To shed its reputation as a notorious AIDS village, officials 
in Wenlou are trying to recreate it as a pioneer in the fight 
against AIDS. But villagers here continue to die, and they 
are demanding the government does more to help them. Han 
Bin, CCTV, Henan Province.” 
====== 










Appendix 16: Countries in the news 
The following table shows the countries in the 1200 News pre- and post-relaunch. 
A country was counted as in the news if the country itself was mentioned or a province 
(state) or city within the country. The column ‘Explanation’ is used only to clarify 
ambiguity in the rationale for the allocation of a particular country to a particular region, 
or in the case of Taiwan, its inclusion as a country. The CIA World Factbook184 was used 
a starting point for the definition of regions. 
 
 Pre-relaunch Post-relaunch 
Algeria Chad 
Angola Congo 















Haiti Costa Rica 
Jamaica Cuba 
Mexico Dominican Republic 
 El Salvador 
Central America 
 Mexico 
Central Asia  Kyrgyzstan 
 Kazakhstan  
 Tajikistan 
                                                 









Georgia European Union 
Germany France 
Great Britain Georgia 
Ireland Germany 






































Canada Canada North America 





North East Asia 
  
Australia Australia Oceania 
New Zealand New Zealand 
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